
Class 

Book _ 



COPYRlGHr DEPOSIT 



SEA POWER 

IN 

AMERICAN HISTORY 




Courtesy of New York Shipbuilding Corporati( 

THE MERCHANTMAN TUCKAHOE 

Launched practically completed as seen in the illustration in twenty-seven days 

from the laying of her keel in the yards of the New York Shipbuilding Corporation 



SEA POWER 

IN 

AMERICAN HISTORY 

THE INFLUENCE OF THE NAVY 
AND THE MERCHANT MARINE 
UPON AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT 

BY 

HERMAN F. KRAFFT 

AND ' 

WALTER B. NORRIS 

Associate Professors, United States Naval Academy 

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 

REAR-ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. BENSON, U.S.N. 

(retired) 

Chief of Naval Operations during the World War 

Chairman, United States Shipping Upard 

ILLUSTRATED 




NEW YORK 

THE CENTURY CO. 

1920 






Cc^yright, 1920,by 
The Centuey Co. 



DEC -I iS20 



g)CU604393 



'-»>v^<i \ 



PREFACE 

The term "sea power," though not invented by Admiral 
Mahan in his "The Influence of Sea Power upon History," 
owes its wide use to him, and no writer since his day has 
been able to do much more than follow in his footsteps. 
But though Admiral Mahan constantly discussed the influ- 
ence of sea power upon American history, and even dealt 
exhaustively with some periods, he never incorporated those 
ideas in a single volume. If the present book, therefore, in 
its endeavor to express succinctly many of these same views 
seems to echo Mahan 's pages, it is only because later writ- 
ers can do little more than repeat the words of America's 
— and the world's — foremost historian of the sea. 

The greater need, however, in a history of sea power 
for the average reader, is to connect the sea and the naval 
and commercial contests which have been waged upon 
its waters, with the political and military movements with 
which they were contemporary. The authors have there- 
fore consistently tried to keep before the reader some idea 
of what was going on upon the land while military and 
commercial navies were active upon the ocean highways. 

In their treatment of purely naval matters the authors 
have aimed to strike a happy mean between those naval 
histories, which relate simply the traditions and stirring in- 
cidents of our maritime wars, and those rather professional 
discussions of strategy and tactics which can be understood 
and appreciated only by naval officers, — both neglect to 
place in true perspective the far-reaching and decisive in- 
fluence of sea power upon the history of the American 
Continent. The authors have not forgotten heroic deeds 



vi PREFACE 

but they have tried to assign a larger place to those silent 
and unspectacular forces in American life and character 
which have sprung from the nation's mercantile and mili- 
tary fleets. If the reader thus finds that more space has 
been devoted to the participation of the French Navy 
in the Revolutionary struggle than to the sea fights of Paul 
Jones, or if he notes that more details are given of the 
progress of the blockade of the South in the Civil War than 
to Gushing 's daring expedition against the Alhemarle, it 
is because in the results achieved the former forces stand 
higher. 

The authors, however, have not neglected the human 
side, for men are, after all, the final factors in history. 
Such personalities as Paul Jones, Stephen Decatur, David 
Porter, John Ericsson, David G. Farragut, and Alfred T. 
Mahan have had more weight in determining the course 
of sea power than the ships or guns which they commanded 
or constructed. The authors have, accordingly, in sepa- 
rate biographical sketches, endeavored to trace the personal 
influence on sea power and national ideals of some of the 
great masters of seafaring and sea warfare. 

The merchant marine, though usually recognized as a 
vital element in sea power, has rarely been given much at- 
tention in histories of that subject. It is coming to be un- 
derstood, however, that it has been an important influence 
in our national life and a force to be reckoned with in 
history. With the revival in the last few years of an 
American high-seas merchant fleet, it is peculiarly appro- 
priate that the large part which this peaceful branch of sea 
power has played in our history should be given recognition. 
If from the pages of this volume the importance of sea 
power in both its military and commercial aspects is made 
clearer to the American citizen of to-day, such a result will 
furnish the authors satisfaction and reward. 



PREFACE vii 

For assistance in securing historical material and illus- 
trations the authors wish to record their special obligations 
and thanks to the authorities of the Library and Depart- 
ment of English of the Naval Academy, the New York 
Public Library, and the Bureau of "War Records and 
Library of the Navy Department. Without their assist- 
ance and that of many others the present work would 
have been impossible. 



INTRODUCTION 

The authors of "Sea Power in American History" have 
realized the desirability of, if not the absolute necessity for, 
a work that would breathe the spirit of the present, and 
at the same time bring out the strong points emphasized 
by recent events, especially the World War, in this all- 
important question of sea power. The authors have been 
most happy in giving proper weight and emphasis to each 
phase of the subject. 

Without going too much into detail, sufficient is said to 
trace out and connect up into one continuous story the 
rise, development, and present condition of both branches 
of sea power, commercial and naval. The authors have 
shown how mutually dependent each is upon the other. 
They show how, after commerce had been developed on 
the sea, it became necessary to have an organized fighting 
force or navy to protect commerce, and then the further 
development of naval strength to repel invasion by enemy 
naval force, or the destruction of one's commerce on the 
high sea by enemy naval vessels. They show how exchange 
of commodities was followed by interchange of ideas, modi- 
fication of customs, habits, etc., the discovery, settlement, 
and development of new lands through commercial enter- 
prises seeking new fields and ne<v markets. 

It has been said that men will not go to sea unless actually 
pushed into the sea. Careful analysis of the periods of 
our merchant marine will show that at each period in our 
history in which we paid particular attention to our mer- 



X INTRODUCTION 

chant marine, our internal conditions were such as to en- 
courage effort on the sea, even if a trend seaward was not 
absolutely necessary at the moment. For example, prior to 
the war of 1861-65 our western country was beset by the 
Indians; there were many hardships tc be encountered 
by those daring the wilderness. While there was a good 
market abroad, and remembering the success of the past 
in human enterprise on the sea, our people along the 
eastern coast, yielding to the lure of the sea, rather than 
to the hardships of the West and the wilderness, took to 
the sea and built up that wonderful merchant marine that 
was the pride of our country and the envy of the world 
in 1861. The destruction of this splendid fleet during the 
Civil War, the production of a restless, and at the same 
time more or less daring spirit during this war, impelled 
many of our men to wander into the far West just after the 
war, and the great success that attended their efforts in- 
duced others to follow, so that the attraction was away 
from rather than toward the sea. 

Throughout the book the authors bring out the signifi- 
cance of our merchant marine's development. It struck 
me perhaps with greater force because as Chairman of 
the United States Shipping Board I have had close con- 
tact with our present peace fleet and the many problems 
attending the rehabilitation of our merchant marine. 
"Sea Power in American History" points out this fact: 
Before the War of Independence we had a merchant marine 
second to Great Britain's, and before the War of 1812 and 
the Civil War, we had a commerce equal to Britain's. In 
other words, in three different periods of our history we 
possessed a large merchant marine that was a source of 
vast wealth to our people. In all three of these periods 
of our history our navy was at a very low ebb. The 
authors in dwelling upon this in Chapter VI state : * ' Dur- 



INTRODUCTION xi 

ing the decade before 1812, when the war was plainly ap- 
proaching, Congress appropriated money for two new 
brigs and two sloops-of-war to protect a conunerce as great 
as England's, — as if a city, growing from one hundred 
thousand to two hundred thousand, added four policemen 
to its force." The navy, I think, should exist for the na- 
tion 's commerce, so as to protect it and make safe the ave- 
nues of trade. Of course a sea-going marine provides ship- 
building and engineering plants, skilled artisans and sea- 
men, all of which contribute to the creating and maintain- 
ing of the navy. But we must not therefore regard the 
merchant marine as existing only for this purpose. 

In the spring of 1917, faced by the necessity of having 
"ships, more ships and MOKE SHIPS" to transport troops 
and supplies overseas, America engaged in the most stu- 
pendous ship-building in the history of the world. That 
huge machine, stretching out to every part of our land, 
which was then set in motion has not ceased its work. Had 
we attempted suddenly to stop it with the signing of the 
Armistice, untold hardship to the workmen of this count rj- 
would have been the result. Only a short time ago the 
whirl of this machine was heard all over the face of the 
globe as a world's record in ship-launching was broken by 
the launching from Hog Island of seven ships in one day. 
More tonnage was flung into the Delaware from one ship- 
yard in one day upon this occasion than our merchant 
marine could show had been added to it in thirty days dur- 
ing the pre-war time through the output of all our yards. 
When this war program is completed we shall have con- 
structed more than two thousand modern type ships. 

Once more we are in a position to take our rightful place 
among the maritime powers of the world. The World 
War eliminated one of the leading maritime powers and 
gave us our chance to rehabilitate ourselves as a maritime 



lii INTRODUCTION 

nation. Not by choice but forced by national emergency, 
we are to-day in possession of sufficient ships again to re- 
sume the proud position we had prior to the Civil War, 
when this nation played a leading role among the sea 
powers. We should be governed by the lessons pointed out 
by the authors of "Sea Power in American History," 
Acquainting ourselves with the historical development of 
our navy and merchant marine should renew our faith 
in America's ability again to sail the seven seas as of old 
when our clipper-ships had no peers. 

The Congress of the United States in the closing hours 
of the sixty-sixth session passed the Merchant Marine Act 
of 1920. This splendid piece of constructive legislation was 
the result of non-partizan effort. By it the United States 
Shipping Board is vested with vast powers. By this Act 
Congress has given the Shipping Board all necessary power 
to develop a permanent and efficient merchant marine, and 
at the same time protect it against the unfair practices of 
other nations. The spirit of the Act is so American that 
I shall refresh your minds by quoting from its preamble, 
which reads in part: 

That it is necessary for the national defense and for the proper 
growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United 
States shall have a merchant marine of the best equipped and 
most suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater por- 
tion of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary 
in time of war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned 
and operated privately by citizens of the United States; and it 
is herebj' declared to be the policy of the United States to do 
whatever may be necessary to develop and encourage the main- 
tenance of such a merchant marine, and, in so far as may not 
be inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, the United 
States Shipping Board shall, in the disposition of vessels and 
shipping property as hereafter provided, in the making of rules 
and regulations, and in the administration of the shipping laws 



INTRODUCTION xiii 

keep always in view this purpose and object as the primary 
end to be attained. 

Every man, woman, and child should study this legisla- 
tive measure which again makes possible a permanent 
American Merchant Marine worthy of our pride. It should 
kindle anew a belief in our power to come back upon the 
seas. All over the world our ships now reach, and Ameri- 
can vessels are being placed in established trade routes as 
quickly as possible consistent with good business judg- 
ment. We are spreading the products of our country so 
that all seaports will have their just share of the overseas 
trade. 

"We have made it our policy to establish shipping con- 
cerns in all ports so that products raised or manufactured 
near those ports will have sufficient tonnage to take care 
of their transportation. This natural flow of commerce 
will provide cheaper and quicker transportation than is 
now so often the case, when goods are sent over a long rail 
haul to a few important shipping centers before being put 
aboard vessels for overseas shipment. Some of the trade 
routes will, of course, not pay at first, but it is necessary 
under the present law to operate vessels in these routes 
until they do pay or after a fair trial prove to be too un- 
profitable to maintain. 

Our merchant marine will be established permanently 
through the private ownership of the vessels now the pro- 
perty of the United States. And the law of the land so 
directs the sale of the ships as soon as practicable, con- 
sistent with good business methods, to individuals or ship- 
ping companies who intend to operate them on established 
trade routes. 

Every collateral activity necessary for the efficient and 
satisfactory functioning of a merchant marine has been 



xiv INTRODUCTION 

established ; such as an American Classification Bureau, an 
American Bureau of Survey to supervise repairs, and an 
American Marine Insurance Syndicate, in which all Ameri- 
can vessels can be amply and properly insured, thus ren- 
dering our merchant marine independent of foreign aids 
in any particular. 

"Sea Power in American History" is a theme that should 
stir every patriotic American. It is timely, now that all 
eyes are turned toward the capture of world markets. In 
the race for trade, let us not forget that a merchant marine 
is as necessary for the national defense as it is to take care 
of the proper growth of our foreign and domestic com- 
merce. Therefore it is our solemn duty to do everything 
possible to build up this merchant marine. Paradoxical as 
it may seem, it is notwithstanding the truth that when all 
is said and done we are not nearly so dependent upon a 
successful merchant marine as other nations. But we 
must have a sufficient number of merchant ships to meet 
emergencies when they arise and to carry on our normal 
trade. 

Recently a determined drive began in the public press 
against Section 28 of the new Merchant Marine Act. The 
discriminatory features of that section of the law are not 
intended as a club over foreign competitors. The sec- 
tion is there merely as a means to force our competitors 
in international trade to play the game fairly. It is our 
intention to play fair. The least we may expect is that 
our competitors will follow suit. Once and for all it should 
be understood that America no longer proposes to stand 
for discriminations against her ships. It would be a sorry 
day for this country should the time ever come when the 
fact that a ship floated our flag would automatically bar it 
from securing a fair chance to acquire a foothold in the 
commerce-carrying business of the world. We have in 



INTRODUCTION rv 

Section 28 a remedy for just such a contingency, and should 
the time ever arrive that made it necessary to put it into 
effect, uo foreign influence should be allowed to sway us 
in our decision to act. 

The authors of this book make another point clear. It 
is this: Though at times, during the last hundred years, 
Great Britain and the United States have had serious dif- 
ferences, these have always been settled by peaceful means, 
England's support of President Monroe a century ago, her 
willingness to settle the Canadian border disputes by diplo- 
macy and arbitration, her final refusal to join Napoleon III 
in the intervention against the Union, her cooperation with 
our Secretary of State, John Hay, in regard to the Panama 
Canal and the Open Door in China, are evidences of her 
good will in the past — a good will that has again been 
shown by her splendid service for human liberty in the 
late war. The century of peace between the two great 
branches of the Anglo-Saxon race is full of good omen for 
the future. 

The authors of *'Sea Power in American History" in 
their biographical chapters on men like John Paul Jones, 
Stephen Decatur, David Porter, Fulton and Ericsson, Far- 
ragut and Mahan, have furnished most useful lessons, les- 
sons that should prove of special value at this time to the 
young Americans entering our navy and merchant marine. 
These young men are to visit all parts of the world, they 
are to be the sample of American manhood, character, 
energy, and integrity exhibited to the people at large 
of foreign countries, and by their actions will all of their 
fellow citizens be judged. From them will all foreigners 
get their impression of our country. Hence the great 
responsibility resting upon our young Americans engaging 
in a seafaring life, either in the navy or the merchant serv- 
ice. For this reason, the special attention given in this 



xvi INTRODUCTION 

book to character makes it of unusual value and interest at 
this time. 

The history of the American Navy and the American 
Merchant Marine shows that some of the finest types of 
American character have been produced there. These men 
were not dreamers with word or pen. They were strong, 
active men who participated in the serious things of life 
and had experienced all its hardships and temptations, yet 
they show most of all an even balance of character. They 
were not prone to fly off on a tangent due to a single idea, 
but faced facts four square and arrived at sound conclu- 
sions that endure. The men of the navy and the merchant 
marine labor far from the view of their countrymen, 
especially in times of peace. And the best appreciation of 
their labors which the patriotic American can show is to 
read and become familiar with their work, so as to know 
of their sacrifices and appreciate what part in the country's 
development is due to their efforts. 

The naval officer is not, as popularly supposed, a fire- 
eater, but is often from his wide experience in the world 
an earnest advocate and a diligent worker for international 
friendship. He is, like the upholders of law and order 
everywhere, more anxious to prevent trouble than to pro- 
mote it. 

The lesson of all naval history, as of all history, is that 
men more than materials accomplish results. If America 
of this generation wishes to achieve success upon the seas it 
must produce men who have the vision to discover what is 
necessary and how it can be achieved. It must produce 
men who have the same genius for seafaring and all the 
maritime occupations connected with it as had the men of 
the earlier periods when the American flag was found flying 
upon ships in every port. 

History that is worth while, historv^ that is reliable and 



INTRODUCTION xvii 

inspiring, is always the record of men of character, loyalty, 
and self-sacrifice for country and mankind. In no profes- 
sion is the importance of character more forcibly exempli- 
fied than in the seafaring life. Careful study of the naval 
heroes of the past who have accomplished constructive and 
lasting results for the good of mankind shows that they 
have not, as a rule, been men of genius, but men of strong 
character, loyalty, and true patriotism. Such men as Sir 
John Jervis (Earl St. Vincent) in the British Navy and 
Farragut in the American Navy have been, during my 
forty-seven years of active naval life, the ideals towards 
which I have striven. 

W. H. Benson. 
Washington, D. C, 
July 29, 1920. 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Preface v 

Introduction ix 

By Admiral William S. Benson, U. S. N. (Retired) 

CHAPTEB 

I British Sea Power Wins an Empire in America 3 

II The Defeat of British Sea Power Gives Amer- 
ica Independence 16 

III Paul Jones, the Genius of Revolutionary Sea 

Power 35 

IV The Rise of Commercial Sea Power in America 

During the Napoleonic Wars 49 

V American Naval Power Reborn 69 

VI Sea Power Dominates the War of 1812 ... 92 

VII Commercial Blockade and Commerce-Raiding as 

Weapons of Sea Power 100 

VIII Sea Power on the Great Lakes 123 

IX Lake Champlain the Decisive Theater of Amer- 
ican Sea Power 137 

X Decatur the Popular Idol of Sea Power . . . 150 

XI David Porter — the Personification of Ameri- 
canism AT Sea 160 

XII Sea Power Aids National Expansion .... 172 

XIII The Climax of American Achievement with 

Wood and Sail 181 

XIV Fulton and Ericsson in America Revolution- 

ize the Sea Power of the World .... 195 

XV The Blockade a Decisive Instrument of Sea 

Power in the Civil War 211 

xix 



XX CONTENTS 

CHAPTEE PAGE 

XVI The Monitor Establishes Union Control op 

THE Sea 224 

XVII Confederate Sea Power Strikes a Deadly Blow 

AT THE American Merchant Marine . . . 239 

XVIII Sea Power Splits the Confederacy in Two . . 255 

XIX Sea Power at Mobile Bay 270 

XX David Glasgow Farragut 283 

XXI Mahan Revolutionizes the World's Conception 

OF Sea Power 297 

XXII Sea Power in the Pacific 308 

XXIII Sea Power Makes the Panama Canal Possible 324 

XXIV American Sea Power in the World War . . . 344 
Index 363 



ILLUSTRATIONS 



PLATES 



The Merchantman Tuckahoe Frontispiece 



TACINO 
PAGE 



First Page of a Contemporary Copy of Cromwell's Naviga- 
tion Act of 1651 8 

Commission of Paul Jones to the Providence 9 

Medal Awarded by Congress to Paul Jones for His Victory 

Over the Serapis 9 

Types of "Warships a Hundred Years Ago 72 

Perry's Flag at the Battle of Lake Erie 73 

Stephen Decatur 156 

David Porter 157 

The American Clipper Westward Ho 192 

Types of Naval Vessels in 1852 193 

Log of the Monitor 233 

The Monitor Showing Dents Made by the Merrimac's Guns 236 

One of Porter's Mortar Scliooners at New Orleans . . . 237 

Farragut and Drayton on Board the Hartford .... 276 

The First Battleship to Pass Through the Panama Canal . 277 

Half a Million Horse Power in Destroyer Boilers . . . 352 

An Airplane View of Hog Island Shipyard 353 

MAPS AND DIAGRAMS 

PAGB 

North America Before 1783 11 

The Water Route from Montreal to New York .... 24 

European Cruises of Paul Jones 40 

The Capture of the Serapis by the Bonhomme JRichard . . 43 

A Century in Naval Construction 55 

zxi 



xxii ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

Tlie Development of the Merchant Marine 64 

Harbor of Tripoli 86 

Theatre of Operations— War of 1812 96 

Actions on the High Seas in the War of 1812 106 

Frigate Actions in the War of 1812 Ill 

The Battle of Lake Erie Showing the Decisive Manoeuver of 

the Niagara 133 

Macdonougli's Method of Winding Ship 145 

A Century of Naval Ordnance 152 

Porter's Cruise in the Essex 164 

Principal Routes for Sailing Vessels 184 

The Ironclad Monitor Proposed to Napoleon III by John 

Ericsson in 1854 209 

The Southern States Showing Railroads Existing in 1860 and 

Routes for Blockade Running 215 

Hampton Roads Showing Location of Fight Between Moni- 
tor and Merrimac 235 

Cruise of the Alabama 1862-1864 245 

Naval Operations in the Mississippi Valley 257 

The Mouths of the Mississippi 261 

The Battle of Mobile Bay 275 

The Pacific Ocean 309 

The Battle of Manila Bay 317 

The West Indies Showing Relation to Panama Canal . . . 331 

Decisive Action of Battle of Santiago 334 

Decisive Action of Battle of Santiago 335 

Mined Areas Around the British Isles 354 



SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 



SEA POWER IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 

CHAPTER I 

BRITISH SEA POWER WINS AN EMPIRE IN AMERICA 

THE World War aroused a new interest in *'sea 
power," as Admiral Mahan, its interpreter and 
historian, called it. This world-wide conflict veri- 
fied virtually all that Mahan had said of the influence of 
sea power on events, so much so that his volumes, written 
years before 1914, now seem full of prophetic vision. Just 
as in ancient times Xerxes, King of Persia, and Hannibal, 
the personification of the military imperialism of Carthage, 
were conquered by the sea power of Greece and Rome, 
and as in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Louis 
XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte were crushed by sea power, 
so in the twentieth century William HohenzoUern and his 
Prussian military ambitions fell victims to the sea suprem- 
acy of the Allied nations, a supremacy without which the 
efforts of Haig, Foch, and Pershing would have been power- 
less. Thus in the last analysis freedom and democracy owe 
a large debt to sea power. 

The term "sea power" covers a wider range of activities 
than is commonly supposed. In general it comprehends 
all those forces in national life which tend to give a nation 
strength upon the sea. Under it are included commer- 
cial fleets as well as naval forces, the capacious merchant- 
man as well as the steel-clad dreadnaught. Not only the 



4 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

craft employed in the foreign trade but also the domestic 
shipping of a nation, — the schooners, steamers, and barges 
which navigate its rivers and lakes and pass between its 
ports, near or distant, — are an important part of sea 
power. This was strikingly illustrated in the World War, 
when the American mine-layers in the North Sea were al- 
most all converted coastwise steamships. 

The various means by which these fleets are constructed 
and maintained are another vital feature of sea power. 
Without shipyards for the manufacture of ships, without 
resources of the materials needed, or easy access to such 
supplies, without genius for naval architecture, no nation 
can long hold supremacy upon the sea. For the fueling and 
protection of armed shipping, and to secure commercial 
fleets against discrimination by other nations there are 
generally colonies and bases which greatly strengthen the 
nation possessing them. Such factors affect considerably 
the sea power of a country. The very situation of the na- 
tion itself may also be an important factor. Not accident- 
ally have islands been frequently the seats of sea power. 

The population which is engaged in maritime pursuits 
is much more extensive than is usually supposed. Besides 
the officers and men of the navy, whether they serve on 
board ship or remain to labor in the navy-yards and bases 
of the fleet, there are the men of the merchant marine, 
whether they are engaged in ocean or coastwise or lake traf- 
fic, and the fishermen and the whalers. There should also 
be added the merchants, brokers, ship-owners, ship-builders, 
and all those who in any way draw their livelihoods from 
the sea. And those men whose minds on land or sea direct 
the water-borne commerce of the world or command and 
manoeuver the naval forces, those men who invent new types 
of ships, or new methods of warfare, those who explore the 
depths of the sea as others seek for pole or tropic upon its 



BRITISH SEA POWER WINS AN EMPIRE 5 

surface, are not to be excluded from the scope of sea power. 

The influence of sea power also has been greater and 
more far-reaching than is generally thought. Nautical en- 
terprise and skill have done more than any other force to 
build up civilization. In ancient times the nations that 
advanced in civilization were usually in touch with the 
sea (witness the Egyptians and the Greeks), and over the 
sea routes of the Mediterranean came Western civilization. 
The freedom inherent in the sea also has been a stimulat- 
ing force in creating and preserving free institutions. 
Thus, even navies have usually proved to be of little danger 
to democracy and liberty, and the great sea powers have 
been the chief bulwarks against autocracy and militarism. 

In the development of the American continent sea power 
has played a more important part than is usually believed. 
Seven out of the eight wars in which the United States has 
engaged have been won by sea power. The Western 
Hemisphere is what it is to-day, free and democratic, 
largely through sea power, — sometimes American, sometimes 
British, and at least once French. The United States owed 
its independence to it, the Latin-American states main- 
tained their early-won independence through the sea power 
behind the Monroe Doctrine, and secession in the South 
and misrule in Cuba were overcome by sea power. Few 
events in American history are entirely free from the 
touch of the sea, whether the touch be commercial or naval, 
whether the nation be Spain, France, Great Britain, or the. 
United States. Beginning with the discovery of the New 
World by the ships of Spain, then the chief sea nation 
of the time, we shall endeavor to trace the influence of the 
sea and sea power upon American character and history. 

The discovery of America, destined to be a curse to Spain, 
was to inure to the benefit of the English and the Dutch. 
Spain, unlike France and Holland, and especially unlike 



6 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

^ England, showed itself in the years that succeeded incapa- 
ble of creating a lasting sea power,. "With a supercilious 
contempt for manual labor and trade, jjthe Spaniard estab- 1 
lished no industries, developed no natural resources in his ' 
new dependencies, and entrusted his ships to Portuguese and ; 
Italian navigators. He could not identify himself with 
his colonies. Master of the Western seas for a hundred 
years after Columbus, he lost his opportunity for perma- 
nent control by his lust for quick-gotten wealth and by his 
mismanagement of his subject races. The cargoes he took 
back to Spain were precious in content, small in bulk, and 
scattered far and wide in a few galleons, — in striking con- 
trast to the ships of Britain and Holland, which, laden with 
the bulky freight of tobacco, spices, fish, and furs, returned 
from all the quarters of the world. Hence the seizure of a 
single Spanish galleon was a very different matter from 
the capture of a British or a Dutch merchantman. When 
Drake, during his circumnavigation of the globe, entered 
the Pacific and captured ''the great galleon" on her an- 
nual trip from Lima to Cadiz, he got a cargo of gold dust, 
pearls, emeralds, and diamonds, valued at half a million 
sterling. The Spaniards, on the other hand, in seizing 
a Dutch ship were as likely as not to get a cargo of salt 
herrings. In other words, Spain at the very height of her 
mastery of the seas was a debtor nation; she had to hire 
Dutch ships to bring to her shores the common necessaries 
of existence, which she paid for in gold wrung from Mexico 
and Peru. "The discovery of America was therefore 
destined to build up Britain's sea power on the ruins of 
Spain's."^ 

England's mastery of the seas is generally considered by 
historians as dating from the defeat of the great Spanish 
Armada in 1588, in the reign of Elizabeth. The wars in 
1 Silborne, The Evolution of Sea Power, p. 95. 



BRITISH SEA POWER WINS AN EMPIRE 7 

whicli Spain, France, and Holland engaged from 1572 on- 
ward offered adventurous English seamen altogether too 
tempting opportunities for privateering in the English 
Channel. And when peace came the profits of the slave- 
trade between Guinea and the plantations of the Spanish 
Main drew many an Englishman besides Hawkins, who 
first attempted it in 1562. Little did it matter that Spain 
reserved all this for her own ships; religious fanaticism 
added fuel to economic rivalry. Drake, the greatest of 
Elizabethan sailors and freebooters, was actuated by an 
intense Puritan hatred of the Spaniards. "To break 
through the Catholic monopoly of the New World, to kill 
Spaniards, to sell negroes, to sack gold-ships, were in these 
men's minds a seemly work for the 'elect of God.'"^ 
This religious, political, and economic antagonism of the 
two peoples came to a climax in the destruction of the 
Spanish Armada by the storms of the North Sea, power- 
fully seconded by British seamen led by Howard, Drake, 
Hawkins, and Frobisher. 

From the defeat of the Armada came far-reaching re- 
sults, Holland secured her independence and began her 
rise as a commercial and naval power, which in turn made 
her develop trade and colonization in America, remnants of 
which still exist in Guiana and Curacao. But as Britain 
had been the victor against the Armada, the scepter of the 
seas passed in a very real sense to her. The decisiveness 
of the Armada victory could not be altered by later naval 
expeditions by both countries, such as the stirring fight 
of Sir Richard Grenville in one ship, the Revenge, against 
fifty-three Spanish, or the joint enterprise of Hawkins and 
Drake to the West Indies, — a ghastly record of discord, dis- 
ease, and death, for both commanders died and were buried 

1 J. R. Green, A Short History of the English People, Revised 
Edition, New York, 1889; p. 415. 



8 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

in American waters in 1795-6). By reason of Britain's 
control of the Atlantic, her colonizers could now use un- 
molested the southern route to America, safer for the small 
vessels of the period, — the route via the Azores, the Cana- 
ries, the "West Indies, and thence to Virginia, as Raleigh 
had named the theater of future British colonization. 

By reason also of this victory, England, realizing only 
gradually the rich possibilities of her new power on the 
sea, instituted under the East India and Virginia com- 
panies that great expansion of trade and colonization to- 
ward both East and West which gathered momentum as 
English enterprise gained confidence and the safety of the 
seas became assured. Her earlier attempts had been 
made against great odds of Spanish interference and loss 
of communication with the mother country such as blotted 
out Raleigh's band of settlers at Roanoke Island before 
ships could return after the Armada. But in another half- 
century she could seize such an exposed outpost as Jamaica 
in the very center of the Caribbean, and hold it against all 
Spanish attempts at recovery. 

Before England, however, could establish an empire in 
America her sea power had to meet, during the next two 
centuries, two new rivals upon the sea, — Holland and 
France. Less than fifty years after the first English 
settlement at Jamestown, Sir Harry Vane fostered the 
navy with the double purpose of checking the power of the 
army and furthering English trade. The English Parlia- 
ment under Cromwell framed the famous Navigation Acts, 
directed at England's commercial rival of the period, Hol- 
land. By them, all imports into England must come 
in English vessels or in those of the country in which the 
cargoes were produced. Defeated by Blake, Cromwell's 
"General at Sea," despite the efforts of Tromp and De 
Ruyter, the Dutch still retained a very large share of the 



('H9) 

AM ACT 

FOR 

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NAVIGATION 

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StDctS, tt)auUe3lmpo?tto o?b:ougt)t mto^tli« 




Courtesy of the New York Public Library 

FIRST PAGE OF A CONTEMPORARY COPY OF CROMWELL'S 
NAVIGATION ACT OF 1651 




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■/..y< ^/.^~^^^^' ^-^;<-y 






Courtesy of the Naval History Society 

COMMISSION OF PAUL JONES TO THE PROVIDENCE 




MEDAL AWARDED BY CONGRESS TO PAUL JONES FOR HIS 

VICTORY OVER THE SERAPIS 
The portrait on the reverse of the medal is from Houdon's bust of Jones 



BRITISH SEA POWER WINS AN EMPIRE 9 

American carrying-trade. Accordingly Charles II, justi- 
fying his action by the discovery of the Atlantic coast by 
Cabot, but really simply coveting the rich fur trade which 
reached the Atlantic by way of the Mohawk and the Hud- 
son, granted New Amsterdam to his brother James, Duke 
of York, later James II, and a better naval officer than he 
was a king ; whereupon James, in 1664, sent a fleet to secure 
his rights, though England and Holland were then at peace. 
Indeed, in the Second Dutch War, which soon developed, 
the English came off second best, and could not prevent the 
disgraceful burning of their fleet at Chatham by the Dutch 
in 1667. The English, however, held on to New York and 
New Jersey, and thus consolidated their Northern and 
Southern colonies. 

Yet a third war was waged before the commercial su- 
premacy of the seas passed from the Dutch. In this Third 
Dutch War, 1672-74, England was allied with France, but 
with slight French assistance upon the seas she was barely 
able to make Southwold Bay and the Texel drawn battles 
with De Ruyter. Yet, when she withdrew from the war 
and left the continental powers that had been drawn into 
it to continue the struggle, she was able to absorb most 
of the American carrying-trade which had formerly been 
Holland's. Thus the Second Dutch War gave to England 
Holland 's most important American colony ; the Third gave 
England Holland's American trade. 

In the two wars of conquest of Louis XIV, the War of 
the League of Augsburg, 1688-97 (known in America as 
King William's War) and the War of the Spanish Suc- 
cession, 1701-14 (known in America as Queen Anne's 
War) , Louis XIV raised against himself coalitions of most 
of Europe. And he succeeded, as Napoleon and Wilhelm 
II later succeeded, in arraying sea power on the side of 
free peoples. In the first of these wars, in which the Eng- 



10 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

lish won the sea fight off La Hogne, there were no results 
for America, except that William of Orange, now King 
of England, unconsciously helped further to neutralize the 
sea power of his native Holland by forcing her to con- 
tribute armies to the coalition, while England continued 
to concentrate her efforts on her navy. The War of the 
Spanish Succession, in which Louis XIV was trying to 
unite the Spanish crown to his own, was ended by the 
Treaty of Utrecht, which rearranged the map of Europe 
and incidentally gave England Hudson Bay Territory, 
Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland. But more far-reaching 
results of these wars, so exhaustive for France, were that 
England emerged with a greater commerce than ever, while 
French commerce had been all but driven from the seas; 
moreover, France, earlier in Louis's reign the money- 
lender of Europe, was now bankrupt. As Mahan so fre- 
quently points out, countries that have control of the seas 
can wage wars of exhaustion, because the revenues from 
their protected commerce furnish almost inexhaustible sup- 
port. Louis XIV, who in his earlier years had seen France 
and Holland running a close second to Britain on the seas, 
saw before his death in 1715 British sea power triumphant. 
In this he had himself to thank. In no small degree the 
loss of New France, half a century later, may justly be 
laid to the door of Louis the Magnificent. 

The question whether England or France was to possess 
an empire in America — and in India as well — depended on 
two more great wars, and the outcome of these turned on 
sea power. The first of these, the War of the Austrian 
Succession, begun by Frederick the Great's seizure of 
Silesia from Austria, started a general European con- 
flagration, and kindled a flame of hostility between the 
French and the English colonists in America, — King 
George's War, as it is sometimes called. In contraven- 




NORTH AMERICA BEFORE 1783 
11 



12 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

tion of Spanish Navigation Acts and the Treaty of Utrecht, 
England had been making such inroads upon the South 
American commerce of decadent Spain that the Spanish 
port authorities went too far in searches and seizures of 
British merchantmen. When a certain Captain Jenkins 
returned to England and appeared before Parliament, in 
his hand the ear which he alleged had been cut off by the 
Spaniards, the War of Jenkins's Ear began, and Admiral 
Vernon sailed away with a fleet — immortalized by Smollett 
in "Roderick Random" — to avenge the insult. With the 
admiral served Lawrence Washington, elder brother of 
George, and the one who gave to his estate on the Potomac 
the name of Mount Vernon. But the expedition was a 
horrible fiasco on account of disease and lack of coopera- 
tion between fleet and troops, and Vernon was defeated in 
his attempt to capture the Spanish cities of Cartagena and 
Santiago de Cuba in the Caribbean. 

When, in 1740, the general European war broke out, 
England threw in her sea power against France and 
Spain, the traditional allies. Though England's navy was 
in a decadent state, her trade, now increased by the trade 
of the American colonies, furnished many of the sinews 
of war to her allies on the Continent. America's contribu- 
tion was a force largely maritime and colonial which set 
out from Boston in 1745 under William Pepperell, Chief- 
Justice of Massachusetts, and captured against great odds 
the fortress of Louisburg on Cape Breton Island. This 
place, from its central position in relation to Eu- 
rope, Canada, the American colonies, and the West In- 
dies, was strategically the Gibraltar of America, as it was 
also called from the strength of its fortifications. Much 
to the disappointment of the American colonists, this 
stronghold, in the peace that ended the war (that of 
Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748), was exchanged for Madras. Thus 



BRITISH SEA POWER WINS AN EMPIRE 13 

colonial sea power had in America won for the mother 
country an empire in Asia, 

Every war and treaty so far had left the great issue of 
the possession of the North American continent unsettled. 
The irrepressible conflict was finally terminated a few 
years later by the great Seven Years' War, 1756-63, in 
American history often called the French and Indian War. 
In this contest, even more than in previous contests, Eng- 
land was supported by the resources of the American col- 
onies from their prosperous . trade and fisheries. They 
also sent their sons to fight under Washington at Pitts- 
burgh, and under Wolfe at Quebec. And in 1758, Admiral 
Boscawen with a powerful fleet and twelve thousand troops 
under Amherst and Wolfe captured Louisburg, on whose 
fortification the French in the intervening years since its 
former capture had spent ten million dollars. With the 
fall of Louisburg, Quebec, which was the Gibraltar of the 
St. Lawrence, was doomed, for Louisburg controlled its 
communications. After a siege memorable for the stub- 
born and heroic conduct of both sides Quebec fell the next 
year, and with it fell Canada, the prize of sea power. 

In the same year, French sea power met its real Trafal- 
gar of the war, — an event which had as much influence 
upon American events as on European. The battle was 
staged in Quiberon Bay, on the coast of France near Brest, 
in most dramatic environment, a strong northwest wind 
and heavy seas driving the contestants toward a rock-bound 
coast. Replying to the remonstrance of his pilot against 
entering the bay under such difficult conditions by merely 
saying, "You have done your duty in the remonstrance; 
now lay me alongside," the British commander, Hawke, 
destroyed a few of the enemy's twenty-three ships and 
forced the rest to scatter and run ashore or be captured. 
With the French fleet powerless, and the invasion of Eng- 



14 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

land impossible, the British were free to raid the enemy's 
colonies, and Rodney and Pocock reduced Havana, Mar- 
tinique, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. During the rest of the 
war, British sea power, pressing silently but relentlessly 
into all parts of the world, slowly strangled the commerce 
and strength of the French. While French privateers — 
another device of the weaker sea power — accomplished re- 
markable results, it is a fact, paradoxical as it is, that the 
more the French destroyed the faster British commerce in- 
creased. On the other hand, French commerce was anni- 
hilated by this war just as was Germany's in the World 
War. British sea power emerged triumphant from the 
Seven Years' War and laid on France the necessity for a 
humiliating peace. By this peace (the Peace of Paris, 
February 10, 1763) England got the whale of North 
America east of the Mississippi River. She restored to 
France Martinique and Guadeloupe and to Spain Havana, 
and granted to France some fishing rights on the New- 
foundland Banks, the sole memento of a once great empire 
in Canada. While the other belligerents, on both sides, 
came out of this war impoverished and with no more 
territory than when they entered, England's sea power, 
besides firmly entrenching her in the Mediterranean and in 
India, had added vastly to her riches, and had won America 
for the Anglo-Saxon race. 

Under the protection of a sea power such as England 
had thus exercised for nearly a century it is not strange 
that the English-speaking colonies of America had turned 
to the sea as a fruitful source of livelihood and prosperity. 
In the first seventy years of the eighteenth century their 
commerce on the sea increased tenfold and in 1772 
equaled England's own at the beginning of the century. 
And in the fisheries and the whaling industry they had 
shown remarkable enterprise and spirit. Burke's en- 



BRITISH SEA POWER WINS AN EMPIRE 15 

comium upon the whalemen, uttered during his great speech 
in favor of conciliation with America, may well represent 
the maritime spirit of the colonies as displayed in all the 
various occupations connected with the sea : 

Pass by the other parts, and look at the manner in which the 
people of New England have of late carried on the Whale Fishery. 
Whilst we follow them among the tmnbling mountains of ice, and 
behold them penetrating into the deepest frozen recesses of 
Hiidson's Bay and Davis's Straits, whilst "we are looking for them 
beneath the Arctic Circle, we hear that they have pierced into 
the opposite region of polar cold, that they are at the antipodes, 
and engaged under the frozen Serpent of the South. Falkland 
Island, which seemed too remote and romantic an object for the 
grasp of national ambition, is but a stage and resting-place in the 
progress of their victorious industry. Nor is the equinoctial heat 
more discouraging to them, than the accumulated winter of both 
the poles. We know that while some of them draw the line and 
strike the harpoon on the coast of Africa, others run the longi- 
tude, and pursue their gigantic game along the coast of Brazil. 
No sea but what is vexed by their fisheries. No climate but what 
is witness to their toils. Neither the perseverance of Holland, 
nor the activity of France, nor the dexterous and finn sagacity of 
English enterprise, ever carried this most perilous mode of hardy 
industry to the extent to which it has been pushed by this recent 
people; a people who are still, as it were, but in the gristle, and 
not yet hardened into the bone of manhood. 

This eulogy is not mere rhetoric, for it was the aptitude 
of the colonists for maritime affairs that contributed so 
powerfully to England's success in the Seven Years' War. 
By the aid of the American colonies, the mother country, 
which entered the contest a kingdom, emerged an empire. 



CHAPTER II 

THE DEFEAT OF BRITISH SEA POWER GIVES AMERICA 
INDEPENDENCE 

THAT the British Empire, established at the height 
of its extent and predominance as it was in 1763 
by the Peace of Paris, should in just twenty years 
give up the sections of the empire richest potentially, if not 
actually, would have been inconceivable to the victorious 
regiments of Wolfe and the proud seamen of Hawke. That 
this loss of three millions of Englishmen and a shipping 
almost equal to half of Britain's own should be brought 
about by the failure and inferiority of Britannia's bul- 
warks, her sea power, would have seemed the fantasy of a 
madman. Yet the event proved that in the struggle be- 
tween the American colonies and the mother country the 
navies, as Washington at the time asserted, had "the cast- 
ing vote";^ and, as Mahan states, "To Arnold on Lake 
Champlain, to De Grasse at Yorktown, fell the privilege 
of exercising that prerogative at the two great decisive 
moments of the war. ' ' ^ Most humiliating of all to the 
proud Briton of 1763 would have been the fact that the 
French Navy was to prove the final instrument in separat- 
ing the Americans from their English blood-brethren and 

1 "Your Excellency will have observed, that, whatever efforts are 
made by the land armies, the navy must have the casting vote in 
the present contest." — Washington to De Grasse, October 28, 1781. 
{The Writings of Washington, edited by W. C. Ford, IX, 399.) 

2 Mahan, Major Operations of the Navies in the Wa/r of American 
Independence, p. 4. 

16 



THE DEFEAT OF BRITISH SEA POWER 17 

in thus reducing the predominant position of Great Britain 
in world affairs. It was De Grasse's "naval Waterloo" 
for the British sea forces off the Chesapeake in the sultry- 
days of September, 1781, that gave the French the com- 
mand of the Atlantic at a critical moment, and sentenced 
Cornwallis, shut up in the narrow acres of the York penin- 
sula, to an ignominious surrender. 

This importance of sea power in the American Revolu- 
tion would seem less strange, especially as to the role which 
America was to play, if the importance and extent of mari- 
time pursuits in the colonies were better known. The naval 
supremacy of the mother country had given opportunities 
for developing the natural bent of the people of the colonies 
for the sea. Roads were difficult, travel by sea easier ; the 
products of the colonies could not be sold or consumed 
within their borders, and thus had to be transported over- 
seas to England, the Continent, or the West Indies. New 
Englanders could build ships more cheaply on the Pisca- 
taqua, close by the virgin forests, than could the mother 
country on the Thames ; they also early found the catching 
of fish, first in Massachusetts Bay, then farther out to sea, 
and finally on the banks of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, 
exceedingly profitable. Thus at the outbreak of the Revo- 
lution there were, says a writer,^ "more people in the 
northern part of New England — Maine and New Hamp- 
shire — engaged in shipbuilding and navigation than there 
were in agriculture, and Massachusetts at the same time 
was estimated to have owned one vessel for every hundred 
of its inhabitants." 

It is not unnatural, therefore, that the causes of the 
Revolution were, especially in their more immediate aspects, 
chiefly maritime. The most profitable trade of the colonies 
was the triangular commerce between themselves, the coast 

1 David A. Wells, Our Merchant Marine, p. 4. 



18 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

of Africa, and the West Indies. For example, molasses 
was brought from the West Indies to the colonies, — New- 
port, Rhode Island, for instance, — there manufactured into 
rum (Newport had twenty-two still-houses for this pur- 
pose), transported to the west coast of Africa, and ex- 
changed for slaves, who were thereupon carried to the 
sugar plantations of the West India islands, or to the 
tobacco plantations of Virginia, and sold, each successive 
transaction yielding a large profit. Especially was the 
trade with the French and Spanish West Indies profitable, 
for fish caught on the Grand Banks and unsalable else- 
where could be sold to the West Indian slave-owners, and 
in exchange sugar and molasses could be bought at rates 
below those asked by planters on British islands. This 
trade could be carried on only by the well-nigh universal 
practice of smuggling in violation of restrictive acts which 
were passed by Parliament from 1651 onward, but which, 
such as the Sugar Act of 1733, were never really enforced. 
But with the coming into power of George III, who was 
determined to enforce these measures, the whole commer- 
cial and financial structure of colonial life seemed about 
to be shattered. Accustomed to manage their own affairs 
in virtual independence, relieved of the fear of French in- 
vasion after 1763, and convinced that the policy of the 
Grenville ministry meant ruin for them, the colonists 
quickly manifested their opposition to these restrictions on 
their maritime activity. 

But when the earlier peaceful and political opposition 
ended in actual hostilities, the Americans soon realized 
the difficulties they were under in conducting a war against 
British sea power. Though they had plenty of sailors 
and half as many bottoms as Great Britain, they possessed 
no vessels of war ;' and many seamen had to enlist in the 
land forces in order to avoid starvation. As the colonists 



THE DEFEAT OF BRITISH SEA POWER 19 

had to import from Europe large quantities of clothing 
and munitions of war, they soon found the Atlantic and 
the paths to the Dutch, French, and Spanish West Indies 
closed by the ships of the Royal Navy. Even the coastwise 
trade between colony and colony was at the mercy of the 
British frigates and sloops that swarmed about the entire 
Atlantic coast, and farther out British privateers watched 
for American prey. In all respects in which sea power 
enters, Great Britain had superiority. Her military navy- 
was far superior to that of any other nation, and there 
was no cloud in the European firmament that threatened 
her with immediate disaster. Her trading fleets, whether 
to the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the Baltic, or the East 
Indies, were so numerous that' she could suffer little from 
the loss of American trade and the depredations of Ameri- 
can cruisers and privateers. Canada and the other sections 
of her empire were loyal, and afforded in Quebec, Halifax, 
Bermuda, Jamaica, St. Lucia, and Barbados, plenty of 
bases for the operation of her fleets. 

But in the less apparent factors on which success would 
depend, George III found matter that disquieted him. 
To break American revolt, armies must be landed on Ameri- 
can shores and must be supplied and reenforced by con- 
stant streams of ships from the mother country and her 
colonial bases. Also, with the multitude of American ships 
idle at their berths, it would be natural for privateering 
to become almost a trade for stranded seamen, and the 
English supply-ships and peaceful English merchant ves- 
sels, especially those in the West Indian trade, which had 
to traverse almost the entire length of the American coast, 
would be in considerable danger of capture. Moreover, in 
Parliament, and to a certain extent in other circles in 
England, there was great opposition to the use of force 
on America, and half-hearted prosecution of the war was 



"i'WrAj^ ..^ ^^WWA^ 



20 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

about all that could be guaranteed. British trade, which 
had begun to expand with the coming of peace in 1763, had 
not yet reached the prosperous state which the commercial 
classes felt was their due. As regards the international 
situation, France still smarted under the lash of the peace 
terms of the Seven Years' War, and European powers 
generally were jealous of the predominant position which 
Great Britain had wrung from her century-long contests 
with the France of Louis XIV and Louis XV. And, 
further, with the members of her empire scattered all over 
the globe she had to maintain absolute supremacy at sea 
to hold her connection with each of them. On the other 
hand, the French, though bowed down by the ruinous debts 
of previous wars, were strengthening their navy, introduc- 
ing efficiency, and might on any favorable chance decide 
to retrieve their previous disasters by another war. And, 
finally, if the French should decide to throw in their 
weight on the side of the colonies, British communications 
with America would at once be jeopardized. 

In accordance with these difficulties and contingencies, 
/■ therefore, British sea power had to arrange its lines of 
operation. It had to maintain the uninterrupted flow of 
British trade from the colonies to England and from there 
to foreign markets; it had, also, and next in importance, 
to maintain the communications of British armies in Amer- 
ica, for there they could expect nothing; moreover, it had 
to cooperate with the armies in the capture of American 
seaports, in the transportation of troops, and in the de- 
fense of Canada; and, lastly, it had to concentrate in the 
Channel, about Gibraltar, and also probably in the West 
and East Indies, fleets strong enough to meet the danger in 
these quarters of any hostile action by France. 

The problem of sea power for the colonies was likewise 
difficult. For the Continental Congress, sitting in Phila- 



THE DEFEAT OF BRITISH SEA POWER 21 

delpliia, and pondering how victory should be won, the 
part of the navy seemed on the whole important but im- 
possible. In an attack on Canada, one of the earliest proj- 
ects, ships were to have no part. On the other hand, the 
hastily armed American merchant vessels could harass 
British commerce, seize British supply-ships on their way 
to Boston to the relief of Howe, and thus assist in driving 
the British regulars from American soil. Further, the 
colonies might maintain some trade with the West Indies, 
mostly by privateers, and from there and Europe itself the 
colonial vessels would have to bring the guns, muskets, 
powder, shot, and clothing which any army must have in 
order to fight. If French aid, secret or open, could be ob- 
tained, this latter problem would be somewhat simplified. 
The plans of both England and the colonies were therefore 
subject to many contingencies and to varied conditions. 

Keeping in mind these general conditions, let us see to 
what extent sea power entered the struggle ; how, as Wash- 
ington said, the navies had the casting vote; and how Ar- 
nold and De Grasse became decisive factors on Lake Cham- 
plain and off the Chesapeake capes, respectively. Naval 
activity began when reports reached General Washington 
at Boston and the Continental Congress at Philadelphia 
about the beginning of October, 1775, that two transports 
richly laden with military supplies were on their way to 
Boston for Howe's forces. Washington immediately sent 
out Captain John Manly in the Lee to cruise in IMassachu- 
setts Bay, and for the same purpose the Congress bought 
and fitted out two small vessels, the Lexington and the Re- 
prisal. By the end of November Manly had succeeded in 
capturing four British supply-ships and in bringing them 
safely into port. Early in 1776 Esek Hopkins, who had 
been placed in command of eight converted merchantmen, 
made a descent on the town of I^assau, in the Bahamas, and 



22 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

seized there a considerable quantity of war material. The 
earlier cruises of John Paul Jones in the Providence and 
the Alfred along the Atlantic coast in the summer and 
autumn of 1776 were largely directed against British ports 
in Nova Scotia, where supplies were being obtained for the 
British armies; his capture of the Mellish, a large armed 
ship, brought to the dwindling and despairing Continental 
Army a thousand complete uniforms intended for the armies 
in Canada. The news that this important capture had 
been made cheered Washington in those darkest days just 
before the battle of Trenton. 

In the success of Washington in forcing the British out 
of Boston, the navy by cutting off supply-ships thus had its 
part. In the campaign which began with the battle of 
Long Island the sea forces of Great Britain necessarily had 
much to do, for as soon as the British fleet under Lord 
Howe was able to force its way up New York Bay and ap- 
proach the East River, Washington of necessity had to 
withdraw his army from its isolated position, cross the East 
River before his retreat could be cut off by British frigates, 
and then withdraw from Manhattan Island to comparative 
security farther inland. It is worth noting, however, that 
in Washington's daring ferrying of his army from Long 
Island to New York under the cover of fog and darkness, 
the Marblehead fishermen, who had upon the stoppage 
of all sea commerce enlisted- in the Continental Army in 
considerable numbers, played the leading role. Washing- 
ton with his genius for strategy quickly realized that New 
York without coast or naval defense was untenable against 
a combined military and naval force. 

The dark months of the autumn of 1776 were, however, 
to witness an engagement — unrealized as its importance 
was — which was to start a train of events destined to end 
only with complete independence for the struggling Con- 



THE DEFEAT OF BRITISH SEA POWER 23 

tinentals. And the chief part in this providential outcome 
was to be played by the man who has gone down in Ameri- 
can history as its Judas Iscariot, the traitorous Benedict 
Arnold. 

With true appreciation of the strategic opportunities of 
the situation the British were planning an expedition from 
Canada by the waterways that lead south from the St. Law- 
rence, through the Richelieu River, Lake Champlain, and 
Lake George, to the upper courses of the Hudson, where 
forces from Howe's army at New York might easily con- 
nect with it and .establish a perfect barricade against any 
communication between New England and the rest of the 
colonies. As the Hudson could be largely controlled by 
naval forces and as so much of the rest was water, the 
scheme required comparatively few troops and promised 
great results. For such a project the control of Lake 
Champlain was a vital feature, and must be secured by 
ships operating on the lake and defeating any American 
naval units which might be there. 

To Benedict Arnold had been intrusted the command 
of the American forces, and by vigorous measures in build- 
ing vessels and in attacking the British post at St. John's 
above the northern end of Lake Champlain, he managed to 
control its waters till October, 1776. Then the British, 
drawing supplies and men from the shipyards of Quebec 
and the vessels of the Royal Navy in the St. Lawrence, con- 
structed and assembled a far superior force, the chief ves- 
sel of which was a fabricated ship with eighteen 12- 
pounders, easily able alone to sweep the entire lake of all 
the American schooners, galleys, gondolas, and other armed 
craft that infested it. But the season was already far ad- 
vanced, and winter was approaching with such speed that 
unless the British advance to the Hudson came very soon 
it must inevitably be postponed till the next spring. To 




BATTLE OF 
LAKE CHAMPLAIN 
SEPT II. 1814^ 

BATTLE OF 

LAKE CHAMPLAIN 

OCT. /I, 1776 



BURLINCTQN 



VEFtOENNES 



'^NRY 



THE WATER ROUTE PROM MONTREAL TO NEW YORK 

Drawn by H. C. Washburn. 

24 



THE DEFEAT OF BRITISH SEA POWER 25 

produce this delay was all Arnold could hope for. He 
hampered the British preparations as much as possible, 
and he determined to contest the control of the lake, even 
if he faced certain defeat. Thus, on October 11th, when 
the British squadron came sailing down the lake with a fair 
wind, he posted his forces under the shelter of Valcour Is- 
land, and awaited attack. The enemy, by the very situa- 
tion of the island, could reach him only from the south, 
and must then beat up against the breeze with all its un- 
certainties and the danger of being raked while approach- 
ing. All da}^ the desultory fighting continued, with con- 
siderable loss to both sides and greater and greater in- 
evitableness of defeat for Arnold as soon as all the British 
forces and guns could be brought to bear. But during the 
night Arnold steered his battered boats through the Brit- 
ish line, and retreated south toward the American forti- 
fications at Crown Point and Ticonderoga, burning his boats 
when they were pursued and on the eve of capture. 

By the time the British forces could be reconstituted and 
the forts taken, winter had set in, and their expedition was 
obliged to halt without completing the connection with 
the men and ships of Howe on the Hudson. The next 
year when Burgoyne, with stronger forces, assumed com- 
mand and advanced as far as the Hudson at Saratoga, 
Howe, at New York, had embarked his army on transports 
and diverted his energies to the campaign of the Brandy- 
wine against Philadelphia. Moreover, the Americans had, 
meanwhile, been strengthened for resistance by further 
enlistments and by the munitions of war which the secret 
aid of Louis XVI had sent through his agent, Beaumar- 
chais. If it had not been for Arnold's extemporized naval 
force on Lake Champlain, all the British delay during the 
summer of 1776 would have been avoided, and their forces 
would have advanced south of Lake Champlain at once 



26 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

and easily have gained the Hudson before winter. It is 
because of this fact that the daring challenge of Arnold 
and his sailors to British naval power on the lake was so 
momentous and decisive. As Mahan remarks, "That the 
Americans were strong enough to impose the capitulation 
of Saratoga was due to the invaluable year of delay secured 
to them by their little navy on Lake Champlain." "It 
[the capitulation of Saratoga] was the cause that naval 
force from abroad, entering into the contest, transformed 
it from a local to a universal war, and assured the inde- 
pendence of the colonies." ^ 

With a few words concerning the activities of American 
privateers, we come to the end of naval operations which 
were organized and carried on bv the colonists without 
foreign, especially French, assistance. ^ With the extensive v 
shipping of the Americans forced into idleness by the 
opening of hostilities, it is not surprising that privateering 
soon attained large proportions. Governor Hutchinson of 
Massachusetts reported in his diary that seventy thousand 
New Englanders were engaged in privateering at one time. 
Though Edward Everett Hale " regards this as an overesti- 
mate, he calculates that many more than this number took 
part in the warfare upon the sea at some time during the 
war. When we reflect that at the beginning of the war 
there were only eighteen thousand men in the British Navy 
it is easily possible, as he states, that in the Atlantic the 
British were outnumbered. Such was the gravity of the 
threat against British commerce and shipping. In 1776 
alone three hundred British ships fell prizes to American 
privateer captains, and the profits of the service were so 
great that in some sections agriculture was almost aban- 

1 Mahan, Major OperaUons of the Navies -in the War of American 
Independence, p. 7. 

2 Winsor, Narrative and Critieal History of America, VI. 584. 



THE DEFEAT OF BRITISH SEA POWER 27 

doned for it. As the entire proceeds of tlie prizes were dis- 
tributed among the captors, the privateers had no difficulty 
in securing men, — a sad contrast to the lack of seamen in 
the Continental naval vessels, — and the work became a busi- 
ness as profitable, if more precarious, than the old molasses- 
rum-slave voyages. 

While the goods which were seized, especially the manu- 
factured articles, often assisted the colonists in their mili- 
tary operations, and the sale of other articles in foreign 
ports helped to make credits for the purchase of supplies 
for America, the actual military results of privateering 
for the Continentals were few. In the first place, the 
British, who also sent out private vessels of war, made 
more captures than did the Americans. Moreover, the 
privateers monopolized sea warfare to such an extent that 
the Marine Committee of the Continental Congress found 
great difficulty in securing men and guns for its regular 
vessels of war. Lastly, if in place of this wasteful priva- 
teer system — carried on in single ships, for personal gain 
of the owners — a well-organized military navy, under a 
single head, had been instituted, it would have gone much 
farther with the ships and men available from the colonial 
merchant marine. It is sad to think of the glorious bene- 
fits lost to the cause of the colonists by the excessive in- 
dividualism of the American seamen of the Revolution. 

That the Americans could never have won their inde- 
pendence from the imperialism of George III without for- 
eign aid is well known, though not always sufficiently em- 
phasized by American historians. This is largely due to 
the neglect of the latter to recognize the influence of sea 
power in this struggle. This vital importance of sea power 
is established clearly by a study such as we are making. 
"While there was much sentiment favorable to American 
revolutionary ideals in France at this time, the real reason 



28 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

for her entrance into the war was a desire to profit by the 
domestic troubles of the British Empire and a strong feel- 
ing that Britain's undisputed hegemony among European 
nations was dangerous to France and the rest of con- 
tinental Europe. This French aid, at first secret, began 
almost at the outset of the Revolutionary struggle. As 
early as 1774, on coming to the throne, Louis XVI gave 
the following advice to his ministers as a statement of his 
policy: "to meddle adroitly in the affairs of the British 
colonies: to give the insurgent colonists the means of ob- 
taining supplies of war, while maintaining the strictest 
neutrality. ' ' ^ One of the earliest advocates of French in- 
tervention in America was Beaumarchais, the popular 
dramatist of the day, who in the summer of 1776 obtained 
money from the French and Spanish governments with 
which to buy guns, munitions, and clothing for the Ameri- 
can armies, all of which were to be exchanged for tobacco, — 
as if it were a private business transaction. But the guns 
were to be bought from the French arsenals, clear evi- 
dence of French sympathy, roundabout and secret as the 
method was. These supplies, reaching America in the early 
autumn, helped to support the campaign against Burgoyne 
and Howe. From French ports, also, privateers, fitted 
out by American agents, harassed British commerce in the 
Channel and North Sea, and managed, though with much 
difficulty, which may have been French attempts at main- 
taining neutrality or mere diplomatic stage play, to sell 
their prizes in French ports and land their prisoners on 
the soil of France. In this dangerous and delicate busi- 
ness, Wickes, Conyngham, and Nicholson won fame at sea, 
and Deane and Franklin on land. 

Upon the formal signing of a commercial treaty between 
France and the United States on February 6, 1778, the 

1 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon Eistory, p. 337. 



THE DEFEAT OF BRITISH SEA POWER 29 

situation underwent a complete transformation. While as 
a result of this treaty troops and supplies would now be 
sure to reach the colonies, the chief and predominant re- 
sult was that Great Britain's command of the sea was to 
be vigorously challenged, and not along the American coast 
but in her own waters. The French Navy was probably 
as efficient as the British at this moment, for it had learned 
much from defeat, and the British had greatly deteriorated 
since the days of 1763 when Pitt had insisted on efficiency. 
As soon as the treaty became known, George III was forced 
to treat the revolt in America as secondary to the threat 
across the Channel, and devote his chief energies to that 
quarter. In fact, British hostilities with France outlasted 
the American Revolution by two years, and Rodney won 
his great victory for Britain in the West Indies six months 
after Comwallis surrendered at Yorktown. America be- 
came the pawn of two great players three thousand miles 
away. France, who had lost America to Britain in 1763, 
was determined that Britain should not keep it. 

The decisive importance of the entrance of France into 
the war cannot be overestimated. Whether pleasing to 
American pride or not, the United States must acknowledge 
its debt to France, and, in less measure, even to Spain and 
Holland, who later entered the war. This debt is fairly 
well known, but the important fact that, after all, it was 
French sea power that was the decisive instrument in se- 
curing American independence, not the army of Rocham- 
beau, is far less widely appreciated. Washington, if sup- 
plied with men and munitions from France, could drive the 
British redcoats into the Atlantic, but it was only the 
French naval strength which could, in the absence of sea 
power in the colonists themselves, block the way of fresh 
British armies, or keep open the lanes of supply from 
France and the West Indies. 



30 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

No sooner had the British naval chiefs learned of the 
entrance of France into the war than the influence of 
French sea power began to be felt in American affairs. ] 
Since control of the sea lines of communication between 
Philadelphia and New York was endangered by the possi- 
ble coming of a French fleet, which in fact had sailed in 
April, 1778, from Toulon under D'Estaing, Howe aban- 
doned Philadelphia and concentrated his forces at New 
York. As Howe had not been able to maintain connection 
overland between the two cities, he had depended on keep- 
ing in touch by sea; now these communications were also 
threatened, and safety lay only in retreat. In fact, had 
D'Estaing had an average passage and arrived only ten 
days sooner, he would, as Washington remarked at the 
time/ have captured all Howe's ships. Even as it was, the 
danger was not past, for, with a superior force, D'Estaing 
would probably have captured New York itself if he had 
been able to secure pilots to carry his huge ships over the 
bar at Sandy Hook or if he had shown real determination 
himself. 

In European waters, also, the intervention of France 
kept Great Britain on the defensive. The French had, on 
July 27, 1778, fought an indecisive action off Ushant with 
a British squadron under Keppel, and John Paul Jones, 
now free to use French ports and ships, was, as will be re- 
lated in the next chapter, harrying British commerce near 
its home ports. 

During the last half of 1778, the French were in com- 
mand of the sea along the Atlantic coast of North America, 
and effectually prevented British expeditions such as 
Howe's had been, or Cornwallis's was to be, from sailing 
from New York to other sections of the colonies. In 1779, 

1 Mahan, Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American 
Independence, p. 63. 



I 



THE DEFEAT OF BRITISH SEA POWER 31 

when Spain entered the war, and the British Channel fleet 
of forty sail found itself opposed by a combined French 
and Spanish force of sixty-six ships, which was, moreover, 
between them and their home ports, the English squadrons 
in America were reduced, and the mere threat of D 'Estaing 
against Savannah caused the evacuation of Narragansett 
Bay by the British and their complete concentration at 
New York. But in the autumn of 1779 and the beginning 
of 1780, the British had a superior fleet in the western 
Atlantic, and Clinton decided, disastrously as it turned out, 
on a division of his forces, part to remain in New York 
and part to embark for South Carolina in an attempt to 
consolidate Royalist strength in the Southern colonies. 
Though he captured Charleston by naval attack, his whole 
success depended on retaining control of the waters be- 
tween New York and the South, and the presence of strong 
French fleets in the West Indies and in Newport consti- 
tuted a constant threat at his communications. On March 
16, 1781, Des Touches with the French squadron from 
Newport defeated the British under Arbuthnot off the 
mouth of the Chesapeake, but did not follow up his advan- 
tage. Accordingly, when the French admiral returned to 
Newport, Clinton was able to send two thousand troops 
into Virginia to assist Benedict Arnold in his devastation 
of that section. 

As the autumn of 1781 approached, Cornwallis, who had 
command in the South, found his fortunes wavering, and 
finally realizing his dependence upon Clinton in New York 
and upon the British fleets in American waters, fell back 
into the peninsula between the York and James rivers. 
Here he intended to refresh-his troops and await reenforce- 
ments and supplies by sea. 

The final act in the influence of sea power upon American 
independence was now to come. As Washington shows 



32 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

clearly and explicitly in his despatches, "naval superior- 
ity"^ was essential, and did indeed prove decisive. The 
"improper distribution" of the naval strength of the Brit- 
ish, on which Mahan partly blames their defeat, was strik- 
ingly illustrated by the events of 1781. With both British 
armies comparatively slender in numbers, — Clinton in New 
York with eleven thousand and Cornwallis in Virginia with 
seven thousand, — divided by over three hundred miles of 
sea, and to be kept in touch only by water, the coming of 
De Grasse's French fleet from the West Indies and its union 
with the Newport squadron would spell disaster. The 
threat could be met only with a fleet ; British ships from the 
West Indies must arrive, unite with those on the North 
American station, and defeat the French. When, however, 
Hood with these West Indian reenforcements reached the 
Chesapeake on August 25th and did not find there the 
British ships under Graves, he naturally proceeded to New 
York to join them. On August 31st, just as the combined 
British fleets left Sandy Hook to succor Cornwallis, De 
Grasse arrived in the Chesapeake and brought thirty-three 
hundred men to reenforce Lafayette. This made the latter 
equal, if not superior, to Cornwallis on land, and the fleet 
gave the French control at sea. 

On September 5th was fought the ultimately decisive sea 
fight known as the battle of Cape Henry. The British ships 
of Hood and Graves appeared off the Capes, and De Grasse, 
superior in the ratio of twenty-four to nineteen, went out 
to meet them. Although the French ships, especially the 
van, straggled out and became separated, Graves, instead 
of attacking these vigorously with his entire fleet, kept up 
a long-distance cannonade in" which the leading British 
ships suffered as much as the enemy. For the next four 
days, while he still kept the French in sight, he did nothing. 

1 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, p. 397. 



THE DEFEAT OF BRITISH SEA POWER 33 

At last De Grasse, who had been equally Laodicean about 
fighting a decisive action, disappeared. As it proved, he 
hastened back to the Chesapeake, where he found the 
squadron of De Barras from Newport with siege-guns for 
the Franco- American Army. Thus, when Graves later 
returned he found thirty-six enemy sail of the line prepared 
to meet him instead of twenty-four, and he was obliged to 
return to New York without hope of rendering any aid to 
the outnumbered and isolated army of Cornwallis. When 
"Washington and Rochambeau arrived on September 14th, 
the die was cast and there was only one result possible, — 
surrender. This final humiliation for British arms was 
thus essentially a product of sea power, and, however half- 
hearted De Grasse had been in the actual fighting, he, as 
the representative of sea power, is entitled to remembrance 
in American history for this fact. This debt Washing- 
ton himself acknowledged at the time, a further evidence 
of his insight into the importance of sea power in the Revo- 
lutionary struggle.^ 

Though Hood lived to take part the next year in Rod- 
ney's tremendous victory of the Saints' Passage and to be 
the man to whom, deservingly, De Grasse in that battle 
yielded up his sword in abject surrender, yet he could not 
change the far-reaching results of the contest off the Chesa- 
peake capes. Lord North, who had carried on the war as 
George Ill's prime minister, received the news of York- 
town, it is said, "as he would a cannon hall through his 
heart. ' ' Shortly after this the North ministry tell through 
general dissatisfaction, and the war in America stopped, 
though the British armies remained till the treaty of peace 

1 "The surrender of York, from which so much glory and ad- 
vantage are derived to the allies, and the honour of which belongs 
to your Excellency, has greatly anticipated our most sanguine ex- 
pectations." — Washington to De Grasse, October 20, 1781. (The 
Writings of WasMngton, IX. 389.) 



34 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

in 1783. Thus American independence was won on the 
sea. France had sought and secured her revenge for the 
humiliation of twenty years before. 



CHAPTER III 

PAUL JONES, THE GENIUS OP REVOLUTIONARY SEA POWER 

DESPITE the insignificance of the Americans' own 
navy and its effort to fight the Mistress of the 
Seas, and despite the merging of American naval 
effort in the French fleets which appeared on the American 
coast after the consummation of the French alliance, one 
American name emerged from the Revolutionary conflict 
with brighter luster than any Britisher or Frenchman. 
Lord Howe, Admiral Keppel, Rodney, D'Estaing, De 
Guichen, and De Grasse are not usually remembered for ^ 
their activities during these years, but John Paul Jones — 
or as he preferred to be called, Paul Jones — is. 

The extent to which he won recognition in his short ca- 
reer — for he was only twenty-eight when the Revolution 
broke out and only forty-five when he died — and the power 
of his name are unappreciated to-day, even by Americans 
w'ho think they know his achievements. From such com- 
petent observers as Robert Morris, George Washington, and 
John Adams he drew golden opinions, even though they 
were unable to give him tasks equal to his abilities as they 
saw them. As far as any one was entrusted with the com- 
mand of the Continental Navy, except for the ephemeral 
and undeserved incumbency of Esek Hopkins, that honor 
was assigned to Jones in a letter of February 1, 1777, from 
the Marine Board, when an extensive expedition in the 
Gulf of Mexico was contemplated. From the French of- 
ficers with whom he came in contact he received special at- 

35 



36 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

tention and consideration, and from Louis XVI a gold- 
hilted sword, and a decoration and title conferred only 
on those who perform "some brilliant action." From 
Catharine of Russia he received the rank of rear-admiral 
in her service, and from Englishmen, even statesmen as 
distinguished as Disraeli and naval essayists as well known 
as Thursfield, he has won admiration. 

This recognition in the case of Paul Jones was not 
due to any of the usual sources of advancement, — birth, 
family connection, naval experience, or powerful friends. 
No novelist could sketch the rise of a hero from more un- 
propitious and obscure circumstances than those from which 
Paul Jones rose to be the recognized naval genius of his 
time. He was born the son of a gardener in Scotland 
where it touches the Irish Sea; at twelve years of age he 
was apprenticed as a sailor; he enjoyed a brief career in 
the British Navy as a midshipman; he commanded mer- 
chant ships between the Irish Sea port of Whitehaven and 
the West Indies; he donned the actor's robes in Jamaica 
in a period of unemployment ; he engaged in the slave-trade, 
legitimate and illegitimate, — for the times made such a 
distinction. In 1773 at Tobago he killed a member of his 
crew in what was clearly self-defense, but on the advice of 
friends he left his ship and except for one appearance at 
Martha's Vineyard in the same year, where he touched as 
commander of a rather piratical crew, we do not again hear 
of him until he reaches Edenton, North Carolina, becomes 
the guest of Willie Jones, the chief planter of the section, 
and adds to his name, John Paul, the name of his host 
and ever afterward hides his identity as Paul Jones. 
Surely this was enough of adventure and vicissitude for a 
man who in 1775 was only in his twenty-eighth year! 
Yet this was he who in 1778 became the "sailor whom Eng- 
land feared" and the man who made Napoleon say after 



PAUL JONES 37 

Trafalgar, "Had Jones lived to this day, France might 
have had an admiral." In the days of the American Revo- 
lution, before Nelson — who so strikingly resembled Jones 
in his insight, sensitiveness, and dash — came upon the stage, 
this Scotch-American was the veritable genius of naval 
warfare. 

Like Nelson's, Paul Jones's conceptions of naval policy 
and strategy bore the distinct marks of genius. Certainly 
no British or French officer of his time surpassed him, 
' I Rodney, who at the Saints' Passage in 1782 introduced a 
new manoeuver, — that of concentrating one's forces upon 
a part of the enemy, — was almost an innocent blunderer 
in his discovery, while Jones saw the naval problems of the 
American Revolution as a whole and placed before the 
American Marine Board the correct course of action for 
them to follow. He wrote to Robert Morris in 1777: 

I agree with you that our infant nax'y cannot protect our own 
coasts, and therefore ought to be employed to draw of£ the 
enemy's attention by attacking their defenseless places. I am 
persuaded that even with a trifling force, it is practicable to lay 
some of the enemy's cities under contribution, and to do indefinite 
damage to their shipping. I know them to be subject to panic 
under the least surprise; and the business may be effected before 
they have time for recollection.^ 

His insight into the strategy of naval warfare was, how- 
ever, best displayed at the time when the French were pre- 
paring to enter the contest. Then Paul Jones proposed a 
plan which might have ended the war at once, and which 
even when tried too late almost succeeded in attaining that 
result. The plan can be no better explained than in the 
very words of Jones himself as recorded in his letter to 
the American Commissioners in France, a letter he later 
incorporated in the journal which he wrote in 1787 for 

1 De Koven, Life and Letters of John Paul Jones, I. 212. 



38 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

Louis XVI. The original letter was written from Nantes 
on February 10, 1778, soon after he had arrived in the 
Ranger with the news of Burgoyne's surrender, and just 
after he had received from a Nantucket privateer informa- 
tion that the British naval forces *on the American coast 
had been divided between New York and Philadelphia. In 
it he says: 

Were any Continental marine power in Europe disposed to 
avail [itself] of the present situation of affairs in America and 
willing to deserve our Friendship, a single Blow well directed 
would now do the needful. Ten or twelve sail of the line with 
Frigates well equipped and provided would give a good account 
of the Fleet under Lord Howe — for as that force would be 
Superior to any of Howe's divisions — the strongest being once 
taken — the Victorious Squadron might sail in quest of the next 
in strength and reach it before advice.^ 

He explains in his Journal : 

There never had been, and there was no prospect of there 
being again, so wonderful an opportunity of striking an over- 
whelming blow at the English Navy. If the plan of the expedi- 
tion had been adopted without delay, and a squadron despatched 
from Brest, Great Britain would have had no knowledge of this 
destructive project until after it had been carried out in America. 
Lord Howe would have been surprised and captured in the 
Delaware ; his squadron would have immediately been armed from 
the American forces, and separating in small detachments to 
left and right, the naval forces of England would have been 
completely destroyed before the arrival of Admiral Byron. The 
resulting enthusiasm of the Americans would have so supported 
General Washington that he would have taken New York, and 
captured or destroyed all the English regiments in the United 
States. . . . 

. . . Thus, in a single campaign, with little expense, France 
would have had an admirable opportunity of establishing the 
Independence of America, and with a single blow to bring Great 
Britain to her feet, thereafter to abandon her boast of being 

1 DeKoven, Li/e and Letters of John Paul Jones, I, 257. 



PAUL JONES 39 

"Mistress of the Seas." . . . What will be the opinion of posterity 
regarding France's long neglect of this unique opportunity? 
Will it not judge that this fault was only increased by the 
adoption of the project three months later, when the time had 
passed, by sending the squadron from Toulon instead of from 
Brest, and causing a delay of at least another month? It is 
useless to add to this narrative of these details the unhappy 
effects which were caused by this delay, the general result of 
which was a long, bloody and costly war in which France, Hol- 
land, Spain and the East Indies were afterwards embroiled.^ 

As we have seen, D'Estaing arrived only ten days too late 
to catch Howe's fleet on its way back to New York, when it 
was encumbered with supply-vessels and was without re- 
enforcements. 

The breadth of mind of this self-educated and foreign- 
bom American sailor is also well illustrated by his insist- 
ence on the need of thorough theoretical and cultural 
training for the officers of the infant navy. His emphasis 
of the ideal of "officer and gentleman" was far ahead of 
his time and remains one of the permanent heritages of 
his professional genius. 

But Jones's fame rests to-day not on his strategical 
ideas but on his execution in real ships and against real 
opponents of these very principles of warfare. In the 
attack on Nassau in the Bahamas, where the Continental 
fleet made its first raid, it was his knowledge of the island, 
its roads and anchorages, which made the expedition suc- 
cessful. His cruises in the Providence and the Alfred 
were directed largely against the British bases of supply 
in Nova Scotia and Cape Breton, and here he accom- 
plished much damage to the enemy. It was here also that 
he captured the Mellish with its cargo of military sup- 
plies for the armies in Canada. In the Ranger, in which 
he carried to France the news of the surrender of Bur- 

1 DeKoven, Life and Letters of John Paul Jones, I, 258. 



40 



SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 



RAA^Ce/f, APRIL/0 —MAYB, 1778 

OONHOMMe niCHARD, AUG. 14 — 3ef>T. 25", /779 

ssRAP/s, sepr. 2S — ocr 3, 1779 



^^FA/^0£ IS. 



. ALLIANCE DEC.26, 1779 -F£0. lO, I780 ^^''^ \ ,•-> 




EUROPEAN CRUISES OP PAUL JONES 

Courses of ships adapted from the map by Mrs. A. H. Eastman in Avery's 
History of the United States, VI, 264. 

goyne, he first showed himself in European waters, secur- 
ing in Quiberon Bay in February, 1778, the first formal 
salute to the American flag from the French. 

But it was in his two celebrated cruises around the 
British Isles that Paul Jones best exemplified his ideas of 



PAUL JONES 41 

naval warfare, — cruises which stirred England as violently 
as the German cruiser raids on their East Coast in the 
World War, but which were entirely free from German 
ruthlessness. Realizing as he did the value of a sudden 
attack on English commerce and the coast towns, where 
so far the war had not penetrated, he sailed out in the 
Ranger for the region of his boyhood, — ^the area between 
northeast Ireland and southwest Scotland, — determined by 
a bold dramatic stroke to shatter the peaceful dreams of 
complacent Britons and to destroy throughout Europe 
the invincibility of British sea power. After his attempted 
raid on the shipping at Whitehaven had failed and he 
had been unlucky enough not to find the Earl of Selkirk 
at home when he went to capture him as a hostage to secure 
the exchange of American prisoners then languishing in 
vile English prisons, he saw, off the northeast corner of 
Ireland, the British sloop of war, Drake, poorly manned 
and poorly prepared for battle, coming out to meet his 
"pirate ship." A few nights before he had boldly sailed 
into Belfast Lough and almost boarded the Drake in a 
night attack, but when the wind carried him too far ahead 
of his enemy he had, without detection, worked his ship 
back out of the bay. On April 24, 1778, when the Drake 
finally offered battle, Jones secured a raking position off 
her bows, and then ranged alongside, all the time pouring 
in effective broadsides. In an hour and five minutes the 
Drake lost most of her masts and rigging, as well as forty- 
two men killed or wounded out of about a hundred and 
seventy-five. Thereupon she surrendered, for her higher 
officers M^ere all wounded, and an American prize crew 
navigated her back to France, a visible token of American 
sea power in its fighting moods. As Mrs. DeKoven re- 
marks, "Jones was, in fact, the most formidable enemy 
which England then possessed upon the sea." To destroy 



42 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

British prestige upon the very waters of the British Isles 
was the most effective method of securing continental 
opposition to British supremacy. 

Paul Jones, moreover, as soon as France was allied with 
the colonies, evolved still further plans for bringing the 
war home to Englishmen, especially to the commercial 
classes, in his proposed raids against the Baltic fleets, the 
Iceland fishery, the Hudson Bay ships, and the West 
Indian trade. As before, he felt that a few American 
raiders might alarm British trade sufficiently to stir the 
merchants and drive them into strong opposition to the war, 
for which the Tories — the landed gentry, who felt the effects 
of war least — were primarily responsible. 

Though at first Paul Jones hoped for a considerable 
force of French ships under his command, he was at last 
resigned to accept the old hulk Duras and to take the 
scrapped guns of the French arsenals. Thus equipped, 
and in like fashion furnished with a motley crew of French- 
men, Englishmen, Maltese, Portuguese, Malays, and some 
recently exchanged American prisoners, he sailed in nom- 
inal command of a force of five small ships, the best of 
which was the American-built Alliance commanded by 
Pierre Landais, an erratic and insubordinate Frenchman. 
Circling west and north around the British Isles, and then 
sailing down the eastern coast, on September 23, 1779, he 
found the Baltic convoy of merchantmen off Flamborough 
Head, and by sunset was engaged with the Serapis, a 
frigate of fifty guns and as new as his ship, now renamed 
the Bonhomme Richard, was old. 

Already deserted by all his ships except one which en- 
gaged a smaller British vessel, he waited for the Serapis 
to come upon his starboard quarter, and then poured in a 
broadside. The two frigates soon came together and were 
lashed side by side by Jones himself, for he saw hope of 



PAUL JONES 43 



/ / /^^^=^ \\aluance 

~^-^-- 











THE CAPTURE OF THE SERAPIS BY THE BONHOMME RICHARD 

victory onl}- in a close action where the British superiority 
in sailing would be nullified. Even after his larger guns 
had burst or been abandoned for fear they would burst, 
and even after his lower deck had almost been shot out of 
his ship by the British fire, Paul Jones maintained fire with 
his three remaining guns on his spar-deck, and soon 
swept the British deck clear of all opposition. Meantime 
acting in the spirit of, if not actually uttering the words, 
"I have not yet begun to fight," he encouraged his men 
in the tops to clear the rigging of the Serapis and keep 
the enemy below. Soon a hand-grenade from this source 
was hurled through an open hatch down upon the gun-deck 
of the Serapis, the deck from which her chief fire was com- 
ing, ignited the powder lying there, and almost blew the 
ship up. Pearson, the British commander, who had seen 



44 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

the Alliance circle around the two eonxbatants and fire 
broadsides which struck the British frigate, — and the Bon- 
homme Bichard also, as Jones proved afterward, — felt that 
he was in the presence of superior forces and surrendered 
in sight of the English coast to a man whose ship had been 
kept from sinking only by the forced labors at the pumps 
of British prisoners numerically superior to his entire crew 
when the battle began. 

Though Jones had to transfer his men to the Serapis 
the next day and see his own ship sink beneath the waters 
of the North Sea, — her colors still flying, — the capture 
reflected more glory on Paul Jones than did the affair of 
the Drake and aided materially in stimulating European 
efforts to curb the sea supremacy of Great Britain. When 
Jones, after taking the Serapis to the Texel, sailed 
through the English Channel, and himself appeared in 
Paris, he became the lion of the hour, the cynosure of eyes 
as distinguished as those of Marie Antoinette, and the 
favorite of all except the French officers who were chafing 
at the lack of French naval achievement thus far in the 
war. Welcomed to the presence of Louis XVI, at fre- 
quent intervals, he charmed every one by his grace and 
geniality. 

At this time Paul Jones was at the height of his reputa- 
tion, for never again in his lifetime did he have opportunity 
to achieve a striking success. In all the vicissitudes of his 
subsequent career, — his return to America, his mission to 
Europe regarding prize-money, his service in the Black Sea 
with the Russian Navy in its war against the Turks, and 
his last months in Paris, where he died in 1792, — he never 
again was given the chance to show his real ability, and 
passed away, doubtless, with disappointment in his heart, 
though, as we now know, he had been the spiritual, and 
largely the material, father of the American Navy. 



PAUL JONES 45 

What were the secrets of character which enabled Paul 
Jones to rise from a miserable West Indian merchant sailor 
in the year 1768 to the most brilliant naval commander in 
Europe in 1779, and to leave behind him the name of 
Britain's most formidable enemy on the sea, creator of the 
American Navy, friend of Louis of France and Catharine 
of Russia, trusted adviser of Lafayette and Washington? 
One secret of his genius was that he possessed a passionate 
curiosity which drove him to master every matter and every 
accomplishment that presented itself. With an ever-active 
mind, he never felt content with his professional knowledge, 
and in 1775 and 1778 he asked to accompany the fleets of 
Hopkins and D'Orvilliers respectively to perfect himself 
in naval practice. And he did not rest until the principles 
of naval strategy were familiar to him, though there were 
no fleets for him to command or campaigns to direct. Con- 
spicuously among the sailors of his day he believed that 
victories are thought out before they are fought out. 

With this intellectual quality went ambition that never 
palled, a fierceness of desire to become great and be recog- 
nized as great which drove him on in every action of his 
career. Never ready for repose, but always greedy of 
honor, he was willing to pay the price in hardship and 
battle risk if only the path of glory opened before him. 
Thus animated, he could hardly lack pride, and fail to 
feel angry at every act of favoritism, and every form of 
political or sectional bias, which deprived him of oppor- 
tunities for distinguished conduct. It is true that his 
unfair subordination in rank to men from the Northern 
colonies at the beginning of the Revolution embittered his 
active career, as did similar favoritism during his months 
in the Russian Navy, but this was the penalty that had to 
be paid for Paul Jones's obsession for achievement. To 
such ambition the slightest detail in naval routine or 



46 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

etiquette was of importance, and one need not wonder 
that Jones was most exacting in regard to the behavior 
of officers and men toward him and in all his relations 
with foreign naval officers. Only the perfect satisfied his 
professional conscience. 

In this stirring of soul and intensity of spirit, Carlyle, 
if he had studied Paul Jones, would have found those very 
qualities whose absence seemed to him to make Washington 
a personage of so little importance. Rankling in Jones's 
breast from the date of his earliest letters is the mystery 
of his birth, his feeling that he was the son of a gentleman, 
perhaps his later patron, the Earl of Selkirk himself. This 
pride he felt outraged when he was treated as though on 
any lower level. A partial factor in this resentment against 
society was his experience in the West Indies before 1775, 
when becoming involved in disputes with various crews he 
commanded, he was twace accused of murder. Though he 
was guiltless in both cases, was acquitted in the first, and in 
the second case had, it was clear, struck in self-defense, he 
felt that he was still branded as a murderer. Few letters 
la}^ bare a man's soul as does Jones's to Franklin in 1779, 
where in reply to a playful but innocent remark of Frank- 
lin's Jones, thinking Franklin has heard the story and be- 
lieves it, unbares his past and relates in detail what he calls 
' ' the great misfortune of my life ' ' ^ — the killing at Tobago 
of a member of his crew who was leading a mutiny and was 
about to strike him down. Contributing to this same con- 
flict of personality was the consciousness that in England 
"he was regarded as a pirate, a renegade who came back 
to sack the home of his childhood. Yet Jones never killed 
a man on English soil, and when his sailors carried off the 

1 Correspondence of Benjamin Franklin, Philadelphia Philo- 
sophical Society, Letter 176. Also in DeKoven's Life and Letters of 
Paul Jones, II. Appendix B 



PAUL JONES 47 

Selkirk silver plate lie bought it back from them and 
returned it with a courteous letter. 

In his political ideas he was not only filled with a sturdy 
love for his adopted country but was, like Jefferson, en- 
thusiastic over the new conceptions of freedom and democ- 
racy which America proclaimed to the world. "I have 
drawn my sword in the present generous struggle for the 
rights of men," and "I am ready to sacrifice my life also 
with cheerfulness, if that forfeiture could restore peace and 
good- will among mankind, " ^ he writes the Countess of Sel- 
kirk in 1778, assuming a tone of polite familiarity which 
offended Lady Selkirk, who did not understand the feelings 
of Jones toward her house. In his advanced attitude 
toward national ideals and democracy, Jones was in great 
contrast to Nelson, who could never think of a Frenchman 
except as a libertine and a blasphemer. 

The marks of genius, moreover, showed themselves not 
only in Jones's ideas and actions but in his very presence. 
On the quarter-deck, as commander of a ship, he stood 
peerless. Professor Laughton, who has charged Jones 
with piracy in his operations around Great Britain, and 
who cannot be regarded as a friendly critic, says, "It was 
Jones, and Jones alone, who won the battle of the Bon- 
homme Richard and the Serapis." ^ He was in all respects 
a real leader of men. Different as he was in temperament 
and mind from his raw crews, he yet radiated from his 
very presence obedience, discipline, and heroism. No man 
fought battles with crews more heterogeneous or with ele- 
ments so antagonistic and jealous. Yet he came off victor 
in the Ranger-Drake action, after his crew had virtually 
refused to fight an armed ship ; he won the Serapis when 

1 Jones to Lady Selkirk, Brest, May 8, 1778, Memoirs of Paul 
Jones, I, 90-1. 

2 Laughton, Studies in Naval History, p. 403. 



48 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

his crew had lost heart and his petty officers even sug- 
gested surrender. Concealed somewhere in that slight body 
with its rather delicate features and romantic eyes, was a 
personal magnetism which with dynamic power repelled 
revolt and energized resistance on the decks of frail frig- 
ates, and enlisted in the support of liberty great ladies of 
the court of France and great leaders of nations which 
hated Englishmen. There was about this man an attrac- 
tiveness, a depth of feeling, a modesty, and a simplicity 
which drew to him strangers such as Willie Jones, the 
elegant Southern planter, Robert IMorris, the shrewd Phila- 
delphia business man, and Marie Antoinette, the frivolous 
queen. 

Paul Jones rests to-day in the mausoleum prepared 
for him at Annapolis, as the great example of naval genius 
surmounting all obstacles which even the most fertile imagi- 
nations might place in the path of the ambitious, and as a 
perpetual voice of encouragement to those youths who, 
as they muse upon him and his victories, may at least dimly 
realize the decisive part a man of genius may play in the 
work of the sea to which they have dedicated their lives. 



CHAPTER lY 

THE RISE OF COMMERCIAL. SEA POWER IN AMERICA 
DURING THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 

THOUGH the American Navy in the years of the 
Revolution had, assisted largely by France, 
acquitted itself well and produced from its ranks 
Paul Jones, the naval commander of the time most deserv- 
ing the name of genius, American sea power, in the com- 
mercial sense — meaning by that term the merchant marine 
and the commerce which depends on it — was destined in 
the years that succeeded the Revolution to achieve far 
more brilliant success. ' Just as before the Revolution the 
maritime interests of the colonies were almost their chief 
activity, so as soon as peace came with the mother country, 
American sea power as commercially constituted quickly 
assumed distinctly the first place in the national life. This 
merchant shipping, as soon as the wars between England 
and France began, saw its opportunity, and by 1803 was, 
with no exceptions, the great carrier of the world's goods. 
Despite the efforts of England to retain her commercial 
supremacy on the sea highways, the United States, through 
its inherent advantages for sea traffic, and despite vexatious 
restrictions and confiscations by both belligerents, achieved 
a power at sea that was, more than is usually appreciated, 
the real basis on which its later commercial prosperity, and 
especially the naval successes of the War of 1812, were 
established. 

It is safe to say that no merchant navy, from the days 

49 



50 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

of Carthage to the rise of German commercial sea power in 
the last years of the nineteenth century, ever overcame so 
many difficulties, or achieved such brilliant results in so 
short a period of time. Deprived of the preferential bene- 
fits of being part of the British Empire; belonging to a 
country composed of thirteen quarreling states, each of 
which was supreme in its control of commerce and shipping ; 
without naval forces to protect it; the prey of pirates in 
the entire seven seas ; the innocent third party in the wars 
that raged almost continually from the day when the 
French revolutionists, by the execution of Louis XVI, made 
an end of monarchy in France, until Napoleon saw the 
desolate shores of St. Helena, — it still flourished.^ Robbed 
of its ships and cargoes if it did not submit to search by 
British cruisers, and robbed of both ship and cargo 
by French vengeance if it did so submit; its best seamen 
plucked from it for the decks of British frigates before the 
highlands of New Jersey or the gleam of Boston Light 
faded from view; even — to cap a dismal climax — forced 
into idleness and starvation by the acts of the American 
Congress and President, — is it strange that the American 
merchant marine has seemed to some writers to have been 
characterized during this period by poltroonery and dis- 
aster of which every American should be ashamed if it had 
not been relieved by the glories of the "War of 1812 ? 

Yet it is but fair to say that a more careful view of the 
period, even with an appreciation of all these disadvantages 
and disasters, shows that it was a time of triumph and 
that not only did the naval forces of the nation do credit- 
able work but commercially the United States throve on 
just this sort of opposition; and in 1810, after having for 
much of the previous decade dominated the carrying-trade 
of the world, its merchant marine was actually greater in 
tonnage than in any year of the next thirty-seven. And 



THE RISE OF COMMERCIAL SEA POWER 51 

from the enterprise of American merchant sailors arose the 
cloud — smaller than a man 's hand — which gave warning of 
the overthrow of Napoleon himself. 

The new conditions that the American merchant marine 
"faced when peace was declared in 1783 were far different 
from what they had been at the end of the Seven Years' 
War only twenty years earlier.. To be sure, Americans 
were assured of participation in the Newfoundland fish- 
eries, but their whole relation to Great Britain was other- 
wise reversed. 'The Navigation Acts, which they had 
violated in prerevolutionary days but which had at least 
protected them from foreign competition, now sheltered 
them no longer, and Britain herself became a formidable 
competitor, who had advantage in every market. The 
chief trade of the colonies had been the trade with the 
West Indies, and from this trade, so far as it concerned 
the British islands, they were now excluded./ Furthermore, 
the British Navy no longer protected them against the 
pirates who infested the West Indies, and especially the 
Mediterranean, and who now swarmed about the American 
merchant ship with confidence that no injury would be 
punished. Lastly, the British ministry that succeeded 
Pitt's in 1783 clapped prohibitive duties on American 
goods entering British ports in American vessels. At the 
same time British ships filled with British goods-!— for which 
there Mas a great demand as soon as the peace of 1783 
came— thronged American harbors, and, as they could 
carry back American products without paying the English 
import duties imposed on American exports, effectually 
prevented any competition from Americans. And worst 
of all, the British allowed an American vessel to bring to 
England only the product of its own state, — a great hard- 
.ship where most of the ships were owned in New England 
and most of the exported products were found in the South. 



52 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

This melancholy condition of America's chief activity, 
commerce, led directly to the formation of the Constitution 
itself J As each state was a law unto itself in regard to 
foreign and domestic commerce and might impose tonnage 
taxes not only on British ships but also on the ships of other 
states entering its ports, no common and effective retalia- 
tion could be offered to British sea power and its commercial 
avarice. The Annapolis Convention, which led directly 
to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, was therefore 
brought about partly by the restrictions on trade between 
the states but also by the inability of Virginia to control 
foreign ships loading on its side of the Potomac. Reenforc- 
ing this immediate need, came the recognition of the 
necessity for a common commercial policy for the whole 
United States. Since the Articles of Confederation were 
insufficient, the few delegates who met in Annapolis in 
September, 1786, adjourned after urging the calling of a 
Constitutional Convention. 

The Constitution finally framed cured the difficulties 
which produced the Annapolis Convention. The Federal 
Government was given power ''to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations and among the several States, and with the 
Indian tribes. " The states were forbidden, with slight ex- 
ceptions, to "lay any impost or duties on imports or ex- 
ports"; nor were they without the consent to Congress to 
"lay any duty of tonnage." Thus was the field cleared for 
a growing merchant marine which should serve the interests 
of the whole country, rather than those of any particular 
state. Furthermore, the Congress in its first real legisla- 
tive act, provided for the protection and encouragement of 
American ships. It allowed a discount of ten per cent, of 
the tariff duties upon imports brought to this country in 
ships built and owned by American citizens. Taking a leaf 
out of the British practice. Congress also gave the American 



THE RISE OF COMMERCIAL SEA POWER 53 

ships engaged in the tea trade with China and the East 
Indies the advantage of a considerable reduction in duties, 
especially if the tea came directly from these Eastern coun- 
tries. 

The results of these measures, especiall}^ the stabilizing 
influence of the Constitution and the preferential tariff, 
were soon felt. In the one year between December 31, 
1789, and December 31, 1790, the American tonnage regis- 
tered for the foreign trade more than doubled. In 1789, 
England had nearly a hundred thousand tons of shipping 
in the American trade ; in 1796, only one fifth as much. 
As Mr. H. C. Adams says in his ''Taxation in the United 
States": "The growth of American shipping from 1789 
to 1807 is without parallel in the history of the commercial 
world." 

It is not surprising, therefore, that new exploits were 
recorded to the credit of American ships and sailors, who, 
trained in the long traditions of colonial seafaring and 
hardened by the bitter experiences of the Revolution, 
sought new markets and new seas for the pursuit of gain 
and adventure. In the years 1787,-88,-89,-90, Captain 
Robert Gray of Boston in the ship Columbia won the honor 
of piloting the first American vessel around the world. 
Sailing from Boston to the west coast of North America, 
he discovered the Columbia River, thus establishing our 
claim to the Oregon territory, traded with the Indians for 
furs, sailed across the Pacific to China, where he disposed 
of his valuable cargo, and then returned home around the 
Cape of Good Hope. From just about this time, also, dates 
the beginning of the American East Indian trade, a trade 
where seamanship, fighting ability, commercial shrewdness, 
and an indomitable courage that could carry an enterprise 
through against innumerable odds, were necessary for suc- 
cess. The ship must be sound to stand the rapid inroads 



54 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

of tropical insects ; the captain must be a skilful navigator, 
for many ships were so small that nowadays we should 
hesitate to leave sight of land in them; he must also be 
a shrewd business man who could sell and purchase three 
or four cargoes in the course of one voyage, keep the inter- 
ests of the o^\aiers always before him, and know how to deal 
with the European trader, the Chinese merchant, and the 
Malay chief. He must also be a commander able to retain 
the respect and obedience of vigorous young Americans 
who looked forward to lives, not before the mast, but as 
captains and traders themselves. In the long voyage that 
might consume years, he must decide everything himself 
without communication with the owners in America, and 
a turn of fortune or a failure of judgment might spell 
the difference between wealth and bankruptcy. 
N/ With the beginning of war between England and the 
French Republic in 1793, American sea power encountered 
all the opportunities and all the vicissitudes of the neutral 
nation in wartime. Its trade and its profits increased 
because of its neutral character, and because of the greater 
drain on the merchant marines of the warring forces to 
supply the needs of their navies. Each country tried to 
stamp out neutral trade with its enemy, but desisted after 
less than a year and then adopted a policy of using the 
neutral for its own advantage and preventing such advan- 
tages for the enemy. The chief blow which the American 
ship-owner and trader felt, however, was the revival by 
Great Britain of the old Rule of 1756. Before hostilities 
began, France prohibited the trade between the French 
West Indies and France to American vessels, in fact to all 
except the French marine. With the breaking out of war 
France opened this trade to the world, which meant to 
America, as the latter was the chief neutral with a mer- 
cantile fleet. But Great Britain thereupon revived the 



56 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

Rule of 1756, which said that in war a neutral should 
not enjoy a carrying-trade which was prohibited it in time 
of peace. Some of these grievances were alleviated by 
Jay's treaty with England, which went into force in 1795, 
but England and the United States could not agree on the 
trade with the British West Indies, and commerce con- 
tinued to be carried on without legal authority and subject 
to frequent interruption. 

And the treaty negotiated by Jay roused the anger of the 
French Directory, and produced fresh assaults on Ameri- 
can ships in the West Indies from French privateers and 
cruisers. The result was the so-called Naval War with 
France, recounted in the next chapter, which, however, se- 
cured some added security for American commerce. The 
unsettled conditions in the Mediterranean due to the Euro- 
pean conflict also gave freer rein to the pirates of the North 
African states, with whom the United States concluded vari- 
ous treaties, generally paying heavily for slight immunity 
from their depredations. Finally in 1801-5 the United 
States fought Tripoli and destroyed this danger to Ameri- 
can trade. 
\/ So great, however, was the demand for maritime carriers 
during the French Revolutionary struggle, and so insuffi- 
cient the supply of European vessels, that the period 
from 1793 to 1805 saw the tonnage of the merchant fleets 
of the young republic increase every year with one slight 
exception, and more than double in the twelve years. 
The secret was the so-called "broken voyage." Al- 
though by the Rule of 1756, American vessels could no 
longer carry the sugar, molasses, and other products of 
the French, Spanish, and Dutch West Indies directly 
to European countries, yet, as was decided by the British 
Admiralty courts in the case of the American ship Polly 
in 1800, the cargo of sugar and cocoa which she was carry- 



THE RISE OF COMMERCIAL SEA POWER 57 

ing from Cuba to Spain could not be seized by the 
British, because, after leaving Havana, she had landed 
her cargo in Marblehead, paid duty on it, repaired, re- 
loaded, secured a new clearance, and begun her voyage 
anew. Though this added to the cost of the goods to the 
consumer, there were no competing ships which could 
make the direct voyage, and American ship-owners and 
skippers grew rich on the profits of this trade. As a 
result of this device, when England and Napoleon once 
more went to war in 1803, the whole carrying-trade 
of Europe fell into American hands. McMaster says: 

The merchant flag of every belligerent, save England, disap- 
peared from the sea. France and Holland absolutely ceased to 
trade imder their flags. Spain for a while continued to transport 
her specie and her bullion in her own ships, protected by her 
men-of-war. But this, too, she soon gave up, and by 1806 the , 
dollars of Mexico and the ingots of Peru were brought to her 
shores in American bottoms. It was under our flag that the 
gum trade was carried on with Senegal; that the sugar trade was 
can'ied on with Cuba; that coffee was exported from Caracas; 
and hides and indigo from South America. From Vera Cruz, 
from Cartagena, from La Plata, from the French colonies in 
the Antilles, from Cayenne, from Dutch Guiana, from the Isles 
of France and Reunion, from Batavia and Manila, great fleets 
of American merchantmen sailed for the United States, there to 
neutralize the voyage and go on to Europe.^ 

With the entire commercial structure of the United 
States organized on the basis of the "broken voyage," 
it is not surprising that the decision in the case of the 
Essex, in 1805, produced panic in America and inflamed 
the country against England so thoroughly that Jeffer- 
son was enabled to embark upon the series of retaliatory 
measures of non-intercourse and embargo which ended 
only with the declaration of war in 1812. The Essex, 

1 McMaster, History of the People of the United States, III, 224, 



58 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

with a cargo which she had secured in Barcelona, was 
on her way to Havana. After having stopped at Salem, 
Massachusetts, in the regular way, landed her goods, 
and paid the duty, she underwent repairs, and cleared 
for Havana as in every case of "broken voyage." But, 
when seized and libeled by the British, she was condemned 
as a prize inasmuch as the cargo had never been intended 
for sale in the United States, but had been sent from Spain 
for the Cuban market. Thus intention was made a new 
element in construing an old precedent, and the voyage 
became one prohibited by the Rule of 1756. 
N^ This was the first of several measures adopted by Great 
Britain to strangle the influx of foreign and colonial prod- 
ucts into the countries controlled by Napoleon and to secure 
for herself as far as possible, and especially by acting as 
a middleman, the trade which the neutral American marine 
was now snatching- from her grasp. In 1806 she declared 
by an Order in Council a "paper blockade" of all the 
European coast from Hamburg to Brest, in so far — and 
this shows her commercial purpose — as vessels brought 
there anything not a product of their own lands, or goods 
that had not been manufactured in Great Britain. Again 
in 1807, another Order in Council forbade neutrals to trade 
between any two enemy ports, and, this not sufficing, in 
the same year, a third Order in Council excluded neutrals 
from all enemy ports unless their ships stopped first in a 
British port, paid certain duties, and secured a trading 
license from the British authorities. 
\ Remembering the Essex interpretation of a direct or 
"continuous" voyage, — as it was later called when the 
United States adopted it in the Civil War and used it 
against England, — a lesson England learned so well that 
she revived it most opportunely in the early years of the 
World War, when the United States again became the 



THE RISE OF COMMERCIAL SEA POWER 59 

great neutral carrier and England was again fighting the 
land power of a continental despot, — we can easily see the 
handicaps under which the American merchant fleets oper- 
ated. Yet, as the exceptions indicate, England did not 
endeavor to prohibit all commerce with Napoleon's do- 
mains, but tried to make such trade pay toll in English 
ports on its way to and from the Continent. Since Eng- 
land, then, as now, perhaps more then than now, was chiefly 
dependent on her commerce and the interchange of 
products in the markets of Liverpool and London, — even 
more than on her manufacturing, for the Industrial Revolu- 
tion was only gaining impetus in these years, — she realized 
that she must have trade to live, and must trade even with 
the enemy to sustain her commercial life. As long, then, 
as she received her share she was willing to allow trade 
even in neutral bottoms, if only the products did not 
directly enrich the coffers of her enemies; she made no 
attempts to prohibit trade absolutel}'; her chief idea was 
to control such trade and secure her share in the profits. 
Her predominance at sea was therefore used toward this 
end rather than toward strict blockade such as she enforced 
against Germany in the World War. This also explains 
partly how American foreign commerce grew during the 
whole period of the Napoleonic Wars, for as long as Ameri- 
can ships fell in with her trade interests, England was 
willing to allow them to operate. Accordingly, in 1810 
we find the total of American ships engaged in the foreign 
trade 981,019 gross tons, a figure not surpassed till 1847. | 
/ In Napoleon the young and rising American commercial 
sea power had a very difiierent kind of enemy. When the 
emperor, having seen his last attempt against English sea 
power sink shattered by the onslaught of Nelson's fleet at 
Trafalgar, inaugurated his Continental System with the 
Berlin Decree of 1806, and tried to shut up England from 



60 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

all profitable trade with the rest of the world, especially 
with the European continent, he struck a worse blow at 
neutrals than he did at England herself. Her commerce, 
which he recognized as vital to her, was largely dependent 
on neutral carriers, but her sea power was such as to put 
the neutral ship under her control, to force it to stop at her 
ports, and so contribute to her commercial prosperity. 
Since an American ship could hardly sail the Atlantic 
except at the pleasure of the British Navy, which meant 
stopping at a British port, the Berlin Decree and the later 
decrees made virtually all American vessels fair prey to 
French privateers or, according to the Milan Decree of 1807, 
subject to confiscation on reaching a port controlled by 
the emperor. Worse than that was the deliberate robbery 
of the American merchant marine in 1810 by the Ram- 
bouillet Decree, when, under a pretense that American ships 
entering a French port or a port in a French colony were 
there illegally according to American laws (Jefferson's 
Embargo and Non-Intercourse Act), Napoleon actually 
seized ten million dollars' worth of ships and cargoes in 
the ports of France, Spain, Holland, Prussia, Denmark, 
and Norway. 

It is not necessary here to go into the Continental Sys- 
tem itself, for with all its theory of isolating England 
from the trade of the world and starving her commercially, 
the plans of Napoleon, like England's own, were not rigid 
or consistent, and just as England sought to attract neutral 
ships to trade through her ports, so Napoleon by licenses 
and "certificates of origin," — which showed that the vessel 
had not touched a British port, — allowed considerable trade, 
even the export of grain to England. And the American 
neutral captain went on his way successfully, furnished 
with two complete sets of papers by the connivance of the 
British authorities, one showing that he had stopped at a 



THE RISE OF COMMERCIAL SEA POWER 61 

British port and was thereby saved from seizure by British 
cruisers, and another stating that he was directly from a 
neutral or friendly port, which he could exhibit to prevent 
confiscation in the Napoleonic countries. 

By one of the ironies of history, Napoleon's confiscation 
of American ships in the Baltic in 1810 led to his over- 
throw, Alexander of Russia refused to grant Napoleon's 
request that he seize American vessels in Russian harbors, 
a difference which led in 1812 to Napoleon's fatal invasion 
of Russia in an effort to include her in the Continental 
System. As Henry Adams the historian says, this was "the 
rock on which Napoleon's destiny split; for the quarrels 
which in the summer of 1811 became violent between 
France and the two independent Baltic Powers — Russia 
and Sweden — were chiefly due to those omnipresent Ameri- 
can ships, which throve under pillage and challenged con- 
fiscation," ^ 

The strongest proof, however, of the inherent vitality of 
American commercial sea power was given not by its re- 
action to the insidious regulations of the British or the 
brutal blows of Napoleon, but by its successful survival of 
the acts of its own government, acts which threatened the 
entire extinction of American commerce on the sea and the 
ruin of the country's chief basis of prosperity. This was 
the policy of embargo and non-intercourse which Jefferson 
inaugurated in 1807, just after the British Orders in Coun- 
cil of May, 1806, and Napoleon's counter-decree from Berlin 
of November. Public opinion in this country was strongly 
stirred against Great Britain by the Chesapeake-Leopard 
affair, when a British man-of-war fired upon an American 
frigate, subdued her, and took from her decks four mem- 
bers of her crew who were alleged to be British deserters. 
This made easy the enactment of Jefferson's Embargo Act, 

1 Henry Adams, History of the United States, V, 408. 



62 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

Tinder which, from December, 1807, to March, 1809, Ameri- 
can foreign commerce ceased to exist. No ship under any 
flag could sail to a foreign port, American ports were full of 
idle ships, American importers and exporters went into 
bankruptcy by the scores, and thirty thousand out of forty 
thousand American sailors were thrown out of employment. 
In New York alone the act cast twelve hundred men into 
prison for debt. It is no wonder that the shipping states, 
New England and New York, virtually defied the law, and 
that heavy bonds were required of every captain who sailed 
for a voyage between domestic ports. That the act did 
not forever ruin American shipping is due to the fact that 
American vessels in foreign waters at the passage of the 
act remained away from American ports and traded abroad 
until its repeal, and also to the fact that the British, by 
formal order, allowed embargo-breakers, who necessarily 
sailed without legal papers, to pursue their voyages un- 
molested. 

The Non-Intercourse Act differed from its predecessor, 
the Embargo Act, simply in that it prohibited trade only 
with Great Britain, France, and their colonies, and pro- 
vided that in case either nation removed the restrictions 
upon American trade, commercial relations might be re- 
newed with that nation. When this also failed to effect 
the repeal of a single one of the British Orders or French 
Decrees, commerce was again made free in 1810, except 
that the President might forbid intercourse with either 
France or England in case the other country repealed 
its obnoxious restrictions before May 4, 1811. Owing to 
Napoleon's skilful manceuvering in claiming that he had 
repealed his decrees, Madison, when the time came, brought 
on non-intercourse with Great Britain, and — as she did not 
yield — recommended a declaration of war, which went into 
effect on June 19, 1812. With that act, American sea 



THE RISE OF COMMERCIAL SEA POWER 63 

power ceased to have commercial aspects and became purely 
naval. The news that on June 23d the British Government 
had revoked the Orders in Council did not reach the United 
States in time to avert the conflict. 

The reasons which had induced Jefferson to recommend 
and Congress to adopt measures as ruinous to American 
shipping as the Embargo Act are clear ; they are, however, 
as unsatisfactory and invalid as they seemed to the Ameri- 
can merchants and sailors of the time, for against the 
embargo New England rose almost as one man. The idea 
of an embargo or non-importation or non-intercourse act 
was not, however, a new one, having been adopted early 
in the Revolutionary struggle, and non-intercourse having 
been defeated in 1793 only by the casting vote of the Vice- 
President, John Adams. But without a naval force ade- 
quate to command the respect of Great Britain's over- 
whelming armadas, Jefferson, naturally of a pacific tem- 
perament, saw no method of retaliating except by economic 
warfare. Realizing the importance of American shipping 
to the belligerent nations, he thought that by mere stoppage 
of this trade the United States could force from England 
and Napoleon whatever measures of relief it wished. As a 
matter of fact, the restrictions did not seriously embarrass 
either country, as many American ships remained at sea, 
and England especially could adapt herself by easing 
the Orders in Council to the entrance of other neutrals to 
her carrying-trade. No more than Napoleon by his Con- 
tinental System, could Jefferson with his embargo stifle 
the operation of economic laws, or completely isolate 
England. Just as the German submarine blockade of the 
British Isles in the World War embarrassed but could not 
defeat England, so Jefferson harmed only his own country- 
men by his ill-advised interference. The extent of British 
sea power, commercial as well as naval, was entirely too 



UNITED STATES 

204.426 DiW.T« 

724,124 DW.T^ 

951.609 D.W.T-*. 

1383.739 aWX— 
2.137.174 D.W.T--^ 

1.920.251 D.W.T-^ 

1.787.663 DW.T.-« 
3.271.147 DW.T.„^ 
5.303.180 D.W.Tm4 
8.030,807 DW.T. 
6.369.761 D.WT. 
6.102052 DW.T 
6.636.746 D.W.T. 
7.747258 D.WT. 
11,262.123 D.W.T 
IW93.437D.W.T 
14,886.776 CkWT. 
24.386.278 D.WT. 



GREAT BRITAIN 




4586.069 D.WT. 

5.454599 DW.T 

5.959.334 DW.T 

5.696.592 D.WT 

7/J50.960 D.WT 

9.524.164 D.WT. 

12^9.678 DW.T 

16.085.551 D.WT 

19.006.135 DW.T 

21.798,198 D.W.T 

24.190.632 D.WT. 

30.064.473 QWT 

32516,955 O.WT. 

25.200.585 D.W.T 

33;i 26,426 D.W.T 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MERCHANT MARINE 
(Report of U. S. Shipping Board, 1919, p. 59) 

Gross tonnage is calculated by taking the entire closed-in cubical capacity 
of a ship and regarding each 100 cubic feet as a ton. 

Deadweight tonnage is calculated as the weight of cargo in long tons which 
a cargo ship can actually carry. It is generally about fifty per cent, greater 
than the gross tonnage. 

64 



THE RISE OF COMMERCIAL SEA POWER 65 

great to be absolutely dependent on foreign bottoms or one 
country's trade. 

Although the extent of the American merchant fleet 
engaged in foreign trade decreased little in the years from 
1807 to 1812, despite embargoes, Orders in Council, and 
Napoleonic Decrees, the year 1807 stands as the real height 
of the American merchant marine for the first naif of the 
nineteenth century. The tonnage then was but slightly 
less than in 1810, when the high-water mark was reached 
for the years before 1847, but in 1807 the value of American 
foreign commerce was $246,843,150, 92,7% of which was 
carried in American vessels, an amount greater than Ameri- 
can ships carried during any of the years in the rest of the 
half-century. Just as the years of the World War have 
seen a rebirth of American merchant marine in the foreign 
trade, so the years of the Napoleonic Wars saw develop in 
America a mercantile sea power which, favored as it may 
have been by the existence of war between great sea powers, 
had to surmount obstacles, imposed by the absence of an 
armed force to protect it and by arbitrary acts of foreign 
governments, which no other merchant marine, it may 
safely be said, has ever met and surmounted. In the annals 
of sea power in American history, the creation of this 
immense maritime force certainly deserves notice. Glorious 
as were the exploits of American war-ships and sailors in 
the War of 1812, it is well to remember that the skill, 
courage, aggressiveness, and enthusiasm there displayed 
were the fruit of a generation of peaceful but not easy 
achievement on every sea, in every port, and in every dif- 
ficulty of the merchant mariners of America. 

The impressment of seamen from American ships by the 
British stands in a somewhat different category from these 
trade restrictions. Although it began as early as 1790, 



66 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

when Great Britain prepared for war with Spain, and 
continued till the outbreak of the War of 1812, — ^indeed 
never was settled formally, for it was not mentioned in the 
treaty which closed the war, — its importance is not in its 
effect on American commercial progress but rather as one 
of the chief causes of the actual outbreak of hostilities with 
England in 1812, Its weight in producing the explosion 
of war was that it contributed that human factor which 
is almost always necessary to bring on the actual break 
between two nations. Just as the interference with Ameri- 
can commerce with Germany by England in the early years 
of the World War did not produce hostilities, while the 
sinking of the Lusiiania and of American ships, with the 
consequent loss of American lives, did bring on war with 
Germany in 1917, so, impressment by its human factor 
excited popular feeling as no interference with ships or 
property could do. And even then the war would not have 
come when it did if the popular irritation against Great 
Britain, caused by impressment, had not been powerfully 
reenforced, perhaps even utilized, by Henry Clay's Western 
war party, which came into power in Congress. The West 
was anxious for war in order to safeguard the Northwest 
Territory from British-Indian machinations and even to 
conquer Canada itself for the United States. 
\J Impressment arose directly from the needs of the British 
Navy in wartime. When, at the outbreak of a war such 
as her war with France in 1793, she tried to fill the comple- 
ments of her naval vessels, she used the press-gang as her 
regular instrument. This meant sending out parties to go 
the rounds of the sailors' resorts in all the ports and seize 
Englishmen who were already trained seamen. At the 
same time British merchant ships entering port were 
boarded and their best seamen taken for the naval service. 
As the British pointed out, it was very difficult to dis- 



THE RISE OF COMMERCIAL SEA POWER 67 

tinguisli a native-bom American from a Britisher, and 
mistakes would necessarily be made. This difficulty would 
probably have been easily surmounted, however, if two 
other factors had not entered into the problem. [ One was 
the circumstance that in wartime neutral vessels would pay 
higher wages than British skippers, and by the increase in 
their opportunities would thus attract many a British 
seaman. If this neutral happened to be an American ship, 
as was usually the case, the British sailor could obtain 
additional protection from forced service in the British 
ships-of-war under cruel discipline and miserable wages, if 
at his first American port he took out naturalization papers 
and thus declared himself an American citizen. But, as 
the right to expatriate oneself — especially in time of war — 
was not recognized by the British authorities, and could 
not be if the navy was to be efficiently manned, this natural- 
ization at once became the cause of disagreement and dis- 
pute between the two countries. It was not surprising, 
therefore, that we find British cruisers lying in wait off 
American ports such as New York and overhauling every 
American ship that came out. Only in that fashion could 
the fleets of Howe, Jervis, Hood, Nelson, and Collingwood 
ever be supplied with fighting personnel. 

In the second place, the man so impressed into the 
British Navy either in the British port or from the deck 
of an American ship often deserted in the first American 
port he could reach, for there he could not be rearrested 
and could obtain naturalization papers that ought to pro- 
tect him from punishment the next time he went to sea. 
Of course, the British Government, supreme at sea as it 
was, could not endure such a transparent flouting of its 
authority, and it is not surprising that in 1807 when the 
British had been informed that deserters from their ships 
of war were actually enrolled in the crew of the American 



68 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

frigate Chesapeake, they decided to board even American 
men-of-war to reclaim their lost seamen. Accordingly, 
when the Chesapeake left Norfolk and headed for the 
Mediterranean, the British 50-gun ship Leopard hailed her, 
demanded the deserters, and when the demand was refused, 
fired upon the American until she surrendered and allowed 
the British to take four men. As a matter of fact, only 
one of the four taken was a deserter ; the other three sought 
for had deserted the Chesapeake before she sailed. This 
humiliating of the American flag stirred the country to 
indignation and enabled Jefferson to carry through the 
Embargo Act in retaliation. It is difficult to discover just 
how many really native-born Americans suffered impress- 
ment, though there is a tradition that Nelson's barge crew 
at Trafalgar was composed of American sailors. But the 
number of British-bom sailors with American naturaliza- 
tion papers' must have been very great, and the embarrass- 
ments and suffering inflicted on the American merchant 
marine were exasperating and hard to bear. Nevertheless, 
the people of the shipping states did not wish to fight for 
"Free Trade and Sailors' Rights," as the slogan went in 
1812, for war would destroj^, not secure, the profitable 
commerce which had made them prosperous for so many 
years. They were, however, in favor of increasing the 
navy to a point where the worst injuries of British sea 
power might be countered, but curiously enough, the West- 
ern War Democrats, hot for the conquest of Canada, were 
opposed to enlarging the navy, and the only considerable 
increase to the navy were the two hundred and fifty open 
gunboats of Jefferson, which, though intended to defend 
American harbors with their one gun per ship, were about 
as useful against a British cruiser or 74 as an Indian canoe. 



CHAPTER V 

AMERICAN NAVAL POWER REBORN 

THE commercial fleets of the United States were 
conspicuous in the eyes of Europe and the rest 
of the world during all the years of the neutrality 
of the United States in the great war in Europe. But the 
naval forces of the new nation were so insignificant in 
comparison that though they brilliantly redeemed every 
opportunity for action they filled but a small place in the 
thought of the nation. In truth, for ten long years the 
United States actually had no navy. In 1785 the three 
ships remaining of the Revolutionary navy were sold, and 
for a decade the United States possessed not a single armed 
national vessel. These ten years were an open invitation 
to piracy, not only in the West Indies but also in the 
^Mediterranean, In the very year 1785 Barbary pirates 
began their depredations on the young, growing, unpro- 
tected trade of America. It was as if police protection 
had suddenly been withdrawn from some great mart, leav- 
ing the shops with their costly wares exposed to robbers, 
who could henceforth pl}'^ their trade in daj'light. By 
1793 Algiers alone had taken thirteen American merchant- 
men and held their crews for ransom until some of them 
died in captivity. A democratic people that looked upon 
armaments in peace times as instruments of tyranny was 
forced to arm, and ^n March 27, 1794, the United States 
Navy was reborn, never, let us hope, however near it may 
at times approach zero, again to reach that limit. 

69 



70 SEA POWER IN AMETlICAN HISTORY 

To meet the threat of piracy, by the law of March 21, ^ 
1794, a date memorable in American naval annals, Con- ' 
gress made provision for the building of six frigates, for | 
the commissioning of six captains and twenty-two lieuten- 
i ants, and for the training of two thousand sailors and ; 
) marines. But the law had the proviso— characteristic of i 
a pacific and over-confident young democracy — that if peace i 
were made with Algiers, work on the six frigates was to j 
cease. \ In imitation of the methods of European nations 
in dealing with the Barbary states, the United States 
bought a treaty of peace from Algiers, a method that is 
prolific of future trouble ; the buying of immunity from a 
bandit gives other bandits a contempt for the purchaser 
and stirs up their cupidity to make similar demands on 
every traveler. Congress, however, under the wise guid- 
ance of Washington, so far modified its earlier decision 
as to make possible the launching of at least three of the 
six frigates. Moreover, the President had commissioned as 
captains in the navy, in accordance with the law of March 
27th, John Barry, Samuel Nicholson, Silas Talbot, Joshua 
Barney, Richard Dale, and Thomas Truxtun. One of 
these, Talbot, had been an army officer in the Revolution, 
a circumstance rather galling to real sea dogs iike Barney, 
who, therefore, refused to accept a commission which would 
make him the former's junior. But in m'itlgation of such 
offensive intrusion of army officers, we must remember that 
the navy was reborn under the War Department, — there 
was as yet no Navy Department, — hence the navy owes a 
bit of gratitude to the army, its foster-mother at a time 
when no one eared to acknowledge the poor little waif. 

To make the plans and supervise the construction of 
these six frigates, Joshua Humphreys was selected, a naval 
constructor who builded better even than he knew, for 
some of these famous six, in our days of great steel super- 



AMERICAN NAVAL POWER REBORN 71 

dreadnaughts scrapped after a score of years, are still 
afloat to tell the tale of the bygone glory of the sail. 
Humphreys carried out his ideal, which was to create frig- 
ates with finer lines, heavier timbers, taller masts, greater 
spread of sail, and heavier armament, — in a word, with 
greater power and speed, — than any ships of that class 
afloat. As he explained in one of his reports, he intended 
to build cruisers so that their commanders "will have it in 
their power to engage, or not, any ship, as they may think 
proper; and no ship, under sixty-four, now afloat, but what 
must submit to them. ' ' They were to be built of live-oak, 
and red cedar, estimated at five times the durability of 
white oak, and to have 24-pounder guns instead of the 
usual 18-pounders. The frigates were of two sizes, rated 
according to gun power as 44 's or 36 's, but this rating 
was merely for classification. The}^ always carried more 
guns than their ratings ; the enterprising captains of these 
first six cniisers, who themselves had a hand in supervising 
their construction, were limited only by the size of the 
gun-decks and the unwieldiness of the early types of guns 
and carriages. The policy of our government was opposed 
to building ships of the line, so called because they were 
intended for the line of battle, the dreadnaughts of the 
day, the t3'pe with which Nelson fought his great battles. 
Humphreys' creations were frigates, — that is, cruisers in- 
tended for convoy and scout work, for commerce-raiding 
and commerce-protection, units that could overmatch any- 
thing of their class, and run from the big unwieldy ships 
of the line, and so live to fight another day. 

IOf these six frigates, the first three, the United States, 
the Constitution, and the Constellation, were launched in 
1797. As a result of the threatening state of affairs with 
France ^ they were equipped and commissioned, and Con- 
1 See above, p. 56. 



72 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

gress appropriated the money for completing the other 
three. ; Washington kept urging his Congress to prepare, 
and the new President, Adams, in a last hope for isolation 
while still extending the hand of friendship to the 
French Republicans, urged his new Congress to prepare 
for war. While waiting for the Directory's reply to the 
Pinckney Mission, Congress passed still stricter laws to 
maintain neutrality. When in those days of slow com- 
munications, the insolent answer of the Directory finally 
arrived. Congress, in the summer of 1798, acted with 
unusual vigor and passed in quick succession a score of 
defensive acts. Among other things, it created the Navy 
Department, provided — in addition to the six frigates above 
mentioned — for the purchase or building of twenty-four 
smaller war-ships, and for the arming of American mer- 
chantmen; moveover, it empowered the President, without 
a formal declaration of war, to capture French armed ships, 
and it repealed all existing treaties with France. ' These 
measures gave the President the power to begin a strange 
war, — a war in which there was never a declaration, in 
which both sides disavowed hostile intentions. The 
Directory, with all its intrigue and insolence to our ambas- 
sadors, when it came to the test, was afraid that war with 
a country that had been so friendly to France would throw 
that country into the arms of its worst enemy, England. 
In accordance with the enactments of Congress, Adams 
appointed Benjamin Stoddert the first Secretary of the 
Na^y. Stoddert proved to be a wise and far-seeing cabinet 
officer, whose suggestions, if they had been carried out, 
would probably have prevented the War of 1812.^ The 
new Navy Department took over the completing of the frig- 
ates, the purchase of the twenty-four minor war-vessels, the 

1 Allen, Our Naval War with France, pp. 54, 55. See also Mahan, 
Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, I. 296. 




Pi 



o 
o 

< T3 



« 2 

V o 

Q :S 

^ i 

M 5 




I 



DONTGIVEUFi 

THESHIF' 



PERRY'S FLAG AT THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE 
"Just before the American Fleet moved to attack the enemy, distant at 10 
o'clock about four or five miles, Commodore Perry produced the burgee or fighting 
flag hitherto concealed in the ship. It was inscribed with large white letters on a 
blue ground that could be read throughout the fleet, 'DON'T GIVE UP THE 
SHIP,' the last words of the inspiring Lawrence and now to be hoisted at the 
masthead of the flagship bearing his name. A spirited appeal was made to the 
crew assembled on the quarter-deck, who returned three hearty cheers that were 
repeated along the whole line of our vessels and up went the flag to the top of the 
fore-royal. When Perry was rowed from his sinking flagship to the Niagara, 
making his way through the hail of broadsides of the British vessels, he flung this 
flag over his arm and under it on the Niagara he entered again into the battle 
and in short order vanquished the British Fleet." 

— Usher Parsons, Assistant Surgeon on the Lawrence. 

This famous old flag, made of homespun, the work of Samuel Hambleton, is 
perhaps the most important relic in the collection of battle flags at the United 
States Naval Academy. 



AMERICAN NAVAL POWER REBORN 73 

enlistment and training of the personnel, and the arming of 
three hundred and sixty-five merchantmen. President 
Adams also recalled from retirement George Washington to 
act as Commander-in-Chief of the new army. This army, 
however, was never mobilized, because the new-bom navy 
finished the job before there was any need of an army. It is 
a strange illustration of sea power that the decisive military- 
factor in bringing both the powerful revolutionary France 
and the petty Barbary states to terms was not an army, but 
the small naval armament, created in 1794-98, the nucleus 
of which consisted of the six frigates: United States, Con- 
stitution, Constellation, President, Congress, and Chesa- 
peake. When the first of this little squadron made its 
appearance in the West Indies, it became an object of 
hilarious ridicule in the ward-rooms of British and French 
men-of-war on the station, a ridicule which some of this 
sextet were destined to change to profound respect. These 
frigates brought about a revolution in construction and 
armament in foreign navies, just as the 74-gun ship of the 
line did after Trafalgar, or as the Monitor blazed the way 
for the modem battle-ship. 

The ships of the new navy quickly got to sea. The 
French privateers operated mostly in the West Indies, 
though they at times had been so bold as to carry on their 
depredations close to shore along the Atlantic seaboard. 
Accordingly, the small United States fleet, divided in three 
squadrons, each assigned to a definite cruising ground, con- 
centrated on the protection of the West Indian trade. 
These squadrons kept up an active patrol against French 
cruisers and acted as convoys for merchantmen to and 
from the islands. 

The chief officer in command of any of these squadrons 
to distinguish himself was Captain Truxtun, who in the 
Constellation defeated near St. Kitts the French frigate 



I 



74 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

Insurgente, February 9, 1799. In this duel, which lasted 
more than an hour, the Constellation proved a far better 
sailer than ''this celebrated French frigate Insurgente, 
esteemed one of the fastest sailing ships in the French 
Navy." ^ The Constellation secured during the manoeuver- 
ing two positions from which she raked the Frenchman so 
effectively that he was forced to strike his colors. In accu- 
racy of fire, too, the new American frigate surpassed an 
enemy that had had much longer experience at the guns. 
During the action the quick wit of Midshipman David 
Porter saved the Constellation from disaster, for by cutting 
the slings and lowering the yard from the wounded fore- 
topmast, he prevented the pressure of the wind from carry- 
ing away the mast. As the French captain, Barreaut, 
came aboard the Constellation and handed his sword to 
Truxtun, he exclaimed: "Why have you fired on the 
national flag? Our two nations are at peace." Truxtun'- 
merely looked at him and replied, ' ' You are my prisoner. ' ' 
He knew, and Barreaut knew, that the American Navy 
had gotten one of the most flagrant offenders against Ameri- 
can merchantmen. 

There was a sort of poetic justice in Truxtun 's victory, 
for the Insurgente had the previous year retaken the 
Retaliation, which, under its original French name Croy- 
ahle, Stephen Decatur, Sr., famous father of a more famous 
son, had caught early in the war in piratical acts off the 
American coast. William Bainbridge, the unlucky com- 
mander of the Retaliation at the time of her recapture by 
the Insurgente, was now, and was to remain many months, 
in the dungeons of Guadeloupe, Truxtun 's victory was 
therefore hailed by the American people as a sharp revenge 
for old scores. 

1 Truxtun's report of the battle. See Barreaut's interesting report, 
Maclay, History of the Navy, I. 183 flf. 



AMERICAN NAVAL POWER REBORN 75 

Truxtun's victory was followed early the next year by an 
indecisive engagement between the Constellation and an- 
other frigate, the Vengeance, but the American squadrons 
had b}'- this time greatly decreased French depredations 
on commerce. With the capture of the French Berceau by 
the Boston, the bold exploit of Isaac Hull in cutting out a 
privateer in the harbor of Puerto Plata, and the work of 
the smaller American cruisers against privateers, the steady 
pressure of American sea power in the West Indies was 
bringing the French people to terms. France, powerful 
in her desperation, like Russia after the World War, had in 
a mad orgy of blood at once been killing her own citizens 
and facing a hostile world. After ten years of radicalism, 
she fell into the power of a great military dictator, Napoleon, 
who had superseded the Directory and who, on September 
30, 1800, made peace with the United States. By the 
terms of the treaty, France recovered the captured war- 
ships but lost seventy privateers taken by the American 
naval forces. 

The treaty with France was hardly ratified before the 
Barbary states began to make new demands for more 
tribute. These North African peoples had since ancient 
times fostered piracy. Especially after the conquest of 
Granada in 1492, when the Moriscos left Spain, religious 
hate added fuel to commercial rivalry and brought on con- 
tinual wars of all sea powers in succession against the 
Barbary states, — wars that were to be terminated once 
for all by a new sea power across the Atlantic. Spain, 
England, Holland, and France, under such great leaders 
as Charles V, Cromwell, De Ruyter, and Duquesne, had 
sent huge fleets to attack the pirate nests, had made treaties 
only to have them broken when vigilance was relaxed, and 
had ended by buying immunity from the corsairs with 
ransom and tribute and blackmail. The United States, 



76 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

following the lead of these great European powers, like- 
wise found it expedient for a time to buy such immunity 
and had accordingly made treaties with Morocco (1785), 
Algiers (1795), Tripoli (1796), and Tunis (1797). The J 
gist of all these treaties was tribute. During the great! 
European war, raging for the last decade of the eighteenth 
century, and yet to rage for another decade, the belligerents 
swept one another's trade off the Mediterranean, and 
American enterprise was active in this sea to supply the 
deficiency. The Barbary states, taking advantage of the 
general disorder of civilization, became more extortionate 
toward any possible victims. The larger European nations 
in their own selfish interests, now as in earlier times, con- 
nived at these depredations on the commerce of a rival, 
or bought their own immunity by winking at piracy against 
others. Indeed, this century-old extortion by bandits was 
largely fostered by the mutual jealousies and lack of co- 
operation of the Christian powers. William Eaton, fire- 
eating ex-Revolutionary American soldier, who was sent 
with the tribute of naval stores to Algiers in 1797, sum- 
marizes the whole Barbary business in these vivid words, 
descriptive of his audience with the Dey of Algiers: 

Here [in the palace] we took off our shoes and, entering the 
cave (for so it seemed), with small apertures of light from iron 
grates, we were shown to a huge, shaggy beast, sitting on his rump 
upon a low bench, covered with a cushion of embroidered velvet, 
with his hind legs gathered up like a bear. On our approach to 
him, he reached out his forepaw, as if to receive something to 
eat. Our guide exclaimed, "Kiss the Dey's hand!" The consul 
general bowed very elegantly and kissed it; and we followed his 
example. . . . Can any man believe that this elevated brute has 
seven kings of Europe, two republics, and a continent tributary to 
him, when his whole naval force is not equal to two Hne-of- 
battle ships ? It is so ! ^ 

1 Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs, p. 63. 



AMERICAN NAVAL POWER REBORN 77 

And the worst of this whole system of tribute was that 
the pirate lust for money was insatiable. A new treaty 
granting more gifts to one Barbary state aroused immedi- 
ately the cupidity of another. Such America found to be 
the case now. She had given more to Algiers and Tunis 
than to Tripoli. The latter, therefore, declared war upon 
the United States, February, 1801. 

But before going on with this war with Tripoli, we must 
pause to tell of an incident that occurred the previous 
year, an incident that would be highly amusing if it were 
not one of the most humiliating events in the annals of the 
American Navy. William Bainbridge, after his long im- 
prisonment at Guadeloupe, at the age of twenty-six years 
was promoted to a captaincy in the navy and was given 
command of the George Washington, of twenty-four guns, 
one of the ships purchased by the Government during the 
** French War." In this he carried the annual tribute to 
Algiers in the autumn of 1800. The Dey ^ of Algiers was 
at this time having trouble with his suzerain, the Sultan 
of Turkey, because the dey had made peace with Napoleon 
without consulting the sultan. The dey accordingly or- 
dered Bainbridge to carry gifts as a solace to his sultanic 
majesty. Bainbridge, who had shown in his career up 
to this time great spirit, refused point-blank. The dey 
answered that he had been accustomed to receive similar 
services from the great nations of Europe and could easily 
get a British ship to carry his gifts, and added: "You 
pay me tribute by which you become my slaves. I have 
therefore a right to order you as I think proper." The 
George Washington was anchored right under the Algerian 
guns and a persistence in refusal probably meant deten- 

1 The North African rulers were known h\ a variety of names, 
such aa dey, hey, hashaw, pasha, sultan, and even emperor, as in 
the case of Morocco. 



78 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

tdon of the ship, imprisonment and slavery for the crew, and 
war between the United States and Algiers. This was the 
reasoning of the American consul-general, O'Brien, at 
Algiers, who advised Bainbridge to acquiesce in the dey's 
demand. An experience of ten years of slavery in Barbary 
may have had some influence on O'Brien's decision, which 
called do'WTL upon him and Bainbridge the bitter denuncia- 
tion of Eaton. Bainbridge, under coercion and deeply 
humiliated, took the dey's mission to the sultan. Besides 
his own crew of one hundred and thirty, he had on board 
''the ambassador, and suite, one hundred in number; also 
one hundred negro women and children, one hundred and 
fifty sheep, twenty-five cattle, four lions, four tigers, four 
antelopes, twelve parrots, and funds and regalia amounting 
to nearly a million dollars." The United States Navy 
during the last century has had varied experiences rang- 
ing all the way from great fights to Arctic explorations and 
relief to earthquake-shattered towns and starving peoples, 
but Bainbridge 's expedition in 1800 stands in a class by 
itself. 

The Tripolitan War, 1801-5, is a period in history in 
which Americans can find small cause for pride except 
in this remarkable fact that the insignificant naval arma- 
ment of a new nation three thousand miles from its base 
accomplished, largely as a result of this war, what the 
great sea powers of Europe had not been able to accomplish 
in three hundred years, — ^the ending of all tribute forever 
to the Barbary states. The main reason that the war with 
Tripoli was spread out over five years was that the Ameri- 
can Navy was handicapped by government red-tape, inter- 
departmental friction, and by a system of annual enlist- 
ments, owing to which American squadrons had to return 
to the United States every year. Of the five squadrons so 
sent out, under Commodores Dale, Morris, Preble, Samuel 



AMERICAN NAVAL POWER REBORN 79 

Barron, and Rodgers respectively, the third and smallest, 
under Preble, was the most decisive factor and presents 
the most illuminating lessons for our consideration. 
Preble was recalled a little bit too soon to finish the job 
because an officer senior to him had by departmental rules 
a prior claim to his command, but Preble's splendid work 
was destined to have a decisive effect on the treaty nego- 
tiations. 

Preble took command in the summer of 1803, and after 
extensive repairs to his flag-ship, the Constitutio?!, in Bos- 
ton, he sailed in August, with the new consul-general to 
the Barbary states, Tobias Lear, aboard, for Gibraltar. 
Preble's squadron, the units of which had sailed singly as 
each was ready for sea, consisted of the frigates Constitu- 
tion and Philadelphia, the brigs Argus and Siren, and the 
schooners Vixen, Nautilus, and Enterprise. Preble, like 
his two predecessors, was a veteran of the Revolution. A 
stern disciplinarian and hot-tempered, he was at first very 
unpopular with his subordinates, whom, on account of 
their youthfulness, he sarcastically called school-boys. 
But under his brusque manner Preble had a big heart and 
an intense spirit of justice, qualities which, coupled with 
his energy and decision of character in dealing with the 
corsairs, quickly inspired in his "boys" a warm admiration, 
which became mutual. Under Preble the squadron 
achieved a very high degree of efficiency, and officers and 
men showed a devotion to service and country that has few 
parallels in history. 

On his arrival at Gibraltar, Preble found plenty to oc- 
cupy his energetic spirit. He met, at the straits, bound 
for home. Commodore John Rodgers, who had during the 
summer captured the Meshuda, a Tripolitan corsair claimed 
under a fictitious sale by the Emperor of Morocco. 
Captain Bainbridge in the Philadelphia, en route to his 



80 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

station, caught red-handed another Moroccan cruiser, the 
Mirhoka, which in contravention of the treaty had just 
captured an American merchantman, the Celia. With 
Morocco thus committing depredations at the very en- 
trance to the Mediterranean, Preble realized that opera- 
tions at Tripoli must be secondary to this new menace. 

He persuaded Commodore Rodgers, with the latter 's 
homeward-bound squadron consisting of the New York and 
the John Adams, to join him in a determined naval demon- 
stration before Tangier. This quick action of Preble and 
Rodgers brought quick returns. The Emperor of Mo- 
rocco, after pretending that he had not authorized his sub- 
ordinate to capture American merchantmen, and after 
feigning anger at the seizure of the Meshuda, confirmed 
anew the treaty of 1785 and gave up all prisoners without 
ransom. Preble's conduct in this matter was a revelation 
to the young officers in the fleet; they saw the dawn of a 
new day in a campaign that had lagged until the boldest 
were losing heart. 

Meanwhile Bainbridge had preceded Preble to his duty, 
the Tripolitan blockade, which had been proclaimed to 
the world by Consul Eaton during the second year of the 
war. Now happened a third misfortune to Bainbridge, 
which with its cumulative force would have broken a less 
resolute heart. The whole coast of Barbary is unusually 
dangerous for blockade duty, especially from September to 
April, when there are frequent and violent gales. Be- 
sides these storms, Tripoli in particular has many reefs, 
uncharted in those days, and dangerous even for the best 
Mediterranean pilots. On October 31, 1803, Bainbridge 
in the Philadelphia, noticing a strange sail standing before 
the wind toward the harbor, gave chase, firing at her as he 
drew nearer. The vessel, which displayed Tripolitan 
colors, ran close in shore. Bainbridge, finding his fire in- 



AMERICAN NAVAL POWER REBORN 81 

effectual, gave up the chase and was bearing off shore when 
the Philadelphia suddenly ran aground in twelve feet of 
water. Bainbridge immediately took careful soundings, 
and finding plenty of water astern, ''laid all sails aback 
and set a heavy press of sail in the ship to blow her off; 
cast three anchors away from the bows, started the water 
in the hold, hove overboard the guns excepting some abaft 
to defend the ship against the gunboats then firing on us. 
I found all this ineffectual. I then made the last resort 
of lightening her forward by cutting away the foremast. 
But labor and enterprise were in vain, for our fate was 
direfuUy fijted. ' ' ^ "Without means of defense and sur- 
rounded by gunboats, Bainbridge submitted to capture, and 
three hundred and seven officers and men were doomed 
to a long imprisonment. The officers were treated fairly 
well, but the men were ill fed, abused, and driven by the 
lash and torture to labor like slaves. The Danish consul, 
Nissen, did much to alleviate conditions for the prisoners. 
Through his unremitting efforts, Bainbridge was able to 
obtain money and supplies from the squadron and carry 
on a correspondence in code with Preble, which was of 
much service to the commodore in condoicting the block- 
ade of Tripoli. A few days after the accident the Tripoli- 
tans succeeded in dragging the Philadelphia off the reef, 
salvaged the anchors and guns, and towed her into the 
harbor amidst a jubilation whose echoes were heard by the 
mortified American prisoners. The court of inquiry that 
followed entirely exonerated Bainbridge, but he felt the 
loss terribly. 

And Preble, who had first learned of the accident a 
month later from the Amazon, one of Nelson's cruisers, 
also felt the loss terribly, though he wrote letters full of 
heartfelt sympathy to Bainbridge in an effort to cheer him 

1 Bainbridge's report to the Secretary of the Navy, Nov. 1, 1803. 



82 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

and his men. "Without the Philadelphia Preble's squad- 
ron, small from the start, lost one third of its force. 
Despite the handicap, however, Preble made all plans for 
a vigorous offensive. He kept the smaller units of his 
squadron busy convoying American merchantmen and as 
scouts watching with vigilant eye the movements of all 
Mediterranean corsairs. He was also in constant com- 
munication with the various United States consuls in the 
Barbary states. As Gibraltar was at this time too much 
occupied with Nelson's fleet, Preble changed the base of 
his squadron to Malta and Syracuse, where he cultivated 
friendly relations with the authorities. During these in- 
teresting times in the Mediterranean, when Nelson was 
bringing to a climax a splendid career by his relentless 
vigil for two years before Toulon in the memorable cam- 
paign that ended with Trafalgar, Preble came in contact 
with that greatest sailor of all times. Nelson had inter- 
vened to make desertions from the American to the Brit- 
ish naval forces less possible, and Sir Alexander Ball, 
friend of Nelson and Governor of Malta, and also the King 
of Naples, another friend of the great British admiral, 
lent much assistance to Preble from time to time. This 
contact of the young American Navy with a service which 
at that time was creating the greatest tradition in all sea 
annals must have had a marked influence upon Preble and 
his boys, who were also making an immortal memory for 
themselves. Unwittingly, long before the days of naval 
academies, Preble was conducting a very practical naval 
school, with harsh experiences as preceptor and illustrious 
examples as inspiration. 

It was well that the youthful American Navy, like the 
American people, drew for its traditions upon England, 
autocratic in form and democratic in spirit, rather than 
upon France, republican in appearance, but reactionary 



AMERICAN NAVAL POWER REBORN 83 

and autocratic in essence. The Americans, co-heirs with 
England of the same language, the same Shakspere, the 
same common law, and the same fundamentals of constitu- 
tional liberty and government, chose, through Congres- 
sional enactment during the "French "War," the Regula- 
tions of the British Navy as basic law of their new navy. 
The two navies, therefore, like the two great English- 
speaking peoples, sprang by tradition and legal sanctions 
from the same sources. 

Almost immediately after the loss of the Philadelphia, 
the strenuous Preble made plans to neutralize the handi- 
cap of his small force by aggressive measures in midwinter. 
Bainbridge, also, was using his time in prison not only 
in conducting an improvised naval school for his fellow 
officers, but also in devising plans for the cutting out of 
the Philadelphia and for the gunboat attacks on Tripoli, — 
plans which he communicated secretly to Preble. But 
Preble and his young fellows out in the squadron were 
likewise devising means of cutting out or destroying the 
frigate. Foremost among these venturesome spirits was 
Stephen Decatur, who had volunteered to make a night at- 
tack in midwinter on the Philadelphia. The Enterprise 
on a cruise recently with the Constitution had captured a 
Turkish ketch, the Mastico, running the blockade. She 
had formerly been a French gunboat and had taken part 
in the attack on the grounded and helpless frigate. This 
Mediterranean-rigged ketch, which Preble renamed In- 
trepid and added to his force, was to take part in another 
attack on the Philadelphia. Preble and Decatur were per- 
fecting, at Syracuse toward the end of January, the most 
careful plans for a feat that takes rank with Nelson 's bold 
exploit at Corsica, with Cushing's destruction of the 
Albemarle, and with Carpenter's blocking of the channel 
at Zeebrugge in the World War. 



84 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

According to these plans, early in February, 1804, 
Decatur, accompanied by Stewart in the Siren, crossed to 
Tripoli, but was prevented by heavy gales from entering 
the harbor. After tossing about for ten days in the close 
and uncomfortable quarters of the ketch, Decatur was 
as?ain making for the entrance of the harbor on February 
16th. A faint moon helped him thread his way in, but 
also made him visible from shore. AVith drags out to 
slacken her speed the Intrepid stood slowly for the Phila- 
delphia. When she had gotten within thirty yards of the 
frigate, she was hailed and ordered to keep off. Catalano, 
Decatur's resourceful Sicilian pilot, who knew the lan- 
guage, answered the hail, and, coached by Decatur at his 
side, kept up an easy fire of replies to the numerous ques- 
tions hurled at him from the deck of the frigate. He ex- 
plained that the ketch had lost her anchors in the gale off 
shore and requested permission to lie alongside for the 
night ; that they were in bad straits for water and food ; 
that the brig outside (the Siren) was the Transfer, re- 
cently bought by the Tripolitans at Malta and now waiting 
to make her way into the harbor. During this conversa- 
tion, the dozen American sailors, disguised in Maltese cos- 
tume, the sole ones visible on deck, were quietly but very 
efficiently making lines fast to the bow and stern of the 
Philadelphia, while hidden forces below were pulling in 
the hawsers and working the ketch alongside. Suddenly 
a suspicion ran through the crowd overhead and some one 
yelled "Americanos!" Decatur, giving the word to 
board, with Morris sprang on the Philadelphia's deck. For 
a brief instant they were alone, but only for an instant. 
The Americans swarmed over the sides and found the 
Tripolitans huddled together, utterly dazed, in the fore- 
castle. The struggle was short and decisive. "Those who 
resisted were cut down and the rest jumped overboard pre- 



AMERICAN NAVAL POWER REBORN 85 

cipitately. ' ' ^ The boarders, according to details very care- 
fully prearranged, separated; some swept the gun-deck 
while others, laden with combustibles, started fires in various 
parts of the ship. The whole thing went like clockwork 
.and was over in a few minutes, — minutes during which 
Stephen Decatur was in command of that fine frigate, whose 
first commander, as she left the ways, had been his father, 
Stephen Decatur senior. The job done, the Americans 
scrambled back to the Intrepid' s deck. Decatur, the last to 
leave, sprang into the rigging of the ketch as she shoved 
off. 

But the Americans were none too soon. They now got 
a rousing send-off. As the sailors manned the sweeps to 
help the light breeze in getting them away from these 
warm surroundings, they gave three cheers, — cheers that 
were quickly drowned by the belching of a hundred and 
more cannon of the forts, which had just awakened from 
surprised stupor. Three Tripolitan cruisers and a few 
galleys, moored near the Philadelphia, also fired at the re- 
treating ketch, but their aim was wild and the ketch re- 
ceived a hole in one sail as the sole token of the pirates' 
rage. The Philadelphia, with ports brightly illuminated 
from the intense fire within, the flames licking with great 
tongues the tall masts and spars, lighted the harbor and 
town. The fast-falling shot cast up jets of fire-lit spray 
and the tall minarets of the town sent back a weird re- 
flection. The Philadelphia, as her loaded gims became 
heated, gave the Tripolitans a broadside and fired a last 
salute for her retreating countrymen. Her hawsers burnt 
off, she drifted on shore near the dey's palace, where she 
blew up. For this daring piece of work Decatur became 
the popular idol of the American people, was promoted to 
the rank of captain at twenty-five, the youngest man ever 

^ Soley, Operations under Preble, U. S. Naval Institute, V, 67. 




86 



AMERICAN NAVAL POWER REBORN 87 

to receive such rank. The venture quickly got to the ears 
of Nelson off Toulon, who called it "the most bold and 
daring act of the age." 

After the destruction of the Philadelphia Preble made 
his plans for the following summer. In May he secured 
from the King of Naples, who was also at war with Tripoli, 
a friendly loan of six 25-ton gunboats, two 30-ton mortar- 
boats, and twelve Neapolitan gunners for each of these 
eight vessels. The gunboats were flat-bottomed, unwieldly 
affairs, intended for harbor defense, mounted one 24- 
pounder in the bow, and carried a complement of thirty- 
five men. The loan of twelve gunners for each vessel helped 
Preble greatly, for his squadron was short-handed. While 
equipping these boats at Syracuse and making his plans 
for the bombardment of Tripoli, he kept a vessel or two 
alwaj^s off Tripoli on blockade duty and he himself was 
constantly on the move between Malta, Syracuse, Tripoli, 
Naples, and Tunis. As at this latter place the bey was 
showing a hostile attitude, Preble appeared in force before 
the town in June and brought the bey back to the strait 
and narrow path of treaty obligations. By July 25th, 
Preble arrived, gunboats and all, before Tripoli, and from 
now until his relief, September 10th, he kept up a harassing 
offensive. During this time he made five carefully planned 
attacks on the defenses, in the course of which he sent some 
thousands of shells into the towns and forts, destroyed half 
a dozen of their gunboats, and reduced the demands of 
the pasha for ransom from half a million to a hundred thou- 
sand dollars. By departmental red-tape Preble was re- 
called at the very moment when he was forcing the pasha to 
his knees. 

Of these five bombardments we will dwell for a moment 
upon the first and most interesting. The larger units of 
Preble's squadron on all of these occasions had to remain 



88 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

a safe distance from the treacherous reefs, and also were 
hampered by northerly gales. The enemy gunboats, num- 
bering three times as many as Preble's, generally kept be- 
hind the long line of reefs, but on August 3d the eastern or 
van division ventured outside the rocks. On this day the 
enemy's center division, of seven boats, lay behind the 
reefs and the rear, of five, under the western batteries. 
Preble, thinking it a favorable opportunity, gave the order 
to his gunboats to cast loose, and began a bombardment 
from the heavier ships to cover the attack. Somers, in 
command of the first division, in a poor sailer, was driven 
too far to leeward, where he encountered the enemy's rear 
single-handed, and inflicted severe losses in driving them 
shoreward. Captain Stephen Decatur, with that dash so 
characteristic of him*, captured an enemy gunboat by 
boarding. Lieutenant James Decatur, his brother, had 
also just made a capture but was treacherously shot at the 
moment of boarding the prize. Maddened by this, Cap- 
tain Decatur left his first prize and boarded another cor- 
sair. In the ensuing encounter Decatur fought with such 
fury that he outstripped the corsairs in a manner of fight- 
ing in which they were masters, but at the imminent risk of 
his life. In his two hand-to-hand encounters Decatur and 
his crew of thirty had slain thirty-three out of sixty and 
made the rest prisoners. Lieutenant Trippe in Gunboat 
Number 6, of Decatur's division, boarded an enemy with 
ten men, but before the rest could get aboard, his vessel 
drifted away, leaving the eleven alone against thirty-six. 
With the fury of madness these plucky eleven killed four- 
teen of the enemy, received the surrender of the remaining 
twenty-two, and sailed back in their prize. Trippe came 
out of this action with eleven saber wounds. Surely these 
' 'boys ' ' could fight a bit ! 

The daredevil spirit that actuated these young ofiScers 



AMERICAN NAVAL POWER REBORN 89 

is perhaps best illustrated by an incident of the blockade of 
Tripoli, known as the Intrepid Disaster. After his num- 
erous bombardments Preble on the fourth of September 
tried to force a decision on the pasha by sending a fire-ship 
into the inner harbor. He found eager volunteers again 
for this dangerous undertaking and chose Lieutenants 
Richard Somers, Henry Wadsvvorth, and Joseph Israel, to 
command the Intrepid. She had on board a hundred bar- 
rels of gunpowder and a fuse timed to burn fifteen minutes. 
Her officers intended to take her into the midst of the 
enemy gunboats, light the fuse, and get back in a cutter. 
She entered the harbor on a dark night and must have 
gotten \evy near her objective when she blew up prema- 
turely. Her consorts waited many hours outside for the 
lads' return but no survivors ever appeared. The In- 
trepid's fate to this day is a matter of conjecture. It was 
known that Somers had vowed not to be taken alive, and it 
is generally supposed that he, surrounded by overwhelm- 
ing odds, deliberately blew up himself and his enemies. 
Thirteen bodies drifted ashore next day, but they were so 
disfigured that they could not be recognized by Bainbridge, 
who was taken to see them. 

A week after this incident Commodore Barron arrived 
and took command. But Barron, a sick man, was in turn 
relieved the following spring by Commodore John Rodgers, 
who had an overwhelming force, the nucleus of which was 
six frigates. Meanwhile the indefatigable and patriotic 
Consul Eaton, bitter critic of earlier naval fiascos, had gone 
to the United States to get authority to back Hamet, an 
elder brother of the pasha, in the former's claim for the 
throne. With an energy that matched Preble's, Eaton 
gathered a motley Falstaffian army in Egypt, captured 
Deme, a town of Tripoli, and was marching on Tripoli 
from the rear, when peace was suddenly made by a bitter 



90 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

enemy of Eaton, Consul-General Lear, on June 3, 1805. 
By the terms of this treaty the Americans paid sixty thou- 
sand dollars ransom, and Bainbridge and his men were at 
once released. But the decisive factor in this result was 
the little squadron under Preble.^ Ten years later Deca- 
tur in command of a big force again entered the Mediter- 
ranean and ended by quick and decisive action all tribute- 
paying by the American Government to these pirate states 
forever. The next year, 1816, England, the mistress of 
the seas, that had submitted to the insolence and extortion 
of Barbary for two and a half centuries, sent a powerful 
fleet under Lord Exmouth and forced Algiers to end white 
slavery and tribute. The rest of Europe soon followed 
suit, but Preble and his boys had blazed the trail. 

The officers who were with Preble and Decatur in the 
year 1803-4 include the whole list, except Perry alone, 
of those who were to win fame in the coming War of 1812. 
In Preble's squadron were Macdonough, Hull, Lawrence, 
the elder and the younger Bainbridge, Stewart, Blakeley, 
Chauncey, Charles Morris, David Porter, Jacob Jones, and 
Biddle, — a famous company, whose names loom large in 
the traditions of the American Navy. 

We have now seen that the sea power of America, re- 
bom in 1794 with the first six frigates, stopped the depre- 
dations of France and Barbary upon America's commerce, 
which constituted at this time a great element of sea power. 
The American naval armament, which in 1801 comprised 
some forty-five war-ships and six thousand officers and 
men, was estimated to have cost the country about $6,000,- 
000 during the "French War." This force protected a 
commerce valued at $200,000,000. After the "French 
War" the navy kept growing to protect against the Bar- 

1 MacKenzie, Life of Decalur, p. 127. Soley, Operations Under 
Preble, U. S. Naval Institute, V. 80. 



AMERICAN NAVAL POWER REBORN 91 

bary pirates a commerce which at the end of the Tripolitan 
War amounted to $250,000,000 annually. A navy so 
founded on a thriving commerce and in proper ratio to 
such commerce is not an instrument of tyranny but rather 
a bulwark of liberty to a great and free people. 



CHAPTER VI 

SEA POWER DOMINATES THE WAR OF 1812 



w 



E have seen that during the great upheaval in 
Europe — an upheaval which was to cover in all 
a quarter of a century — the United States had 
already been drawn into two wars, one of which was a 
maritime contest with one of the two great belligerents, 
France ; the other of these two belligerents, England, was 
now, on the same isvsue of freedom of the seas, to draw 
the United States into war a second time. We have seen 
that in the European war, during the decade after the 
"French War," both European belligerents, by act after 
act of reprisal which in turn produced further restrictions, 
ruthlessly and effectively made neutral commerce more 
and more difficult. As in 1914 to 1917, England with her 
mighty sea power — her navalism, as her opponents called 
it — was engaged in a death-grapple with militarism, a yet 
more ruthless power lusting for world conquest. In this 
contest peace-loving, isolation-loving America, after ten 
years of patience and note-writing, was finally again forced 
to take sides. Blinded by the old slogans of the War of 
Independence, — navigation acts and a tyranny that threat- 
ened again to reduce the new country to the status of 
colonial dependence, — the American people fought Eng- 
land rather than their traditional friend, France. Blinded, 
too, the Americans were by the clever phrases of that 
wonderful man Napoleon, who posed as the gi'eat op- 
ponent of autocracy, and who, while reducing to poverty 

92 



I 



I 



THE WAR OF 1812 93 

millions of people in Europe by stealing private property 
on land, pretended to the most scrupulous regard for pri- 
vate property at sea. Despite the fact that America in 
1812 chose as a virtual ally one whom she should have 
chosen as an enemy, the vast sea power of Britain domi- 
nated the world in 1812 as it did a century later. And well 
it was for America that Britain's sea power did dominate 
the world, for taken all in all, Britain, against the radical- 
ism and militarism of France, was the bulwark of the 
world's liberty.^ 

Napoleon's weapon on the sea, after Trafalgar in 1805, 
was the Continental System, a vast scheme to destroy the 
life-blood of British sea power, her commerce upon the 
seas, bj^ shutting it out from the whole of Europe. This 
Continental System, whose mere enforcement, ranging from 
the Baltic to the Atlantic and Mediterranean, was an enor- 
mous drain on Napoleon's resources, wasted his revenues, 
his credits, and his enforced contributions from subject 
peoples, and gave him in their stead the hatred of these 
peoples. At the same time British trade, despite the sys- 
tem, continued to flourish and powerfully sustained the 
revenues of Britain, giving her the ready money for war- 
making by which she kept alive and vigorous those suc- 
cessive coalitions against the despot of Europe. The Con- 
tinental System, intended to break Britain, broke its cre- 
ator, Napoleon. For, to enforce his vast system, he, the 
great apostle of concentration in military strategy, made 
enemies at the two ends of Europe, — Spain and Ru.ssia. 
The Russian disaster to his army was the beginning of the 
end. The entry of the United States at the moment when 
the contest in Europe was most critical, 1812, forced the 
sea power of Britain, already greatly dispersed, to a 

1 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution, II. 242, 
408, 409. 



94 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

greater dispersion in protecting her trade routes and mar- 
kets.^ A friendly Atlantic seaboard in America with its 
convenient harbors, as in the Seven Years ' War, was a great 
asset to any sea power. Deprived of these American ports 
for food, ships' stores, shelter from storms, and especially 
for the interchange of commerce, Britain would be com- 
pelled greatly to increase her naval force to protect the 
avenues of trade to her home ports and thence to her 
greatest market, — ^the Continent of Europe, from which 
Napoleon, in his last desperate effort to starve Britain into 
submission, was trying to exclude British goods. On the 
other hand, France, virtually an ally of America in 1812, 
might at any time use these American ports and the great 
resources of food and raw products in America. She 
might have availed herself of American products, but she 
did not, and for the same reason that Germany in the 
World War could not. Napoleon had constructed ships 
industriously enough after Trafalgar; but his fleets, by the 
relentless vigilance of the British Navy, were kept, like 
the German Navy at Kiel, locked up in their home ports; 
and France had lost the assistance of her colonies by rea- 
son of that same dominating sea power, as Germany lost 
her colonies in the World War. Such being the maritime 
power of Britain, whose mainstay was six hundred dread- 
naughts and first-class cruisers,^ what was the governing 
principle for the United States in this War of 1812 to adopt, 
a country without a single sliip of the line and with a total 
of twenty-one frigates and sloops of war ? 

This governing principle, the plan of a great campaign 
of war by which all military factors, the harmonized co- 
operation of army and navy, are to operate is called 
strategy. The story is well known of Napoleon, sprawled 

1 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, pp. 280, 281. 

2 James, Naval History of Britain, VI. Appendix 21. 



THE WAR OF 1812 95 

on the floor of his office over a map of Europe into which 
he was sticking various-colored pins. He explained to his 
amazed secretary, "We shall be here [sticking a pin] on 
such a day, the Austrians there [another pin]." Weeks 
afterward, the secretary, yet more surprised, rode with 
his great chief into each of these pin-pricked spots on 
schedule time. Strategy is simply such a comprehensive, 
unified plan, thought out on paper with mathematical pre- 
cision. Like mathematics, it is true for all ages and for 
all places. Tactics, on the other hand, is the plan of 
operations of armies and navies after they come in con- 
tact, and varies with the introduction of new inventions and 
weapons, — steam, gunpowder, the rifle, the submarine, bar- 
rage fire, etc. In addition to strategy and tactics, tech- 
nical writers apply the term logistics to communications, 
to the getting of fleets and armies to the battle-ground, and 
to their maintenance. Strategy then is the head that plans, 
tactics the fist that strikes, and logistics the nerves that 
continue to keep in communication the plans of the head 
and the power of the fist. 

To a strategical plan the situation of the United States 
— and especially its numerous harbors with the St. Law- 
rence and the Great Lakes separating it from Canada, a 
great colony of a distant enemy — offered many advantages 
which compensated somewhat for the scantiness of Ameri- 
can military forces. Nature itself had determined the 
strategy most advantageous for the United States. Ac- 
cording to these natural conditions, the strategy of the 
war had two phases, — a defensive phase for the navy on 
the Atlantic seaboard against British commerce and com- 
munications and an offensive phase for the army and navy 
on the Canadian border. 

The New England coast with its wide harbors and violent 
storms of winter made blockading difficult and the slip- 



96 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

ping out of raiders easy. Of course, if America had had 
even one respectable fleet of a dozen ships of the line, as 
Robert Morris and Stoddert had often urged, the enemy's 
fleets might have been forced to remain concentrated at their 
bases, Halifax and Bermuda. During the decade before 
1812, when the war was plainly approaching, Congress ap- 
propriated money for two new brigs and two sloops of war 
to protect a commerce as great as England's, — as if a city, 
growing from one hundred thousand to two hundred thou- 
sand added four policemen to its force. Owing to the 
paucity of American men-of-war, the British were able 
gradually to eliminate or blockade the few American frig- 
ates. To the British strategy of commercial blockade of 
the Atlantic coast, America's only reply could be commerce- 
raiding and threats on the enemy's Canadian communica- 
tions. Aggressive and remarkable as were the achieve- 
ments of the handful of American cruisers and of the five 
hundred privateers, they were doomed in the long run to 
be driven to cover. Mahan aptly contrasts the efficiency of 
England's blockade and America's reply in these words: 
"To cut oft' access to a city is much more certainly ac- 
complished by holding the gates than by scouring the 
country in search of persons seeking to enter it. " ^ 

The British blockade became gradually so rigorous that 
it gave England an opportunity to occupy the Chesapeake, 
bum the American capital, seize eastern Maine and Mo- 
bile, and attempt by the battle of New Orleans the con- 
quest of Louisiana and the Mississippi, In the face of this 
blockade and of the military occupation of the American 
seaboard, the strategy of the Americans could only be de- 
fensive; it should have been at least an offensive-defensive 
to prevent British throttling of their ports. As it was, 
however, the American strategy of the Atlantic seaboard 

1 Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, I. 288. 



THE WAR OF 1812 97 

was — if we consider the great odds — remarkably aggres- 
sive. 

On the other hand, the second phase of the strategy of 
the United States should properly have been an offensive 
Canadian campaign. Quite irrespective of the fact that 
the people of the West, led by Henry Clay, then a War 
Democrat, called for the conquest of Canada, an attempt 
to overrun the Dominion was entirely correct from the 
military point of view as an important factor leading to a 
quick decision. The United States, having no means of 
invading England, or of capturing her West Indian pos- 
sessions, had in Canada a vast property belonging to the 
enemy, which, if captured, would force a humiliating peace. 
For this conquest, nature again, as on the Atlantic sea- 
board, favored the Americans. The geographical situation 
gave the United States the interior lines, that is, the short- 
est and quickest routes, by water, to the enemy's bases. 
These routes began at New York, the source of supplies, and 
led via the Hudson and Mohawk rivers to Ontario, or via 
Lakes George and Champlain to Montreal. From Albany 
the Americans therefore could m,ove to either Sackett's 
Harbor on Ontario, or to Montreal on the St. Lawrence, 
and so could keep the enemy in doubt as to their objective 
and thus prevent his concentration at either spot. More- 
over, the Great Lakes afforded splendid support to the 
armies of the nation whose naval forces controlled them. 

In those days of poor but passable roads on the American 
side, and all but impassable roads in Canada, these water- 
routes by rivers and lakes to and along the Canadian 
border outlined what should have been the American 
strategy of the war. Montreal should have been the great 
objective. Lying at the apex of an angle, one of whose 
legs runs south through waterways to New York, the other 
west through the Great Lakes, Montreal, if occupied by 



98 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

American forces, would have stopped the long reach of 
British sea power right there, and with the American oc- 
cupation of Montreal, Canada would have been doomed.^ 
But instead, the British got the start on the Americans. 
With only forty-five hundred troops in all Canada, two 
thirds of which were in Montreal and Quebec, the British 
under an efficient young general. Brock — helped greatly 
by the "amazing incompetence" of the American generals 
— early in the war captured Detroit and Mackinac. The 
fall of these two places on connecting links of the Great 
Lakes secured the British right wing in Canada and gave 
the conquerors the help of Tecumseh's Indians, who, 
anxious only for food and plunder, readily joined the win- 
ning side. The Canadian border now assumed the usual 
military front, right, center, and left, — i. e.. Lakes Erie, 
Ontario, and the St. Lawrence, respectively, with centers 
at Detroit, Kingston, and Montreal. The American front 
had as its right, center, and left. Lakes Champlain, On- 
tario, and Erie, centering respectively at Plattsburg, 
Sackett's Harbor, and Presqu'isle (Erie). The American 
strategy should have concentrated on the British left, 
which was in direct contact with the British Navy; if this 
flank fell, the rest of the line would crumble. The tree 
should have been cut here at the roots at Montreal; the 
later lopping of its two great branches at Erie and Cham- 
plain was too late to allow a vigorous offensive campaign. 
The American military strategy by reason of superannu- 
ated and incompetent commanders and misdirected energy 
during the years 1812 and 1813 lost its great opportunity 
to conquer Canada. By the year 1814 it was too late; 
Napoleon had abdicated and more British troops could 
now be spared for the Canadian border. But the 
American Navy under Perry on Lake Erie and under Mac- 
1 Mahan, 8ea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, I. 308. 



THE WAR OF 1812 99 

donough on Chainplain prevented the threatened disaster 
to American arms on the northern frontier; the decisive 
victories of these two won back the offensive on the Ca- 
nadian border for the Americans. 

We may therefore say, in conclusion, that the sea power of 
Britain, while it dominated the world and broke a great 
tyrant, was itself checked by sea power in the War of 1812. 
The young sea power of America, despite its handicaps, 
prevented the conquest of any part of American soil ; in this 
sense it gave America the victory in this second war for 
American independence. 



CHAPTER VII 

COMMERCIAL BLOCKADE AND COMMERCE-RAIDING AS WEAPONS 
OP SEA POWER 

WE have seen that the strategy of the "War of 1812 
presented two main aspects, the defensive on 
the seaboard and the offensive on the Canadian 
border. It will be the object of this chapter to consider in 
more detail the former of these aspects, the war on the 
Atlantic Ocean. This phase was characterized during the 
three summers of 1812, 1813, and 1814, by the blockade of 
United States commerce by Great Britain, which gradually 
tightened until, in the last year, it amounted to the strangle 
hold of a wrestler upon his opponent. During the first 
season (1812) England, to foster her trade — the sinews 
of her war with Napoleon — and also to foster disunion and 
disloyalty in the United States, left the New England ports 
unmolested. New England was opposed to the war, and 
by a conciliatory attitude in this quarter, England hoped 
to destroy the unity of effort in her enemy, and, by her 
system of licensing neutral and American vessels ^ and by 
fostering contraband trade with Canada, she could finance 
with her great West Indian commerce the vast coalition 
armies in Europe and leave something to spare for her 
small Canadian army. Halifax, at the intersection of the 
three lines to England, the West Indies, and the Great 
Lakes, became not only an important point of strategy for 

1 MaJbian, Sea Power in Its Relations to the Wa/r of 1812, I. 409-41 1. 

100 



COMMERCIAL BLOCKADE 101 

her navy but a still more important focal point of trade. 
The next year (1813) Admiral Warren, in chief command 
in the western Atlantic, declared all ports south of New- 
London in blockade; with increased naval forces he now 
instituted a more vigorous throttling of American ports, 
especially Chesapeake and Delaware bays. And during 
the last year (1814), under "Warren's successor. Vice- Ad- 
miral Cochrane, England sealed up the whole Atlantic 
coast so tightly that the smallest coastwise traffic found 
itself endangered. Even starvation in some isolated spots, 
and terrorism, like the German U-boat menace, followed 
in the wake of British sea power. In considering, there- 
fore, the war on the seaboard, we must remember this 
progressive change of policy of Great Britain during the 
three years 1812, 1813, and 1814, — a policy due to her 
gradual release from the great pressure of Napoleon, a 
virtual but rather incongruous ally of the American re- 
public. Also, the change of policy was due to the determina- 
tion of Great Britain to coordinate military effort on the 
seaboard and on the Canadian border and by sharper meth- 
ods to force America to terms. The war that began by 
opposition in some parts of the United States to fighting 
**our brothers" in Canada and England, gradually roused 
the old intense bitter hatred in both belligerents, a hatred 
that in extreme cases manifested itself in outrages on non- 
combatants such as the burning of peaceful villages on the 
Chesapeake. 

According to these three periods in Britain's policy, we 
find somewhat similar changes in the American counters 
to her thrusts. To the commercial blockade, America's 
answer, her only answer, was commerce-destruction on the 
high seas. For this her powerful 44-gun frigates were 
admirably adapted, especially during the first year, when 
England had not as yet an overwhelming force off United 



102 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

States ports. Later, as these few frigates were locked up 
by more powerful squadrons, the smaller national sloops of 
war and the great number of American privateers, handier 
and speedier, kept up incessant raids at the pivotal points of 
British trade. The frigates could meet and destroy the 
cruisers of their class acting as blockaders and convoys, 
as watch-dogs of the avenues of trade. The smaller units, 
national and privateer, preyed more on the trade itself; 
and these, as the war progressed and as the cumulative 
forces of more powerful British squadrons barred the ports 
of the Atlantic seaboard, went farther afield to the pivotal 
points, the cross-roads, the beginnings and endings, of 
British trade, — i. e., to British home waters, to the African 
coast and its adjacent islands, and to the Caribbean. Of 
the American forces so used in commerce-destruction there 
were 21 national ships of all classes against 1000 in the 
British service. Against the 21 American war-ships, of 
which only 14 were in commission, and of which the largest 
were the 3 fine 44 's. President, Constitution and United 
States, England had 236 ships of the line (dreadnaughts), 
and 659 frigates and smaller cruisers.^ The United States 
had further some 250 gunboats, a hobby of Jefferson's that 
proved of no military value. In addition the United States 
developed rapidly during the war that readily improvised 
force of a country without a navy, privateers. These, 
which numbered in the aggregate 526, contributed con- 
siderably in this war of attrition to win a less harsh peace. 
But a couple of dozen ships of the line, or even frigates, 
would have been a far cheaper and far more efficient means 
of combating England's strangulation of American com- 
merce. 

1 For a complete list of the twenty-one American national ships, 
see Soley, Naval Campaign of 1812, U. S. Naval Institute, VII. 302, 
303. 



COMMERCIAL BLOCKADE 103 

This force of fourteen national ships seemed so insignifi- 
cant to the Washington government that it would have 
dismantled them or used them as harbor defense during 
the war, if it had not been for the energetic and patriotic 
remonstrances of such officers as Bainbridge and Stewart, 
who saw even in this puny force some possibility for harass- 
ing the great commerce of the enemy. The event amply 
bore out these officers' opinions. But how could such a 
force be best utilized? Commodore Rodgers was in favor 
of sending one squadron to the British Isles and the rest 
to the West Indies. Bainbridge and Decatur, on the other 
hand, believed in scattering the fourteen over the seas in 
individual cruises. This latter course would leave less 
trace than a big squadron, would avoid the danger of hav- 
ing all one 's eggs in one basket and so losing the whole, and 
would tend to scatter the enemy's cruisers in running the 
raiders to cover. Both plans were adopted, but the whole 
force was so insignificant that a squadron could amount 
to hardly more than two units at any one time. But they 
were nothwithstanding dignified with the name squadron. 
Commodore Rodgers made a cruise in the first weeks of 
the war to the British Isles and home via Madeira, and suc- 
ceeded in demonstrating his theory of forcing thie enemy, 
short of ships in the Atlantic at this period, to remain con- 
centrated. The first attempt at deconcentration, in the case 
of the Guerricre, as we shall see, proved fatal. Three 
American squadrons, in October, 1812, set out along the 
triangular trade route, — to the African coast. West In- 
dies, and home. But the glory of this war for Americans 
was won, not by squadron actions except on the Great 
Lakes, but by single ships cruising alone, — according to 
the bolder suggestions of Decatur and Bainbridge. The 
most famous of these single-ship duels were the Constitu- 
tion-Guerricre, the United States-Macedonian, and the Con- 



104 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

stitiition-Java, all frigate actions and all American victories 
and all won during the first year of the war, when Britain 's 
vigilance in the western Atlantic was necessarily limited. 
As this vigilance increased, the American frigates were 
gradually locked up by overwhelming blockading forces in 
ports, whence they sailed, if at all, at great peril. But the 
nimbler, handier, and smaller American cruisers, especially 
the sloops of war of the class of the Wasp and the Hornet, 
added throughout the war to the remarkable achievements 
of this seemingly contemptible little navy of the United 
States. 

It is the purpose of this chapter to study the more im- 
portant duels of these few national American ships and to 
take a glance at the work of the American privateers in 
their attempts to break the ever-tightening cordon of Brit- 
ish blockaders of American commerce, — to trace, in a word, 
the effect of commerce-raiding as a weapon against the com- 
mercial blockade. 

The cruise of Rodgers's squadron, while failing to en- 
counter a big enemy merchant fleet, was indirectly the 
cause of the first disaster to a British frigate. Rodgers's 
unknown whereabouts forced the British squadron, under 
Captain Broke, to remain united, to sail far out to sea to 
convoy a merchant fleet bound for England, and, after 
sending the Guerriere back to Halifax to refit, to return 
to their station near the Atlantic seaports. 

Meanwhile, Hull, early in July, in the Constitution was 
hurrying from the Chesapeake, a bay easily shut up so 
tightly that he might never again have the opportunity to 
get to sea. En route to New York he sighted, a dozen miles 
off the Jersey coast, a sail which he hoped was one of 
Rodgers's squadron but which at daylight of July 18th 
turned out to be from Broke 's squadron. Then ensued a 
chase remarkable for the duration, sixty hours, and for the 



COMMERCIAL BLOCKADE 105 

skill of Hull in eluding capture against great odds. Dur- 
ing most of the pursuit he was on soundings and was handi- 
capped by lack of wind. In such circumstances he used 
his boats for towing, dropped anchors far ahead, and 
warped his ship along, and on occasion set all sails, even 
studdingsails, whenever a breeze sprang up. Toward the 
end of the long pursuit, Hull, seeing a squall of wind and 
rain ahead, ''let everything go by the run apparently in 
the utmost confusion, as if unable to show a yard of can- 
vas. . . . The enemy, perceiving this, hastened to get every- 
thing snug, before the gust should reach them; but no 
sooner had they got their sails furled than Captain Hull 
had his courses and topsails set and the Constitution darted 
forward with great rapidity."^ During this ruse, which 
gave Hull a long lead, he skilfully picked up his launches, 
in spite of his speed of ten knots, while the British, who 
had on the approach of the squall cut all their boats adrift, 
spent several days in securing theirs. 

It must be noted that the pursuers had many advan- 
tages ; one of their fleetest units might have gotten within 
gunshot and winged the chase, so destroying the latter 's 
speed, a circumstance that nearly bore fruit at one stage ; 
moreover, the British had a whole squadron to draw from 
for towing-launches, an advantage of which they made 
every use. On the other hand, these towing-boats were 
peculiarly vulnerable for the stern-chasers of the pursued. 
But the honors remained with Hull. With masterly sea- 
manship and inventive skill, he had taken advantage of 
every device; his success was due to a careful use of such 
details, each small in itself, but decisive in the aggregate. 
Finding New York closely blockaded, he took refuge in 
Boston. 

1 Naval Monument, pp. 8, 9. See also an interesting account of the 
chase in The Autohiography of Commodore Morris, pp. 51-55. 



^s^V 




BAM I A 'f -^CJ 




TRISTAN DA Ct/MHA 



ACTIONS ON THE HIGH SEAS IN THE WAR OF 1812 

AP = Argus vs. Pelican 

CB =: Chase of the Constitution 

CO = Constitution vs. Cya/ne and Levant 

CG ^ Constitution vs. Guerriere 

CJ ==: Constitution vs. Java 

CL = Chesapeake vs. Leopard 

CS = Chesapeake vs. Shannon 

EB := Enterprise vs. Boxer 

EC = Essex vs. Cherub and Phoebe 

EP = Peacock vs. Epervier 

HP = Hornet vs. Peacock 

PE ^ President vs. Endymion 

PLB = President vs. LittJe BeW 

PH = Hornet vs. Penguin. 

USM = United States vs. Macedonian 

WA = Wtwjo vs. Avon 

WP = TFa^iO vs. Frolic 

WR = Tfasp vs. Reindeer 

106 



COMMERCIAL BLOCKADE 107 

On August 2d, Hull, bent on commerce-raiding and fear- 
ing blockade, slipped out of Boston Harbor. For, while 
the British showed leniency toward Boston merchantmen 
in this first year, they, of course, did not extend this im- 
munity to raiders like the Constitution. Hull cruised to 
the vicinity of Halifax, a great supply point, and was on 
his way toward Britain's second cis- Atlantic base, Ber- 
muda, when on August 19th, some seven hundred and fifty 
miles east of Boston, he fell in with the Guerriere, Captain 
Dacres, on her way to Halifax, as above noted. Both cap- 
tains immediately made ready for action and manceuvered 
for position, like two wary fencers trying to give 
or avoid the deadly thrust. The most deadly thrust 
was in those days called a raking fire, — that is, a 
broadside do\^Ti the length of an enemy ship, where well- 
aimed shots would do the most damage in sweeping 
the crowded decks of guns and men. In manoeuvering for 
a raking position the frigate captain also tried to keep to 
windward of his antagonist, — to retain the weather-gage 
fts it was called, — a position that gave him speed and 
manoeuvering control. In the action between the Consti- 
tution and the Guerriere, Hull, with the weather-gage, to 
avoid being raked approached in a zig-zag course, or yawed, 
as it was called, while Dacres with the similar object of giv- 
ing or avoiding thrusts turned in semicircles, i. e., wore ship, 
back and forth several times across the path of the oncom- 
ing Constitution (a, b).^ After three-quarters of an hour 
of such manceuvers Hull with his greater sail power drew 
up alongside of Dacres, and both frigates now sailed on 
parallel courses before the wind and at close range (c). 
Under the close and accurate fire of the Constitution, the 
Guerriere lost her mizzenmast, which falling over the star- 

1 Letters a, b, c, etc., refer to synchronous positions in the accom- 
panying diagram, Frigate Actions of the War of 1812, page HI. 



108 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

board (right) side acted like a rudder and crippled her 
manoeuvering power. Hull took instant advantage by run- 
ning across the Guerriere's bows and pouring in two raking 
broadsides (d). Then Dacres with similar purpose to 
cross Hull's path and rake him succeeded only in fouling his 
bowsprit in the Constitution's rigging (e). In these 
critical moments both sides tried to board and to repel 
boarders, and sent heavy musketry fire from aloft that in- 
flicted the severest losses on both crews. After the two 
frigates drifted apart, the Guerriere's foremast, owing to 
the loss of stays and shrouds, toppled overboard, also carry- 
ing away in the crash the mainmast, and she pitched in the 
heavy sea a helpless and beaten hulk. Hull now hauled 
off to make hasty repairs ; it was a custom of the American 
raiders to make such repairs after an action so as to be ready 
instantly in case another British cruiser appeared on the 
horizon. On his return Hull received the surrender of 
Dacres. During the night he transferred the wounded 
and prisoners to the Constitution and the next day, finding 
the Guerriere too badly damaged to bring to port, blew her 
up. 

In this first round between what we may call commerce- 
raiding and the commercial blockade Hull had won a vic- 
tory that caused a warm glow of pride in America, a grow- 
ing pride that helped to supplant the indifference to the 
war in New England, and which caused a corresponding 
gloom among the British, who referred sarcastically to the 
American frigates as disguised ships of the line. Of course, 
the American frigates of the class of the Constitution were 
in gun power and crew superior, about 30 per cent., to the 
British frigates, but this fact and the superior marksman- 
ship are, as Roosevelt in his ''Naval War of 1812" points 
out, to the credit of the Americans. Hull had broken the 
spell of British invincibility at sea. In Roosevelt's words, 



COMMERCIAL BLOCKADE 109 

Hull's skill in his evasion of Broke 's squadron and in his 
defeat shortly afterwards of Dacres, "places him above any 
single-ship captain of the war." Hull's victory, coming 
three days after the disastrous defeat of his uncle, General 
Hull, on the Canadian border, acted as a solace for the loss 
of Michigan. Sea power against great odds had won where 
land power with great odds in its favor had lost. 

The superior gunnery of the American raiders was 
demonstrated more clearly in the next action between the 
United States sloop of war Wasp, Captain Jacob Jones, and 
the British brig Frolic, Captain "Whinyates, five hundred 
miles east of the Chesapeake, October 18, 1812. The Wasp 
in a commerce-raid was following the track of merchant- 
men from the Gulf of Mexico to Europe and the Frolic was 
on convoy duty for homeward-bound traders. Both 
cruisers, which were of the smaller types, and with a slight 
preponderance (275 pounds to 250) in broadside in favor 
of the British brig, had suffered damage in the gales of 
the preceding days. The sea was still running high. The 
two antagonists attempted little manoeuvering and began 
the action at fifty yards' distance on parallel courses that 
gradually converged until they fell aboard of each other. 
The British here, as in the case of the Giierriere, claimed 
a "superior fire," by which they meant in both actions 
quicker fire. But the hits were entirely in favor of the 
Americans. The Frolic's shots flew high, hitting the rig- 
ging of the Wasp, while the latter 's hulled the Frolic, 
causing great damage to masts, ship, and crew, so much 
so that when the Wasp's men boarded, they found only 
four men alive on deck, — three officers, all wounded, and 
a seaman. Unfortunately for Captain Jones, at the mo- 
ment of victory a British 74, the Poictiers, appeared on the 
scene and took both victor and vanquished in tow to 
Bermuda. Captain Whinyates had fought with British 



110 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

tenacity and thus had prolonged the action long enough 
to retrieve the disaster of capture by recapture. But 
this action, like the previous one, showed the British that 
they could not let up in their vigilance in convoying their 
merchant fleets. The challenge of the small American 
Navy as raiders was a real menace in spite of overwhelm- 
ing odds and the stringent blockade. 

A few days before the Wasp left the Delaware capes for 
her eventful cruise, Rodgers, on October 8th, had set sail 
from Boston with two small squadrons, which parted com- 
pany on October 11th. The President and the Congress 
under Rodgers 's own command constituted a first squad- 
ron, which sailed to the Cape Verde Islands, back along 
latitude 18 degrees north, and home, in all eleven thou- 
sand miles. During this cruise, in which Rodgers touched 
at the great cross-roads of trade from the East Indies, 
Africa, South America, and the West Indies, he en- 
countered just five enemy merchantmen, of which he cap- 
tured two. This failure in results was due to the rigid 
enforcement of the British convoy system now in opera- 
tion. The second American squadron, made up of the 
United States and the Argus, under Decatur, and a third 
squadron, consisting of the Constitution, the Hornet, and 
the Essex, under Bainbridge, who set sail from New York 
on October 26th, were more prolific in results. For, in 
addition to their merchant prizes, Decatur and Bain- 
bridge were each to bag a British frigate, Lawrence in 
the Uornet was to destroy the brig Peacock, and Porter in 
the Essex was destined to make a cruise that placed him in 
the forefront of commerce-raiders. 

Shortly after parting company with Rodgers, Decatur, 
in the United States, separated also from the Argus, pre- 
ferring, in accordance with his earlier expressed sugges- 
tions, to cruise alone. 'He was making his way toward the 




CONSTITUTION i^\ 

AND GUERRIERE 
AUGUST 19, I8lg. 




UNITED 5TATES AND MACEDONIAN 
OCTOBER 25. 1812 . 





CONSTITUTION AND JAVA 
DECEMBER £9. ie,\Z 



CHESAPEAKE AND SHANNON 
JUNE I 1815 



FRIGATE ACTIONS in ihe WAR Of 1812. 



C0UI?5E OF AMERICAN FRIGATES 

COURSE Of BRITISH FfflGATES 

a, tic. etc, SYNCHRONOUS FOS|TIPf''S. 



Ill 



112 SEA POWER IN A'MERICAN HISTORY 

Madeiras when at daybreak, October 25th, the outlook in 
his masthead made out a sail some twelve miles to the 
south-southwest. This sail later turned out to be the Brit- 
ish frigate Macedonian, Captain Garden, who was evi- 
dently approaching on a line that would eventually cross 
Decatur's course at a wide obtuse angle (a). The two 
frigates were therefore sailing on opposite tacks, with the 
wind south-southeast giving Garden the weather-gage. 
From the court-martial proceedings of Garden's trial it 
appears that Garden, during the approach determined, 
against the advice of his first lieutenant, Hope, to retain 
the weather-gage rather than come to close quarters at 
once. As the United States had superior gun power, 24- 
pounders to 18-pounders, this decision played directly 
into the hands of Decatur, whose game it was to cripple 
or destroy his opponent with his longer-range guns before 
the latter 's guns could reach him. Decatur, who in his 
earlier career showed plenty of headlong dash, played 
in the ensuing duel an unusually wary fence. At 8 :30 
A. M. he wore, i.e., turned around as if to cross Garden's 
course and so seize the weather-gage. Garden therefore 
hauled closer to the wind, so as to foil Decatur's move. 
Decatur then wore again, thus returning to his original 
course, and on passing his opponent on opposite tacks 
opened with a broadside at a mile's range (b). Garden 
after passing him! also wore and gave chase, fairly well 
astern of Decatur, who had much the slower ship in his 
"Old Wagoner," as the sailors called the United States. 
As Garden was evidently attempting to come to close 
quarters so that his smaller guns could bear, Decatur turned 
first to starboard then back to port (c). Then, by hauling 
out the spanker and letting fly the jib-sheet, Decatur came 
up to the wind, and by backing the mizzen topsail, he 
retarded "his speed and had his ship in such a position that 



COMMERCIAL BLOCKADE 113 

he could pour from his heavier guns a deadly, almost 
raking, fire upon his appi;oaching opponent (d). Such an 
approach was disastrous for the Macedonian, — especially as 
she was coming nearly bows on, a position from which 
she could make little reply. Before the Macedonian got 
within close range she was a beaten ship ; only her lower 
masts were standing ; her carronades, the main reliance for 
close fighting, were disabled, and she had many killed and 
wounded. On the other hand, the United States was virtu- 
ally ' ' in perfect condition, ' ' a result of the cautious tactics 
of Decatur, who was evidently anxious to keep the United 
States intact to make sure of getting back to his distant 
base. With characteristic chivalry, Decatur now crossed 
his beaten foe's bows without giving the raking broad- 
side, the coup de grace, so surely expected that, as he 
passed in silence, the Macedonians gave a cheer in the 
apparent belief that he was fleeing from the fight. When 
he returned an hour later, the Macedonian hauled down 
her colors, Decatur refused to receive the sword of 
Garden. The two men had been friends and some years 
before had had an argument as to the relative merits of 
24-pounders and 18-pouuders, — an argument which they 
tested out in this action. The power of the United States 
to the Maeedoivian was as three to two, but the compara- 
tive losses were in the ratio of one to nine in the Ameri- 
can's favor. Notwithstanding hints from the British 
Admiralty to Admiral Warren that his blockade should 
be tighter and despite Warren's greatly increasing force 
in the Atlantic, Decatur succeeded in getting both frigates 
safely to he United States. Decatur had added another 
to America's scant force of raiders, which was destined, 
however, against the cumulative blockade to be as harm- 
less as if it were at the bottom of the sea, except for the 
fact that every raider in a port required a squadron 



114 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

cruising before that port winter and summer to watcli it. 
Two months after the United States-Macedonian fight, 
Commodore Bainbridge in the Constitution and Lawrence 
in the Hornet were blockading the sloop of war Bonne 
Citoyenne in a neutral port, Bahia, Brazil. In the hope 
of luring out the sloop to single combat, Bainbridge had 
left Lawrence alone on blockade and was standing out to 
sea when on December 29, 1812, at 9 :00 a. m., he sighted 
two strange sail, which turned out to be the British frigate 
Java, Captain Lambert, and an American prize. As the 
Brazilian authorities had shown considerable irritation at 
various breaches of neutrality by belligerents, Bainbridge 
proceeded farther off shore. The Java, an excellent sailer 
under a skilful seaman, followed at the unusual speed of 
ten knots an hour. Now ensued a battle, lasting over two 
hours, which, unlike the two previous frigate actions, was 
a combination of both gunnery and ship evolutions, — 
evolutions so serpentine that it is difficult to determine the 
synchronous positions from the reports of the two cap- 
tains. These combatants were too nimble, their manoeuv- 
ers too quick, for observers of that day without stop- 
watches and cameras to catch the movements in this spar- 
ring contest. Indeed, the two accounts vary so hopelessly 
that one writer suggests that "someone's watch was adrift." 
But with the aid of the diagram on page 111 we hope to 
make clear the salient features. At approximately two in 
the afternoon the two ships were in contact, firing the 
first shot at half a mile range (a). They now wore 
several times to avoid each other's attempts at raking. 
At 2:30 p. M., the Constitution had her wheel shot away, 
an accident that forced upon Bainbridge the awkward 
makeshift of steering by relieving tackles (b). To offset 
this handicap, however, the Constitution's superior marks- 



COMMERCIAL BLOCKADE 115 

manship shot away the Java's bowsprit and cut her rig- 
ging to pieces so that at three o'clock the Java, heading 
up into the "wind, gave the Constitution two opportunities 
to rake her (c and c'). Later Bainb ridge, after foiling 
Lambert's attempt to board, crossed the Englishman's 
bows twice in quick succession (d and d'). This double 
manoeuver with its accompanying fire from all angles at 
close quarters was the knock-out blow. A little after four 
o'clock the Java, a shattered hulk, with all spars except 
the lower mainmast gone, her decks a shambles, and her 
captain mortally wounded, gave up all resistance. As in 
the other two actions, the American captain now with- 
drew for temporary repairs and on his return received the 
surrender of the Java. After transferring her crew and 
passengers, Bainbridge blew her up. 

Some days later, as the dying Lambert was being taken 
ashore from the Constitution, Captain Bainbridge — him- 
self suffering from two severe wounds, and supported by 
two officers — came on deck to bid Captain Lambert fare- 
well and to return his sword. Of this incident a writer 
says, "The contrast between the dignified, magnanimous 
bearing of the participants in this action and the tone of 
the writers who subsequently described them is very strik- 
ing. ' ' ^ This stately and chivalrous courtesy among naval 
officers of the times had other interesting phases as seen 
in the challenges to combat that reflected the dueling 
customs of the period. On blockading the Bonne Citoy- 
enne earlier, Bainbridge had given his word of honor to 
her captain that he would not interfere if the latter came 
out to answer the challenge of Captain Lawrence in the 
Hornet. The British captain quite properly declined to 
win any "fighting-cock glory"; so long as he was holding 

I HoUis, Frigate Constitution, p. 187, 



116 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

•two American raiders on blockade duty, he was, from a 
military point of *view, winning a more important battle.^ 

Lawrence, after waiting in vain for bis challenger, later, 
off the Demerara River, met and sank a war-ship of his 
own class, the Peacock. With his sloop full of prisoners 
and short of provisions and water, Lawrence made for the 
United States, where he was to take p'art in his last combat, 
a combat which showed that British sea power was win- 
ning the race against the American commerce-raider. 

Two months after his arrival in the United States, 
Lawrence was given the Chesapeake, then refitting at Bos- 
ton. He was to take her to the vicinity of Halifax to act 
against the communications of the British Army in Can- 
ada. Outside of Boston Harbor lay the Shannon, under 
Broke, a man skilful alike with pen or sword. The British 
captain sent a most courteously worded challenge to Law- 
rence, — which the latter never got, — in which he under- 
lined the words " even combat " in veiled allusion to the 
previous frigate actions, the sting of which defeats the 
British captains felt keenly. But the chivalrous Law- 
rence needed no written challenge ; the presence of an 
equal opponent off shore was sufficient provocation for 
his high mettle. In spite of a crew largely new to one 
another and to the officers and therefore not a fighting 
unit, Lawrence stood out under a fair wind on June 1, 
1813, to meet a rival who for seven years had commanded 
the Shannon, of which Mahan says, "there was no more 
thoroughly efficient ship of her class . . . during the 
twenty years' war with France." At a time when most 
British captains stiU had the idea of Nelson — to get so 
close to your opponent that your guns can't miss — Broke 
had adopted new ideas such as gun-sights and frequent 

1 Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, II. 3. 



COMMERCIAL BLOCKADE 117 

practice with sliot, not blanks, at real targets, and had 
by these means made his command the crack ship of the 
service. 

As Lawrence came out, Broke chivalrously yielded to 
his opponent every advantage, such as the weather-gage 
and the opportunity for raking positions. Lawrence, evi- 
dently believing that his raw crew could do better work 
at the guns at point-blank range than at the more difficult 
task of handling the sails, kept the simple manceuver of 
a parallel course to Broke 's. The artillery duel that en- 
sued was sharp and short. To make matters worse for the 
Chesapeake, she had come into the action with too much 
headway (a) ; ^ therefore, despite Lawrence's attempt to luff 
closer to the wind, she forged ahead (b).^ At this junc- 
ture, by reason of loss of head-sails and a disabled wheel 
under the accurate and destructive fire of the Shannon, 
the Chesapeake pointed up into the wind (c), gathered 
stern-board, exposed herself to the diagonal or raking fire 
at close range of her antagonist, and finally ran aboard 
of the latter (d, d'). It was in vain for the wounded 
Lawrence to call for boarders. Broke and his men in- 
stantly boarded the Chesapeake, whose remnants of a 
crew, without leaders, offered, to borrow Broke 's words, 
"a desperate but disorderly resistance." The battle was 
all over in fifteen minutes. All things considered, the 
Chesapeake's crew behaved well; they forced the victorious 
crew to pay dearly for victory. They lost forty-eight 
killed to the Shannon's twenty-six. Doubtless, from the 
standpoint of Lawrence's major duty, commerce-destruc- 
tion, it would have been wiser if he had waited for a more 
favorable opportunity to slip out of Boston Harbor and 
so to elude the blockaders and get away to his station off 
Halifax, but whether he was inspired by a rash over- 
1 See diagram on p. 111. 



118 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

confidence in offering battle to the Shannon, as Mahan 
intimates/ is of no great moment now. A raiding cruise 
to Halifax, li,ow;ever successful;, would have had little 
weight against the overwhelming pressure of British sea 
power. The American people have forgotten Lawrence's 
lack of judgment or his over-confidence, but they can never 
forget his dying words, ' ' Don 't give up the ship, ' ' a watch- 
word of the navy ever since, a clarion call ringing as true 
to-day as a century ago. 

These frigate actions, though "indecisive of general re- 
sults,"^ formed for the sea power of a young nation a 
glorious tradition, which was augmented by the smaller 
national sloops upon which devolved more and more the 
duty of comuLerce-destroying, as the larger frigates were 
being hopelessly shut up in ports by the gradual tighten- 
ing of the blockade. To the duels of these sloops belong 
the Wasp-Frolic and Hornet-Peacock encounters described 
above. Owing to the blockade the sloops were forced 
farther afield. The most famous of the later sloops, the 
Argus, the Peacock (2d), and the Wasp (2d), — the latter 
two new built and named after the victories of the Hornet 
and the Wasp, — won distinction by daring raids, like Paul 
Jones's in British waters. As in Paul Jones's day, too, 
these raiders could rely somewhat on friendly French 
ports for disposal of prisoners and prizes, and for repairs, 
if they could get by the powerful cordon of British block- 
aders. They sometimes, however, like the German sub- 
marines a hundred years later, had to burn or destroj'- their 
prizes at sea, first taking off specie and other valuable cargo. 
But unlike the Germans they sent their prisoners ashore in 
cartel-ships. 

These raiders of the American regular navy, while in- 

1 Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, II. 145. 

2 Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, I. 289. 



COMMERCIAL BLOCKADE 119 

tended for commerce-destroying, did not avoid conflict 
with equal opponents of the British Navj^ On the other 
hand, the American privateers, which aggregated 526, con- 
fined their operations to the enemy's commerce. Like the 
national ships, they operated at the cross-roads and focal 
points of commerce. Of these privateers perhaps the most 
famous and certainly the most successful were the Yankee 
and the Chasseur. The former made forty prizes during 
the war, of which thirty-four were ships or brigs, valued 
with their cargoes at three million dollars. The Chasseur, 
with thirty prizes to her credit, at the end of the war 
captured a ''camouflaged" merchantman, the armed 
schooner St. Lawrence. The Chasseur's captain later 
apologized for capturing a war-ship unawares. Though 
privateering was a business venture, a matter of personal 
gain rather than patriotism; though by its big rewards it 
took men much needed by the regular navy ; though it was 
on the whole a costly substitute for a regular navy, these 
privateers, the people's navy as it were, dealt the pride 
and commerce of Great Britain a weighty blow.^ They 
captured all told 1,340 prizes during the war. 

Such losses, however, were a small fraction of Britain's 
vast commerce. On the other hand, her blockade of the 
American coast, progressively increasing in rigor toward 
the end of the war, was bringing in its wake widespread 
distress and deep humiliation to the United States. For 
example, that great estuary the Chesapeake became to 
all intents and purposes a British lake. As around it lay 
the chief sections on which the country depended for its 
meat and grain, the British by frequent attacks endeavored 
to destroy the flour-mills and stores of wheat on its shores 
and thus starve out the American armies. They even de- 
stroyed private property and entire villages, such as 

1 Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1S12, I. 2G5. 



120 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

Georgetown and Frederickstown at the head of the Chesa- 
peake, as punishment for local resistance. Meanwhile they 
carried on a bold licensed trade through neutrals, real and 
pretended, and furnished the British fleets with fresh Amer- 
ican beef "supplied from American ports, by American 
dealers, in American vessels."^ — a trade later stopped by 
the American Government under another embargo. But 
despite all these minor achievements on the Chesapeake Ad- 
miral Warren failed to cut out the Constellation lying at 
Norfolk, a raider whose destruction was of first military 
importance. 

Warren's measures were too mild for the British Gov- 
ernment and he was therefore succeeded by Vice-Admiral 
Cochrane, who arrived in the Chesapeake in April, 1814, 
and inaugurated the last phase of the war on the Atlantic 
seaboard, a phase intended to bring home the war to Ameri- 
cans by a species of punitive terrorism. With a fleet of 
twenty sail, four of which were ships of the line, and 
with four thousand of Wellington's veterans, the British 
now inaugurated some major operations in Chesapeake 
Bay and in Maine, operations intended to act as diversions 
to help Prevost's plan of invading New York, To fur- 
ther the first of these purposes Cochrane sent a mixed 
naval and military force under General Ross up the Patux- 
ent to destroy Commodore Barney's flotilla of barges and 
gunboats and to veil the real objective, Washington; and 
in support he also sent a division of frigates up the Poto- 
mac, Ross forced Barney to burn his boats and drove 
him to Bladensburg, where Barney and his four hundred 
seamen opposed, virtually unsupported, the march of Ross 
toward "Washington, The uudrilled American militia, the 
"citizen soldiery," upon which the Washington govern- 
ment had relied so strongly, broke and fled. The British 

1 Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of IS 12, IT. 172. 



COMMERCIAL BLOCKADE 121 

proceeded to Washington, where they bnmed the Capitol 
and the White House, but fearing for their communica- 
tions, hastily retreated, getting back to their fleet within 
four days from the day of departure. The British frig- 
ates in the Potomac, acting as a support of Ross, destroyed 
some shipping and levied a contribution on Alexandria. 
But owing to a little better American organization some 
time later, a similar attempt to levy a contribution on 
Baltimore failed. Not content to hold the Atlantic sea- 
board in a grip so tight that hardly an oyster boat could 
put out from shore without getting caught, the British 
by this attack on the national capital in a most humiliating 
way brought home the war to the American Government 
and people. 

During this last year, though the harassment was 
severest in the Chesapeake, the British adopted also more 
offensive measures in New England and especially in 
Maine. Besides such operations as the destruction of 
twenty sea-going ships up the Connecticut and sixteen at 
Wareham, Massachusetts, they now planned to occupy 
Maine to "rectify the frontier." In upper Maine their 
communications between the two great bases, Quebec and 
Halifax, were endangered by American occupation. 
Governor Sherbrooke of Nova Scotia, therefore, in the sum- 
mer of 1814 sent a combined naval and military force up 
the Penobscot, burned the shipping, and forced the de- 
struction of the John Adams by her crew. After this, Sher- 
brooke, who assumed a conciliatory attitude toward the 
inhabitants, proclaimed the territory under the British 
flag. Thus by possession, which is said to be nine tenths 
of the law. Great Britain hoped to pave the way at the 
peace table for the permanent annexation of Maine. 

In conclusion, we may repeat that the British commercial 
blockade had driven American commerce from the high 



122 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

seas. Even small coasters carrying necessities made their 
runs from headland to headland at imminent risk of cap- 
ture. In Boston alone, in September, 1813, 245 sea-going 
vessels, not counting coasters, were lying idle; and insur- 
ance on American bottoms had risen to 50 per cent. A 
commerce, once second to England's alone, fell from forty- 
five millions in 1811, to twenty-five millions in 1813, and to 
seven millions for the year ending September 30, 1814.^ 
Interstate trade in the common essentials of life was car- 
ried on under circumstances so difficult that it made their 
cost prohibitive. Wagons of dry-goods, for example, took 
forty-six days from Philadelphia to South Carolina. 
Robert Fulton, who died during the war, estimated that 
enough money had been spent on wagon hire for this inter- 
state trade to construct a complete system of inland water- 
ways from Maine to Georgia. The general stagnation was 
reflected, too, in prices; a glut at the point of production 
caused the bottom to drop out of prices while distant com- 
munities were in isolated cases near starvation. For in- 
stance, flour worth about $4.00 a barrel in Baltimore, the 
wheat center, brought $25.00 at New Orleans ; and inversely, 
sugar worth $9.00 a hundredweight in New Orleans 
brought $26.50 in Baltimore. After the blockade was 
lifted, sugar dropped overnight in New York from $26.00 
to $12.50 per hundredweight. In the midst of plenty, a 
country that had helped feed the world was in want. ^The 
commercial blockade was the Continental System in 
America; it had the American seaboard by the throat. 

1 Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, II. 201. 



CHAPTER VIII 

SEA POWER ON THE GREAT LAKES 

WHILE the naval operations on the Atlantic 
seaboard, logically by reason of American un- 
preparedness, defensive, became in reality an 
aggressive defensive, the Canadian border on the other 
hand, logically the theater of the American offensive, as- 
sumed the character of a desperate defensive. In the 
early days of the war leaders in Congress like Calhoun 
and Clay were cock-sure of success in Canada. "So far 
from being unprepared, sir," declared Calhoun in a speech 
in March, 1812, "I believe that in four weeks from, the 
time a declaration of war is heard on our frontier, the 
whole of Upper Canada . . . and a part of Lower Canada 
will be in our power." Yet such words, despite the gross 
neglect of military preparation during the decade before 
the war, were not altogether vainglorious boasting. 
England, handicapped by a huge European war that had 
been sapping her energies for twenty years, could spare 
only a paltry three or four thousand men for the whole 
border. On the other hand, the merest glance at the map 
will convince the reader of the great advantages of the 
United States for an aggressive campaign, especially if 
directed early at Montreal, situated at the apex of water- 
ways to the westward and southward. The United States 
had the short direct routes — the interior lines, as they are 
called in strategy — to the eneni}- 's country ; and the Great 
Lakes, if under American control, would afford the quick- 

123 



124 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

est and safest communications. But these natural ad- 
vantages were thrown away by the "broken-down" army 
leaders like Dearborn and Hull. These men, veterans of 
the War of Independence and not without distinction in 
their earlier days, formed a striking contrast to a vigorous 
aggressive young general like Brock. The latter had been 
with Nelson at Copenhagen and demonstrated Nelson 's idea, 
"Boldest methods are safest," in his quick decisive blow 
on August 16, 1812, in forcing General Hull, who had a 
much superior force, to surrender Detroit. This was a 
disaster to American arms, for with Detroit fell Michigan 
and the offensive on the Amierican left wing. In lieu of 
Calhoun's predicted invasion of Canada, the United States 
had now the threat of being itself invaded. Moreover, 
the Northwest Indians became allies of the victors as a 
result of Brock's stroke. This disaster showed a lesson 
often forgotten in peace time, that war is a young man's 
game. What the army under its old leaders lost the navy 
with its young leaders regained. These youthful naval 
leaders, Chauncey, Perry, and Macdonough, were to re- 
establish in part at least the offensive on the Canadian 
border. But even Chauncey saw too late the great oppor- 
tunity and advantage of Montreal. In 1814 he declared 
the tree ought to have been felled at its base at Montreal 
instead of lopping off great branches like Lakes Erie,' 
Ontario, and Champlain. If he had seen this in 1812, it 
would quickly have brought about Calhoun's prophecy. 
But Perry by lopping off Lake Erie, and Macdonough by 
lopping off Champlain, prevented England from getting 
a lasting grip on the Northwest and on New York. 

Though the season of 1812 therefore ended in disaster 
to American arms on the border, the chance to retrieve 
misfortune by a vigorous American offensive in 1813 still 
remained. They say Opportunity knocks at every man's 



SEA POWER ON THE GREAT LAKES 125 

door, and al every nation's, at least once. Such oppor- 
tunity came to the American naval commanders on Lakes 
Erie and Ontario and to the American nation in the sum- 
mer of 1813. During this year England with her hands 
still tied by the great European conflict could send but 
smlall reenforcements to Canada and then only long after 
the ice broke up. The opportunity so presented was seized 
by Oliver Hazard Perry, the American commander on Lake 
Erie, and lost by Isaac Chauncey, Perry's superior, on Lake 
Ontario. The two British naval commanders, Barclay and 
Yeo, were also trying to seize the opportunity for control of 
these two lakes. To attain this control all four naval com- 
manders were busy in two ship-building races, which culmi- 
nated in a decision on Erie and a drawn battle on Ontario. 
Such decision on Erie would help the American cause 
considerably, but Ontario, nearer the heart of British sea 
power, was the more important; the artery of British com- 
munications, if severed at Lake Ontario, would have cut otf 
the life's blood of all British military operations west of 
Montreal and thus insured the crushing of the British right 
wing. But both Commodore Chauncey and Sir James Yeo 
on Ontario played an over-cautious game. War is a game of 
risks whose stakes the over-cautious seldom win. The able 
fighter makes careful preparations, takes his chance, and 
wins victory by his boldness, if his boldness stops short of 
rashness. At the respective American and British naval 
bases on Ontario — Sackett's Harbor and Kingston — Chaun- 
cey and Yeo built ships with all the energy and speed their 
limited resources allowed. As one won a temporary pre- 
ponderance in tonnage he ranged the lake and protected 
military communications, only to take refuge in his base as 
soon as his opponent got a slight mathematical superiority. 
During this ship-building race, in the critical year 1813, 
Chauncey on April 27th, captured York (Toronto), a sec- 



126 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

ondary British base, and seized the 22-gun Duke of Glou- 
cester and destroyed a 30-gun ship on the stocks; while the 
British made a similar raid on Saekett's Harbor a month 
later and burned the Duke of Gloucester and a large quan- 
tity of military stores. For a month the British had con- 
trol of the lake and recaptured York. Then on July 20th 
Chauneey completed his heaviest ship, the General Pike. 
During the summer the two over-wary contestants came to 
blows just three times. Of these actions the first was near 
Fort Niagara, August 10th, the second off the Genesee 
River, September 11th, and the last off York, on September 
28th. All three actions w^re fought so warily, for fear 
either side should lose a unit, that the season ended with 
neither side in control of the lake. Opportunity never 
knocked again for Chauneey; the next year, 1814, England, 
free in Europe, could with the great reach of her released 
sea power hand over guns and men to Yeo. The latter 
soon had an overwhelming superiority, his strongest unit 
being a ship of the line of a hundred and two guns. 

From these three actions fought by Chauneey and Yeo 
on Lake Ontario we may draw one important lesson, as 
true to-day as then : A battle-ship with its unity of 
organization and mounting ten guns is superior to five 
cruisers under different commanders and mounting alto- 
gether ten guns. On Lake Ontario, Chauneey had three 
larger ships, of which the 800-ton Pike was the most im- 
portant unit, and ten schooners, — the whole flotilla so 
heterogeneous that they were like three warriors entering 
battle with ten children in tow. On the other hand, Yeo 
had six units of various rigs and sizes but fairly homo- 
geneous in manoeuvering ability. The Americans had long 
guns in the ratio of four to one, but in carronades the Brit- 
ish had a superiority of two to one. Chauneey, therefore, 
would prefer long-range battle, while Yeo would prefer to 



SEA POAVER ON THE GREAT LAKES 127 

come to close grips where his carronades with their heavy, 
smashing charge would be effective. But Yeo would have 
to have plenty of wind to approach quickly or be sunk by 
the long guns of his enemy before he could get close enough 
to strike a blow. If, therefore, Chauncey had left his use- 
less smaller vessels at his base, his three larger units with 
their more homogeneous speed would have been more than a 
match for Yeo's flotilla; and indeed the General Pike alone 
under favorable conditions — i.e., with the weather-gage — 
would have been equal to the whole of Yeo 's f orce.^ 

To this naval campaign on Ontario the campaign on Erie 
was a striking contrast. In the midst of his indecisive 
work, Commodore Chauncey wrote this advice to his subor- 
dinate. Perry, on Lake Erie: "The first object will be to 
destroy or cripple the enemy's fleet, but in all attempts 
upon the fleet you ought to use great caution, for the loss 
of a single vessel may decide the fate of the campaign." 
By a strange irony of fate. Perry, not heeding too narrowly 
the "great caution" of his superior, was destined to win by 
this very means — "the loss of a single vessel" — a decisive 
battle ; this too, at the very time that Chauncey was fighting 
his long-drawn-out second action. 

The foundation for Perry's victory was laid during the 
fall of 1812 by Lieutenant Jesse D. Elliott, who took charge 
of the work on Lake Erie on September 7th of that year. 
With great energy but poor judgment he established a tem- 
porary navy-yard at Black Rock near Buffalo. Besides 
acquiring some schooners by purchase, he cut out the armed 
British brigs Detroit and Caledonia. The latter with its 
valuable .cargo of furs he brought to his base, but the De- 
/roiY^which, by the way, had formerly been the U. S. S. 
Adams, captured from the Americans and renamed Detroit 
in honor of their victory — Elliott burned to prevent recap- 

1 Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, II. 54-56. 



128 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

ture. The British, though still possessing a superior JEoree 
on Lake Erie, felt these losses keenly. By his quick and 
decisive action Elliott was in a fair way to dispute the con- 
trol of this lake with the British commander, Barclay. 
Of course, he regretted the loss of the Detroit, with which 
he might have gained full control before winter, but his 
small force restricted the freedom of the lake to the British ; 
it was a real threat to British communications. Both sides 
realized the vital importance of these communications, — ■ 
these short interior lines by water along which to transport 
food and troops, — and both sides worked feverishly to get 
a superior force with which to gain the undisputed control 
on which the fate of the military campaign in the Northwest 
depended. 

With the arrival on March 27, 1813, of Commander Oliver 
Hazard Perry, who now superseded Elliott in command on 
Erie, the ship-building race between him and Captain 
Robert H. Barclay was on in earnest. Both, like their 
immediate superiors, Chauneey and Yeo, on Lake Ontario, 
were young and full of energy; both, again like their 
superiors, despite youthful years were veterans in the 
service of the Tripolitan War and Nelson's great battle 
respectively, but both had more dash and initiative than 
their superiors, and both were left largely to their fate by 
these superiors, who were indeed in this summer of 1813 
too much occupied with each other to spare men and guns 
for their subordinates. Both commanders worked under 
great handicaps to create their forces. If Perry had to 
bring everything except timber — iron, guns, ammunition, 
sails, cordage, provisions — a distance of five hundred miles 
from, Philadelphia, Barclay had on his side to contend 
against severer weather conditions, impassable roads, and 
less-developed industries of the Canadian side. If Perry 
was handicapped by lack of skilled artisans and by insubor- 



SEA POWER ON THE GREAT LAKES 129 

dinate militia, Barclay longed for regulars instead of 
Indians and for real salt-water tars in place of his Canadian 
lake sailors. 

But despite all these handicaps each commander 
achieved wonders in the construction and equipment of 
his flotilla. Perry had by midsummer a force headed by 
the 500-ton brigs Lawrence and Niagara, armed largely 
with carronades and constituting the important units of 
his squadron. Besides these two he had captured the 
brig Caledonia and half a dozen schooners. Barclay, on 
the other hand, had completed the new ships Detroit and 
Queen Charlotte, armed with long guns, the nucleus of his 
squadron; and besides he had the brig Hunter and three 
schooners. Their force in ships was therefore as nine is to 
six in favor of the Americans, with a preponderance of 
long guns on the British side. Both flotillas were short- 
handed; Perry for example had only 490 of the estimated 
complement of 740 required to man the squadron properly. 
He had remonstrated about the inferior lot of blacks, 
soldiers, and boys sent him by Chauncey in a recent detach- 
ment, which made up his 490, to which Chauncey replied, 
"I have yet to learn that the color of the skin, or the cut 
and trimmings of the coat, can affect a man's qualifications 
or usefulness"; and he added, ''There will be a great deal 
expected of you from your country. ' ' This rebuke, uttered 
by one whose inaction presented such a contrast to Perry's 
later achievement, nearly caused the quick-tempered Perry 
to resign, a loss that would have been disastrous, for Perry 
was the American Navy on Lake Erie. 

In the earlier campaign on Erie Barclay made two seri- 
ous strategical mistakes — mistakes either of which if 
avoided would have made the battle and its crushing defeat 
impossible. The first of these was his failure to prevent 
Perry from transferring his ship-building base from Black 



130 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

Rock to Erie (Presqu'isle). Perry found Black Rock a 
poor location because it was within point-blank range of the 
enemy's guns across the Niagara, and also because the cur- 
rent was so strong there that he could have taken his 
schooners into the lake only by warping them with great 
labor against the rapid current. Under these difficulties 
Perry had watched for a favorable opportunity, eluded 
Barclay by skirting under cover of a fog along the shore to 
Erie, where he established his new base in a good harbor, 
protected by a sand-bar across its entrance. 

This very sand-bar led to Barclay's second strategical 
error in the Erie campaign. Chauncey and Perry had 
decided on Erie as a base during the previous winter, not 
because of this bar, but in spite of it. To Erie the much 
needed cordage, sail-cloth, guns, and ammunition could be 
brought the long distance from Philadelphia and Pitts- 
burgh by water all the way except the last fifteen miles. 
By midsummer Barclay anticipated Perry in completing 
some of his units and with these at once set up a blockade 
of Perry, which lasted from July 20th to August 2d. Then 
he left without apparent reason. He had evidently not 
learned the lesson of his former great commander. Lord 
Nelson, who during his last campaign, Trafalgar, blockaded 
his enemy at Toulon night and day for nearly two years 
with such relentless vigilance that he himself did not leave 
the deck of his flag-ship, the Victory, for twenty-one months. 
With probably much less effort than Nelson's at Toulon, 
Barclay, powerfully aided by nature, should have sealed 
up Perry hermetically and so rendered him harmless. But 
the moment Barclay 's vigilance was relaxed, on August 2d, 
Perry, whose flotilla was by now complete, took instant 
advantage. He lifted his schooners across the bar and 
stationed them off the entrance. He also mounted tempo- 
rary cannon on shore in case Barclay should return and 



SEA POWER ON THE GREAT LAKES 131 

catch him in the act of getting the large new ships, Law- 
rence and Niagara, out of the inner harbor. With only- 
four to six feet of water over this bar, which extended 
completely across the harbor, he found it necessary to take 
off the Laivrence's guns and sink floats alongside, which 
on being pumped out acted as pontoons ("camels") and 
carried their burdens safely across. By several days' hard 
work Perry got his flotilla out not a moment too soon, for 
Barclay reappeared almost immediately, August 5th. Bar- 
clay seeing that Perry was now in much superior force to 
himself, retired at once to his base, Maiden, there to await 
the completion of his largest ship, the Detroit. He had 
missed his second great opportunity to make Erie a British 
lake. 

Perry, who could after getting across the bar range 
the lake at will, took up his position at Put-in-Bay, in the 
Bass Islands, whence he could readily intercept Barclay in 
case the latter made a dash for Long Point, the British sup- 
ply base. As a matter of fact Barclay was in straits in early 
September; his men were on half-rations and the Indian 
allies had wantonly killed cattle earlier and were now get- 
ting restive for lack of British supplies. Finally, with only 
one day's flour on hand, and nagged into premature action 
by Prevost, Governor-General of Canada, Barclay was 
forced to act. Perry's watchful waiting at Put-in-Bay was 
rewarded on September 10, 1813, for at sunrise his lookouts 
caught sight of Barclay's flotilla standing out of Maiden 
under a southwest wind. Perry got under way at once to 
meet it. Shortly after, the wind shifted to the southeast, 
thus giving Perry the windward position, or weather-gage, 
a great advantage for fleet manoeuvers in the days before 
steam. Both commanders were sailing into action in single 
column, — i. e., all units in line, one in the wake of the other, 
— a time-honored formation coming down from the early 



132 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

days of the sail and still the great battle line to-day, for 
it is the most flexible formation, since the flag-officer may 
readily change course, and oppose the maximum broadside 
and the minimum vulnerability to his opponent. In their 
columns both commanders had their strongest ships and 
brigs in the center to give the lines cohesive strength. As 
Perry drew nearer, he rearranged his three center units to 
correspond with Barclay's center, so that his flagship, the 
Laivrence, should be opposed to Barclay's Detroit, his Cale- 
donia to the Hunter, and his Niagara to the Queen Char- 
lotte. Elliott, Perry's second in command, had the Niagara, 
and Captain Finnis in the Queen Charlotte ably seconded 
Barcla3^ Thus the two flotillas joined battle, sailing in 
southerly parallel courses with Perry to windward of his 
enemy. 

The action, which lasted from noon till three o'clock, was 
fought in two distinct phases, in each of which by an unfor- 
tunate accident Perry with half of his squadron was 
matched against virtually the whole of the enemy, a cir- 
cumstance that neutralized to a large extent that superiority 
in number of ships which Perry had labored so successfully 
to achieve. As the Lawrence and the Niagara possessed 
chiefly batteries of heavy carronades, effective only at close 
range, Perry himself early in the action set the example 
for close fighting by steering, with the Lawrence and the 
two leading schooners, Ariel and Scorpion, a course oblique 
to the enemy, called bow and quarter line. At the moment 
of changing course, he signaled to Elliott and the rear 
ships, straggling behind in the light wind, to close up. By 
reason of Elliott's misunderstanding of orders or by his 
lack of judgment and initiative, an ever widening gap 
now grew between Perry's van and rear ships. There- 
fore, for two and a half hours the Lawrence and the two 
van schooners bore the brunt of the battle unsupported. 



SEA POWER ON THE GREAT LAKES 133 





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THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE, SHOWING THE DECISIVE MANCEUVER 
OF THE NIAGARA 

Adapted from a diagram of the battle by H. J. Fenton in the Department 
of English, U. S. Naval Academy. 

Also, the Queen Charlotte left her natural antagonist, the 
Niagara, forged ahead, and so added her broadside to the 
Detroit's against the Lawrence, a local superiority of two 
big units against one. At the end of the first stage of the 
battle the Lawrence was a wreck, with four-fifths of her 
crew either dead or wounded. But the Detroit, too, ac- 
cording to Barclay, was "a perfect wreck." At the end 
of this first phase, Perry, assisted by the purser and the 
chaplain, fired the last gun from the hulk that had shown 
herself so worthy of the name of the brave Lawrence. 

Leaving her flag still flying and letting her drift astern 
out of action. Perry put her in charge of a subordinate 
and made his memorable trip in a cutter to the Niagara, a 
fighting unit unscathed and fresh, and just at this time, 



134 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

2 :30 P. M., entering the theater of close action. Here 
began the second phase of the battle. Perry, sending 
Elliott to hurry along the rearward schooners, himself 
took the Niagara, as he had previously done the Lawrence, 
into close action in true Nelsonian fashion. The odds were 
now all in his favor. The Detroit and the Queen Charlotte, 
handicapped by the death of her able commander, were 
trying to wear to bring fresh broadsides to bear, but with 
almost all their braces and bowlines shot away the manceuver 
was badly executed and the two vessels fouled each other. 
While they were in this predicament. Perry came up with 
his new flotilla headed by the Niagara. He sailed through 
the enemy's battered line, in passing fired his port broad- 
side into the enemy's schooners, and with his starboard 
battery raked the fouled Detroit and Queen Charlotte. At 
such close range the 32-pounder carronades of the Niagara 
did great execution. The second part of the battle was thus 
short and decisive. Perry now transferred his broad pen- 
nant back to the Lawrence, that he might receive the sur- 
render of the enemy on her decks. Lawrence's namesake 
on Lake Erie had tried hard to live up to his dying behest 
four months previously, "Don't give up the ship." 

After this battle another but different sort of battle was 
fought out for years by the two principals on the American 
side, Perry and Elliott. As on some other occasions, the 
brilliant victory was marred by a battle of w^ords as to the 
respective merits or demerits of the leaders. This contro- 
versy assumed such bitterness that the friends of the con- 
testants took sides. The evidence is confusing, but from 
the point of view of the historian it seems difficult to explain 
why Elliott did not come to the aid of Perry until he saw 
his chief well-nigh crushed. Whether Elliott misunder- 
stood or never received the signal to close up, he should at 
least have followed Perry 's lead into close action, especially 



SEA POWER ON THE GREAT LAKES 135 

as the Niagara, a sister ship of the Lawrence, had her entire 
battery, except two guns, of carronades, which were useful 
only at close range. The main point of Elliott's defense, 
— a defense into which Fenimore Cooper threw himself 
with fierce energy, — that he was keeping his position in 
the line behind the slow Caledonia, is untenable, because 
such keeping of position was a discarded principle of naval 
tactics that had lost many former battles for other nations. 
Elliott, if he had read anything of the still recent battles 
of Rodney and Nelson, should have known this. Besides, 
Perry's whole plan of formation showed plainly that he 
intended that Elliott in the Niagara should take as his 
immediate opponent the Queen Charlotte. By Elliott's 
failure to do so, the Queen Charlotte was enabled to 
close up with the Detroit and so help crush Perry's van in 
detail. And again, though the wind was light, it was not 
so light as to prevent the Queen Charlotte, for example, 
from keeping up with her consorts. Against Elliott's own 
statement regarding lack of wind it was in evidence that he 
had his main topsail sharp aback for a long time to keep 
from running into the Caledonia. Whether, therefore, it 
was lack of professional knowledge, or lack of judgment 
and initiative, Elliott's stubborn sticking to his place 
behind the Caledonia brought him; into close action a 
couple of hours late, almost too late, for Perry was very 
nearly defeated when Elliott finally arrived.^ 

But apart from this tempest in a tea-pot, the battle of 
Lake Erie was a great victory for the American cause. It 
secured American communications, changed on the Ameri- 
can left wing the defensive to the offensive, won back 
Detroit and Michigan, and led directly to the victory of the 
Thames, in which Tecumseh, the great leader of the In- 
dians, was killed. This latter victory removed the threat of 

1 aiahan, Sea Power vn Its Relations to the War of 1812, II. 83-89. 



136 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

Indian warfare in the Northwest and prevented the forma- 
tion of the Indian buffer state, which England was threat- 
ening to carve out of the American Northwest as a reward 
to her Indian allies. Besides, "For the first time an 
American fleet had met a British fleet and defeated it. . . . 
The charm of British invincibility had been broken in the 
great ship duels which made the names of Decatur, Bain- 
bridge and Hull household words. To this list was now 
added the name of Perry, who was looked upon by the 
Americans as a hero of the same class as Nelson. ' ' ^ By 
Perry's victory, America's sea power regained what her 
armies had lost. 

1 Babcock, Rise of American Nationality, The American Nation 
Series, XIII. 124. 



CHAPTER IX 

LAKE CHAMPLAIN THE DECISIVE THEATER OF 
AMERICAN SEA POWER 

WHILE Perry was making Lake Erie an American 
inland sea, and while Chauncey was playing a 
losing game with Yeo for supremacy on Lake 
Ontario, the ''modest but lion-hearted Macdonough," as 
Fenimore Cooper called him, was preparing on Lake 
Champlain for a contest that more nearly than any other 
merited the word decisive. Commodore Thomas Macdon- 
ough, whose father had served as a major under Washing- 
ton at the battle of Long Island, was bom near Middle- 
town, Delaware, December 31, 1783. A midshipman at 
seventeen, he had had by the time he reached twenty- 
one more stirring and practical professional experiences 
than most officers during their entire lives. He was one 
of Preble's school-boys and volunteered with such com- 
rades as James Lawrence and Charles Morris for the 
burning of the Philadelphia under Decatur. Like Farra- 
gut he early knew responsibility and even as a mere lad 
had interesting and unusual experiences, as for example 
when he went ashore at Gibraltar, then a great base of 
British operations, to demand the return of some seamen 
impressed into the British service, or when on a later occa- 
sion he routed single-handed at dead of night some des- 
peradoes at Messina. Between Macdonough and his imme- 
diate superior in the Tripolitan War, Decatur, there sprang 
up a warm friendship that lasted through life. Both were 

137 



138 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

kindred spirits. Chivalrous, with high ideals of honor, 
with similar magnetism in inspiring the confidence of their 
subordinates, both sought eagerly the post of greatest 
danger. A young Yale student, Joseph H. Dulles, who 
visited Commodore Macdonough at Plattsburg the Sunday 
before the great fight of the latter 's life, has left us an 
intimate picture of the young officer. Dulles says : 

Macdonough was then thirty-one years of age, but seemingly 
several years younger, of a light and agile frame, easy and 
graceful in bis manners, with an expressive countenance, re- 
markably placid. The confidence of bis officers and men was 
unbounded, and sucb as great leaders only can secure. While 
awaiting the dinner hour be entered freely into conversation on 
religious services in the navy. 

On this occasion Macdonough quoted these verses from 
the Epistle of St. James as peculiarly appropriate for the 
sailor: "He that wavereth is like a wave of the sea driven 
by the wind, ' ' and ' ' Behold the ships, though so great, are 
turned about by a very small helm. ' ' ^ These quotations, 
which emphasize the importance of resolution and of atten- 
tion to details, bring out the two most striking qualities of 
the man who was to make the events on Champlain of the 
following Sunday, September 11, 1814, an object of re- 
spectful attention at the peace table at Ghent- 
Late in the autumn of 1812, Macdonough took charge on 
Lake Champlain, a sheet of water which was to play in this 
war, as it had done nearly two score years before against 
the British invaders, a critically important role, yet its 
great strategical value seems to have been overlooked in the 
early part of the war by both sides. With Lake George 
and the Hudson River, Lake Champlain constituted a com- 
paratively easy route against Montreal or New York. 

1 Rodney Macdonough, Life of Commodore Thomas Macdonough, 
p. 155. 



THEATER OF AMERICAN SEA POWER 139 

These waterways, lying in United States territory, would 
have made the strategy for the Americans for an offensive 
against Montreal easy, especially as the United States 
had in 1812 a slight superiority of naval force on Lake 
Champlain to begin with. For the Americans had three 
sloops on the lake, while the British had only one. 
Unfortunately for the Americans, however, two of these 
sloops, the Eagle and the Growler, in chasing some row- 
galleys back to their British base near Isle aux Noix on the 
Richelieu River, were fired at from shore and captured. 
With his initial superiority now gone, Macdonough entered 
upon a race in building and manning ships like the com-, 
petitive efforts on Lakes Erie and Ontario, a race in which 
both sides were handicapped especially by lack of seamen. 
British sailors found their merchantmen paid such high 
wages, and Americans were so lucratively engaged in priva- 
teers, that the lake commanders were at their wits' ends 
for sailors. This race in improvising a naval force on Lake 
Champlain lasted a year and ended in a draw. 

As a result of the capture of the Eagle and the Growler, 
the British commanders, Everard and Bring, were free to 
raid the lake at Plattsburg and elsewhere during the season 
of 1813, and the next spring attempted to blockade the 
mouth of Otter Creek on the Vermont side, where, at Ver- 
gennes, Macdonough was building his flotilla. But despite 
hampered communications on the lake and lack of skilled 
men, the American commander launched on April 11, 1814, 
a small frigate of twenty-six guns, the Saratoga, whose 
timbers had been standing in the forest forty days before. 
By the end of May, Macdonough took his station half-way 
down the lake, at Plattsburg, wdth his whole force except 
the new brig Eagle, which was to be ready in good time. 
His flotilla now comprised the flag-ship Saratoga, the 
schooner Ticonderoga, the sloop Preble, and ten galleys. It 



140 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

is curious to note that the Ticomderoga, which had been 
designed as a steamboat, was by reason of official lack of 
faith in Fulton's invention changed at the last moment to 
the old reliable fore-and-aft sailer. With this force Mac- 
donough could now restore American communications on 
the lake, could release and convoy stores and troops — long 
shut up at Burlington — and could force the British to stay 
at their base at Isle aux Noix until the completion of their 
flotilla. The defensive became the offensive. 

Meanwhile the British were completing their lake forces. 
On August 25, 1814, they launched the new 37-gun frigate 
Confiance, the same day that Sir George Prevost reported 
the reenforcements to his army in Canada as aggregating 
twenty-nine thousand regulars. Easier conditions in the 
great war in Europe during the summer of 1814 were re- 
leasing increasing forces for the war in America. On Sep- 
tember 2d, Captain Downie, like the other lake commanders 
a young veteran and an officer with an excellent record, 
replaced Everard, whose temperament had not shown itself 
equal to the emergency on Lake Champlain. Downie 's 
spirit put new energy into the completion and equipment of 
the British flotilla at Isle aux Noix. His force consisted of 
the Confiance, the Linnet, the Chuhb, the Finch, and a dozen 
galleys and amounted to some 2400 tons against Mac- 
donough's 2250 tons. The British historian James heaps 
up the figures to show that Macdonough had the superior 
force; on the other hand, Roosevelt in his "Naval War of 
1812" meets these figures with keen analysis and a new 
array of figures. Incidentally he consigns James, who de- 
clared that Macdonough covered his falsehoods with pious 
expressions, to the Ananias Club. Despite all handicaps 
handed down to Downie by his inefficient predecessor it 
remains true that he had a big advantage in his long guns 
in the ratio of three to two and a still greater advantage i^v 



THEATER OF AMERICAN SEA POWER 141 

the frigate Con fiance, which under favorable conditions 
like the Pike on Ontario might well have been a match for 
Macdonough's whole squadron.^ The great disadvantage 
under which Downie labored in the nine days between his 
assuming cominand and giving battle to the enemy was the 
continual nagging that he had to endure from Prevost, who 
was goading him, as he had previously goaded Barclay on 
Lake Erie, into premature action and subsequent disaster. 

Prevost, Governor-General of Canada, much senior in 
rank and years to Downie, led in person eleven thousand 
of Wellington's Peninsular veterans, with which he in- 
tended to invade the United States by way of the west 
shore of Lake Champlain. He chose this shore deliberately, 
because he did not wish to alienate some Vermonters, whose 
loyalty was so lukewarm that they furnished a large part 
of the fresh beef for the British army. Indeed, so great 
was the illicit traffic that the roads on the eastern shore 
were "insufficient for the cattle pouring into Canada." 
In a letter to the Navy Department Macdonough complained 
of this disloyalty in these words, ' ' The turpitude of many of 
our citizens in this part of the country furnishes the enemy 
with every information he wants. " ^ Prevost then marched 
south along the west shore of the lake in close column 
without any attempt at caution, — e.g., by deployment, — 
for he was virtually unopposed. At the critical moment the 
American general Izard was ordered to retire to Sackett's 
Harbor, This left Macomb in command of a small brigade 
of two thousand effectives at Plattsburg, in whose harbor 
Macdonough was making careful preparations for battle. 
On his way to Plattsburg Prevost sent an army captain 
back to a lake port to keep an eye on Downie until the 

1 Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of IS 12, II. .371. 

2 Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, II. 
3C3-365. 



142 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

latter got under way. Of course it was quite necessary 
for Prevost to have his left flank protected by Downie's 
flotilla, but a little less haste would have helped Downie 
immensely. The latter got his last reenforeement of sea- 
men from the British fleet the day before the battle ; thus 
many men were unknown to their officers on the critical 
day, and shipwrights were working on the Confiance en 
route to Plattsburg till within two hours of the battle. 
Prevost arrived at Plattsburg on September 6th, but made 
no attempt to cross the easily fordable Saranac, dislodge 
Macomb's small army, and thus drive Macdonough out 
into the lake, as he had by implication informed Downie he 
would do. Had he attacked Macomb instead of leaning so 
heavily on Downie, he would have destroyed the American 
military and naval forces in detail. Had Prevost driven 
Macdonough out into the open lake, he would have deprived 
Macdonough of the very carefully planned disposition of 
the American flotilla, a disposition which went far toward 
counterbalancing Downie's preponderance in long guns and 
tonnage. 

In this placing of his squadron Macdonough in a most 
skilful manner supplemented the natural advantages of 
Plattsburgh Bay by careful use of every device of tactics 
and seamanship that might contribute in any way to suc- 
cess. He anchored his flotilla in line northeast and south- 
west across the entrance of the bay, his stronger ships close 
to Cumberland Head to the north, — that is, to windward. 
Lake Champlain, long and narrow, has its prevailing winds 
north and south and its current northward. Downie's 
ships, flat and of shallow draft, could not beat to windward, 
and would necessarily wait for a favorable, that is, north- 
erly breeze. Hence Macdonough 's formation was such 
that Downie would have to come to close quarters nearly 



THEATER OF AMERICAN SEA POWER 143 

bows on and into the wind, a most exposed and dangerous 
position for attack. Furthermore, Macdonough had pro- 
vided his units, especially the Saratoga, with a system of 
extra anchors and hawsers, called springs, so arranged that 
the ship could be turned completely around and present 
a fresh broadside to the enemy. Inshore of his main 
column — which consisted of the Eagle, Saratoga, Ticon- 
deroga and Prehle respectively from north to south — he drew 
up his galleys under sweeps to support the smaller units 
at the southern end of his line. Macdonough 's line, extend- 
ing from shoal to shoal and aided by shore batteries, would 
prevent any attempt of the enemy to double his flanks. By 
his skilful planning Macdonough had arranged for a battle 
on his own terms. A jury in a war college would have 
declared the American commander the victor before either 
side fired a shot. 

Early on the fine Sunday morning of September 11, 
1814, the Americans looking across Cumberland Head, 
could see the British standing south before a fair wind. 
On reaching Cumberland Head, Downie, who had arranged 
his formation in accord with Macdonough 's line, hove to 
to wait for his galleys. At nine o'clock he approached in 
line abreast, intending to anchor the Lin7iet and the Chul)b 
off the Eagle in the van of the American line, the Confiance 
off the Saratoga, and the Finch off the Tico7i.deroga. In ac- 
cord with Downie 's plan the Linnet came to anchor in her 
intended position and poured a diagonal fire upon the Eagle 
at such close quarters that the latter finally cut her cables 
and took refuge behind the Saratoga. The British Chubh, 
however, rendered unmanageable by the American fire, 
failed to make her assigned position and drifted behind the 
American lines out of action. Downie, perhaps imitating 
the example of his old commander, Nelson, at the battle of 



144 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

the Nile, evidently intended to destroy Macdonough's line in 
detail by concentrating a local superiority of force on the 
American van. 

As the British were approaching, Macdonough, a very 
devout man, knelt with his officers on the quarter-deck for 
a few moments' prayer. Then after some words of en- 
couragement to officers and men he led them by his example 
into action by aiming very coolly and deliberately one of 
the 24-pounders. At this moment a shot from the Linnet, 
striking a chicken coop on board the Saratoga, released a 
cock, which, flying on top of a gun-slide, gave forth a lusty 
crow. The sailors laughed and cheered the bird of good 
omen just as Macdonough fired the gun he had, been aiming. 
The shot ranged the length of the deck of the Confiance, 
then still about a third of a mile away, and did great 
damage. Under the harassing fire of the Saratoga, Downie 
was compelled to anchor farther away than he had intended. 
With much difficulty and great perseverance he finally 
brought the Confiance broadside on to the Saratoga. Then, 
having first made everything secure, he, like Macdonough, 
aimed the first gun himself and so let loose a broadside 
which is said to have killed or wounded one-fifth of the 
Saratoga's crew. Despite the untrained crews on both 
sides, who in their excitement made such mistakes as ram- 
ming home shot without powder, the fire at the head of the 
line with virtually stationary platforms on a calm sea at 
point-blank range was terribly destructive. Downie was 
killed early in the action, and Macdonough was bowled 
over twice, but picked himself up immediately, in both 
instances unhurt. 

The decisive and unique feature of this battle was Mac- 
donough 's winding of the Saratoga by means of the springs 
he had provided. This gave him a new broadside and 
virtually a new ship. Later, Robertson, Downie 's succes- 



THEATER OF AMERICAN SEA POWER 145 




MACDONOUGH'S METHOD OP WINDING SHIP 

In preparing for action, Macdonough planted a kedge anchor off each bow, 
with a line leading to the quarter, and hung a stream anchor over the stern. 
At the critical period of the engagement, the stream anchor was let go, with 
a line (C) from its ring to the port bow, and the bower cable (A) cut. The 
stern was hauled over to the kedge on the starboard hand (D), and the line 
from the other kedge (B) dipped and brought in on the starboard quarter. 
With this line from the starboard quarter and the line from the port bow to 
the stream anchor, the Saratoga was sprung entirely around and her new 
broadside brought to bear. This manoeuver decided the engagement. (Adapted 
from Knight's Seamanship, by permission of the author.) 



sor, tried to imitate Macdonough 's manceuver by means of 
improvised springs. In Ms attempts he succeeded only in 
getting thf Confiance half-way around and so exposed her 
to the raking of the Saratoga and the Eagle. With his 
hold full of water and a crew opposed to further fighting, 
Robertson struck his colors. Macdonough at once swung 
around to bring his full broadside to bear upon the Linnet, 
and in a quarter of 'an hour he compelled the latter also to 
surrender. So ended the only serious phase of the battle, 
at the head of Macdonough 's line. 

At the southern end the British with the Finch and their 



146 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

galleys made a desperate effort to turn the Americans' 
flank. The Finch failed to keep near enough to the wind 
to make the position assigned to her abreast the Ticon- 
deroga; even with the aid of sweeps she could not regain 
the lost ground. She was forced out of the action by a 
couple of well-directed broadsides from the Ticonderoga. 
Lieutenant Cassin of the Ticonderoga, first with long 
guns and then with canister at close quarters, scattered 
the British galleys, four of which offered a desperate 
resistance. The row-galleys on both sides were too small 
and vulnerable to affect the outcome of the battle. 

From start to finish, in an action that lasted nearly two 
and a half hours, it was for the Americans a desperate fight. 
The Saratoga was hulled fifty-five times and the Confiance 
one hundred and five times. The American flag-ship lost 
approximately 50 in killed and wounded out of a crew of 
210, while the losses on the Confiance amounted to at least 
100 out of a total crew of 270. The battle illustrated the 
sole advantage of the defensive, — the careful choice of the 
battle-ground and skilful preparation for every contingency. 
Thus the defender of fortress or fleet forces an opponent 
to fight in his own territory and on his own terms. To 
Macdonough is due. the credit for his foresight in making 
a wise use of the defensive. Of him Roosevelt, in his 
"Naval "War of 1812," says, ''His skill, seamanship, quick 
eye, readiness of resource, and indomitable pluck, are be- 
yond all praise." 

The immediate result of this victory on Lake Champlain 
was the precipitate retreat to Canada of Prevost and his 
magnificent army. For this retreat and for his previous 
failure to support Downie he was later, at the instance of 
Yeo, court-martialed, but he died before his trial. Yet 
we have the words of no less a strategist than the great 
Wellington himself that the invasion of the United States 



THEATER OF AMERICAN SEA POWER 147 

was impossible without control of the waterways. After 
the first fall of Napoleon the British Ministry considered 
British defeat in Canada so dangerous to their nation's 
interests in Europe that they urged Wellington to assume 
the command in Canada and retrieve the disaster. But he 
replied : 

Neither I nor any one else can achieve success, in the way of 
conquests, unless you have naval superiority on the lakes. Till 
that superiority is acquired, it is impossible, according to my 
notion, to maintain an army in such a situation as to keep the 
enemy out of the whole frontier, much less to make any conquest 
from the enemy. . . . The question is, whether we can obtain 
this naval superiority on the lakes. If we cannot, I shall do you 
little good in America; and I shall go there only to prove the 
truth of Prevost's defense, and to sign a peace which might as 
well be signed now.^ 

Wellington, the contemporary of Nelson, knew from much 
experience that sea power dominates land power. It can 
give or take away, by control alike of high seas or Great 
Lakes, the offensive. This control of a strategic waterway 
and the resulting vital effect on the whole Canadian mili- 
tary situation is Macdonough's achievement. The des- 
perate defensive on the American right wing Macdonough 
had by one stroke changed to a victorious offensive. In 
the words of Professor Babcock, ' ' It would seem as though 
the persistent mismanagement of the American forces in 
northern New York, the incompetency of Dearborn and 
"Wilkinson, the strange interference of Secretary [of War] 
Armstrong, the diversion of the forces of Izard from the 
front of Prevost's army, were all atoned for by the bril- 
liancy of the accomplishment of Commodore Macdonough 
and his handful of sailors and soldiers on Lake Cham- 

1 Castlereagh Letters, Series III. Vol. II. 203. Quoted by Mahan, 
Sea Power in Its Relations to the Wwr of 1812, II. 430. 



\ 



148 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

plain, " ^ " Down to the time of the Civil War, ' ' declares 
Theodore Roosevelt, "Macdonough is the greatest figure in 
our naval history." 

But Macdonough's victory had other more important if 
remoter results. The Treaty of Ghent — on which all sub- 
sequent battles on land or sea, such as the battle of New 
Orleans and the fight of the President and the victory of 
the Constitution over the Cyane and the Levant, were with- 
out effect — was the result of a year's deliberation. The 
Russian Czar in the first year of the war had made offers 
of mediation which finally culminated in a counter-sug- 
gestion from Castlereagh for direct negotiations for peace. 
This suggestion was accepted on January 5, 1814, by the 
United States, and Ghent was selected as the meeting place 
for the plenipotentiaries. During the year there were long 
periods of deadlock. Britain would not back down on 
impressment and on her seizures of shipping under the 
Orders in Council. On the other hand, the United States 
would consent neither to the surrender of the Northwest as 
an Indian state, nor to the recognition of the Great Lakes 
as exclusively under the sovereignty of Great Britain, nor 
to the cession of a large part of Maine to "rectify" British 
frontiers. These extreme demands on both sides gradually 
gave way to more moderate counsels. To this result the 
delicate situation in Europe and the victories of Perry and 
Macdonough contributed most. Napoleon was on the island 
of Elba dangerously near France, which was ready for a 
new revolution against Louis XVIII ; moreover, the Allies, 
gathered at the memorabie Congress of Vienna, were in- 
tensely jealous of one another and looked askance at Eng- 
land's designs on Maine and Louisiana. With these 
European influences on the peace negotiations at Ghent, 

1 Babcock, Rise of American Nationality, American Nation Series, 
XIII, 127. 



THEATER OF AMERICAN SEA POWER 149 

Macdoiiough 's victory had a cumulative effect toward forc- 
ing the British to relinquish a peace of conquest. 

The treaty, therefore, while forcing England to give up 
conquered territory, passed over in silence the great issues 
on which the war had been started, — impressment and 
seizures under the irregular blockades. Of these two 
issues, the former was dead beyond recall; the latter was 
destined to survive for another century. But while the 
war therefore ended without material results for either side, 
to Americans it was fraught with deep spiritual meaning. 
To them it was a second war of independence; it re- 
awakened a love of the Union, an intense spirit of patriot- 
ism. Under its growing commerce and wealth the new 
republic had been endangered for a time by materialistic 
and sectional interests. Britain again and again during the 
war had banked on sectionalism and had hoped to split the 
Union in two. This rebirth of the love for country was due 
in no small degree to the remarkable achievements of Ameri- 
can sea power, brought to a decisive climax by Macdonough 
on Lake Champlain. 



CHAPTER X 

DECATUR THE POPULAE IDOL OF SEA POWER 

WHILE Macdonough was the decisive instrument 
of the sea power of the new country, we must 
seek elsewhere for the popular idol of American 
achievement upon the seas. This hero, around whose name 
has been woven ever since all the romance of the sea; this 
Nelson of his day without the opportunities of a Nelson; 
this popular hero was and still is Stephen Decatur. His 
personal gallantry in the Tripolitan War, his chivalrous 
spirit, and his flame-pure patriotism mark him as kin to 
the great hero of British sea power. Around his name were 
formed many of the finest traditions of the American 
service. To him "we may ascribe in no small degree that 
heroic tone which has marked all the after achievements 
of our navy. ' ' ^ 

In even greater degree than was true of Nelson, who 
commanded conscript seamen during most of his days, was 
Decatur the idol of the enlisted men and his subordinates 
in the volunteer naval forces of the New World. His atti- 
tude toward his men was strikingly like Nelson's. At a 
time when discipline in both navies was maintained by the 
free use of the cat, both Nelson and Decatur had to a singu- 
lar degree " the happy art of governing sailors rather by 
their affections than their fears." The devotion of their 
men was such that the latter were willing even to sacrifice 
their lives for their officers. Thus we find the sailor, Reu- 

1 Mackenzie, Life of Decatur, p. 96. 

150 



DECATUR THE IDOL OF SEA POWER 151 

ben James/ in the fierce hand-to-hand encounter during the 
boat attack at Tripoli, himself severely wounded, inter- 
posing his head to ward off the saber-blow meant for De- 
catur, — just as John Sykes, Nelson's coxswain, in a similar 
hand-to-hand encounter in a boat attack off Cadiz, had 
saved Nelson's life. Nor was this devotion all on one 
side. Both Nelson and Decatur took the deepest interest in 
their subordinates and manifested a jealous and sympa- 
thetic alertness in securing their comfort and their rights. 
As Nelson refused honors if they were not bestowed im- 
partially on his officers and men, as he dashed at imminent 
risk to self and ship back into a squadron of the enemy 
to 'save Hardy, so Decatur showed a similar watchfulness 
over his subordinates. On one occasion when an officer 
had kicked a sailor in the face for some misunderstanding 
of orders, the man, indignant at the outrage, appeared at 
once on the quarter-deck before Decatur, The latter — of a 
naturally hot temper seldom revealed to others except by 
a flash from his fine eyes — for an instant lost control of 
himself. He felt the insult to the man as if it had been 
personal, and berated the officer publicly in so violent and 
humiliating a manner as to make an indelible impression 
upon the whole ship's Company. On another occasion 
Decatur learned of a duel arranged at Malta between a 
British officer and Midshipman Joseph Bainbridge, who as 
a result of one of those sneering remarks about Yankee 
cowards then in style among young British officers had ' 
been challenged to fight by an expert shot. Decatur at 
once^ insisted on substituting himself as Bainbridge 's sec- 
ond. He kept the duelists — who were only four j^ards 
apart — with weapons extended until he noticed that the 
Englishman's hand became unsteady. Then Decatur gave 

1 For the dispute as to whether it was Reuben James or Daniel 
Fraser, see ^Tackenzie, Life of Decatur, p. 36^ 











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DECATUR THE IDOL OF SEA POWER 153 

the order to fire and both men missed. Their honor was sat- 
isfied, but Decatur had saved the young midshipman 's life. 
The Englishman happened to be the private secretary of 
Sir Alexander Ball, the Governor of Malta and an intimate 
friend of Nelson. This contact between Nelson's and 
Preble's officers left its impression upon Decatur. Con- 
sciously or unconsciously, Decatur patterned himself after 
Nelson, whose officers in a very literal sense worshiped their 
commander as the genius of British sea power. 

Like Nelson, too, Decatur was in the appeal of his per- 
sonality, his chivalrous bearing, and his romantic charm 
for women. Decatur's slender and athletic figure, his 
military bearing, his striking features, and his fine eyes 
marked him as unusual- in any company. After his de- 
tachment from the Mediterranean squadron, he landed at 
Norfolk, where he met in an official capacity the Mayor of 
Norfolk and the latter 's beautiful daughter, Susan Wheeler. 
She and her girl friends had been previously admiring in 
the cabin of the war-ship a miniature by an Italian artist 
of the handsome hero. Decatur's marriage to Miss 
Wheeler, which took place on March 8, 1806, when he was 
twenty-seven years of age, was destined to be unusually 
happy. Though his bent was naturally rather toward ac- 
tion than books, he took a deep and sympathetic interest 
in Mrs. Decatur's love of music, poetry, and especially 
Italian art, for which his Mediterranean experiences had 
given him a taste. Henceforth, in his victories as in the 
crises of his life, Decatur's first and last thought was for 
his wife. With fine chivalry he attempted to shield her 
from the pain of the frequent separations and sorrows that 
were to befall them. On October 30, 1812, the same day 
that he wrote his official report to the Secretary of the 
Navy on the capture of the Macedonian, he wrote another 
letter, in very different tone, to his wife. This letter, in- 



154 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

tended only for Mrs. Decatur, was published many years 
later with her permission. As an intimate glimpse of 
Decatur's character it is quoted here in full: 

Frigate, United States, 

At Sea, October 30, 1812. 
My Beloved Susan, 

I have bad tbe good fortune to capture H. B. M.'s frigate 
Macedonian, Captain Carden, by which I have gained a small 
sprig of laurel, which I shall hasten to lay at your feet. I tried 
burning [the Philadelphia] on a former occasion, which might 
do for a very young man; but now that I have a precious little 
wife, I wish to have something more substantial to offer, in case 
she should become weary of love and glory. 

One half of the satisfaction arising from this victory is de- 
stroyed in seeing the distress of poor Carden, who deserved suc- 
cess as much as we did, who had the good fortune to obtain it. 
I do all I can to console him. 

Do not be anxious about me, my beloved. I shall soon press 
you to my heart. 

Your devoted, 

S. Decatur.^ 

A severe test for Decatur as the popular hero of the sea 
came with his loss of the frigate President to the British 
blockading squadron off New York in January, 1815. After 
the battle, Decatur, wounded and exhausted by a thirty- 
hour chase in a violent northwester, went below to the cock- 
pit to have his wounds dressed. Here he insisted on wait- 
ing his turn on the surgeon 's table, as Nelson after the bat- 
tle of the Nile on a similar errand had remarked, "I will 
take my turn with my brave lads. ' ' Then Decatur donned 
his full uniform preparatory to repairing at three o'clock 
in the morning in wintry seas to the British flag-ship to give 
up his sword to the British squadron commander. A cap- 
tive of war now, he was taken to Bermuda but was later 

1 Mackenzie, Life of Decatur, p. 371. 



DECATUR THE IDOL OF SEA POWER 155 

brought back to New London, where he arrived on February 
21, 1815, a few days after the ratification of the treaty of 
peace by the United States Senate. The next morning the 
enthusiastic inhabitants came down to the landing and drew 
Decatur's carriage to his house, celebrating at once the re- 
turn of peace and of the popular idol. As his biographer 
says, Decatur, "conquered, yet conquering, was still tri- 
umphant in the hearts of his countrymen." Nor was 
Decatur, despite his defeat, less of a hero in the eyes of the 
Government than of the people. For two weeks after the 
promulgation of peace, the Government declared war 
against Algiers and chose Decatur to command a squadron. 
As we have seen, Decatur brought the corsairs to terms 
within forty days after leaving the United States. This 
service was a fitting climax to his earlier work in the Medi- 
terranean. If Nelson by sea power defeated Napoleon, 
Decatur achieved in the Mediterranean what even the sea 
power of Great Britain had not been able to achieve in 
two hundred and fifty years, — the end of piracy in that 
sea which had been so peculiarly the theater of great Brit- 
ish naval victories. 

On his return to New York, November 18, 1815, Decatur 
received at once new laurels from his countrymen as their 
idol of the sea. President Madison on the assembling of 
Congress in December highly complimented Decatur on 
his speedy termination of his mission. Congress later 
voted him and his crew $100*,000 prize money for the 
capture of Algerine ships. He and Commodores Rodgers 
and Porter were chosen the three Commissioners of the 
Navy, who in those days under the Secretary of the Navy 
managed the whole business of naval supply and opera- 
tion. En route to his new post in January, 1816, and 
on his later trips to navy-yards, Decatur was everywhere 
toasted and hailed by admiring countrymen for his 



156 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

achievements. On one such occasion in Baltimore he re- 
plied to a toast in these words, ' ' The citizens of Baltimore : 
Their patriotism and valor defeated the veteran forces 
of the enemy, who came, saw, and fled." And it was in 
Norfolk in answer to the toast, "The Mediterranean, the 
sea not more of Greek and Roman than of American 
glory, ' ' that he gave the famous response, ' ' Our Country ! 
In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always 
be in the right ; but our country, right or wrong. ' ' 

The toast may be said to strike the key-note of De- 
catur's character, — his intense love of country. Herein 
again he is like Nelson, with whom patriotism was a pas- 
sion. Nelson in the great crises of his life asked him- 
self, What is England's need at this moment? What 
would my country have me do? It was at these crises 
that Nelson, in his zeal for the nation, disobeyed the 
orders of his commanding officers; as for example at 
Copenhagen, when he deliberately put the glass to his 
blind eye to take a look at the signal for retreat and 
quietly remarked, "I don't see the signal." With a zeal 
no less than Nelson's, Decatur subordinated every other 
interest to his country's. It is said that he remarked to 
his wife that only one other love would take precedence of 
his love for her, — that for his country. Decatur in a very 
real sense sacrificed himself to his high ideal of patriotic 
duty. 

In his work as naval commissioner, Decatur had to settle 
many important questions of organization and policy of 
the young navy. It was in connection with this duty 
that a minor question came up for Decatur's decision, a 
question fraught with tragic fate for him personally. 
Much against his will, Decatur had been assigned a dozen 
years before to one of the unpleasantest duties that a naval 
officer must undergo, — the court martial of a brother of- 




STEPHEN DECATUR 
From the portrait by Chapppl 




DAVID PORTER 
From the portrait by Chappel 



DECATUR THE IDOL OF SEA POWER 157 

ficer. Court martials have, like our jury system, much in 
their favor; yet in practice they seem at times to cause 
many hardships. As against his comrades, duty on a 
court martial is extremely unpleasant to the conscientious 
officer. Decatur found it so in the court on which he sat 
against James Barron, the officer who allowed his frigate, 
the Chesapeake, to be boarded by the British Leopard in 
1807 for purposes of impressment. The court found Bar- 
ron guilty of negligence in going to sea unprepared and 
sentenced him to suspension from duty for five years. 
Barron, who never forgave Decatur for the latter 's part 
in the decision, applied to the naval commissioners for re- 
instatement. Decatur objected to such reinstatement on 
the ground that Barron had not offered his services to his 
country during the war of 1812. As Barron's period of 
suspension was up in 1813, his continued residence abroad 
was regarded by Decatur as desertion in time of war. His 
application for reinstatement now on a par with those 
who had endured all the dangers of an unequal contest 
seemed brazen. It was as if a slacker and deserter asked 
for a share of the glory. 

As a result of disappointment Commodore Barron now 
began a lengthy correspondence with Decatur. In a re- 
markably and almost brutally frank letter in this corre- 
spondence, Decatur, while abjuring all personal feelings 
of animosity, explained at length his reasons for his de- 
cision. From this correspondence it is plain that Decatur 
was actuated by none but the highest motives of interest 
in service and country. Barron, however, was determined 
on settling the matter on "the field of honor," — that is by 
a duel, to which Decatur's reply was: "If we fight, it 
must be of your seeking ; and you must take all the risk and 
all the inconvenience, which usually attend the challenger 
in such cases." Decatur reminded Barron, in reply to the 



158 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

latter's reiterated comments about his (Barron's) eyesight, 
that his own eyes had not improved with the years. But 
Decatur from a delicate sense of honor allowed, without pro- 
test, Jesse D. Elliott of Lake Erie fame, Barron's second, to 
dictate to Bainbridge, Decatur's second, the important 
condition that the fight should be at twelve paces. Decatur 
had told his intimates that he was not going to shoot to 
kill; he had no desire to injure Barron except in self-de- 
fense. On the morning of March 22, 1820, after a happy 
breakfast with Mrs. Decatur, to whom from motives of 
tender feeling he had given no inkling of the affair, he 
drove to the rendezvous near Bladensburg. Immediately 
after the command to fire, the pistols flashed and both men 
fell wounded to the ground, Decatur mortally, as the event 
proved. 

We must remember in explanation of Decatur's action 
that dueling was, especially among men in public life, 
not yet under a ban, but quite the contrary. In England 
men like Wellington, Castlereagh, Fox, Pitt, Sheridan, 
Canning, Hastings, and 'Connell, and in America, Charles 
Lee, Burr, Hamilton, Clay, John Randolph, and DeWitt 
Clinton had fought or were to fight duels. In the American 
Navy the "honor code" was virtually unescapable. As we 
have seen, it was applied even to ship combats. The gallant 
Richard Somers — with Decatur at Tripoli — is said to have 
fought three duels in one day. Decatur had himself been 
' principal or second in a number of affairs ; in fact, he acted 
, as second for Commodore Perry, of Lake Erie, in the latter 's 
1 duel with Heath, in which Perry deliberately refused to 
fire his pistol. With this example in his mind, Decatur 
had intended not to return Barron's fire and he would 
not have done so, if Barron had not insisted on the short- 
est distance allowed by the "code of honor." As it was, 
Decatur aimed low, to wound without killing Barron. 



DECATUR THE IDOL OF SEA POWER 159 

It is a sad reflection that the glorious work of the navy 
during the War of 1812 was spoiled by much hard feeling 
after the war, of which the controversy between Perry 
and Elliott and the Barron-Decatur duel were striking 
illustrations. As Decatur was carried off the field at 
Bladensburg, he remarked, '*I am mortally wounded; at 
least, I believe so, and wish I had fallen in defense of my 
country." He was taken to his home in Washington, 
where he soon after died, a victim to his high sense of 
honor and duty. From the President, the Cabinet, and 
Congress, who attended the funeral, to the humblest citi- 
zen, the nation mourned its hero of two wars, "the Bayard 
of the Sea." 



CHAPTER XI 

DAVID PORTER — THE PERSONIFICATION OP AMERICANISM 

AT SEA 

THE stirring events which marked the history of 
England and America from 1763 to 1815, from 
the close of the Seven Years ' War to the downfall 
of Napoleon at Waterloo, produced no greater changes 
in the political complexion of the American colonies than 
they did in the social and intellectual life of the inhabi- 
tants. The typical Colonial of 1763, of the days even of 
the Stamp Act, was a totally different person from the 
American of the end of the War of 1812, The purely 
English bent toward conventionality and conservatism of 
even so great a man as Washington was in utter contrast 
with the nervous, uncouth, boastful, individualistic Ameri- 
canism of Andrew Jackson. Yet the latter was almost as 
representative of the dominating forces in American life 
in the second and third decades of the nineteenth century 
as Washington was of the previous century in its last 
quarter. The American had been transformed and re- 
created; he had been reborn from aristocracy into de- 
mocracy. 

When we seek the causes of this remarkable metamor- 
phosis in American character, a metamorphosis which has, 
despite many economic and intellectual changes, persisted 
in the typical American, we find the usual view to be that 
the influence of the West was the greatest factor. In the 
words of Professor Turner, perhaps the best exponent of 

160 



DAVID PORTER 161 

this theory, "American democracy is fundamentally the 
outcome of the experiences of the American people in deal- 
ing with the West. "^ Without excluding this influence, 
and without forgetting the tremendous effect of the whole 
movement toward man's political and intellectual eman- 
cipation which we call the French Revolution, it is per- 
tinent to inquire whether in American life the influence 
of American experience on the sea, especially in the stirring 
years of the Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and the War 
of 1812, did not play a significant part in forming in 
Americans a new spirit of nationality and democracy. 

Simply recall the spirit and achievements of the colonial 
American whaler, as portrayed so vividly by Edmund 
Burke; add only the fact that during the Revolution and 
the War of 1812 privateering absorbed the energy of a 
very considerable part of American manhood. Then one 
realizes that there were in existence factors which could 
turn the American type from the steady colonial landsman 
into the aggressive Western pioneer. When one realizes 
that during all this period the sea was more unsafe than 
the Western wilderness, unsafe always because of the un- 
certainty and wildness of Nature herself, and unsafe more- 
over because of the frequent wars, the privateers, the pi- 
rates, the jealousy of England, and the greed of Napoleon, 
one has to acknowledge that here were elements which 
needed only to be utilized to produce the sturdy, self-re- 
liant, independent, masterful, and, it must be admitted, 
boastful, violent, and impetuous individual that came to 
represent America in European thought in the first half 
of the last century. 

Indeed, when one compares a typical seaman of the time 
with a typical Western pioneer the likenesses in tempera- 
ment and character are startling. Two such men were 

1 Atlomtic Monthly, January, 1903, p. 94. 



162 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

David Porter, commander of the Essex in its brilliant cruise 
against the British whaling-fleet in the South Pacific, and 
Andrew Jackson, the hero of New Orleans and the first 
Westerner to seat himself in the Presidential chair. Force- 
fulness of character was the central trait in both, and this 
trait manifested itself early in both men, and independence 
of action marked their respective careers, naval and mili- 
tary, independence so great that it carried both beyond 
the instructions of their governments and even beyond the 
letter of international law. In both appeared that direct- 
ness of action which went straight to the heart of a diffi- 
culty and accomplished the result desired. Both were 
violent in disposition and frequently engaged in personal 
quarrels with their associates and opponents. They were 
alike in their uncompromising hatred of all foreign ene- 
mies of their country; both were jealously watchful not 
only of the material interests of the nation but still more 
of her honor as a sovereign power. 

Porter, Boston-born and Baltimore-bred, was early at 
sea, undergoing in 1796 as a mere lad of sixteen a baptism 
of blood in repelling a British press-gang from his father's 
ship. In later voyages as a merchant sailor he showed his 
spirit by refusing to obey British orders when he was him- 
self taken on board a British frigate for impressment. 
When, just before the naval war with France, he became, 
according to his own claims, the first midshipman to be 
enrolled in the regular navy, he soon distinguished himself 
in the engagement between the Constellation and the In- 
surgente. Afterward, as first lieutenant of a smaller vessel, 
he forced his faint-hearted captain to keep on fighting in- 
stead of surrendering to a swarm of pirates. 

In his social life he showed the same forcefulness. The 
story is that when he won the hand of the lady who after- 
ward became his wife it was after only a very brief court- 



DAVID PORTER 163 

ship. Soon he traveled to Chester, Pennsylvania, to secure 
her father's consent. When he arrived he was received 
by her brother and informed in an icy tone that he could 
not see the father and had come on a fool's errand any- 
way if he hoped to marry the daughter. Porter replied: 
**I came here about marrj'ing your sister; I didn't come 
to marry you, and, d — n you, if you don't leave the room 
I '11 throw you out of the window. " ^ So effective was the 
threat that he married the lady presently and received an 
attractive house at Chester as a wedding-present from her 
father. 

Against the British, with whom he had many scores to 
settle, he was equally violent, and his feelings during the 
vexatious years of the Napoleonic Wars, with their trade 
restrictions, embargoes, and impressments, are seen in the 
following, written to an intimate friend in 1810 : 

There are some things dearer to a nation than the wealth of 
its citizens on shore or on the ocean, and that is its honor, and 
when we fail to esteem that in advance of all else, we will stand 
poor indeed in the world's estimation.^ 

Soon afterward he offered his resignation from the navy, 
but fortunately the Secretary of the Navy prevailed on 
him to withdraw it and remain in the service. 

When Porter sailed for the South Atlantic in 1812 
in command of the small frigate Essex, there came the de- 
cisive moment of his life. Prevented from making the 
prearranged junction with Commodore Bainbridge oft' the 
coast of Brazil, and seeing little chance of effective service 
in those waters, he boldly decided to carry out a plan which 
he had previously discussed with his superior, namely, to 
cut loose from all bases, round the Horn, sweep down upon 

1 D. D. Porter, Memoir of Commodore David Porter, p. 71. 

2 D D. Porter, Memoir of Commodore David Porter, p. 82. 



164 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 



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PORTER'S CRUISE IN THE ESSEX 



the British whaling-fleets off the South American coast, 
especially in the vicinity of the Galapagos Islands, and ex- 
ist as best he could on the supplies of his captures. No 
man who had not self-reliance and an utter contempt for 
the chance of disaster to his reputation in thus departing 
from his official orders, would have done as Porter did. 
But he acted in full accord with the note of independence 
and individualism which sounded through his whole ca- 
reer. 

Putting his men on short rations. Porter beat his labor- 
ious way around the desolate Horn in almost the worst 
weather of the year. Refitting in the friendly port of Val- 



DAVID PORTER 165 

paraiso, he quickly sailed to the north, and like a bolt from 
a clear sky fell upon the British whaling-fleets, capturing 
vessel after vessel, and delivering blows which for decades 
all but annihilated British enterprise in that section. As 
he needed to make extensive repairs to his ship, he sailed 
with his fleet of prizes to the Marquesas Islands, where, in 
the romantic and Eden-like environment of the South Seas, 
he refitted his vessels and even annexed the islands to the 
United States. In justification of this act he issued a 
proclamation which breathes the very spirit of the Declara- 
tion of Independence. The document announces, after 
making the formal proclamation of annexation : 

Our rights to tliis island, being founded on priority of discovery, 
conquest and possession, cannot be disputed. But the natives, to 
secure to themselves that friendly protection which their defense- 
less situation so much required, have requested to be admitted 
into the great American family, whose pure republican policy 
approaches so near their own. And in order to encourage these 
views to their own interest and happiness, as well as to render 
secure our claim to an island valuable on many considerations, 
I have taken on myself to promise them that they shall be so 
adopted; that our chief shall be their chief; and they have given 
assurances that such of their brethren as may hereafter visit them 
from the United States, shall enjoy a welcome and hospitable 
reception among them, and be furnished with whatever refresh- 
ments and supplies the island may afford, and that they will 
protect them against all their enemies, and, as far as lies in their 
power, prevent the subjects of Great Britain (knowing them to 
be such) from coming among them until peace shall take place 
between the two nations.^ 

In his disastrous engagement with the British ships 
Phoehe and Cheruh on his return to Valparaiso in 1814, 
Porter showed the typically American qualities of inde- 
pendence, aggressiveness, and pluck. When the Phaehe, 

1 Porter's Journal, II. 79. 



166 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

a frigate fully the equal of the Essex and superior in long- 
range guns, entered the harbor and came sailing down on 
the Essex as if to come alongside and attack, even in a 
neutral port. Porter shouted to Hillyar, the British com- 
mander, "If you touch a rope yarn of this ship, I shall 
board instantly."^ He later challenged the Phoehe to a 
duel outside the harbor. But the British with their two 
ships waited their chance, and found it when the Essex, 
having slipped outside to draw the Phoehe out, became dis- 
abled by the loss of a topmast and put back into neutral 
waters. Here Porter was attacked by both Britishers and 
obliged to surrender. But he did this only after a heroic 
resistance in which he lost nearly two hundred men. 
Though the Essex had her sails partly disabled, and though 
the British vessels took positions where they could rake him 
with impunity. Porter several times made enough sail, or 
turned his ship by cables, so that he could bring his car- 
ronades to bear and inflict injur}' on the enemy. 

By taking risks and assuming responsibility, even though 
he must have foreseen the inevitable, fatal outcome. Porter 
dealt Great Britain a blow which did much to put her in 
a receptive mood for peace. The damage to the whaling 
industry was about six million dollars, — and the expenses 
to the American Government were only the loss of the 
Essex herself, originally built for the French war by the 
citizens of Salem at their own cost. 

Porter's independence of action and impatience of re- 
straint, as well as his strong hatred of British arrogance 
on the sea, were further shown on his return to America 
under a cartel signed with Captain Hillyar. By this 
the men of the Essex were to be free to return to the 
United States but were not to take part in the war 

1 Loyall Farragut, Life of David Glasgow Farragut, p. 33 (quoted 
from Farragut's Journal). 



DAVID PORTER 167 

again. Stopped off New York by a British blockading 
frigate, whose captain refused to recognize Hillyar's ar- 
rangement, Porter, impatient at such obstruction, decided 
he had a right to escape. He first wrote a letter to the 
British comm'ander, in which he stated that most British 
naval officers were not only destitute of honor themselves 
but regardless of the honor of those of their fellow of- 
ficers who possessed it. Then, getting into one of the 
ship's boats, manned by some of his men, he sailed off in 
the friendly fog for Long Island, sixty miles away. "When 
he managed to land safely and establish his identity, he 
was enthusiastically welcomed in New York and Phila- 
delphia. Soon afterward he assisted in energizing the 
defense of Baltimore and Washington when they were at- 
tacked by Admiral Cockburn. Thus he vindicated his 
honor and illustrated the sentiment he expressed at the 
beginning of the war, when, referring to enemies in the 
Navy Department, he wrote to an intimate friend, "I 
intend that no one shall treat me badly with impu- 
nity." 

The strange parallel between Porter and Andrew Jack- 
son appeared most prominently when Porter was sent to 
the West Indies in 1823 to command an expedition against 
the pirates who infested the waters of Cuba, Haiti, and 
Porto Rico and despoiled American merchantmen in the 
extensive trade they carried on there. The revolutionary 
movements against Spain that marked that decade among 
Tier American colonies gave admirable opportunities for 
piratical enterprise, and the weakness and corruption of 
the Spanish officials made suppression of such piracy a 
difficult task. Porter went at it with such directness that 
when a subordinate officer of his squadron was insulted and 
imprisoned for a few hours by the Spanish mayor at Fox- 
ardo, Porto Rico, he sailed into the harbor of the town, 



168 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

landed a few men, spiked the guns of the Spanish forti- 
fications, and quickly secured an abject apology. But as 
he had committed a hostile act against a nation with which 
the United States was at peace, he was peremptorily re- 
called from the West Indies, deprived of his command, 
and tried by court martial for disobedience of orders. 
Spain never protested against the slight to her sover- 
eignty; political and personal reasons were probably at 
the bottom of the affair. Porter was so incensed that 
early in the sessions of the court he could not contain him- 
self and made his feelings so evident in his written com- 
munications that the court ordered that all letters should 
first be submitted to the judge-advocate. This roused 
Porter's temper to such a point that he quitted the tri- 
bunal and let the trial proceed without him. The result 
was six months' suspension from duty. 

Porter, however, refused to resume his place in the navy 
and resigned his commission. He had done only what 
Jackson had done when he had invaded Florida, captured 
Spanish towns, and hanged Englishmen without authority 
from his Government or right in international law. In 
the latter case the Government, while disavowing the act, 
did not punish the culprit, and took full advantage of the 
results obtained, which were, as in Porter's case, emi- 
nently beneficial. Curiously enough, John Quincy Adams, 
the man who as Secretary of State defended Jackson, 
was President when Porter was cashiered for similar in- 
dependence of action. 

After resigning his commission Porter accepted a place 
as admiral in the Mexican Navy, and with inadequate 
forces at his disposal harassed Spanish commerce in the 
Gulf of Mexico. But he soon grew impatient of the 
demoralized conditions in Mexico, the political corruption 
and the material and other deficiencies of the service, and 



DAVID PORTER 169 

returned to the United States as soon as Jackson entered 
the White House. 

Though Porter had been insulted by President Adams 
on the very steps of the White House and in the presence 
of Lafayette himself, he was now received by Jackson in 
the most friendly fashion and was offered his old position 
in the navy. But he replied, "I would rather dig than 
associate with the men who sentenced me for upholding 
the honor of the flag." 

"Right," said Jackson; "by the Eternal, you shall not 
either if I can help it; I wouldn't associate with them 
myself."^ 

This attitude Porter maintained consistently to his dy- 
ing day, although his brother officers of the court martial 
had tried to soften their sentence with the statement that 
they ascribed the conduct of the accused "to an anxious 
disposition, on his part, to maintain the honor and advance 
the interest of the nation and of the service." His feeling 
seems to have been directed chiefly against two men, the 
president of the court, Captain James Barron, who had 
himself been suspended from the navy for five years for his 
failure to defend the Chesapeake against the Leopard in 
1807 — a court martial of which Porter had been a member 
— and Captain Jesse D. Elliott, Perry's second in command 
at Lake Erie. As for Elliott, Porter, in his outspoken man- 
ner, had expressed uncomplimentary views of his conduct 
in the duel between Barron and Decatur. Such was Por- 
ter's bitterness toward Elliott that it persisted even when 
Porter had been appointed charge d'affaires to Turkey, — 
a post created for him by President Jackson. When El- 
liott visited Constantinople in the Constitution Porter re- 
fused to have an3^hing more than official intercourse with 
him. And he so notified Elliott in writing. 

1 D. D. Porter, Memoir of Commodore David Porter, p. 391. 



170 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

Perhaps the sturdy Americanism of the hero of 1812 
is more happily illustrated by his conduct on first reaching 
Turkey in 1831. Although the Turks required foreign 
war-vessels to dismount their guns before passing up the 
straits to Constantinople, Porter insisted that they should 
exempt the John Adams, in which he was being carried to 
his post, from such humiliation, and he gained his point, 
— an act that must have warmed the heart of Andrew 
Jackson, 

In Porter's care and training of David Glasgow Farra- 
gut — whom he virtually adopted and who accompanied 
him in the Essex on her historic cruise, though the lat- 
ter was but eleven years of age — is seen a tenderer ele- 
ment. That it persisted to the very end is seen by the fol- 
lowing letter, written only eight years before his death: 

St. Stepbano de Constantinople, June 20, 1835, 
My dear Glasgow : 

My country has thus far taken care of me, and I hope by good 
conduct to merit what sbe has done, endeavoring to serve her to 
tbe utmost of my power. There was a time when there was 
nothing that I thought too. daring to be attempted for her; but 
those times are past, and appear only as a confused and painful 
dream. A retrospect of the history of my life seems a highly 
colored romance, which I should be very loath to Hve over again ; 
and it would not be beheved if it were written. My sufferings 
in Mexico, the trials of fortitude I underwent, exceed belief; but 
now I am enjoying Elysium, compared to what I then suffered 
in body and mind. 

But let it pass. They have left an impression on my mind 
that can never be effaced. I have been taught to admire a bold 
struggle with adversity as one of the most noble moral spectacles, 
and pride myself on acquitting myself with honor. 

I could not serve that base, unprincipled nation; but they 
woidd not let me. But I left them without a stain on my char- 
acter, which was not what others, under the same circumstances, 
would have done. 



DAVID PORTER 171 

But where am I running Aol It is time that I should stop. 
But before I finish my letter, my dear Glasgow, I must say that 
the next thing to be admired is a grateful heart; and I am svire 
that I have found in yours ^hat treasure which should be so 
much prized. I have always endeavored to do good, solely for 
the sake of good. I have never looked for any other return 
than what my feelings gave me, and to find such sentiments of 
gratitude from you, after all others had forgotten that they had 
received any benefits from me, is truly refreshing to the feelings. 

Accept, my dear Glasgow, my best wishes for your health and 
happiness, and believe me to be your sincere friend. 

David Porter. 
Lieutenant-Commandant D. Glasgow Farragut, 
U. S. Navy.i 

Though Porter spent the remainder of his life on the 
shores of the Bosphorus, only once revisiting the United 
States, and had little need to exhibit forcefulness of char- 
acter, he can well be remembered not only as the gallant 
midshipman of the French war, the Tripolitan prisoner of 
1803-5, the intrepid and successful raider of the second 
war of independence, and the American who did most to 
suppress maritime anarchy in the West Indies, but also 
as a brilliant example of the new Americanism. Through- 
out his career he exhibits that sturdy, independent, and 
unrestrained American spirit which in the years following 
the Revolution gradually developed within the American 
breast both from the unceasing struggle with the wilder- 
ness and the Indian and from the equally unceasing strug- 
gle with the perils of the sea and the selfish pressure of 
European sea power. 

1 Loyall Farragut, Life of David Glasgow Farragut, p. 121. 



CHAPTER XII 

SEA POWER AIDS NATIONAL EXPANSION 

IT has already been suggested that the spirit with which 
the American seamen participated in the second war 
of independence was at heart the same as that which 
actuated the Western pioneer. But during the period 
from the War of 1812 to the Civil War, when the coun- 
try was chiefly occupied with expansion toward the West 
and the sudden burst of American enterprise which fol- 
lowed the discovery of gold in California, the part played 
by sea power has generally been dismissed in a few words. 
Yet the activities of the American seaman were many and 
constant, and he played, if not the major, at least an im- 
portant, part in making the United States a continental 
nation with one arm along the Atlantic and another reach- 
ing to the Pacific. 

Though the Americans had vindicated their sovereignty 
by their resistance to the pressure of European powers, 
they were in the years after 1815, as they had been before 
1812, inferior in armed strength at sea. At the outbreak 
of the war there had been only fourteen serviceable war- 
vessels in the navy, and no ships of over fifty-five guns. 
In 1823 the Secretary of the Navy reported sixteen men-of- 
war in commission, but only one a ship of the line. Six 
others and three frigates were available in case war came, 
and five ships of the line and five frigates were on the 
stocks, — a total of thirty-five vessels of at least twelve 
guns. In 1843 forty-seven vessels might be mustered, only 

172 



AIDS NATIONAL EXPANSION 173 

ten of which were ships of the line. In 1850 the numbers 
were only slightly greater, the chief addition being five 
steam frigates. By the outbreak of the Civil War, the 
ten ships of the line were unserviceable, and only forty-two 
vessels were in commission, with twenty-seven more avail- 
able for emergencies. For the work which was set before 
the American Navy this was meager indeed, especially if 
it meant any determined opposition to Great Britain, whose 
navy was during the whole period overwhelming in com- 
parison with that of other powers, and which was politically 
unhampered by alliances or understandings with other na- 
tions. 

It was fortunate, therefore, that in respect to the most 
momentous issue of this period, the expansion of the United 
States and development of independent governments in 
the Central and South American countries, Great Britain 
aligned herself beside the United States. As a commer- 
cial power, England saw that her interests in the colonies 
of Spain which revolted in the first quarter of the nine- 
teenth century lay not in their territory but in their trade. 
That trade — secured for her during the Napoleonic Wars by 
her supremacy at sea and by the break-up of the Spanish 
rule in Europe — needed to be guarded not so much against 
the United States as against Europe. It was for England's 
interest that no European government should seize infant 
South American republics, and close their ports to English 
trade and manufactures. When her foreign minister. Can- 
ning, in 1823 saw the members of the Holy Alliance — 
Russia, Austria, and especially France — considering send- 
ing an army to the New World to assist the Spanish king 
to subdue his revolted provinces, she not only announced 
her opposition but secured the assistance of the United 
States. The latter, fearing, naturally, that a foreign army 
in America would mean the acquisition of territory by 



174 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

France and Russia, and thus the beginning of new em- 
pires, felt its own safety threatened, and in Monroe's 
message to Congress, declared "that the American Con- 
tinents, by the free and independent condition which they 
have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be con- 
sidered as subjects for future colonization by any European 
powers." 

But such an attitude could be made effective only by 
superiority at sea, a condition not true of the United States. 
If it had not been, therefore, that the United States had 
behind it the force of British sea power, it would hardly 
have been able to maintain the Monroe Doctrine as the 
leading principle of American policy. 

On this fundamental fact all the expansion of the United 
States before the Civil War is based. Just as the failure 
of Napoleon's sea power led him to sell Louisiana to Jef- 
ferson, so only because the United States was free from 
European interference was it able to carry forward its 
march westward across the plains and the Rocky Moun- 
tains to the shores of the Pacific. In this development 
sea power played a real part. It furnished in the steam- 
boat, first operated by Fulton on the Hudson in 1807 and 
soon introduced on the Ohio (1811), the Mississippi (1812), 
and the Great Lakes (1819), the cheapest and quickest 
means of migration and travel. The very volume of the 
westward movement was also greatly dependent on the 
state of the shipping industry. "The migration westward 
declined during the good times of the Napoleonic Wars, 
rose in a huge wave which settled Ohio at the Peace of 
Amiens, and the Embargo Act and the War of 1812 sent 
many settlers west."^ The disturbed condition of com- 
merce just after the war diverted men from seafaring and 
sent them over the Alleghanies and down the Ohio toward 

1 Bogart, Economic History of the United States, p. 190. 



AIDS NATIONAL EXPANSION 175 

the free land of the Mississippi Valley. The westward 
movement did not attain its full tide till the maritime in- 
terests of the country lost their amazing prosperity as neu- 
tral carriers in a time of European war, or until the pre- 
eminence of foreign trade and shipping declined in Ameri- 
can life. 

But the influence of sea power on American expansion 
was not generally so negative and suicidal. The claims of 
the United States to the Oregon territory were, as has 
been noted, largely due to the discovery of the mouth of 
the Columbia by Captain Gray in 1792. In the events 
which preceded the acquisition of California and the South- 
west, the navy played an important part. Indeed, Ameri- 
can sea power was so ready in its help that in 1842, when 
Captain Catesby Jones, while cruising off the coast of Peru, 
heard a rumor that Great Britain had secured California 
from Mexico and was soon to take possession, he hastened 
north to the California coast, landed at Monterey, seized 
the city, and declared the whole region the property of 
the United States, For one day he maintained possession. 
Then, convinced that the reports he had received were false, 
he gave back the place to the Mexican officials. As he had 
acted absolutely without orders, the Government dis- 
avowed the act and made profuse apologies, but naturally 
could not entirely appease the anger of the Mexicans. 
When war was actually declared in 1846, the American 
squadron in the Pacific, under Commodore Sloat, im- 
mediately proceeded to the scene and seized Monterey, 
San Francisco, and Los Angeles. American sailors and 
marines also assisted the army in maintaining the Ameri- 
can occupation. On the Gulf coast of Mexico the navy did 
disagreeable blockading duty and assisted in the attack and 
capture of Vera Cruz before General Scott and his troops 
landed on their expedition to Mexico City. 



176 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

It was during this period, also, that the naval connec- 
tion with the Isthmus of Panama began. In 1848, when 
Europe was in the throes of the revolutions which sprang 
up over Europe upon the overthrow of Louis Philippe in 
France, the United States had made a treaty with New 
Granada (now the United States of Colombia) by which 
it was granted the right of transit across the Isthmus of 
Panama. In return it guaranteed to Colombia the posses- 
sion of the Isthmus against all enemies. Across this strip 
was built the Panama Railroad, and over its rails crawled 
the trains of gold-seekers for California and a never-ending 
line of supplies. The uninterrupted operation of such a 
railway could be secured only by force, and the navy was 
the means by which this was secured. Thus in America 
during the first half of the nineteenth century sea power, 
whether British or American, became in the last analysis 
the foundation upon which American independence and 
American expansion across the continent really rested. 

The most conspicuous triumphs of American sea power, 
however, were displayed in the Far East. The frigate 
Congress in 1819 was the first American ship of war to 
visit Chinese waters; the second was the Vincennes in 
1830, — the first American naval vessel, by the way, to cir- 
cumnavigate the globe. Every visit secured new respect 
for American ships and new privileges from the rather 
arrogant Chinese, who restricted foreign trade to Canton, 
and hedged in the conduct of business with hiuniliating 
and vexatious regulations, not even allowing foreign ships 
of war to remain in Chinese waters. But in 1840, at the 
close of the Opium War, Commodore Kearney of the 
Constitution, who was in Chinese waters, secured, largely 
by well-timed insistence and especially by dealing fairly 
with the Chinese authorities regarding American smug- 
gling of opium, a promise that whatever commercial priv- 



AIDS NATIONAL EXPANSION 177 

ileges were granted to the British at the conclusion of the 
war should be also granted to other nations, — the inaug- 
uration of our "open door" policy in the Far East. 

Five ports in China having been opened to foreign trade, 
the eyes of all nations were directed toward Japan, where 
the policy of isolation still continued. Only at Nagasaki, 
and there only through the Dutch, was any foreign trade 
allowed. The American flag had first been seen off Japan 
just after the American Revolution. During the Napo- 
leonic Wars, American vessels were hired by the Dutch 
to carry their cargoes to Europe; such vessels flew the 
Dutch flag in Japanese waters, but the Stars and Stripes 
elsewhere. About 1820, however, American vessels pene- 
trated to the whaling grounds east and north of Japan. 
But if ships were wrecked on the Japanese coast, the men 
who landed on those shores were treated with great harsh- 
ness by the Japanese authorities and imprisoned indefi- 
nitely. With the introduction of steam vessels it also 
became necessary to establish coaling-stations in the Far 
East. And, above all, the vigorous expansion of world 
trade which characterized the years about the middle of 
the century made all the leading nations ambitious to be 
first to enjoy the products of Japan and first to introduce 
their wares and goods. 

After Commodore Bid die, who was authorized through 
the American envoy to China to make the attempt, had 
visited Japan in 1846 but had found the Japanese authori- 
ties opposed to concluding any treaty, the matter was en- 
trusted in 1852 to Commodore Matthew C. Perry, who 
was furnished with a letter from President Fillmore, writ- 
ten by the Secretary of State, Daniel Webster. His in- 
structions were to secure, by persuasion if possible, humane 
treatment of all Americans who were shipwrecked on the 
Japanese coast, also the opening of several ports for the 



178 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

obtaining of supplies, and perhaps for regular trade. If 
the first of these objects could not be secured otherwise, 
he was to use threats, but not force except in self-defense. 
It was in this skilful mixture of friendliness, threats, and 
absolute insistence upon what he wished that Perry achieved 
his success. In their treatment of foreigners the Japanese 
had been accustomed to use every kind of trickery and in- 
sult at their disposal. They tried the same methods on 
Perry, but soon found that he would not brook insult, and 
was easily their equal in diplomacy. 

Perry's squadron of two side-wheel frigates and two sail- 
ing sloops of war had no sooner reached the Bay of Yedo 
below Tokio than it was surrounded by a cordon of Japanese 
police-boats. But when they attempted to make fast to the 
American ships, they were roughly pushed off, and no 
Japanese was allowed to come aboard. When an inferior 
official approached and ordered the ships to leave, the Amer- 
icans replied that they had a letter from the President of 
the United States and that they would deliver it nowhere 
else, and only to officials of the highest rank. 

Finally, the vice-governor of the province arrived and 
was allowed to come aboard. Perry, however, would not 
permit him to enter his cabin but deputed a mere lieutenant 
to talk with him. Not only was the vice-governor's request 
that the squadron go to Nagasaki refused, but threats were 
made that unless the police-boats were ordered away they 
would be fired on. The astonished Japanese official 
hastened to comply, and, when he left, promised that a 
higher official would come the next morning. 

The next morning he arrived, the governor himself, at- 
tired in full uniform with lacquered helmet held in place 
by a ferocious chin-strap. His formidable appearance was 
lost on Perry, for the American commander refused to see 
such an inferior official and appointed three of his cap- 



AIDS NATIONAL EXPANSION 179 

tains to treat with him. The governor insisted that the 
Americans should go to Nagasaki, but they again refused, 
and as they noticed that he used different titles for the 
President and the emperor, they at once protested and de- 
manded that both should be treated alike. 

Not till the authorities at Tokio, the Shogunate, who 
were the military rulers and the only authorities with 
whom Perry carried on any negotiations, had, on Perry's 
threat to move up the bay and deliver the letter in Tokio 
in person, agreed that two princes should receive the letter 
in a house to be erected on the shore near by, did Perry him- 
self appear. Then, on July 14, 1853, he landed in full uni- 
form, amid thundering salutes, and accompanied by a con- 
siderable bod}^ of sailors and marines. Guarded on each 
side by a gigantic negro, he proceeded to the meeting-place 
and delivered the letter, which was engrossed on vellum 
and contained in a gold box richly decorated. Not insist- 
ing upon an immediate reply, he gave notice that he would 
return in the spring, and soon afterward sailed for China, 

In the meantime the political factions in Japan were al- 
most evenly divided as to abandoning the policy of isola- 
tion and inaugurating intercourse with foreign nations. 
When, however, Perry returned in midwinter in order to 
forestall the French and Russians, both of whom were 
planning missions to Japan, he found the government favor- 
able, and on March 13, 1854, concluded a treaty which se- 
cured substantially the objects he sought. 

As has been well said, "the opening of Japan was a 
memorable achievement, whether viewed as an international 
spectacle, a difficult task, or an historical event. Its spec- 
tacular features arrested the attention, and kindled the 
imagination, of the whole civilized world. The surmount- 
ing of its difficulties might well have challenged the ablest 
statesmen of the century. Perry's success was in no small 



180 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

measure the result of a rare combination of strong quali- 
ties of character, — ^firmness, sagacity, tact, dignity, pa- 
tience, and determination. His achievement was one of the 
great historical events of the last century, the far-reaching 
effects of which are still but partially revealed. ' ' ^ 

This episode and the opening of Korea to American trade 
through similar methods by Commodore Shufeldt in 1882 
are two of the greatest diplomatic achievements of naval 
officers in American history. Both reveal in clear outline 
that side of sea power in its naval sense which is little ap- 
preciated by the ordinary citizen. As the expansion of 
commerce has proceeded and the United States has come 
into touch with every people and every tribe which has a 
sea-coast, the navy has found much of its mission to lie in 
the protection of American lives and property and the 
maintenance of the prestige of the nation. In this activity, 
neither purely peaceful nor purely belligerent, but a deli- 
cate blending of the two, the naval forces of the country 
have contributed in no small degree to the expansion of the 
nation and done much to advance the cause of civilization. 

1 Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations of Naval Officers, p. 281. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE CLIMAX OF AMERICAN ACHIEVEMENT WITH WOOD 
AND SAIL. 

TO present simply the influence of sea power in a 
purely naval sense as the most important feature 
of American maritime activity between the War of 
1812 and the "irrepressible conflict" over slavery and 
States' Rights, which rumbles like the premonition of an 
earthquake during all the period, would be to disregard the 
much more prominent place which the commercial fleets of 
the United States occupied in the thought of the world in the 
half-century of comparative peace which settled upon Eu- 
rope after the defeat and exile of Napoleon. Then it was 
that America acquired again in peace much of the import- 
ance as a maritime nation which she had achieved during the 
stormy period of the Revolution and the Napoleonic strug- 
gle. Toward the end of this half-century she not only 
reached new heights for her maritime industry but saw 
the climax of her achievement with wood and sail. During 
this period the American clipper-ship, with her clouds of 
canvas, her lofty spars, her yacht-like lines, fought bril- 
liantly to perpetuate the wooden sailing-ship. In the 
struggle against the slow but inevitable victory of steam 
and iron she reached heights of achievement the world had 
never before witnessed. 

When this important epoch ended and civil war came, 
came also the end of an American merchant marine of 
any great importance in foreign trade and the eclipse 

181 



182 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

of shipping as a distinctly American industry. For 
causes which will be stated and which are not connected 
with the Civil "War to any great extent, the American 
commercial fleets dwindled to insignificance, and the ports 
of China, Australia, India, South America, the Mediter- 
ranean, and western Europe ceased to see as a familiar 
sight the Stars and Stripes and the American sea-captain 
with his air of conquest and command. 

With the coming of peace conditions in 1815 it was 
natural that the United States, already firmly established 
as a maritime power with an abundance of ships and an 
increasing population and industry, should see its hope for 
success on the sea in freedom of trade, the slogan which had 
been inscribed on its banners during the war. But as 
other nations might not wish to adopt a similar policy, the 
American people decided on the policy of reciprocity ; that 
is, that no restrictions on foreign vessels of any nation 
trading with United States ports should be continued, if 
that nation allowed America similarly free commerce. By 
this means, and later by the imposition of heavy duties on 
nations not reciprocating, the United States gradually se- 
cured participation in the whole trade of the world. In 
1830 Great Britain opened her trade with the West Indies 
to American ships, and in 1849, under the influence of 
Richard Cobden and the other statesmen of the Manchester 
free-trade school of thought, she repealed the remaining 
provisions of the Navigation Acts, and even admitted for- 
eign ships to her coastwise trade. The safety of navigation 
had also been greatly increased by such campaigns as De- 
catur's and Lord Exmouth's against the Barbary pirates, 
and by Commodore Porter's measures against the pirates 
and irregular privateers of the West Indian seas. 

More than in any preceding period, the whaling industry, 
which shared with the fisheries inclusion in "coastwise 



ACHIEVEMENT WITH WOOD AND SAIL 183 

trade," to which after 1817 only American vessels were 
admitted, and on which no import or other duties were 
levied, had become almost an American monopoly. Though 
such whaling centers as Nantucket had lost half their fleets 
during the war and Nantucket had only twenty-three 
vessels left, American whaling later increased in impor- 
tance, and in 1849, according to an English writer, the 
United States possessed 596 whale-ships to Great Britain's 
fourteen. With the increase of this industry went the 
enterprise of its captains and seamen. In 1818 they in- 
vaded the off-shore ground of the Pacific to the east of the 
Marquesas Islands; in 1821 a few American vessels sought 
the whales off the Japanese coast, which increased in 1822 
to thirty ships. In 1835, the Kodiak ground off the north- 
west coast of North America saw its first Yankee whale- 
ship, and the pursuit of the leviathan of the sea was soon 
extended to the Kamchatkan coast and the waters of Bering 
Sea and the Arctic. 

Similar was the history of the American fisheries. Al- 
though trouble ensued after the War of 1812 and at fre- 
quent intervals later regarding American fishing-rights off 
the British provinces of northeast Canada, Congress in- 
creased the bounties paid fishing-vessels constructed in the 
United States, and thus maintained the fishing-fleets, which 
supplied American merchantmen with cheap food to carry 
to the slave plantations of the Southern States and the 
West Indies, and also to the Roman Catholic countries of 
southern Europe. The difficulties about fishing near the 
coasts of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland drove the daring 
American fishermen to Labrador, — where in 1820, 530 
American sails were seen, — and to the banks of Newfound- 
land which lie so far to sea that they had previously been 
shunned by fishermen. But in 1821 three Gloucestermen 
tried the St. George's Bank, and despite rough weather 




184 



ACHIEVEMENT WITH WOOD AND SAIL 185 

secured large hauls. Such fleets were the nursery of Ameri- 
can sailors in the foreign trade, and in the navy that sprang 
up so suddenly with the outbreak of the Civil War. 

The increase of American activity on the world's high- 
ways on the seas was also greatly helped by the natural 
development of trade throughout the world during the 
first half of the nineteenth century. In all the new fields 
thus opened up, American seamen and merchants were not 
behind other nations in their efforts to secure a share. In 
1816 began the regular crossing of the Atlantic, the Black 
Ball line of packet-ships between New York and Liverpool. 
Built on sturdy lines which could resist the North Atlantic 
gales, and crowded with enough sail to sink a ship under 
any other than their eager, skilful American skippers, these 
vessels sailed as regularly as the day of the week came 
around, and traveled laden with emigrants from Europe or 
the products of the Western world. The opening of the 
Erie Canal in 1825 soon made New York the great export 
center of the country, and from its wharves left most of 
the sailing-packets, for example, the Red Star Line, and 
the Dramatic Line, whose ships made the trip to Europe in 
from sixteen days upward. Other regular lines sailed also 
between Boston and Liverpool, New York and Havre, and 
New York and New Orleans. 

With the Far East, the chief trade under the Stars and 
Stripes was still maintained with the merchants of Canton, 
Hither in 1821 as many as 126 ships sailed from Salem 
alone. About the same date the Salem navigators turned 
their prows to Madagascar and Zanzibar, where gum opal 
for varnishes was obtained, and to Manila for hemp, which 
was far superior to the old materials for cordage. The 
extension of American shipping w^as soon evident ; in 1826 
American ships carried 92.5 per cent, of their country's 
foreign trade, import and export; by 1831 the coastwise 



186 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

tonnage surpassed the foreign tonnage ; in 1838 the former 
reached a million tons. It was not till 1847 that this fignre 
was reached in the foreign trade, and that American ship- 
ping with other countries surpassed the tonnage fibres of 
the years of the Napoleonic Wars. Before this high-water 
mark was reached, as early as 1840, it was estimated that 
two hundred thousand Americans were connected with 
maritime industries and commerce, and that the capital in- 
vested reached $430,000,000. 

That the American sailor still merited the admiration of 
Europeans, as much in 1835 as in 1775, when Burke spoke 
so highly of her whalemen, is shown by the words of De 
Tocqueville in his "Democracy in America," a work pub- 
lished the former year : 

The European sailor navigates with prudence; he only sets 
sail when the weather is favorable; if an unfortunate accident 
befalls him, he puts into port; at night he furls a portion of his 
canvas; and when the whitening billows intimate the vicinity 
of land, he cheeks his way and takes an observation of the sun. 
But the American neglects these precautions and braves these 
dangers. He weighs anchor in the midst of tempestuous gales; 
by night and day he spreads his sheets to the winds; he repairs 
as he goes along such damage as his vessel may have sustained 
from the storm; and when he at last ajoproaches the term of his 
voyage, he darts onward to the shore as if he already descried 
a port. The Americans are often shipwrecked, but no trader 
crosses the seas so rapidly. And as they perform the same dis- 
tance in shorter time, they can perform it at a cheaper rate. . . . 

I cannot better explain my meaning than by saying that the 
Americans affect a sort of heroism in their manner of trading. 
But the European merchant will always find it very difficult to 
imitate his American competitor; who, in adopting the system I 
have just described, follows not only a calculation of his gain, 
but an impulse of his nature. 

But the supreme test of American maritime efficiency had 
arrived. In 1840 an Englishmian, Samuel Cunard, received 



ACHIEVEMENT WITH WOOD AND SAIL 187 

a subsidy from the British Government and began the 
famous Cunard Line with four side-wheel wooden steamers, 
first to Halifax and Boston, then to New York, which soon 
became the main terminus. Meanwhile the Opium War 
between Great Britain and China was throwing consider- 
able trade into the hands of American shippers and cap- 
tains, and the years of peace in Europe between the revolu- 
tionary movements of 1830 and those of 1848, gave a de- 
cided impetus to American trade expansion. The export 
of American products, especially cotton, had also grown to 
tremendous size, and it was simply a question whether this 
expanding trade should fall to Britain, with her steamers, 
or to America, the home of cheap sailing-craft. With the 
recurring spasms of anti-British sentiment which were 
stirred by the fishery question, the northeastern boundary, 
the dispute over Oregon, and the remarks of English travel- 
ers, such as Dickens, whose "American Notes" appeared in 
1842, it became almost a matter of patriotism for America 
to meet the challenge and show that sail could beat steam. 
The skill of American seamen could hardly be improved, 
but the ships they sailed could always be made faster and 
more efficient. It was this latter development that made 
the American merchant marine of wood and canvas aston- 
ish the world for the two decades after 1840. The clipper 
ship seems to have sprung from the French luggers which 
brought supplies to America during the Revolution. These 
were the prototypes of the so-called Baltimore clippers, 
really schooners, of world-wide reputation for speed as 
privateers in the War of 1812, and later much sought for 
as slave-smugglers on the African coast. In the years 
just after 1840, the opium trade with China attracted many 
Americans because of its great profits and because fast 
vessels such as the Baltimore clippers were needed. But 
all these vessels were small schooners, far different from 



188 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

the huge clipper ships which were to be the climax of wood 
and sail in the "clipper ship era" from 1843 to 1860. 

The first large ship on clipper lines was the Ann McKim 
of Baltimore, built in 1832. But the real movement be- 
gan in 1841 when John W. Griffeths of New York ex- 
hibited a model of a proposed clipper which would change 
thje full-beamed, solid lines of the old cargo vessels, where 
capacity seemed the only object, to the more slender lines 
of the new type, where the greatest breadth was farther aft. 
With this new model before them, American ship-builders 
soon produced the fastest and most economical cargo ves- 
sels of their generation. From the yards of Donald McKay, 
at East Boston, and William H. Webb, at New York, to 
mention only two of the foremost, came creations of wood 
and canvas that quickly established the supremacy of 
American shipwrights and riggers. Instead of the insig- 
nificant 493 tons of the Ann McKim, Donald McKay turned 
out such ships as the Flying Fish, 1600 tons, the Sovereign 
of the Seas, 2400 tons, and the Great Bepublic, 4555 tons. 
The latter was 325 feet long, four-masted, and with a main- 
yard 120 feet in length. In the coastwise trade the adop- 
tion of the schooner rig on larger vessels helped to lower the 
cost of transportation and meet the menace of the steam- 
boat, for on a schooner only two-thirds as large a crew was 
required to work the sails. 

In all the fields of ocean commerce the American ship 
now won fresh victories. In the transatlantic trade, the 
steamers, virtually all British until 1850, were obliged to 
carry so much coal that they had room for little else, and 
were besides frequently passed by Yankee sailers. In 1852 
the Sovereign of the Seas, during a fast fourteen-day trip 
between the two continents, made 340 miles one day by sail 
alone, while the Cunarder Canada was covering only 200. 



ACHIEVEMENT WITH WOOD AND SAIL 189 

The best American liner was the Dreadnought, built in 
1853, and commanded by Samuel Samuels. On her first 
trip from Liverpool westward, she left a day later than 
the Cunard Liner Canada, and arrived in New York just 
as the latter made Boston, a shorter distance. Passages 
of thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen days were not uncom- 
mon. 

In the extensive China trade, sometimes via the Cape 
of Good Hope, then later, after the California trade be- 
gan, by way of the Horn, American clippers threatened 
to take the East India trade from the very mouths of 
British ship couynanders. This was especially after 1849, 
when the British Navigation Acts were repealed and 
American ships were free to carry tea and 'other products 
from India to the very docks of London and Liverpool. 
During the years 1840-60, many a British or Dutch bark 
with upper yards bare, making slow headway across the 
Pacific or Indian oceans, saw astern a pyramid of snow- 
white canvas appear over the horizon and sweep by in the 
course of a few hours, — a Yankee clipper from New York 
to Hongkong, or Batavia, flying unreefed royals and with 
topgallant studdingsails out to catch every bit of breeze. 
Such was the American habit of carrying every inch of 
sail the yards would bear and forcing the ship day and 
night toward her destination. One of the most famous 
clipper commanders. Captain Bob Waterman, is said to 
have put padlocks on the topsail sheets and halliards to 
prevent timid seamen from lowering sail in every little 
blow. Many a ship's log had records like that of the 
Florence on her trip of ninety-two days from Shanghai to 
England. For nine days in succession she carried royal 
studdingsails. From December 26th to March 20th she 
never reefed her topstails. On another voyage out to 



190 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

Penang the Florence for the entire trip of eighty-one days 
never started her topsail halliards, except once to take in a 
single reef for a few hours. 

Another factor which helped to establish the superiority 
of the American sailing-ship was the earlier adoption of 
scientific methods in navigation. In 1842 Lieutenant Mat- 
thew Fontaine Maury, just placed in charge of what later 
became the Naval Observatory and Hydrographic Office 
in Washington, began the compilation of data for charts 
which -would show the winds, currents, and other phe- 
nomena encountered in the waters traversed by ships. 
Through these charts, and the sailing-directions furnished 
with them, American skippers were able to cut days, and 
sometimes weeks, from their passages. By these methods 
alone Maury is estimated to have saved the American mer- 
chant marine at least $2,250,000 per annum. 

But probably the greatest influence in American mari- 
time history of this period was exerted by the discovery of 
gold in California in 1848. All trade between the Atlan- 
tic coast of the United States and the Califomian gold- 
fields of the Sacramento Valley was coastwise traffic, from 
which foreign ships were excluded. It did not, therefore, 
feel the competition of the British steamship lines, nor have 
many rivals between New York and Aspinwall (now Colon) 
and between Panama, western end of the Panama Railroad, 
and San Francisco. Especially in the route around Cape 
Horn the clippers had the field to themselves, and the 
rivalry between ship-builder and ship-builder, and between 
captain and captain was intense, for in this coast-to-coast 
trade were made the great fortunes of the day, both ashore 
and at sea. 

As mails and passengers filled the Panama route to ex- 
haustion, the clippers around the Horn could charge what 
they pleased for freight, and a ship could in one voyage to 



ACHIEVEMENT WITH WOOD AND SAIL 191 

the west coast earn profit enough to pay for its building 
and operation. 

If the swift clipper returned by way of China and cir- 
cumnavigated the globe, its profits were much increased. 
Here again American seamanship was a vital factor. In 
1851 the Surprise, Captain Dumaresq, entered the Golden 
Gate, ninety-six days out from New York, having during 
the 16,308 miles from Sandy Hook, reefed topsails but 
twice. On August 31, 1851, the Flying Cloud, Captain 
Creesy, arrived after a voyaage of eighty-nine days, making 
374 miles in one day. This surpassed the best day's run 
of any Atlantic steamer of that time, and meant an average 
of 227 miles a day, or 91/2 miles per hour throughout the 
voyage. On her return from California via Honolulu in 
1853, the Sovereign of the Seas made 424 miles in twenty- 
four hours, and at times attained a speed of 19 to 20 knots. 

A similar impetus to clipper-ship sea power came with 
the discovery of gold in Australia in 1851. As the voyage 
was long and there were few possible coaling-stations, 
steamers could not be used, and the American-built clip- 
per-ship, whether owned by Americans or foreigners, 
found itself supreme. Furthermore, Maury's calculations 
disclosed a new route which did not touch at the Cape 
of Good Hope, as had been the custom, and which cut the 
time of the voyage jn two. By taking a course far south 
of the cape ships fell in with steady westerly winds which 
carried them east with great speed, and on the return the 
ship sailed east from Melbourne around Cape Horn, thus 
circumnavigating the globe. In this trade American- 
built ships, such as Donald McKay's Sovereign of the Seas, 
Red Jacket, Chariot of Fame, Lightning, Champion of the 
Seas, and James Baines, made passages which were not 
surpassed by any other vessels. 

It may well be maintained that the years from 1854 to 



192 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

1862 marked the heyday, the climax, of American merchant 
ships of the sail and wood period. In the United States 
ship-building was carried on more profitably than any- 
where else in the world; here was the native genius in 
design of a people bred to the sea for generations; here 
were cheap timber and skilful workmen; here was an 
increasing demand for more ocean carriers to provide for 
the expanding transoceanic trade. The commerce with the 
half -opened East of China and Japan and the tremendous 
demands of territories like California and Australia, where 
in a night thousands of eager settlers appeared and de- 
manded supplies and equipment, opened new avenues for 
shipping. The revolutionary movements in Europe in 1848 
resulted in vast emigration from the European continent, 
and, as explained before, the repeal of the Navigation Acts 
by England also gave fresh impetus. "With the breaking 
out of the Crimean War in 1854 and the Sepoy Mutiny 
in 1857, came a still greater call for shipping, and during 
these years, 1854—62, American tonnage in the foreign trade 
amounted each year to two million gross tons or more, a 
figure never surpassed before or since. In 1861 came the 
highest figure, 2,496,894 tons ; 1858 saw the peak of tonnage 
in the whale fishery, 198,594 tons; in 1862 the deep-sea 
fiisheries reached their climax with 193,459 tons of shipping. 
When, therefore, the Civil War began, American 
sea power in a commercial sense was, including coastwise, 
one third that of the entire world, and virtually equal to 
Great Britain's. On every sea the American flag was seen, 
in every port American ships were found, and the hold of 
America on the carrying-trade of the world seemed firmly 
established. The rich men of the day, the captains of 
industry of their time, were almost entirely the merchants 
and ship-owners. The United States from its earliest set- 
tlement, — through its colonial period with its West Indian 



ACHIEVEMENT WITH WOOD AND SAIL 193 

trade, through the Revolutionary epoch, whose financial 
straits were so often relieved by the chief maritime mer- 
chant of the day, Robert Morris, through the period of the 
French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, and through 
the later expansion of foreign trade in the clipper-ship era, 
— through these periods the United States was distinctly a 
maritime nation. Like the Scotch poet America could have 
sung, "Our heritage the sea." 

What were the conditions which caused the United States 
to decline as a shipping power? There were many, includ- 
ing the Civil "War and the destruction of Northern ships 
by the Confederate cruisers, but the chief cause was the 
inevitable victory of the steamship built of iron. Against 
the power of steam the argosies of sail were in the long 
run powerless, though the genius of American ship-builders 
and navigators prolonged the struggle for many years. 
Sail and wood had reached their zenith, and could rise no 
higher ; steam and iron were in their infancy and had their 
hands upon the future. The changes in domestic affairs 
also gradually turned against American shipping interests ; 
the North, especially New England, built factories and 
wished protection against foreign products; the grow- 
ing sectional feeling alienated Southern support of bounties 
and subsidies, which had been granted fishermen and trans- 
atlantic liners, both sail and steam. There was therefore 
little encouragement for the few ship-builders in the North 
who realized that American ships must quickly change from 
wood and sail to steam and iron, and they accordingly 
received no governmental assistance and had to fight the 
natural conservatism of the builder of clipper-ships, with 
his yard and workmen organized by the old methods. But 
the story of the skill and enterprise which displayed the 
American flag in every port of the world, and which origi- 
nated new types of ships, strikingly superior to the old lum- 



194 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

bering cargo-carriers of the early decades of the century, 
constitutes one of the chapters in the history of American 
sea power which ought not to be forgotten. With the 
gradual exhaustion of iron and coal, it may be that men 
will some day again fall back on the cheaper wind and wood 
for at least some share in transportation by sea. 



CHAPTER XIV 

FULTON AND ERICSSON IN AMERICA REVOLUTIONIZE THE 
SEA POWER OP THE WORLD 

THE Latin poet sang : * ' His heart was cased in oak 
and triple brass who first put forth upon the 
treacherous sea. ' ' Yet the beginning of navigation 
was not a greater change than the transformation which 
occurred in merchant marine and navy in the first half 
of the nineteenth century. Sail and wood had been since 
the dawn of history the very essentials and fundamentals 
of all seafaring ; yet before the triumphal march of human 
invention and the undaunted enterprise of two Americans 
the ships of the time lost the need of sails and found wood 
almost useless, and, abandoning both, entered on a new 
age of maritime achievement. 

It is difficult for the present-day reader to realize the 
wide gap which lies between Nelson's ships in the blockade 
of Napoleonic France and the fleets of battle-ships and 
merchantmen that plowed the seas a half century later. 
The very essence of navigation by sail was the wind; yet 
to-day it hardly enters the thought of the voyager. That 
the ship should carry within her the power which would 
propel her over the seas, as a horse has within him the 
power of locomotion, was hardly conceivable; also for the 
wooden walls of the ship of the line to be entirely dis- 
carded, and the very masts and bulkheads to be of a mate- 
rial that would sink if placed in water, would have seemed 
to earlier generations a mere vagary of an abnormal imagi- 

195 



196 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

nation. Accordingly the two men who were the real leaders 
in this transformation, and the steps by which it occurred, 
are well worth consideration in any history of sea power. 

It was inevitable, as soon as James Watt in 1765 had 
made his great improvement on the crnde steam-engines 
of his day, the separate condenser, that steam should some 
day become the motive power of ships, and until one realizes 
the revolution in navigation which it involved, it is hard 
to understand why sail power continued to hold the mastery 
of the seas for nearly three quarters of a century longer. 
As we have seen, the climax of sail was in the forties of 
the next century, and not till after the Civil War do we 
fairly find ourselves in the steam era on the sea. 

The delay was due, however, to perfectly natural con- 
ditions, which also explain why — despite the mechanical 
supremacy of Great Britain in the early years of the last 
century — practical and actual steam-navigation first ap- 
peared not in England but in America. The conservatism 
of the older countries was simply the usual tendency of 
society, the willingness to carry on the affairs of the world 
in the well-worn, well-practised ways which had proved 
their worth through the centuries. Usually during time 
of war there is considerable chance for experiments, for the 
weaker sea power seeks by ingenuity to overcome the handi- 
cap of inferior forces. But, singularly enough, when it 
came to new ideas of naval warfare, Napoleon, who repre- 
sented the weaker sea power, happened to be not one who 
sought for revolutionary changes in method but one who 
used more brilliantly than his opponents the methods and 
materials already in existence. Accordingly, though 
France as the weaker naval power would be expected to 
overcome superior forces by some new idea in warfare, she 
did nothing of the sort. Great Britain, moreover, confi- 
dent in the strength of her sailing-ships of war and her 



FULTON AND ERICSSON 197 

wooden walls, which had protected her ever since the 
Armada, did not feel the need — though she was on the 
highroad of mechanical invention — to deviate from the sure 
path of experience. Besides, her inventors found full occu- 
pation in the improvement of manufacturing. 

But in America the conditions were quite different. The 
new nation was expanding inland toward the "West, where 
rivers abounded but roads did not exist. Though, like 
England, she started building canals, her imperative need 
was some method of navigation of the deep rivers that 
flowed into the Atlantic and some means of transportation 
up and down the Ohio, the Mississippi, and the Great Lakes. 
On the rivers the old methods of sail were virtually impos- 
sible; there were narrow channels, sharp turns, swift cur- 
rents, and sudden squalls from the bluffs that lined their 
banks. In the United States some other method than sail- 
ing had to be devised to furnish the quick and reliable 
transportation so much needed. 

With the natural progressiveness and freedom from tradi- 
tion of a new country the United States turned toward the 
untried power of the steam-engine. It is needless to men- 
tion the various devices projected, or actually tried, for 
navigation by steam. Robert Fulton, therefore, though 
he deserves his title of the inventor of the steamboat, did 
not anticipate every one else in all the adaptation of the 
steam-engine to marine navigation; his claim rests rather 
on his being the first to demonstrate in a definite way that 
the steam-engine could be applied to navigation success- 
fully enough to overthrow sail as the commonest method of 
propulsion. 

It was, therefore, with Fulton, who had a real genius for 
invention, that the first steamboat originated. Though he 
did not receive much education in his boyhood days near 
Lancaster, Pennsylvania, his mind was active and his con- 



198 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

fidenee great. In 1782 at the age of seventeen he removed 
to Philadelphia, where he became by 1785 a miniature- 
painter of some ability, and may have seen before he went 
abroad in the next year, or perhaps, in 1787, John Fitch's 
steamboat on the Delaware, a craft with several paddles 
placed parallel to one another and made to strike the water 
on each side of the boat like the paddles of an Indian canoe. 
After pursuing art, especially portraiture, in London for 
several years, Fulton suddenly abandoned an apparently 
successful career and ever after devoted himself to inven- 
tion. His earliest sketch of a steamboat dates from 1793, 
but during the first few years he was chiefly occupied in in- 
venting a machine for cutting marble, another for lifting 
canal-boats to a higher level with the use of a lock, and a 
machine for digging canals. Passing over to France in 
1797, he apparently kept working on the steamboat, con- 
ducting as early as 1798 experiments with the screw pro- 
peller. 

But he was chiefly engaged here with a submarine tor- 
pedo-boat, which in 1800 he actually constructed and in 
which he made trips on the Seine near Paris and at Havre 
and Brest. He even made a voyage of seventy miles on the 
high seas in his cockle-shell, looking for English brigs to 
torpedo, but the news of the existence of his dastardly war 
engine, as it was then considered, had reached the British 
fleets, and they avoided him. Although Fulton 's invention 
did not accomplish anything, it contained the essential 
characteristic of the modem submarine, — ability to sub- 
merge and navigate underwater. Its motive power, how- 
ever, was so deficient, being only a screw turned by hand, 
that it could not overtake any vessel or travel any con- 
siderable distance. Furthermore, its success depended — 
like that of its predecessor, Bushnell's submarine of 1777, 
which made an unsuccessful attack on the British 64-gun 



FULTON AND ERICSSON 199 

Eagle in the Hudson River — on reaching the bottom of 
the vessel and there placing the torpedo, or mine, as we 
should call it to-day. 

The arrival of Robert R. Livingston as American Minister 
to France in 1801 really marks the beginning of Fulton's 
definite efforts to solve the problem of steam-navigation, 
for Livingston was much interested in the matter, was con- 
versant with all the various experimenters then working in 
America, especially Morey, Roosevelt, and Stevens, and he 
had already secured an act from the New York Legislature 
giving him a monopoly of steam-navigation in the state. 
In 1802 Fulton and Livingston signed a partnership agree- 
ment whereby Fulton was furnished funds for constructing 
a small boat for trial on the Seine. This steamboat made 
a successful trip on August 9, 1803, and attained a speed 
of about three miles an hour. Fulton did not lay claim 
to having invented any constituent part of the craft; the 
boiler was of French make and of well-known design and 
the paddle-wheels had been used by others before him. He 
claimed only a more successful arrangement and combina- 
tion of these parts. Accordingly, safely buttressed by a 
possible monopoly of the Hudson and its tributaries, he 
sought no patent, but with Livingston prepared to set 
up in America a steamboat which would have commercial 
possibilities. 

As England was admittedly the leading nation in the 
manufacture of machinery, Fulton ordered an engine from 
Boulton & Watt, of Soho, near Birmingham, asking for 
some special features but in the main using the standard 
type of engine of the day. The boiler was made in London, 
and the whole shipped to America. But meanwhile 
Napoleon had assembled at Boulogne an army with which 
he intended to invade England. Fulton, whose activities 
in France in the previous war were known and apparently 



200 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

respected by the British, supervised an attempt to sink 
some of the French flotillas at Boulogne and Calais by 
means of submarine bombs, similar to those he had used 
in France. In this case, however, he was using no sub- 
marine but a sort of raft on which a man lay and towed 
a quantity of explosive against the side of the intended 
victim. Although Fulton again personally directed these 
expeditions and received considerable money for his serv- 
ices, the results were negligible. When Napoleon just be- 
fore Trafalgar gave up hope of securing command of the 
Channel and packed his army off to the Danube, Fulton 
gave over the attempt and in October, 1806, started for 
New York to resume his efforts to introduce steam-naviga- 
tion in his own country. 

In the construction of a suitable hull and in the placing 
of the engine in the most advantageous position, Fulton 
displayed a scientific attitude which was in advance of his 
time. Hitherto naval architects had decided such matters 
as shape of hull, displacement, and speed, by rule of thumb 
and experience, but Fulton utilized the results of the latest 
investigators, especially Beaufoy's experiments regarding 
the resistance of variously shaped solids moving through 
water. The technical details are clearly seen in the speci- 
fications given in the patent applications filed by Fulton 
in 1809 and 1810, illustrated as they are by drawings 
which show his skill as an artist and his preeminence 
as an engineer. It is not, therefore, in the improvement 
of the engine that Fulton contributed most, but in the 
scientific calculation of details of the hull, and in fitting 
hull and engine to each other. 

On August 17, 1807, almost four years to a day after 
the successful trial on the Seine, The Steamboat, as it was 
first known, or the Clermont as it was later called when 
others of its kind appeared on the Hudson, started from 



FULTON AND ERICSSON 201 

New York for Albany, and arrived at the latter place in 
thirty-two hours, a speed of a little less than five miles per 
hour. The craft which thus inaugurated the era of steam 
was 150 feet long, and 13 feet beam, and drew 2 feet of 
water. Its displacement was 100 tons. So successful did 
it prove that Livingston secured an extension of his 
monopoly until 1833, and the line thus established has con- 
tinued to run to the present day. 

The revolutionary change from sail power to steam was 
soon evident. Steamboats appeared and multiplied on all 
the principal rivers of the United States. Only a month 
after the Clermont made her maiden trip, John C. Stevens 
of Hoboken, who as early as 1803 had constructed a small 
twin-screw steam vessel which actually worked, launched a 
rival ship equipped with paddle-wheels. In 1809, this ves- 
sel, debarred from the Hudson by Livingston's monopoly, 
steamed from New York to Philadelphia, the first steamboat 
to accomplish an open-sea voyage. As has been mentioned, 
the first steamer appeared on the Ohio in 1811, on the 
Mississippi in 1812, and on the Great Lakes in 1819, and 
the steamboat thus had an important influence in develop- 
ing the valleys of the Ohio and the Mississippi. In 1825 
when the Supreme Court declared Livingston's state 
monopoly unconstitutional as a control of interstate com- 
merce, in the famous case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, a new 
stimulus was given to steamer lines between the principal 
cities. In England the Comet, built in 1811, seems to have 
been the first steamboat to deserve mention, but not till 
1820 was steam-navigation at all common there. It was 
certainly the example of Fulton that led to the use of steam 
in England, and he was directly responsible for its intro- 
duction into Russia. As late as 1824 the French Govern- 
ment sent a commissioner to the United States to report on 
the advisability of establishing steam-navigation in France. 



202 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

Fulton, however, did not rest on his well-earned claim 
as the father of steam-navigation. In 1811 he introduced 
the steam ferry-boat, constructed with bow and stem exactly 
alike and rounded at each end like the ferry-boats of to-day. 
In 1813, he designed and constructed the first steam war- 
ship, the Demologos, i. e., the Voice of the People, — a name 
that recalls Fulton's enthusiasm for democracy, one of his 
real inspirations as an inventor. The vessel was designed 
primarily for harbor defense. The plans were different 
from any vessel ever built before or after. To protect the 
machinery, which utilized the paddle-wheel principle, a 
single wheel was placed in a well in the very center of the 
hull and protected above by a deck. The hull had a bow 
and stem like a ferry-boat, with two rudders at each end. 
Thirty 32-pounders were on board, and were to fire red-hot 
shot. The main deck was protected by solid wooden armor, 
four feet, ten inches thick. 

The Demologos was not completed till after the War of 
1812, but made actual trips outside of Sandy Hook without 
difficulty. After Fulton's death in 1815 she was named the 
Fulton in honor of her inventor, and remained at the 
Brooklyn Navy Yard till 1829, when she blew up. So 
revolutionary was her design that in England any exagger- 
ation about her passed as truth. One writer even stated 
that her sides were thirteen feet thick and that she could, 
by a mechanical device, brandish three hundred cutlasses 
with the utmost regularity over her gunwales and could also 
thrust out an equal number of heavy iron pikes which darted 
back and forth every fifteen seconds. 

Although the paddle-wheel has now been discarded for 
the screw propeller, except for shallow waters, it is well 
to remember that the early triumphs of steam-navigation 
were all won by this means of propulsion. In 1810 the 
American side-wheeler Savaiinah crossed the Atlantic and 



FULTON AND ERICSSON 203 

went on as far as St. Petersburg, though chiefly by means of 
sail. In 1838 the British steamer Sirius, also a side-wheeler, 
arrived in New York after a voyage made wholly by steam. 
She was followed a day later by another steamer of the 
same type, the Great Western. Transatlantic steamship 
travel had begun. The early ships of the Cunard Line, 
established in 1838, were all side-wheelers, and those of the 
first American line, not established till 1847, were of the 
same type. In fact, there were some side-wheel Cunarders 
plowing the Atlantic as late as 1870. Screw steamers did 
not become common until after the Civil War. 

After its introduction into the merchant marine, steam 
was gradually adopted by the navies of the world, at first 
in the form of the side-wheeler, England began building 
steam towing-vessels for her fleets in 1820, but the first 
real steam war-ship did not appear till 1832. After Ful- 
ton's Demologos, the first steam vessel in the American 
Navy was the Fulton, not built till 1837, although its con- 
struction had been authorized by Congress in 1815. Of 
the early side-wheel steamers in the American service, the 
best known was the Mississippi, built in 1842 and prominent 
in Perry's expedition to Japan and in the operations in 
the Mississippi till her burning at Port Hudson in 1863. 

With all the progress in the use of steam in navigation, 
it is nevertheless true that previous to 1843 the steamer had 
many points of inferiority to the sailing-vessel. In the 
transatlantic service, the clean, fast-sailing American 
packets with their snowy canvas frequently beat the sooty, 
cranky Cunarders with their clumsy paddle-wheels. On 
inland waters the side-wheel steamer was supreme, but on 
the high seas she was never a success, even in the com- 
mercial fleets. Her huge paddle-boxes were hit by every 
wave and made a storm a time of misery and danger. Be- 
sides, if heavily laden, she had her wheels too deeply im- 



204 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

mersed to work effectively and, therefore, when she most 
needed power, had it least. For naval purposes the side- 
wheel steamer was almost useless, for her wheels were in 
exposed positions, and her machinery had to be placed 
well above the water-line, where it. was very vulnerable. 
It is not strange, therefore, that the use of steam on the 
oceans and in war had not progressed greatly in 1843, when 
John Ericsson by the invention of the screw propeller in ia 
practical form for large ships obviated all these difficulties 
and started another revolution in ship design — one which 
was to establish firmly the right of steam to the trident of 
the seas. But Ericsson's services to sea power did not stop 
here, for by his later invention of his ''Monitor" type, an 
iron-armored vessel which was virtually in\'iilnerable and 
could with one gun do the work of a whole broadside, he 
revolutionized sea power in its military sense. If, there- 
fore, Fulton was the father of the modern steamship, Erics- 
son was the father of the modern dreadnought. 

Unlike Fulton, who changed in his twenties from art to 
engineering, John Ericsson had only one ambition all his 
days. He was reared in the atmosphere of the great me- 
chanical and engineering epoch which began in England 
with the perfection of the steam-engine by James Watt, and 
which is concisely described as the Industrial Revolution, — 
the great transition period for all Europe from medieval 
life to modem civilization. 

Born in Sweden in 1803, his father being connected with 
canal construction, Ericsson became a draftsman of some 
ability by his fourteenth year, when he entered the Mechan- 
ical Corps of the Swedish Navy. He later served as subal- ] 
tern in the army and became familiar with ordnance. In ' 
1826 he emigrated to England and immediately started his 
career as an engineer and inventor. In 1828 he began the 
use of compressed air for transmitting power, and invented 



FULTON AND ERICSSON 205 

the first practical steam-engine for extinguishing fires and 
pumping. By this time he was beginning to give his atten- 
tion to marine engineering and had invented an improved 
condenser. In 1828 in remodeling the Victory, a ship then 
fitting out for Arctic exploration, he placed the engines 
below the water-line, an important matter in a war-ship — 
as Ericsson regarded the Victory, for the commander con- 
cealed the real use of the vessel. 

For the next ten years invention after invention came 
forth from the ingenious brain of Ericsson — a locomotive 
that was a dangerous rival of Stephenson 's ; a sea lead that 
measured depth by the compression of air; in fact, over 
thirty distinct devices which Ericsson in 1863 listed among 
the best hundred he had made. 

As we have seen, the screw propeller was not a new idea, 
but had been discussed and experimented with by Fulton 
in his submarine in 1798, by Stevens in 1803, and by Eng- 
lish inventors of the thirties, such as Shorter and Smith. 
But, as in the case of steam, one man established the idea 
as a practical commercial and naval method of propulsion. 
That man was not Stevens or Shorter or Smith, but John 
Ericsson. And it is interesting to note that again it was 
in the United States that the new idea, though perfected 
and exhibited in Europe, was first demonstrated and 
adopted. 

The two men whose names should be associated with 
Ericsson's in this epoch-making event are both Americans, 
— Francis B. Ogden and Robert F. Stockton. The former 
was the American Consul at Liverpool, and had in 1831 
become a partner of Ericsson in a patent for a steam drum, 
owing to the fact that as an American citizen he could take 
out the patent in the United States. As Fulton had in 
Paris demonstrated his steamboat, so in 1837 Ericsson 
demonstrated the advantages of the propeller on the Thames 



206 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

in the Francis B. Ogden, a miniature steamer, only forty- 
five feet long. It towed the American packet-ship Toronto 
against the tide at four and a half knots an hour, and on 
a later trip propelled the Admiralty barge up the Thames 
to the discomfiture of the skeptical naval officers aboard. 
The second American associated with Ericsson was Robert 
F. Stockton, of New Jersey, a naval officer who saw Erics- 
son's small screw steamer and became enthusiastic over this 
new method of propulsion. He immediately had a larger 
steamer of iron built on the Mersey, This small craft, the 
Robert F. Stockton, crossed the Atlantic under sail and was 
used for years as a tow-boat on the New Jersey canals. It 
was, with the exception of Stevens's screw-launch of 1803, 
the first propeller steamer in America, and the first to be 
used commercially. 

So conservative were English ship-builders and engineers 
and so enthusiastic his American friends that in 1839 Erics- 
son left England and proceeded to New York to adopt 
America as his country for the rest of his days. He came 
with plans prepared for a steam-frigate with a screw pro- 
peller, as Stockton believed he could secure the authoriza- 
tion of Congress for such a vessel. While the deal with the 
Government was under way, Ericsson fitted out several 
vessels with his new machinery, among them the Clarion, 
the first screw steamer between New York and Havana, and 
the Vandalia, the first on the Great Lakes. All told, before 
1844 (when the Princeton, the first naval vessel to be 
equipped with an Ericsson propeller, was commissioned), 
he had introduced his invention into twenty-four merchant- 
men. 

From 1841 to 1843 Ericsson was almost entirely engrossed 
in the building of the Princeton. Though Stockton was the 
one in charge, Ericsson was called upon for one hundred 
and twenty-four working-drawings, and the fact that the 



FULTON AND ERICSSON 207 

ship embodied his ideas, and virtually his alone, seems to 
have been well known. The vessel was indeed crowded 
with inventions of Ericsson's. Besides the screw propeller, 
he had on her a new hooped gun — the principle of which 
was adopted later in the Parrott — an improved gun- 
carriage, a friction-gear for controlling the recoil of guns, 
a range-finder, a self-acting gun-lock, a telescopic smoke- 
stack, and a system of blowers which made the draft of 
the furnaces independent of the riddling of the funnel by 
shot. The engines, much less bulky and much lighter than 
those of side-wheel steamers, were placed below the water- 
line, where they were not exposed, like the old paddle- 
wheels, to every shot that the enemy fired. 

From an engineering point of view, therefore, the Prince- 
ton was the first modern war-ship, for its essential principle 
still survives and is to-day being applied even to submarine 
and aerial warfare. The success of the Princeton, even 
before she was tested in the Mexican War, and before she 
appeared in European waters, started the navies of the 
world to building screw vessels. In 1843 Ericsson, through 
his representative abroad, received an order for a propeller 
for the French 44-gun frigate Pomona, and in 1844 in 
New York he drew the designs for a propeller and an engine 
of 300-horse-power to be placed in the British frigate 
Amphion. Commercially, the advantages of the screw were 
also soon recognized. In 1852 it was calculated that 
whereas the cost of transporting four hundred tons of mer- 
chandise five hundred miles with paddle-wheels was virtu- 
ally a thousand dollars, the screw vessel with auxiliary sail 
power could do the work for less than a third the amount. 

The services of Ericsson to sea power were not, however, 
ended. Without giving here an account of the dramatic 
encounter between his iron-clad Monitor and the Confed- 
erate battery Merrimac in the dark days of the Civil War, 



208 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

it is important to indicate how seven years before that 
conflict, into which the North entered without one iron-clad 
vessel, Ericsson was fully prepared so to change the whole 
course of naval construction and warfare that within a year 
of the beginning of the Civil War the United States by the 
adoption of Ericsson's idea, should be overwhelmingly the 
strongest sea power in the world. The introduction of iron 
into ship-building, which began in Great Britain in 1838, 
was inevitably to supersede the wooden walls of the navies, 
and the adoption of guns throwing explosive shells which 
would smash wood and set it on fire made the wooden 
steamer, whether side-wheel or screw, a defenseless hulk. 
But this was not realized till the Crimean War, when the 
armored batteries of the French withstood the fire of the 
Russian forts at Kinburn without receiving any appreciable 
damage themselves. And it was this war rather than the 
Civil War that produced the monitor type, Ericsson 's chief 
contribution to sea power. Russia was Sweden 's hereditary 
enemy; Russia represented autocracy, Sweden democracy; 
Ericsson, intense in his loves and hates, was stirred at the 
attempts of the Russian Czar to extend his power in the 
Black Sea. He therefore sent to Napoleon III, through the 
Swedish Minister in Paris, detailed plans for, and a model 
of, a new type of ship in which were embodied all the fruits 
of his inventive genius, and which possessed stability, great 
gun power such as would destroy land forts, ease of 
manceuver in shallow waters, economy of armament, and 
invulnerability, — in other words, the essential points of his 
later Monitor. The following description of it was sent by 
Ericsson to Napoleon : 

The vessel [is] to be composed entirely of iron. The midship 
section is triangular, with a broad hollow keel, loaded with about 
two hundred tons of cast iron blocks to balance the heavy upper 
works. The ends of the vessel are moderately sharp. The deck, 



FULTON AND ERICSSON 



209 




THE IRONCLAD MONITOR PROPOSED TO NAPOLEON III BY JOHN 
ERICSSON IN 1854 

Prom Ericsson's own drawings in his "Contributions to the Centennial Ex- 
hibition." Plate XLII. 



made of plate iron, is curved both longitudinally and trans- 
versely, the curvature being five feet; it is made to project eight 
feet over the rudder and propeller. The entire deck is covered 
with a lining of sheet iron three inches thick, with an opening in 
the center sixteen feet in diameter. Over this opening is placed 
a semi-globular turret of plate iron six inches thick revolving 
on a vertical column by means of steam power and appropriate 
gear-work. The vessel is propelled by a powerful steam engine 
and screw propeller. Air for the combustion in the (boilers and 
for ventilation within the vessel is supplied by a large self-acting 
centrifugal blower, the fresh air being drawn in through numer- 
ous small holes in the turret. The products of combustion in the 
boilers and the impure air from the vessel are forced out through 
conductors leading to a cluster of small holes in the deck and 
turret. Surrounding objects are viewed through small perfora- 
tions at appropriate places. Reflecting telescopes, capable of 
being protruded or withdrawn at pleasure, also afford a distinct 
view of surrounding objects. The rudder-stock passes through 
a water-tight stuffing box, so as to admit of the helm being 



210 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

worked within the vessel. Shot striking the deck are deflected, 
whilst shell exploding on it will prove harmless.^ 

As Ericsson himself stated, the plans he used for the later 
Monitor were not essentially different from those of this 
submerged armored steam battery with its one gun in a 
revolving turret shaped like a hemisphere. Unfortunately 
for Ericsson, by the time the model was received, the 
armored batteries had finished their work and the Crimean 
War was over. Consequently Ericsson received only a 
formal acknowledgment of the receipt and rejection of 
his scheme. But he kept both plans and model, and appar- 
ently revealed to no one the real secret of his ship. 

Thus seven years before the Civil War, a Swedish-Ameri- 
can had in his desk the plans for that ship which was to 
save the Union and revolutionize the navies of the world. 
Though the Princeton had been a successful war-ship, the 
naval authorities of the day seemed to think that Ericsson, 
with his wealth of ideas far beyond their ken, was on the 
whole visionary and impractical. Wlien the occasion came, 
as Ericsson and many others felt it would soon, the time, 
when "Once to every man and nation comes the moment 
to decide," would they, these worshipers of naval tradi- 
tion, have insight and greatness enough to subordinate the 
force of habit and tradition and listen to the greatest marine 
engineer the world had ever seen? On the answer hinged 
the issue of the Civil War and the fate of freedom and 
democracy. 

1 Ericsson, Contributions to the Centennial Exhibition, p. 412. 



CHAPTER Xy 

THE BLOCKADE A DECISIVE INSTRUMENT OF SEA POWER 
IN THE CIVIL WAR 

HISTORY never repeats itself, some would have us 
believe, but one of the chief pleasures of those 
interested in historical questions is to find resem- 
blances and parallels for matters far separated in time 
and place and not usually associated in thought. It is 
interesting, therefore, to discover that the Civil War, par- 
ticularly from the point of view of the South, was strik- 
ingly like the American Revolution, in regard to sea 
power. As has been made clear in this volume, the sea 
power of France, by breaking the command of the At- 
lantic by the British for a short time in the year 1781, 
won for the American colonists their freedom from the 
mother country. No such result ended the South 's efforts 
at revolution and independence, but Southern success de- 
pended, — and it is to the credit of Southern statesmen that 
they recognized this fact, — upon breaking Union control 
of the sea by inducing European intervention by naval 
powers stronger than the North. This would give them 
access to the materials of war in Europe, just as it gave 
the colonists access to French stores of guns and munitions. 
More than has generally been conceded by Southerners 
since that day, was European participation against the 
Union the only stone on which the ultimate success of the 
secession movement could be based. 

The fact that such intervention was recognized as neces- 

211 



212 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

sary proves the preponderant influence of sea power in the 
Civil "War. It was the blockade of the Southern coast by 
the sea forces of the Federal Union that was the decisive 
instrument in throttling the Confederacy and giving final 
success to the armies of Sherman and Grant. As long as 
the government at Richmond had no sea power of any size 
comparable to the Union strength, and as long as it could 
not add to its resources the navies of England and of 
France, there was no real hope that the eleven seceding 
states could make permanent headway against the industrial 
resources of the North and its far greater population. 
But as Mahan so often states and reiterates, "communica- 
tions dominate war," and sea power with its ability to 
maintain its own communications and destroy those of its 
opponents generally holds the "casting vote." As it was, 
therefore, in the Revolution, as it was even in the Napoleonic 
Wars and in the latter part of the "War of 1812, so in the 
years between 1861 and 1865 on the coasts of the Southern 
Confederacy and in the open reaches of the Atlantic and 
the other oceans, sea power exerted a decisive influence. 

The uses to which Northern sea power could be applied 
were chiefly in the blockade of the South and in all the 
incidental operations of isolating the South absolutely from 
the rest of the world, such as the capture of Southern ports 
and cooperation with the army in expeditions on Southern 
rivers. Secondly, the sea power of the Union must be 
ready for the entrance of a European nation or nations 
into the conflict, and, thirdly, it must scour the seas in 
search of Confederate commerce-destroyers, privateers, and 
foreign-built vessels, which, like the ships of Conyngham 
and Wiekes in the Revolution, might try to hinder the free- 
dom of maritime commerce and destroy the commercial 
prosperity of their enemies. 



THE BLOCKADE IN THE CIVIL WAR 213 

But the blockade was the preponderating strategy of the 
Union, to which all other movements were secondary. In- 
deed, it was the concentration on this object which is per- 
haps the most striking evidence of the military insight of 
such men as President Lincoln, Gideon Welles, his Secretary 
of the Navy, and Gustavus V. Fos, the latter 's professional 
adviser. To this object was sacrificed, whenever necessary, 
the risk of European interference, the demands of army 
leaders insistent on making the navy merely a slave to land 
operations, and the need of Northern commerce for ships 
in which to carry on its trade. 

A brief review of conditions in North and South will 
show clearly that no better plan could have been devised. 
The South was in no sense independent economically, even 
in the things which it needed for land warfare. Sur- 
rounded on every side by loyal states or the open sea, except 
for the remote and desolate plains where Texas and Mexico 
are separated by the Rio Grande, the Confederacy was well 
situated to be cut off from the essentials of warfare and 
national life by a vigorous blockade. There was little 
manufacturing in the seceded area, only five iron-works, 
and the raw material for these had always come entirely 
from Northern mines. There were, accordingly, no fac- 
tories ready for turning out such necessary articles as guns, 
bayonets, cannon, or shells. Even the cotton, on whose 
cultivation the Southern people had concentrated their 
efforts, was not made into cloth on home soil but was ex- 
ported to England, France, and the North to be manu- 
factured into calico and cloth for the elegant Southern 
matron as well as for the rude negro slave. While the 
South was an agricultural region and raised food enough 
for its wants, the meat-raising sections were chiefly beyond 
the Mississippi, far from the battle-fields of Virginia, and 



214 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

connected only by a few feeble railway lines and no navi- 
gable rivers. 

Furthermore, the export of cotton was the very life- 
blood of Southern financial existence. More than a billion 
bales went to England every year, a large amount to France, 
and much to the mills of Massachusetts and Rhode Island. 
In volume of export, in number of persons engaged in its 
cultivation, and in importance in determining the pros- 
perity of the entire section, ''Cotton was King." As it 
was a bulky article for export, it was all the easier 
for Northern blockading ships to interfere seriously with 
the most essential and influential factor in Southern pros- 
perity. Cotton could not be consumed in the South, it was 
not an article of food, and only by exportation could it 
become of any value. Its use in the manufacture of ex- 
plosives, which made is such a necessary article for Germany 
in the World War, had not yet been introduced. 

From a more purely naval point of view the blockade 
was adapted to conditions in North and South, The Union 
Navy was small, utterly incapable by itself of closing more 
than a few ports, but the extent of maritime industry 
in the Northern States was so great that the deficiencies of 
the military navy could be quickly supplied. There were 
plenty of seamen in the North, shipyards were ready for 
constructing new vessels, and the coastwise steamers and 
ferry-boats were so plentiful in Northern waters that a 
very considerable force could quickly be collected and 
thrown around the Southern coast. Feeble as such con- 
verted merchant vessels would be in real battle, against 
unarmed ships and for the purpose of giving legality to a 
measure which simply required a ship of some sort every 
few miles, they were entirely adequate. Furthermore, in 
Southern harbors were few vessels which could be armed 
and sent out to attack this nondescript fleet with any real 



THE BLOCKADE IN THE CIVIL WAR 215 




THE SOUTHERN STATES SHOWING RAILROADS EXISTING IN 1860 
AND ROUTES FOR BLOCKADE RUNNING 

chance of success. The lack of shipping owned in the 
South left it entirely dependent on foreign assistance either 
in creating a navy or in exporting its products and in secur- 
ing munitions and manufactures abroad. 

Yet it was with almost unbelievable audacity that on 
April 19, 1861, President Lincoln proclaimed a blockade 
of the entire sea-coast of the Confederacy from the southern 
boundary of North Carolina to the extremest limits of 
Texas, "in pursuance of the laws of the United States and 
of the law of nations in such case provided." According 
to the figures given in Secretary Welles 's report for 1861, 
on April 19 there were only eleven vessels at all available 
for blockade duty. Yet on April 27, 1861, the blockade 
was extended to include North Carolina and Virginia, and, 
on paper at least, the Confederacy along all its nearly three 



216 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

thousand miles of sea-coast was cut off from communication 
with the outside world. Not till May 12th, however, was 
the first blockade-runner captured off Charleston, not till 
May 30th off the mouth of the Mississippi, not till June 5th . 
off Mobile, and not till July 4th off Galveston. Indeed, 
the strict blockade of the Atlantic coast seems to have come 
last, for not till August 3d was any capture made off 
Wilmington, or till August 6th off the St. Mary's River, 
Florida. Furthermore, up to November 15, 1861, only one 
steamer had been caught running the blockade, and only 
one other steam vessel, a tug, taken from the Confederates.^ 

By October, 1861, however, the Union Navy had received 
reinforcements sufScient to produce a real influence upon 
SoufRern commerce. The war-ships laid up in navy-yards, 
except those at Norfolk, were fitted out and sent to sea. 
The various cruisers of the navy in the East Indies, on the 
coast of Africa, and in the Mediterranean were recalled, 
and soon placed on blockade duty. Merchantmen were 
chartered and purchased, mostly side-wheel steamers and 
propellers, and even city ferry-boats with their double ends 
and their unwieldy hulls and paddle-wheels were sent to 
patrol the inshore waters of the Confederacy and to do 
duty in Hampton Roads or the sounds of North Carolina. 
About fifty wooden sloops and gunboats, steam-powered 
and mostly with screw propellers, were ordered constructed. 
Over sixty old sailing-vessels were purchased, loaded with 
stone, and sent out to be sunk as block-ships in the entrances 
to Confederate ports. 

To strengthen the blockade further, — "a primary ob- 
ject," as Welles wrote to Stringham, the commander of 
the Atlantic Blockading Squadron in May, 1861, the Union 
authorities planned joint military and naval expeditions 
to capture Southern ports and thus prevent such harbors 

1 Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1861, pp. 145-151. 



THE BLOCKADE IN THE CIVIL WAR 217 

from being centers for contraband trade. Instead, these 
ports would afford bases for the blockading fleets, where 
supplies could be obtained and crews and ships restored 
to efficiency after the dull, incessant patrol. Hatteras Inlet, 
at the entrance to Pamlico Sound, was first captured, and 
soon afterward, on November 7, 1861, Port Royal, south 
of Charleston, fell before the skilful manceuvering and 
enfilading fire of a fleet under DuPont. This neglected 
harbor became the chief base for the Atlantic squadrons, 
and Pensacola, which was early recovered, became the base 
for the Gulf Squadron. In 1862 Beaufort Inlet and all 
the entrances to Pamlico and Albemarle sounds had been 
captured, St. Augustine occupied, and Fort Pulaski, which 
controlled the principal access to Savannah, made a Union 
stronghold. Thus on the Atlantic coast nothing remained 
to the Confederates except Charleston and Wilmington. On 
the Gulf coast, the mouths of the Mississippi, with the city 
of New Orleans, and several smaller harbors, had come 
into the possession of the Federal navy. Mobile and Gal- 
veston held out till 1864 and 1865 respectively. 

By 1863 the only places where supplies could be re- 
ceived and sent on to the Southern armies were, thus, 
Wilmington and Charleston, and Mobile and Galveston. 
Before these ports, however, the Union forces seemed un- 
able to produce results. During the first year of the war 
sailing-vessels and merchant steamers of ordinary speed 
had been the blockade-runners and had for all the diligence 
of the Union Navy managed to carry away a considerable 
amount of cotton. The statistics show that in 1861 
816,000,000 pounds of cotton reached England from the 
United States; in 1862 13,500,000 pounds, and in 1863 
only 6,000,000. Parts of these amounts doubtless came 
from the North, but they show that blockade-running ex- 
isted at all times. 



218 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

By 1863, however, the increasing effectiveness of the 
Federal blockade and the higher prices paid for cotton 
brought about the construction of specially designed 
blockade-runners. They were generally long, narrow ves- 
sels with paddle-wheels, with their deck only seven or 
eight feet above the water-line. The funnels were tele- 
scopic, and there were no lofty masts, as everything possible 
was done to make the ships indistinguishable. Painted 
gray and burning smokeless anthracite coal, they were able, 
with their great speed (twelve to seventeen knots), to out- 
distance any Union ships which discovered them, and they 
often slipped into Charleston, Wilmington, or Mobile with- 
out even being sighted. Their other termdnus was generally 
Nassau, Bermuda, or Havana. It cannot be said that the 
blockading fleets ever suppressed these agile sea hounds, 
and they stopped their voyages only when they captured the 
sea-coast cities and so left them without ports. It is said 
that so difficult to capture were these special-service vessels 
that one passed into Mobile Bay while Farragut's fleet 
was preparing to make its memorable attack, and in 
the bombardment of Fort Fisher, at the entrance to Wil- 
mington, another actually joined the Union fleet, and under 
cover of their smoke passed in safely. English shipping 
firms engaged in blockade-running as a regular business. 
British naval officers, many of whom later distinguished 
themselves in their profession, commanded the vessels, and 
the highest qualities of courage, seamanship, quick action, 
and engineering skill were called into play. 

The blockade-runner operated on the most exact schedule, 
as it was necessary to arrive off the blockaded port at night, 
then pass round the end of the patrol squadron and proceed 
close alongshore where its outline would blend with the 
shadows of the land, and then on reaching the actual en- 
trance to the port make a quick dash by the Union vessels 



THE BLOCKADE IN THE CIVIL WAR 219 

watching there, trusting to invisibility and speed for suc- 
cessful escape. The voyage out was generally more easily 
managed, as it could be timed for a dark period of the 
night, and after the positions of the Union ships in the 
offing had been accurately plotted- So superior to the 
nondescript blockading squadrons, which had to keep the 
sea for weeks without a chance for repairs, were these ships, 
that in one case mentioned in Taylor's "Running the Block- 
ade" a blockade-runner passed by sixty-four Union vessels 
without being sunk or captured. 

The United States, however, made the blockade effective 
by stiffening its interpretations of international law and 
holding that articles obviously destined to be carried into 
the Confederacy in violation of the blockade could be cap- 
tured at any point on their journey. In pursuance of 
this policy, Federal naval officers boarded vessels bound 
for Matamoras, Mexico, as for instance the Peterhoff — 
which was captured at St. Thomas — and seized the cargo 
as contraband and in violation of the blockade, because 
Matamoras was just opposite Brownsville, Texas, across the 
Rio Grande, and afforded an easy entrance to the Con- 
federacy from Mexico. Furthermore, they boarded neutral 
vessels bound for Bermuda and Nassau, places which before 
1861 had little trade with Southern ports but which became 
flourishing centers of commerce as soon as the blockade was 
declared. 

In other controversies as to ultimate destination of com- 
modities the United States also extended the reach of its 
blockading force. In 1862 the Bermuda, a British steamer, 
sailed from Liverpool, stopped at Bermuda, and sailed 
from there for Nassau, where, according to the state- 
ments of her agents, a return cargo to Europe had been 
provided. Just before reaching Nassau, however, she was 
stopped by the Union steamer Mercedita, a prize-crew was 



220 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

put on board, and the ship was sent into Philadelphia. 
The Federal attorneys, when the case came before the prize- 
court, maintained that the cargo was clearly intended to 
enter the Confederacy in violation of the blockade. Fur- 
thermore, they insisted that the stop at Nassau was only a 
pretext and that the ship was intended for running through 
the blockade as it had done the year before. In the end 
both ship and cargo were condemned. It is little to be 
wondered at that Great Britain protested against such 
action, but the North held its ground, and the doctrine of 
ultimate destination became a fairly well-established article 
of international law. 

Similar was the case of the Springbok, a neutral vessel 
bound from London to Nassau and of too g^eat draft to 
enter any Southern port. When one hundred and fifty- 
six miles from her destination in February, 1863, she was 
boarded by the Union cruiser Sonoma and sent in as a prize. 
While she carried only a little contraband, it was evident 
that her cargo had the Confederacy as its ultimate destina- 
tion. It was impossible to prove this in a legal way ; never- 
theless the Northern prize-court, although it released the 
steamer, condemned the cargo. 

Other measures against which the British Government 
protested, but without shaking the determination of the 
North to institute a real blockade and bring about the ex- 
haustion of Confederate necessaries of war and trade, were 
to refuse all vessels clearance from New York to Nassau, 
to open mail-bags on British steamers, and to seize virtually 
every steamer in West Indian waters that might be in any 
way assisting in supplying, directly or indirectly, the 
armies of Lee and the economic life of the seceded states. 
Although Great Britain filed claims for the illegal seizure of 
478 vessels, 181 of which were allowed by the arbitrators 
after the war, the object sought was attained, and the 



THE BLOCKADE IN THE CIVIL WAR 221 

blockade was made absolute, — the only condition on which 
it could be of decisive benefit to the blockading power. 

The stubborn determination of the Federal Government 
to stamp out every attempt to break the blockade and 
defeat every step toward securing recognition or inter- 
vention by European governments is seen in many incidents 
in which war with England was risked, sometimes un- 
wisely. The ease of the Trent is perhaps the best known. 
Captain Wilkes of the Federal steamer San Jacinto stopped 
the British mail steamer Trent off the northern coast of 
Cuba in November, 1861, and took off two Confederates, 
]\Iason and Slidell, who were proceeding from Havana to 
Europe to secure the assistance of the English and French 
governments. Wilkes, who was the well-known discoverer 
of the Antarctic continent, regarded these gentlemen as 
contraband, which shows how wide a gamut the word ran 
in the minds of Northern sympathizers, since the term 
had never been applied to persons except by General B. F. 
Butler, who had shrewdly started the term contraband as 
describing the legal status of the negroes who entered the 
Union lines. The arrest of Slidell and Mason was uni- 
versally applauded in the North, but Seward and Lincoln 
saw the danger of reviving the issue of impressment, on 
which England and America had taken opposite sides in 
1812. The cominissioners were accordingly released and 
sent to England, but several of the European powers, 
already stirred by the way the blockade was interfering 
with their commerce, and inspired partly by unfriendly feel- 
ings which had remained from the numerous disagreements 
of the past, were almost ready for at least the recognition 
of the Confederacy, and perhaps for a declaration of war. 
The British Navy was mobilized, and troops were sent to 
Canada, some of whom were unluckily forced into Port- 
land, Maine, by the freezing of the Canadian ports and 



222 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

had to request permission to pass through the United States. 
This request was smilingly granted. 

But the fact that American restrictions upon neutrals 
affected commerce, not lives, and the deep and almost uni- 
versal feeling in England that the cause of the South was 
the cause of slavery, prevented any final move for inter- 
vention. Palmerston, also, expressed what was after all a 
prophecy when he said that the restrictions the United 
States imposed on neutral trade might be of great ad- 
vantage to England in some future war. Thus England 
by accepting the practice of the North and not intervening 
profited in 1914, — when the United States, not England, 
was the neutral, — by all the precedents of the Civil War 
to justify her limitations on commerce with Germany 
through the neutral countries of Holland, Italy, and Scandi- 
navia. The Federal Government staked its all on the 
blockade. Incessantly, remorselessly, the cordon tightened. 
For example, salt cost $1700.00 in the Confederacy when it 
could be purchased in Nassau for $7.50; while cotton in 
Liverpool was worth ten times as much as it was on the 
wharves of Charleston. As the Union forces about Chatta- 
nooga gradually cut all the railway lines from the West, 
the armies in Virginia had to be supplied with food by the 
blockade-runners, and much beef came in by way of Wil- 
mington, which had direct railroad connection with Rich- 
mond. When Wilmington fell in January, 1865, the doom 
of Lee's dauntless band of fighters was sealed. W^ithout 
supplies, and with Grant 's ever-increasing hordes battering 
them steadily backward, there was no alternative except 
surrender. The blockade had won its objective. It had 
throttled the Confederacy and choked secession. It had 
proved to be the decisive instrument of Federal sea power 
in its operations during the war. As Admiral Mahan de- 
clared, ''Never did sea power play a greater or a more 



THE BLOCKADE IN THE CIVIL WAR 223 

decisive part than iu the contest which determined that the 
course of the world's history would be modified by the 
existence of one great nation, instead of several rival States 
in the North American continent. ' ' ^ The blockade was, to 
quote again from the same author, "the paramount func- 
tion of the United States Navy during the Civil War, 
dealing probably the most decisive blow inflicted upon the 
Confederacy. " ^ 

1 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, p. 44. 

2 Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, I. 287. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE MONITOR ESTABLISHES UNION CONTEOL. 
OP THE SEA 

THE importance of the naval operations of the 
Union in winning the war against the seceding 
states is probably too little appreciated by Ameri- 
cans of the present generation. They accept, without real- 
izing the significance, the fact that the blockade was de- 
clared and maintained through four long years of unceasing 
naval effort. They do not realize that during all that time 
the Union Navy suffered no defeat of any seriousness, and 
they fail to contrast this with the serious reverses suffered 
by the Union land forces before Lee surrendered at Appo- 
mattox. And it is hard to realize the damaging effects even 
one such defeat at sea would have had. The breaking of 
the blockade at any one point might have negatived the effec- 
tiveness of the whole ; its success depended on the absolute 
exclusion of the Confederacy from outside intercourse. 
Two dangers to the blockade existed, both interrelated, — 
the danger of intervention by European governments, espe- 
cially England and France, and the danger that the sea 
power of the Confederacy, created in Southern harbors by 
the enterprise and ingenuity of ex-Federal naval officers or 
supplied by the construction of ships in English and French 
shipyards, would break through the cordon and nullify the 
blockade or threaten Northern comtaerce and Northern 
cities. Especially was there a possibility that Southern 
ironclads might be built either in the Confederacy or in 
^ 224 



UNION CONTROL OF THE SEA 225 

European shipyards and become decisive factors in break- 
ing the supremacy of the North at sea. 

As has been seen, the first of these dangers was much 
more real than many Americans of the time realized. But 
it was from France much more than from England that it 
came. Louis Napoleon, with his constant ambition to be 
the arbiter of international affairs, as witness his interfer- 
ence in Italy in 1859 and his disastrous strokes in 1870, 
was anxious to involve France in the changing movements 
of New World politics, and while he preserved an official 
and formal neutrality, he constantly suggested interven- 
tion, and in 1861 actually did intervene in the affairs of 
Mexico, sending a military expedition in which he per- 
suaded England and Spain to join, though the latter two 
soon withdrew their support. As early as May, 1861, the 
French Minister at Washington advised his government to 
intervene by raising the blockade, and in the summer of 
1861 Louis Napoleon officially asked England to co- 
operate with him in recognizing the South and opening the 
Southern cities to trade. Napoleon even went so far as 
to state that he was ready, in cooperation with England, to 
send a fleet to the mouth of the Mississippi and demand free 
egress and ingress for merchant vessels. As late as July, 
1862, Napoleon stated to Slidell that Europe should have 
recognized the Confederacy in the summer of 1861 when 
Washington .was threatened with capture and the Southern 
ports not yet all closed. 

It was in opposing just such projects, disastrous as they 
would have been to the Union cause, that Federal sea 
power found one of its great values. Only a fleet able to 
threaten the destruction of European naval forces, many of 
which were already in the Gulf of Mexico in connection 
with Napoleonic intervention in Mexico, would prevent the 
success of such an undertaking once it had been started. 



226 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

It was in fulfilling this mission as well as in defending the 
Union from assault from within the Confederate lines that 
the Monitor and the other vessels of that type played a 
decisive part in the Civil War. Just as the increasing 
number of blockading ships which a maritime nation like 
the North could supply by intensified efforts stopped the 
danger of intervention by England and made her recognize 
the blockade as legal, so the ironclads of Ericsson in the 
later years of the war were the strongest factors in cutting 
off from the Confederates their final hope of succor, the 
intervention of Louis Napoleon. 

At the beginning of 1862, almost a year after the firing 
on Fort Sumter, the Federal Government was unprepared 
for any real opposition to European intervention. Though 
the use of iron in ship-building was then at least thirty 
years old, and an iron screw steamer, the Great Britmn, 
had crossed the Atlantic in 1845, there was not, except for 
a small gunboat on the Great Lakes, a single iron ship in 
the United States Navy. And despite the fact that in 1861 
France had three armor-plated steam frigates on the sea, 
two more launched, and twelve building, and Great Britain 
five armor-clads in commission, five launched, and eleven 
under way, there had not yet been even an attempt to 
apply iron as armor to any American ship. The Union 
Navy would therefore have been essentially powerless 
against either of those nations in any conflict such as had 
seemed probable during all the first two years of the war. 
While the legality of the blockade was still an issue, the 
Trent Affair stirred up European animosity, and the scar- 
city of cotton in the mills of Birmingham and Rouen was 
creating hunger among the working classes and tension 
among the diplomats. 

The Confederates, however, partly because several of 



UNION CONTROL OF THE SEA 227 

their leading men were progressive, and partly because they 
had no ships of war and needed to gain victory not by 
slow preparation but by brilliant and rapid action, early 
adopted the plan of utilizing the advantages of iron-armored 
ships, so thoroughly demonstrated as successful in the 
Crimean War. Mr. Mallory, the Secretary of the Con- 
federate ^SiYy, had been chairman of the Senate Naval 
Affairs Committee before the war, and had been a firm 
advocate of the new ideas of steam and iron for naval 
construction. Less than a month after war broke out, 
he had urged the great advantage of an iron-armored ship 
and had stated, with truth, "Such a vessel at this time 
could traverse the entire coast of the United States, prevent 
the blockade, and encounter, with a fair prospect of success, 
their [the Union] navy." 

In June several Confederate officers were directed to 
design an armored ship, but finding that the industrial 
resources of the Confederacy would be unable to furnish it 
quickly, they decided to convert the partly burned hulk of 
the screw frigate Merrimac, then lying in the Norfolk Navy 
Yard. Her hull was sound, her engine workable, except 
for rust due to standing in water for some weeks, and, as 
they aimed to construct a battery like the French and 
English ironclads, a regular ship with the sides protected 
with iron, the conversion of the Merrimac fell in with their 
ideas. The upper works were not restored, but, instead, a 
casemate of wood reinforced with iron was placed on the hull 
with sloping sides extending beneath the water-line. On 
the top of this was stretched an iron grating to allow venti- 
lation and protect the gun-deck from falling projectiles. 
The armament was of ten guns, far fewer than the usual 
frigate. The use of the heavy hull of the old Merrimac 
made the draft too great for manceuvering in the shallow 



228 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

waters of Southern bays and rivers. Her draft of twenty- 
two feet and her inefficient engines cut down her speed to 
only five miles an hour. 

The essential feature of the Merrimac was her armor. 
Following apparently the practices of the French and Brit- 
ish, and verifying these by experiments of their own, the 
officers in charge placed four inches of iron on the sloping 
sides of the Merrimac, the same thickness which had been 
used on the floating batteries 'at Kinburn and which up to 
this time had not been pierced by any of the ordnance then 
in use. As a matter of fact a gun which Ericsson placed 
on the Princeton in 1842 had pierced four and a half inches 
of iron, but had been removed from the vessel when another 
gun, the famous Peacemaker, burst. But so far as the Union 
Navy in 1862 was concerned, there was no weapon likely 
to be used which could seriously threaten the invulner- 
ability of the Confederate armor-clad. 

Perhaps the Confederate officials, who were not entirely 
conversant with the defects of construction and lack of 
manceuvering-power, speed, and seaworthiness of the vessel, 
had too rosy hopes, but the fact that she was undeniably 
the only ironclad on the coast made them look forward 
to ending the war at once by a master stroke. Thus Mal- 
lory, on February 24, 1862, addressed orders to Franklin 
Buchanan, who had been appointed her commander, — orders 
which had in mind an attack on Washington : 

Could you pass Old Point and make a dashing cruise on the 
Potomac as far as Washington, its effect upon the public mind 
would be important to the cause. The condition of our country 
and the fearful reverses we have just suffered demand our utmost 
exertions, and convinced as I am that the opportunity and the 
means of striking a decided blow for our navy are now for 
the first time presented, I congratulate you upon it, and know 
that your judgment and gallantry will meet all just expectations. 



UNION CONTROL OF THE SEA 229 

And on the day before the first encounter, Mallory men- 
tioned to Buchanan the project of steaming to New York 
and attacking and burning that city : 

Such an event would eclipse all the glories of all the combats 
of the sea, would place every man in it preeminently high, and 
would strike a blow from which the enemy could never recover. 

Nevertheless, when on March 8, 1862, the Merrimac came 
slowly out from Norfolk into Hampton Roads, accompanied 
by five small steamers (one of which, the Patrick Henry, 
had some side armor), the Union forces in the Roads, con- 
sisting of some twenty different ships with nearly three 
thousand guns, felt no anxiety about the outcome. But 
as a matter of fact, they were all wooden vessels, had no 
armor, and only one, the Minnesota, was able to use steam 
for manceuvering. Furthermore, the Merrimac had been 
fitted with a ram, — a new and terrible weapon in naval 
warfare for some years afterward, which added to the 
terror of her invulnerability. 

Proof as to the power of the new ironclad was not de- 
layed for long. With cool deliberation she proceeded down 
upon the Cumberland and the Congress, good-sized sailing 
vessels each armed with more guns than the Merrimuc 
could boast, and received their entire broadsides without 
the slightest damage. Then she rammed the Cumber- 
land, and set fire to the Congress with her shells. The 
day ended when she retired to Sewell's Point for the night 
with the Cumberland sunk off Newport News, only her flags 
showing from her mastheads, and the Congress burning 
fiercely where she had run ashore and surrendered. Cer- 
tainly iron had won a spectacular success over wood and, 
with the explosive shell, made the wooden ship or the side- 
wheel steamer as unsafe as a house of paper. 

But just when the Union cause seemed lost, the long- 



230 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

delayed counter-stroke of the Federal Government bore in- 
stant fruit. Althougli iron-clad vessels were well known, 
and the destructive effect of shell-fire on wooden vessels 
well recognized, for some time after the beginning of the 
war there had been no movement toward supplying the 
deficiency. Not till August 3, 1861, did anything really 
happen. Then authority was given by Congress for a 
board of naval officers to recommend some policy about 
constructing ironclads. Three officers of high rank were 
appointed, none of whom was familiar with the construction 
of iron ships, and none of whom knew much about engines. 
On August 29, 1861, Ericsson wrote to Lincoln, offering to 
build a vessel which would be able, ten weeks after the keel 
was laid, to "take up position under the rebel guns at 
Norfolk, and . . . within a few hours the stolen ship [the 
Merrimac] would be sunk and the harbor purged of 
traitors." And he said what at that time was certainly 
true: 

Steel clad vessels cannot be arrested in their course by land 
batteries, and hence our great city is quite at the mercy of such 
intruders, and may at any moment be laid in ruins. ... It is 
not for me, sir, to remind you of the immense moral effect that 
will result from your discomfiting' the rebels at Norfolk, and show- 
ing that batteries can no longer protect vessels robbed from the 
nation, nor need I allude to the effect in Europe if you demon- 
strate that you can effectively keep hostile fleets away from our 
shores.^ 

The board of naval officers did not share the confidence 
of Mallory and Ericsson in ironclads and made a very faint- 
hearted report. They mentioned the adoption of iron 
armor by European nations, but they were afraid it was 
unsafe for ocean-going vessels, although they conceded it 
might be a formidable assistance in coast and harbor de- 

1 Church, Life of John Ericsson, I. 246. 



UNION CONTROL OF THE SEA 231 

fense. The enormous weight of the iron depressed them ; 
the power needed to propel the vessel when fully loaded 
with coal seemed to them too great for engines of their day 
to attain. They unequivocally contradicted Ericsson's 
statement that an armored ship could cope with a land 
fort of masonry, though they must have known the story 
of Kinburn. Then, assuming that four and a half inches 
of iron was the heaviest armor a sea-going vessel could 
safely carry, they finally recommended experimenting with 
three different types of armored ships. Besides Ericsson's, 
there was to be the Galena and the Ironsides. The Galena 
was to be plated with iron placed at a slight angle, just 
enough, it proved, for the enemy's fire from a bluff to hit 
it at right angles and do the most damage ! The Ironsides, 
to be built in Philadelphia, was to be a wooden vessel with 
iron plates. The latter stood some of the fiercest fighting 
of the war, being hit more times than any other ship in the 
navy. She was to cost twice as much as either of the 
other two. Finally, they recommended building a float- 
ing battery, designed on a novel plan, but one which they 
thought would render it shot-and-shell-proof. They were 
very apprehensive of its seaworthiness, but as they desired 
especially light-draft ships that could manoeuver in shallow 
water, the plan appealed to them. So they urged that the 
builders be forced to guarantee success or lose all their 
investment.'^' 

The chances, of disaster, to the Union cause were never 
perhaps so great as during the days of the deliberation of 
this board. Ericsson had not been popular with the 
naval service since his building of the Princeton. His mind 
was too fertile, his thoughts too bold for the severely 
practical and generally conservative temperaments of the 
officers then in authority. They had been born and trained 

1 Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1861, pp. 152-6. 



232 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

in the epoch of sail and wood ; he was of another era en- 
tirely and had for their cherished beliefs and inclinations 
only ridicule and scorn. It is said that Ericsson was per- 
suaded to offer a design to the board only by the subterfuge 
of a friend, so convinced was he that anything he proposed 
would be rejected. But when he arrived in Washington 
and exhibited his pasteboard model, especially designed 
for showing the principle of the revolving turret, opinion 
was favorable and was well expressed by Lincoln, in his 
humorous way, at one of the conferences: "All I can say 
is what the girl said when she stuck her foot into the stock- 
ing, 'It strikes me there 's something in it.' " When later 
the Government exacted a guarantee of success, one of 
Ericsson's partners became disgusted and almost prevented 
the contract from being consummated. 

Indeed, if Ericsson had followed the advice or the orders 
of the Navy Department, the Monitor would never have 
met the Merrimac on March 9, 1862. Although he went 
ahead and started the manufacture of the plates for the 
ship before the contract was signed, there were numerous 
delays. Even the dilatoriness of the Government in meet- 
ing the payments it promised delayed the vessel, because 
otherwise more men could have been put to work at night. 
When her trial trip came off, the rudder was found to be 
overbalanced. If the naval authorities had had their way, 
she would have been put in dry-dock and fitted with a new 
rudder, thereby losing a month of time. But Ericsson, 
asserting his ownership of the vessel, made a change in the 
steering-gear which remedied the fault sufficiently. 

The Monitor, like the Princeton, but to a greater degree, 
was solely the product of Ericsson's brain. The hull, tur- 
ret, engines, and all other parts were designed by the great 
inventor. As he wrote to General McClellan in 1877, ' ' The 
entire labor of preparing the original working plans was 



^^^^.^w^aufc" ^./^^^'^-^s^ 



'^ t^ 



^4^ c/lf^A^ <2,.<ia^^^ e^e^=^^^ '^'^y- ^— **^a^ ,&^^^<^ 
^.^.SX..^ ^4-.^ ..^.-^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^'-^p^ 

FROM THE ORIGINAL LOG IN THE NAVY DEPARTMENT LIBRARY 



233 



234 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

performed by myself, every line being drawn by my own 
hand. " In a vessel in which the only parts above the deck 
were the turret and the pilot-house, and where the deck 
was only just above the water-line, almost every feature of 
the old high-decked ship had to be revised. Ericsson's 
blower system was used for ventilation ; the propeller, which 
was much nearer the surface than ordinarily because of the 
shallow draft of the vessel, had to be protected by an 
armored overhang, and the anchor instead of being placed 
on the deck was housed underneath it in a well, and oper- 
ated from the inside of the ironclad to avoid danger from 
enemy fire. At least forty pateritable contrivances were 
contained in the completed ship. Although the Merrimac, 
delayed much more than the Monitor, was out of dock and 
afloat by January 29, 1862, the Monitor did not get her trial 
trip till February 19th. As late as March 4th she was 
still at New York and just having her guns tested. On 
March 6th she left New York, and soon ran into a storm 
during which the waves swept over .her deck and sent 
water through her blower pipes and under 'the edge of the 
turret. But by hard work on the part of her crew she 
weathered the storm. Thus narrowly again did the Union 
cause survive. During the night of March 8th she arrived 
inside the Capes, and her commander, Lieutenant John L. 
"Worden, immediately reported to Captain Marston, of the 
Boanoke, who, disregarding orders to send her to Wash- 
ington, directed her to remain to protect the Union fleet. 

When the Merrimac, under Lieutenant Catesby Jones, 
appeared the next morning to complete the destruction 
of the Union fleet, she found * * a strange looking iron tower, 
sliding over the waters" toward her. In the unsatisfactory 
engagement that ensued, the advantages of the Monitor 
were evident, but so was the invulnerability of armored 
ships even as crude as the Merrimac. Since the latter fired 



4 

i 



UNION CONTROL OF THE SEA 



235 




HAMPTON ROADS SHOWING LOCATION OF FIGHT BETWEEN 

MONITOR AND MERE I MAC 

Prom the Century Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol, I, page 699. 

shell entirely, she made no impression on the Monitor ex- 
cept when a shell burst so close to the sight-hole of the 
pilot-house that it broke one of the iron bars in two and 
partially blinded the commanding officer. But neither was 
the Merrimac seriously injured by the solid shot fired by the 
Monitor, although some of her outer plates were broken. 
Ericsson himself attributed this to the small charges of 
powder which the Navy Department ordered used in the 
two 11-inch Dahlgrens which composed the armament. 

But the superiority of the light-draft Union vessel over 
the heavy-hulled Merrimac was at once apparent. Not 



236 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

only could the Monitor assume any position she desired, 
even in water too shallow for the Merrimac to follow, but 
her revolving turret enabled her to fire a shot every six 
minutes, while it took the Merrimac fifteen minutes to be 
ready with a broadside. Consequently, when the tide be- 
gan to ebb about noon, the Merrimac' s commander, as the 
engine power of his vessel, never much at the best, was 
rapidly decreasing from the loss of her smoke-stack, feared 
she would run aground or be unable to get back to safe 
waters. He accordingly retired to the Elizabeth River, 
whither he was not pursued by his Federal antagonist. 

The results of the battle were therefore not decisive, but 
the Merrimac never again got into action. She was burned 
when the Confederates abandoned Norfolk in May. But 
the general object of the building of the ship was frus- 
trated; the Monitor barred the way to Washington and 
New York, and the blockade remained unbroken. 

The results to the Union Navy were, however, important. 
A week after the battle Ericsson received an order to build 
six more monitors as quickly as possible. They were to be 
a third larger, and had one conspicuous difference: the 
pilot-house was to be on top of the turret, which had been 
Ericsson's original idea. They were to be armed with 15- 
inch guns. In all, thirty-five monitors of various designs 
and sizes were under construction within a year after the 
historic ninth of March. As the remainder of the war pro- 
duced no duel between ironclads comparable with the Mer- 
rimac-Monitor battle, these new monitors fought usually 
against land fortifications and proved their worth in this 
respect as well. In the case of the Montauk, one of the first 
monitors constructed by Ericsson after his initial triumph, 
the ability to stand fortress fire was evidenced. In Feb- 
ruary, 1863, lying within range of Fort McAllister, near 
Savannah, and receiving the full fire of the fort, she sent 



UNION CONTROL OF THE SEA 237 

shells into the Confederate blockade-runner Nashville, which 
was seeking shelter behind the fort, and quickly destroyed 
her. When the Confederates sent out the iron-clad ram 
Atlanta later in the same year to break the blockade on 
the Georgia-South Carolina coast, the monitor Weehawken 
discovered her coming out and at a range of three hundred 
yards penetrated her 41/^-inch armor with the very first 
shot from her 15-inch gun. Thus the armor protection of 
every European ironclad was shown to be vulnerable. 

Although the Federal navy, even with its ironclads, did 
not succeed in capturing Charleston, the monitors inflicted 
great damage and kept a large Confederate military force 
occupied till the end of the war. At Fort Fisher, the 
last resort for blockade-running, the monitors of Porter's 
fleet bore the brunt of the attack, and were stationed in- 
shore of the other ships. It is said that only three persons 
were . actually killed on board monitors during the entire 
war. 

The demonstrated merits of the monitor type of war-ship, 
especially for coast defense, and in particular such per- 
formances as the Weehawken'Sy show clearly that Erics- 
son's novel ideas of 1854 and 1861 were sound and full 
of momentous meaning for sea power. If a vessel of the 
monitor type could endure the fire of the heaviest guns, 
and could by her revolving turret train her gun-fire in 
any direction without manceuvering, all naval vessels un- 
protected with armor w^ould be mere charnel-houses, and 
iron-clad ships with fixed broadsides would be under great 
disadvantages in fighting such ubiquitous foes. 

While putting the hull almost entirely underwater did 
not appeal to the European naval constructors, they did 
full}' appreciate the advantage of the revolving turret. 
In fact, the device had dimly appeared in a turret invented 
by Captain Coles of the British Navy in the Crimean War. 



238 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

But it was the success of the revolving turret on Ericsson's 
monitors that did more than anything else to give a real 
standing to the Coles turret. And it is worth noticing that 
with the advent of the World War and the demand for 
long-range guns for shelling enemy fortifications from sea- 
ward, the monitor idea was revived, and the ships con- 
structed for this purpose did useful service off the Belgian 
coast. To the Memrimac and the Monitor and to the other 
vessels which followed the latter ship must be assigned im- 
portant places in any history of American sea power. The 
Merrimac brought back the ram into prominence for a 
good many years; the whole course of events connected 
with these ships firmly established the obsoleteness of the 
wooden ship, and the revolving turret of the Monitor in- 
troduced into the navies of the world a feature of naval 
architecture that has made possible the development of the 
battle-ship and the dreadnought. 

In its effect on American history, the fight between 
these two new naval giants was also momentous. The 
blockade was preserved, intervention by European nations 
was discouraged, and in 1866 the existence in the North of 
a naval force flushed with victory after four years of 
strenuous service and overwhelmingly superior to any which 
could be brought against it, spelled inevitable defeat for 
the French invasion of Mexico and the violation of the 
Monroe Doctrine. Had it not been for Ericsson's monitors, 
Napoleon might have fostered in the New World an empire 
which would have checked entirely that expansion of the 
United States into the Caribbean which has been so impor- 
tant a feature of American development in the last genera- 
tion. 



CHAPTER XVII 

CONFEDERATE SEA POWER STRIKES A DEADLY BLOW 
AT THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE 

WHENEVER a nation has found itself outclassed 
upon the sea, as did the South at the beginning 
of the Civil War, it has generally availed itself 
of the weapon of the weaker sea power; it has harassed 
and attempted to diminish, if not destroy, the maritime 
commerce of the enemy. In the past, as we have seen in 
the American Revolution and in the War of 1812, the popu- 
lar method has been privateering, based on the issuance 
of letters of marque and reprisal to private individuals, 
who thereupon are invested with authority to seize enemy 
vessels and property upon the seas. As all the risk lay 
with the individual, so all the profit was his. No nation 
has ever carried this method of warfare so far as America. 
It is said that during the Seven Years' War there were 
eleven thousand American colonists engaged in privateering 
and we have seen that during the Revolution the privateers- 
men were far more numerous than is easily believable. In 
fact, privateering both in the American Revolution and in 
the second war of independence was much more popular 
than service in the regular army. 

It was not, therefore, surprising that as soon as the 
Confederacy started to resist the naval attack of the Union, 
it adopted commerce-destruction as its chief instrument of 
sea warfare. The South was so much the inferior sea 
power that it had no navy, and had no means of starting a 

239 



240 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

merchant marine. But the Northern States from Maine to 
Maryland were distinctly maritime in their interests ; much 
more than is usually realized, the chief activity of the 
Atlantic seaboard was seafaring or occupations allied with, 
or dependent upon, maritime life. Manufacturing, while 
important, had far fewer years of history behind it ; since 
the early colonial days and hardly without suspension, the 
states north of the Chesapeake had given themselves to the 
sea and ocean commerce. The clipper-ship era was at 
its height in America at the beginning of the Civil War; 
the largest tonnage under the American flag in the foreign 
trade came in 1861. American ships traded with the West 
Indies, which were now thoroughly open to American ves- 
sels; with California and Australia, the new El Dorados of 
the time; with South America, which was now entering 
on some years of stable government; and with every other 
profitable market of the European continent and the Pacific 
seas. On every trade route and on every fishing-bank and 
whaling-ground the sails of American ships were seen. 
I Here was a vulnerable spot where the Union might be 
struck a blow that would check its enthusiasm for war, — a 
war which many a Northerner felt was unfortunate and 
unwise, silent though he might be for fear of unpopularity 
and persecution. The merchant marine of the North, espe- 
cially that part that left the protection of its coasts, con- 
sisted chiefly of sailing-vessels, which could be easily 
overtaken by steamers of almost any speed. The blockade 
of the Southern coast demanded every war vessel the Fed- 
eral Government could muster, and few really effective 
vessels would be likely to be detached to pursue far-scattered 
privateers and naval commerce-destroyers. 

The attempts of the South to commission privateers had 
considerable success, and the coasting-vessels from New 
England to the West Indies were captured in some num- 



CONFEDERATE SEA POWER 241 

bers in the early part of the war. But the supply of 
suitable Southern vessels was small, all were sailing-craft, 
and the presence of more and more Union steamers on the 
Southern coast became so menacing that this form of war- 
fare soon ceased. Unless privateers could bring their prizes 
into home waters or dispose of them in neutral ports, there 
was little profit possible. These circumstances, rather than 
the growth of international feeling against privateering, 
as expressed by the Declaration of Paris in 1856 (which 
declared it abolished) were the prime factors in the result. 
The fact that the United States had been the only principal 
power to withhold its signature to this agreement was an- 
other case of the irony of history. 

"With no vessels in Southern ports for conversion into 
war-ships, the only resource of the Confederacy was to buy 
them abroad or have them constructed there, for Southern 
shipyards in which the work could be done did not exist. 
Various Confederates of naval training and experience 
were accordingly sent abroad to create in England and 
France a fleet of commerce-destroyers which should be let 
loose upon the defenseless Northern sailing-vessels and de- 
prive the North of a continuance of the wealth which its 
ships had brought it in the past. The chief of these men 
was James D. Bulloch, a former officer of the United States 
'Navy and the naval representative of the Confederacy in 
Europe during the whole Civil War. Other officers fol- 
lowed him and other objects were added, such as the con- 
struction of ironclads to break the blockade, but the primary 
purpose of the mission was to secure ships for commerce- 
destruction. 

Although there was considerable sjinpathy with the Con- 
federate cause in England, and perhaps more in France, 
where Napoleon III did not disguise his personal interest, 
both governments issued neutrality proclamations, and 



242 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

these bore hard upon the project of securing commerce- 
destroyers abroad. Although both belligerents could buy- 
abroad all the arms, cannon, powder, uniforms, and food 
supplies they wished, and could transport them openly out 
of the country, so long as they were willing to assume the 
risk of capture by the enemy, yet when it came to ships, the 
case, curiously enough, was quite different. Ships them- 
selves could be bought freely, but the construction and 
equipping of a vessel of war in a neutral country was not 
allowed by international law. In England, the Foreign 
Enlistment Act made such offenses cases for which the ordi- 
nary courts could punish either Englishmen or foreigners 
residing in the country. The essential element which must 
be present, however, in every act which made a person 
liable to prosecution was the equipping of a ship with intent 
to cruise against a friendly state. 

It is obvious that the interpretation of these words will 
vary with the circumstances of the case, and that there will 
be almost surely disagreement as to their meaning. Dur- 
ing the war the British Government was necessarily the 
arbiter in the matter, and during the first year of the con- 
flict construed these words according to their letter to the 
advantage of the South; in the latter part of the war it 
construed them according to the spirit of the law to the 
disadvantage of the Confederacy. As a result, some ships 
were allowed to proceed to sea in the first period, although 
everybody knew that they were intended as Southern raid- 
ers. In the latter period ships were so hampered and 
delayed that with one exception they were of little use to 
their new owners. 

The first vessel Bulloch had built was the Oreto, or 
Florida, as she was later and better known, a wooden screw 
steamer with auxiliary sail power. She was built on almost 
the very lines of a British gunboat, but as when ready to 



CONFEDERATE SEA POWER 243 

sail she had on board no war equipment, no guns, no am- 
munition, and no Confederate crew, she was regarded as 
not equipped as a vessel of war and was allowed to depart. 
After her equipments for warfare were transferred to her 
in an unfrequented part of the Bahamas, whither they had 
come from England on a separate vessel, she was commis- 
sioned a naval unit of the Confederacy and put under the 
command of Captain J. N. Maffitt, another ex-officer of 
the United States Navy. 

The second vessel to leave English shipyards in the 
attempt to harass Union commerce was the Alabama, or 
No. 290, as she was called during construction, or the 
Enrica, as she was christened when launched. Like the 
Florida, the Alahama was an auxiliary, screw-propeller 
steamer of wood. She was bark-rigged, with a fore-and-aft 
sail below the topsail on each mast. In every way she was 
a superior ship, equal in the quality of her construction to 
a vessel of the Koyal Navy. She was coppered, and had a 
brass screw, which was fitted with a device by which it 
could be lifted out of the water when sails alone were being 
used, and in her iron bunkers she had room for a consider- 
able amount of coal. Thus she was well fitted to cruise 
for long periods without supplies and docking, — a very 
important consideration in a commerce-raider which had 
only uncertain neutral ports wherein to secure coal and 
make necessary repairs. 

The method by which Bulloch managed to get the Ala- 
hama constructed and to sea was the same as in the case 
of the Florida. He ordered the ship from the Lairds of 
Birkenhead, the best-equipped builders in the United King- 
dom, as if securing a vessel for his private business. No 
mention was ever made to the builders of the purpose of 
the cruiser. When ready for sea she was taken out into 
the Mersey for several trial trips, with guests on board 



244 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

and colors flying, and from the last of these she never 
returned. The guests were sent back on a tender; the 
crew already on board signed for a voyage to Havana 
or intermediate ports. Although the ship sailed without a 
clearance, this was claimed by Bulloch to have been per- 
fectly legal in the case of a new vessel to be delivered in 
another country. Bulloch later denied that when she sailed 
from Liverpool on July 29, 1862, he already knew of the 
decision of the Crown lawyers that she should be detained 
until her destination was ascertained.^ . 

Meanwhile, a sailing-vessel had left London for Terceira 
in the Azores with guns, ammunition, cutlasses, clothing, 
and all the necessary stores for a ship of war, — a perfectly 
legal proceeding. In the Bay of Praya the two ships met, 
and the guns of the Alabama were installed, and the ammu- 
nition taken on board. Before this was finished, the 
steamer Bahama arrived with Captain Raphael Semmes 
and a group of officers and men for the Alabama, and a 
considerable number of the original crew agreed to re- 
main even when the belligerent mission of the vessel was 
publicly announced to them. After the ships had moved 
out from land beyond the three-mile limit on August 24, 
1862, the Confederate flag was hoisted at the Alabama's 
peak, and with cheers from the crews of the ships present 
the most famous and destructive of the Confederate com- 
merce-destroyers started on her long cruise. 

In the despatch of iron-clad vessels for the Confederacy 
Bulloch was not so fortunate, although he made elaborate 
arrangements with a Franco-Egyptian firm to appear as 
agents of the khedive in the transaction. But the purpose 
of the vessels could not be argued away, and the British 
Government, now somewhat more anxious to preserve the 

1 Bulloch, The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe, 
I. 260 




'Tl CI 

(^ I 

o -s 



245 



246 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

friendship of the North, finally salved the difficulty by 
buying the vessels itself. If they had passed into the 
hands of the Confederates they would have, been indeed 
formidable opponents of any of the monitors, to which they 
were similar, for they were to be equipped with turrets 
(in this case of the Coles type), each containing two guns. 
Bulloch wrote on December 18, 1862: *'I designed these 
ships for something more than harbor or even coast defense, 
and I confidently believe, if ready for sea now, they would 
sweep away the entire blockading fleet of the- enemy. ' ' ^ 

In 1864, however, Bulloch managed, though only by great 
dexterity, to fit out the Sea King, the last of the Confed- 
erate raiders. He arranged for an Englishman to buy the 
ship, ballast her with coal, clear her for Bombay, and give 
the captain power of attorney to sell her at any time after 
she left London. The vessel, which later took the name of 
the Shenandoah, was a wood-and-iron ship fitted with sails, 
auxiliary engines, and a lifting screw. About the same 
time that she departed a small screw steamer also sailed, 
this time not from London but from Liverpool, with freight 
and passengers for Havana. Her bills of lading and the 
tickets for the passengers were perfectly regular, but the 
innocent articles mentioned in the first were in reality guns 
and ammunition, and the names of the passengers on the 
tickets were fictitious and concealed crew and officers for 
a Confederate raider. Not till the Sea King reached the 
Madeiras did she become the Shenandoah, and not till the 
previous owner had had time to hear of the sale of his 
vessel and change the registry did the Shenandoah begin 
her depredations. So well was the scheme arranged that, 
though the U. S. S. Niagara and Sacramento patrolled off 

1 Bulloch, The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe, 
I. 394. 



CONFEDERATE SEA POWER 247 

the Thames when she came out, they could not discover 
her identity. 

In this struggle of the Confederacy to create a navy in 
foreign waters the most obvious reflection is that the success 
usually depended not upon international law but upon 
the state of public opinion. AVhile public opinion in 
England was favorable Bulloch was rewarded for his skilful 
efforts. But when sjonpath}^ swung around to the North 
and the prospects of Confederate success dimmed, the Brit- 
ish authorities turned against him and found it easy to 
interpret international law to suit their changing purposes. 
The vigorous efforts of Charles Francis Adams, the Ameri- 
can Minister, must not be forgotten. At the critical mo- 
ment when the Confederate rams seemed about to get away, 
Adams declared to Earl Russell, the British minister of 
foreign affairs, in words that have become historic, "It 
would be superfluous in me to point out to your lordship 
that this is war. ' ' 

The careers of these few cruisers show both the insuffi- 
ciency of the Federal measures against them and the dev- 
astation they wrought on the hitherto magnificent foreign 
commerce of the North and the merchant marine in which 
it was conducted. The Sumter, Captain Raphael Semmes, 
the first raider of any importance, was not a foreign-built 
ship but a converted coastwise steamer. Though slow 
under sail or steam, she slipped out of the Passes of the 
Mississippi in the very end of June, 1861, and eluded the 
Brooklyn, which was stationed off there. She then cruised 
about the West Indies without being caught by the Union 
steamer Iroquois, which several times sighted her, even 
blockading her at St. Pierre, Martinique. Crossing the 
Atlantic to the Spanish coast, Semmes secured numerous 
prizes, eighteen in all, before he was shut up in Gibraltar 



248 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

by three Union war-ships and obliged to sell his vessel. 
In his cruise of about six months he had captured only 
eighteen merchantmen, but the knowledge that he was 
upon the sea paralyzed Union commerce and caused Ameri- 
can sailing-vessels to be laid up or transferred to neutral 
flags. He also kept five of th« fastest Union steamships 
occupied in pursuing him. Thus, the blockade was weak- 
ened at a time when it was most in need of enforcement. 

The chief of the Confederate raiders, the one which kept 
the sea the longest and did the most damage to Union 
commerce, was the Al€,'ba/ma, commanded during her entire 
career by the same Captain Raphael Seinmes, easily the 
most brilliant of the naval officers of the South who engaged 
in this work. In two ways he was especially well fitted 
for the task before him. As an officer of the United States 
Navy during the Mexican War he had shown courage and 
audacity while in command of a shore battery ; before this, 
in the interval between cruises he had studied law and been 
admitted to the bar. He was therefore well fitted to deal 
with the legal technicalities arising on a commerce-de- 
stroyer which scarcely, if ever, sighted the coasts of the 
country whose flag it bore, and which needed to utilize many 
a detail of international law in seeking shelter, supplies, 
and coal in neutral ports and in eluding capture by the 
very brilliancy and audacity of its movements. 

When the Alabama was commissioned at the Azores in 
August, 1862, the Sumter had been shut up in Gibraltar 
for several months, and Union merchant captains had 
become bolder. They did not suspect the presence of a 
raider in the very vicinity of the cross-roads of the Atlantic, 
the stretch from the Azores to Brazil^ and close by the 
frequented whaling-grounds off the former islands. After 
capturing ten vessels in three weeks, Semmes, who believed 
in appearing in a new locality just whqn news of his pres- 



CONFEDERATE SEA POWER 249 

ence in the old would have reached the United States, 
worked his way across to Newfoundland, and in this well- 
traveled region found no Northern scouts but many North- 
ern merchant vessels. From here he darted to the West 
Indies soon after the beginning of November. By reading, 
as he says, the shipping columns of the New York Herald, 
copies of which were captured on his prizes, he learned the 
movements not only of merchant vessels but even of the very 
war-ships sent to find him. In the West Indies he escaped 
from the 8an Jamito by sending her off on a false trail, 
and captured the Ariel, a steamer bound from New York to 
Colon and crowded with many Americans, including five 
hundred women and children. As he could not take them 
on board the Alabama, he was obliged to let the vessel go 
under ransom. 

From the papers on the Ariel, however, he learned of an 
expedition against Galveston being prepared under General 
Banks, an effort of the Federals to secure a foothold in 
Texas and thus block any junction between the Confederacy 
and the forces of the French in Mexico. Semmes, accord- 
ingly, sailed toward the Texan coast to interfere with 
Banks's movements, Nearing the blockading line, he de- 
coyed out the side-wheeler Eatteras and sunk her with 
gun-fire in fifteen minutes. So well had he disguised his 
ship that when he allowed the Eatteras to overtake him, 
his reply, ''Her Britannic Majesty's ship Petrel," was 
answered only by the Union captain's ''I will send a boat 
on board you." Thereupon Semmes, having secured a 
raking position, announced, ' ' This is the Confederate States 
Steamer Alabama," unfurled the Stars and Bars, and 
poured in a deadly broadside. 

When Semmes was next heard of he was off the Canaries, 
in which section he took some twenty-four prizes. He then 
coaled off the Brazilian coast, effected a few repairs at 



250 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

Cape Town, at the southern end of Africa, and struck boldly 
across the Indian Ocean for an assault on the American 
ships in the China trade. He returned by the way of Ceylon 
and Madagascar. Though this excursion did not produce 
great results in actual captures, he did find many American 
vessels laid up in Singapore, and thus useless to the Union. 
Another reason for his lack of success was that he was 
afraid of meeting the Federal steamship Wyoming, which 
had been sent to the East especially to watch for him. 

The methods used by Semmes savored strongly of the 
dramatic. He hugely enjoyed luring Northern merchant 
captains on board his supposedly British cruiser and get- 
ting them to pilot him into difficult harbors, all the time 
uttering imprecations against that dastardly pirate ship, 
the Alabama, and her worse commander, the bucaneer 
Semmes. Then they discovered the truth and the fact that 
they were prisoners. Even in the judicial decisions which 
Semmes had to write before burning his prizes there is a 
touch of the ironical. The documents were in the severely 
legal style which Semmes 's training as a lawyer enabled 
him to use, but the transparent efforts of Northern ship- 
pers to make it appear that the cargo was owned by British 
firms were dexterously pierced, and the decisions after 
being interlarded with references to woi>ks on international 
law and legal precedents, generally ended with the laconic 
phrase, "Cargo condemned." 

After a cruise of n-early two years and the capture of 
over sixty-nine vessels, incluKiing the Ariel, ransomed, and 
the Hatteras, sunk, the career of the Alahama ended just 
outside the harbor of Cherbourg, France, on July 19, 1864. 
Semmes had a ship inferior to the Kearsa/rge, his antagonist, 
and, as it proved, his ammunition had deteriorated through 
long exposure to heat, but he came within an ace of 
ending his career by a more brillian<t single-ship victory 



I 



CONFEDERATE SEA POWER 251 

than any other of the war and so placing his name beside 
that of Paul Jones by an action in almost the very waters 
where the latter had operated. If the shot from the Ala- 
bama which struck the stem-post of the Kearsarge had 
exploded, the Union ship could hardly have escaped dis- 
aster. But as it failed to explode, the Kearsarge, superior 
in speed, ammunition, and gunnery, soon riddled the Ala- 
bama, and she plunged stern foremost beneath the waters 
of the English Channel. Yet, as Semmes stated in a 
speech to his crew just before the battle, and with con- 
siderable truth, she had destroyed or driven to the shelter 
of neutral flags one half of the commerce of the Union. 

Of all the Southern naval leaders Semmes stands alone 
in dash and intellect. For two years he had kept the sea 
without, successful pursuit by Union war-ships and without 
receiving any assistance directly from the Confederacy. 
He had had to depend on supplies sent him from Europe 
and on the uncertain sympathy of neutral officials. The 
fact that he was obliged to destroy his prizes and was so 
successful in eluding capture made him perhaps the Con- 
federate most detested by Northerners. It is also prob- 
able that the fact that his ship was built in England and 
that his crew was composed largely of Englishmen had its 
effect in stirring bitterness against him. Like Paul Jones, 
whose style of warfare he so closely parallels and whose 
versatility and love of the dramatic he seems to have shared, 
he was execrated as a pirate, though neither of them set 
their captives adrift in boats or destroyed life except in 
fair battle. 

Gamaliel Bradford, in his *' Confederate Portraits," has 
unearthed a passage from ' ' Service Afloat and Ashore Dur- 
ing the Mexican War," a book written by Semmes before 
he took sides with the South, in which Semmes, not fore- 
seeing the developments of the next twenty years, declares 



252 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

that a war-ship where a majority of the officers and crew 
are not citizens of the country whose flag it bears is no 
better than a pirate. But such a definition has never 
been accepted, and it was plainly only the acrimony of war 
and the absolute mastery he showed in handling inter- 
national law and the stratagems of warfare that ever be- 
stowed such a term on Semmes. 

The career of the Florida, whose construction in England 
preceded that of the Alahmma, did not really begin till 
January, 1863, by which time the latter ship had done 
most of its damage in the Atlantic. The Florida, mean- 
while, had been lying in the harbor of Mobile completing 
her equipment. On January 16th she ran out through the 
blockading fleet at a speed of fourteen knots and began an 
extensive cruise in the West Indies, and especially off the 
North Atlantic coast of the United States. Her first prize 
in the West Indies was a ship homeward bound from China 
with a cargo worth a million and a half dollars. Except 
for a period of repairs in Brest, France, she cruised about 
the North Atlantic for over eighteen months and made 
many captures. Tenders which she converted from prizes 
made twenty-three in all, including the Caleb Cushing, 
a revenue cutter which was seized while peacefully lying 
at anchor in the harbor of Portland, Maine. The Florida 
herself captured a mail steamer only ten miles off the Dela- 
ware. After further cruising in the cross-roads of the 
Atlantic, the vicinity of the Azores and the Madeiras, 
Morris, her commander during the later part of her career, 
foolishly entered the harbor of Bahia, Brazil, unloaded his 
guns, and let half his crew go ashore. His confidence in 
the protection of a neutral port was soon shattered, how- 
ever, for a few days later, on October 7, 1864, the Federal 
ship Wachusett, which was also lying there, rammed his 



CONFEDERATE SEA POWER 253 

vessel, towed her out of the harbor, and carried her off to 
the United States. The Union authorities, it is true, dis- 
avowed the act, but the Florida never again flew the Con- 
federate flag, for when she was about to be returned to 
Brazil her Union crew scuttled her at her anchorage in 
Hampton Roads, But already the Florida and her tenders 
had destroyed thirty-seven American vessels and effectively 
terrorized the American shipping between the United States 
and Europe. 

Though the Navy Department was right in concentrating 
its efforts on the blockade, American commerce, carried on 
mostly in sailing-vessels, paid a heavy price in ships de- 
stroyed and trade turned over to neutrals. In 1860 two 
thirds of the commerce of New York was carried on in 
American bottoms; in 1863 three fourths was in foreign 
ships, and in 1863 alone 252,579 tons of shipping were 
transferred to the British flag, more than three times the 
amount of 1861.^ 

The only other important factor in the destruction of 
American shipping was the She7iandoah, which late in 1864 
sailed for the North Pacific, and chiefly after the surrender 
of Lee but before news could reach those far-distant waters, 
captured and burned American whalers worth over a million 
dollars. 

The justification for an organized warfare by armed ships 
against the defenseless merchant marine of an enemy is that 
by destroying his commerce one drains the very life-blood 
of his ability to make war, his economic and financial pros- 
perity. Yet, as compared with an effective blockade, the 
results attained by commerce-destroying by cruising ships 
are almost negligible. Though the Confederate cruisers and 
privateers captured in all 258 vessels of a value of from 

1 Wilson, Ironclads in Action, I. 169. Note. 



254 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

twelve to fifteen million dollars, they accomplished no vital 
military object. Their work did not prolong the war or 
bring pressure upon the North. 

The virtual extermination of the American merchant 
marine has usually been charged to the Confederate raiders 
such as the Sumter, the Alalama, the Florida, and the 
Shenandoah. Though they exerted a strong influence in 
this direction, other factors have already been mentioned 
which undoubtedly shared in the result. The days of sail 
were over, and commerce was inevitably to adopt new 
methods of transportation. Steam navigation gave Great 
Britain, the leader in the manufacture of machinery, an 
important advantage. In the use of iron, which was rap- 
idly coming into use. Great Britain likewise was first in her 
mines and foundries. Furthermore, the Union blockade 
had absorbed so much of the shipping of the North that it 
was natural for American ships to be withdrawn from 
distant trade routes. Besides, the opening of the territory 
beyond the Mississippi soon after the Civil War by the 
building of transcontinental railways, and the tremendous 
development of manufacturing in the Eastern States, 
diverted American energy and capital from maritime pur- 
suits. In such a situation, the Southern raiders on com- 
merce gave a finishing blow, which unfortunately did the 
South no good and the whole country much harm. It is 
fair to concede, however, that the American naval traditions 
of initiative, dash, indomitable enterprise under almost in- 
superable difficulties, and humanity in making war, were 
nowhere better exemplified than by the men who carried 
out the Southern warfare against commerce. Their ex- 
ploits are, therefore, a part of the rich heritage of American 
sea power of all later generations. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

SEA POWER SPLITS THE CONFEDERACY IN TWO 

THE achievements of Semmes and his fellow raiders 
on Union eommereo, remarkable as these achieve- 
ments were, were ineffective against the over- 
whelming sea power of the North, whose Navy Department 
in the first months of the war took steps to occupy the 
Mississippi River and New Orleans, — a city of 168,000 
inhabitants, more than twice the size of Richmond and 
Charleston combined, and the chief seaport of the South. 
Down the mighty Father of Waters, with its tributaries 
greater in length than the Atlantic Ocean is broad, and 
tapping the richest valley in the world, a commerce flowed 
to New Orleans and thence to Europe which had con- 
tributed the bulk of the revenues of the Southern States. 
The commerce of New Orleans, which in 1860 amounted to 
$324,000,000, was paralyzed by the blockade during the 
first year of the war. Of cotton, the great article of export 
that furnished credits in Europe for the purchase of mili- 
tary equipment and munitions for the South, New Orleans 
had handled, in 1860, 2,255,448 bales, more than half of the 
whole crop of the Southern States for that year. Besides 
its great revenues, the Mississippi River in the hands of the 
South made possible the continuous streams of supplies 
from the quieter states of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas 
to the rest of the Southern States, whose agriculture was 
handicapped by the draft of their manhood for war. In a 
word, the Mississippi in the hands of the South was a vast 

255 



256 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

source of revenue ; in the hands of the North it would be a 
great strategic line of communications for offensive military- 
campaigns into the heart of the Confederacy, campaigns 
which well handled and under a unified plan of operation, 
as they later were under Sherman and Grant, might have 
ended the war in 1862/ 

The occupation of the Mississippi and its tributaries was 
one of the three strategic plans which Gideon "Welles, Secre- 
tary of the Navy, formulated early in the war. Assisted 
by his able professional adviser, Commander Gustavus V. 
Fox, Welles perfected plans in the autumn of 1861 for 
operations from Cairo southward and from Ship Island 
at the mouth of the Mississippi northward. Between these 
two bases, more than one thousand miles apart, if one 
followed the tortuous course of the river, Wells and Fox 
planned a gigantic undertaking under Flag-Officer Foote 
operating from Cairo and Flag-Officer Farragut operating 
from the Gulf. These two officers achieved wonders in tak- 
ing and maintaining their fleets five hundred miles from 
their bases through a river whose current was at times 
strong, whose channel buoys were often destroyed, whose 
trained pilots belonged to the enemy, and on whose banks 
batteries overnight replaced those previously destroyed. 
The maintenance of the river flotillas and their communi- 
cations was a difficult task. Foote had to exercise the 
greatest care, for a shot in the boiler or engine of one of 
his gunboats would have made her drift down-stream into 
the enemy 's lines. Farragut on the other hand had to bring 
all his coal and supplies under convoy against the current 
and frequently under fire. His heavier-draft vessels often 
went aground in the season of low water; for his flotilla 
belonged to the deep-sea naval forces, while Foote 's gun- 

1 Hosmer, The Appeal to Arms, American Nation Series, XX. p. 
110. 




NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY 

Showing railroads as they existed in 1860. 
Adapted from the Atlas to the Army Records of the Civil War, Plate 135. 

257 



258 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

boats were of shallow draft and constructed on the lines of 
the river steamers. 

Andrew H. Foote, who arrived at his base in September, 
1861, supervised the ship-building race in the northern part 
of the river. Under Foote, J. B. Eads at St. Louis, work- 
ing day and night, including Sundays, built in sixty-five 
days seven casemated iron-clad gunboats, of which the 
Carondelet later became the best known. These each had 
an armament of thirteen heavy guns and a speed of nine 
knots. Later, after the Monitor's fight. Bads built some 
turreted gunboats ^ while Charles Ellet in imitation of the 
South 's experiment in the Merrimac produced his river 
rams, which he and his brother later commanded with 
marked success. On the other hand, the South attempted 
under great handicaps the building of rams and also seized 
some river steamboats ; the latter became known as the River 
Defense Fleet. This force, worth mentioning only because 
it is tj^pical of the lack of organization and cooperation of 
the Confederate military authorities on the Mississippi 
River, was under the control of the army. General Lovell, 
in command at New Orleans, voiced his faith in this River 
Defense Fleet in these words, "Fourteen Mississippi River 
captains and pilots will never agree about anything after 
they once get under way. ' ' 

On the other hand, the Union naval and military forces 
under Foote and Grant worked together in harmony. The 
two branches of the service, army and navy, Foote once 
remarked, were "like blades of shears — united invincible; 
separated almost useless." Thus on February 2, 1862, 
Foote, leaving his base at Cairo, convoyed Grant 's army up 
the Tennessee River for a combined attack on Fort Henry. 
On February 6th Foote 's gunboats shelled and captured the 
work, before Grant's troops, impeded by bad roads and 
swollen steams, could get in its rear. Owing to Grant's 



SEA POWER SPLITS THE CONFEDERACY 259 

delay most of the garrison escaped to Fort Donelson, twelve 
miles away on the Cumberland River. These two forts 
occupied strategic positions for mutual support on the two 
rivers leading into the heart of Tennessee and Kentucky. 
Fort Donelson, situated on a bluff one hundred feet above 
the river, sent a plunging and destructive fire almost at right 
angles against the decks of the gunboats, but Grant's troops, 
again safely convoyed by the gunboats, defeated the Con- 
federates the next day. Donelson surrendered on Febru- 
ary 16th. The two successes had cost the South twenty-one 
thousand men, — a result brought about largely by Foote's 
thorough cooperation with Grant. 

Shortly after the fall of Fort Donelson the Confederate 
troops on the Mississippi retreated from Columbus, Ken- 
tucky, to Island Number Ten, situated in an s-shaped bend 
in the river. Here General Pope sought to get in their rear 
and so cut their lines of communications, but he was unsuc- 
cessful until Commander Walke in the Carondelet of 
Foote's squadron on the night of April 4, 1862, lighted on 
his way by vivid flashes of lightning, ran the gantlet of 
the six batteries with their fifty guns without grounding 
in the twisting channel. Having performed what Mahan 
calls **one of the most daring and dramatic events of the 
war," Walke -made it possible for the troops to cut of? 
the retreat of the Confederate garrisons, who surrendered 
to Foote on April 7th, — the same day that Grant was 
fighting the battle of Shiloh on the Tennessee, where an- 
other division of Foote's gunboats helped to stave off 
serious disaster to Grant's whole army. Foote, worn out 
from hard work and suffering from a wound, was relieved 
on May 9th by Captain C. H. Davis. The latter the next 
day warded off a spirited attack by the Confederate River 
Defense Fleet at Fort Pillow, forced the surrender of Fort 
Pillow by bombardment on June 4th, and on June 6th 



260 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

captured or destroyed all but one of the River Defense 
Fleet. The Northern naval commanders had cleared the 
river to Vicksburg and were ready to join forces with 
Farragut. 

The work of the navy on the upper Mississippi and the 
Tennessee and Cumberland had made it possible for the 
army to save Kentucky and occupy western Tennessee, — 
results that caused consternation in Richmond and brought 
solace to the North for the defeats on the Potomac. After 
the fall of Donelson Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote Motley, 
the historian : 

Never was such ecstasy, such delirium of excitement, as last 
Monday, when we got the news from Fort Donelson. Why to 
give you an instance from my own experience, when I, a grave 
college professor, went into my lecture room, the class, which 
had first got the news a little before, began clapping and clapping 
louder and louder, until I had to give in myself, and flourishing 
my wand in the air, joined with the boys in their rousing hurrahs, 
after which I went on with my lecture.^ 

While Foote had been thus clearing the river from the 
north, Flag-Officer David G. Farragut was opening the 
river from below. Because Farragut was on record as the 
professional authority on the power of fleets against land 
fortifications, he had been selected by Fox to command the 
West Gulf Squadron for the contemplated attack on 
New Orleans. For this attack, which, unlike the northern 
Mississippi operations, was purely naval. Fox found in Far- 
ragut a man after his own heart, for the work required 
audacity and a willingness to cut loose from communica- 
tions. Farragut instantly agreed with Fox that New 
Orleans could be captured without first reducing the two 
forts, Jackson and St. Philip, below the city, a project that 

1 Motley's Correspondence, II. 68. 



SEA POWER SPLITS THE CONFEDERACY 261 

seemed little less than foolhardy to Commander D. D. 
Porter, Farragut's able assistant, who argued for a reduc- 
tion of the forts with mortar-boats before attacking New 



Pontcharthmin 




PASS A L 'OUTM 

itoKTHSAsr fuss 



SOUTHWEST f/as 



THE MOUTHS OP THE MISSISSIPPI 
Drawn from the Atlas to the Army Wax Records, Plate 176. 

Orleans. By this very audacity of the older man, tempered 
with wise and careful preparations, the impossible became 
possible. The project required a quick and bold stroke be- 
fore the Confederate authorities at Richmond — who be- 
lieved that the Union would concentrate all its efforts on 



262 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

the northern reaches of the river — could prepare adequately 
for a naval attack from the Gulf. 

With Farragut's arrival in his flag-ship, the steam sloop 
of war Hartford, in February, 1862, the Confederates made 
every effort to strengthen their defenses, — which consisted 
of the two forts, Jackson and St. Philip, a log boom across 
the stream, and a flotilla of thirteen gunboats and two rams 
above this barrier. The forts mounted 126 guns, mostly of 
small caliber, 56 being the old fashioned 24-pounders. Fort 
St. Philip, situated at a bend on the left bank, could rake 
approaching ships. The barrier, at first of cypress logs, — 
four feet thick, chained together, and held by thirty 
anchors, — was broken by the spring floods and mended by 
means of anchored hulks and chains strung across them 
from bank to bank. The Confederates were handicapped 
by lack of skilled artisans and of tools and equipment — the 
latter a result of the tightening blockade of the sea power 
of the Union — for completing the powerful ironclads they 
were building, especially the Louisiana, which with good 
engines might have been a serious menace to Farragut's 
efforts to capture the city. Moreover, the Confederate 
forces suffered from lack of organization, discipline, and 
cooperation between army and navy and between state, city, 
and Confederate authorities. For example, four different 
naval officers who were successively in authority failed to 
cooperate with General Lovell, and the flotilla was made up 
of a heterogeneous lot of river boats, owned partly by the 
state, partly bj^ the central government, and partly by citi- 
zens. Hence delay was the greatest need of the defenders 
and an immediate offensive the greatest aid of Farragut. 

But with all the dash that Farragut manifested in the 
New Orleans campaign — a dash unusual for a man of his 
age — he was far from reckless; he realized fully the diffi- 
culties of attacking forts, especially under the conditions 



SEA POWER SPLITS THE CONFEDERACY 263 

now faciug him. His half-century of professional service 
\,'ent back almost to the days of Nelson, when it was a 
common saying that one gun ashore was equal to a ship of 
the line. Always a most painstaliing student of profes- 
sional matters, Farragut had, during the attack of the 
French fleet in 1838 against the fort at San Juan de Ulloa 
protecting Vera Cruz, made careful observations and notes 
of the effects of the new type of shells hurled by the 
French bomb vessels. From these observations, though he 
had little faith in the result, he now authorized Com- 
mander Porter with the latter 's mortar-boats, stationed 
three thousand yards below Fort Jackson, to make a pre- 
liminary attempt to reduce the forts. Accordingly, Porter 
fired all told from 13,500 to 16,800 ^ shells at the forts, but 
though he frequently hit them, he did not silence them. 
He succeeded in killing only 4 soldiers of the two garrisons 
of 1100 and in disabling only 7 of their 126 guns. With 
Farragut 's fine differentiation between the practicable and 
the impossible, he, while not minimizing the great difficul- 
ties, had with his unusual determination set himself the 
task of solving them. One of his greatest difficulties had 
been the getting of his larger ships over the mud flats above 
the mouth of the river ; it took him, for example, two weeks 
and five attempts to drag the Pensacola, finally through a 
foot of mud, into the deep water below the chain barrier. 

Realizing then to the full the task before him, Farragut 
made thorough preparation for the passing of the forts. 
Of course, he had a powerful fleet and the great sea com- 
munications of the Union at the back of him. But so, too, 
the Allies in the World War in their disastrous attempt to 
pass the Dardanelles had a large fleet, supported by a 
sea power mightier than Farragut 's, and the result the 
reader knows only too well. Farragut 's squadron con- 

1 Century Battles and Leaders, II. 32, 72. 



264 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

sisted of nine gunboats, seven steam sloops of war, and one 
large side-wheeler, seventeen in all, mounting 154 guns, 
many of them rifles of great power for that day. Seeing 
that Porter was making no serious impression on the forts 
with his shells, Farragut detailed Captain Bell and Lieu- 
tenant Caldwell on the night of April 20th to make a gap 
in the chain barrier. After much effort, Caldwell managed 
to work his gunboat above the barrier, then steaming up- 
stream to get a good start, he turned and with the current 
and full speed of his engine rammed the Itasca against the 
barrier, tearing away several of the hulks and leaving a 
wide gap in the line. This being accomplished, Farra- 
gut ordered his captains to festoon the sides of their ves- 
sels with chain cables and cover the decks amidships with 
bags of ashes, coal, and sand, as improvised armor belts. 
Most of the captains also daubed the sides of their ships 
with river mud to render them less visible, and some white- 
washed the decks to make guns and shot stand out in the 
darkness. To cover the passage of the fleet Farragut or- 
dered Porter to moor some of his mortar-boats near Fort 
Jackson and concentrate their fire on the water battery of 
this fort. Having previously carefully explained to his 
captains his plan of action, — ^the important feature of which 
was a column formation in three divisions with the power- 
ful sloops distributed in the van and center, — Farragut 
made a last-minute personal inspection of his fleet and gave 
the signal for the start at two o'clock on the morning of 
April 24, 1862. 

The battle of New Orleans, as it is called, had two phases, 
— the passage of the forts and the destruction of the Con- 
federate fleet. The passage of the forts was successful 
for all of Farragut 's force except the last three gunboats, 
which owing to the darkness and smoke did not succeed in 
finding the gap in the barrier. Some of the larger units 



SEA POWER SPLITS THE CONFEDERACY 265 

like the Pensacola and the Brooklyn passed Fort St. Philip, 
the more formidable work, slowly, at times stopping the 
engines altogether, and pouring into the fort grape and 
canister at such close quarters that the sailors could see the 
soldiers running to cover or could exchange curses with 
them. The Hartford in passing was hit by a fire-raft, but 
Farragut, with that coolness characteristic of him in great 
emergencies, sheered off, sank the tug that was pushing the 
raft toward him, quickly had his well-disciplined crew 
extinguishing the flames already shooting up the rigging of 
the Hartford, backed her off the shoals under the guns of 
St. Philip, and all the time kept up a steady fire at the 
fort. During the passing of the fleet, the Confederate ram 
Manassas, running the gantlet of Farragut 's ships, was 
skilfully avoided by a quick turn of the Pensacola' s helm, 
but succeeded later in ramming the Mississippi and the 
Brooklyn, without serious damage to either. 

Under this protection of Farragut 's heavier ships, some 
of the gunboats, notably the Cayuga and Varuna, quickly 
slipped by and began an unequal contest with the Con- 
federate flotilla above. The darkness and confusion were 
such that it was difficult to distinguish friend from foe. 
The Varuna was sunk. In this second phase of the battle, 
as the main fleet arrived above, the Confederate flotillas — 
a few of which put up a brave but useless fight — were all 
destroyed or captured. The Louisiana, whose engines 
would not work, played virtually no part in the battle. 
The Manassas was later blown up. The forts, on the sever- 
ing of their communications by the fleet above, surrendered 
a few days later, as Farragut had predicted. New Orleans 
was his. 

After destroying some batteries farther up the river, 
Farragut arrived off New Orleans at noon on April 25th, 
where he found that the inhabitants in a mad panic of 



266 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

patriotism had set fire to great quantities of cotton and 
coal, some steamboats, and the Mississippi, an ironclad on 
the stocks, more powerful than the Louisiana. General 
Lovell had turned back the city to the mayor and had with- 
drawn with his troops. Farragut sent ashore to demand 
the surrender of the city two oflficers, Captain Theodoras 
Bailey and Lieutenant George H. Perkins, whose progress 
through the hostile city was like that of Nelson and Hardy 
through the streets of Copenhagen after Nelson's great 
victory over the Danes. George W. Cable, at the time a 
young boy acting as clerk in a New Orleans store, gives the 
following account of this incident : 

About one or two o'clock in the afternoon (as I remeanber), 
I being again in the store with but one door ajar, came a roar of 
shoutings and imprecations and crowding feet down Common 
Street. "Hurrah for Jeff Davis ! Hurrah for Jeff Davis ! Shoot 
them ! Kill them ! Hang them !" I locked the door on the out- 
side and ran to the front of the mob, bawling with the rest, 
"Hurrah for Jeff Davis!" About every third man there had a 
weapon out. Two officers of the United States Navy were walk- 
ing abreast, unguarded and alone, looking not to right or left, 
never frowning, never flinching, while the mob screamed in their 
ears, shook cocked pistols in their faces, cursed and crowded, and 
gnashed upon them. So through the gates of death those two 
men walked to the City Hall to demand the town's surrender. It 
was one of the bravest deeds I ever saw done. 

As the Mayor would not haul down the flag, Farragut 
had to land some marines and order an officer to take it 
down. On May 1st General Butler and his troops arrived 
to hold what the navy had won. 

Farragut was now ordered to complete the opening of 
the river and join Davis in the upper part. Aided by 
Porter's mortar-boats, he bombarded the batteries on the 
high blutfs of Vicksburg for two days, but without a large 
army to cooperate with him his bombardments were in 



SEA POWER SPLITS THE CONFEDERACY 267 

vain. He joined Davis above and the two cooperated in 
keeping the river open, but the difficulties were great. 
Farragut was five hundred miles from his base ; the river 
was getting low, endangering his vessels; sharp-shooters 
were picking off his officers ; masked batteries sprang up on 
all sides overnight, and his men in great numbers were con- 
tracting malaria. Finally realizing that Farragut could 
not patrol the Mississippi with definite results unless a large 
army cooperated with him, the Navy Department ordered 
him back to New Orleans. Before his return he and Davis 
planned for the destruction of a powerful ram, the Arkan- 
sas, building up the Yazoo River. Just as they were about 
to seek her, she came down, passed unscathed through the 
Union fleet, and took refuge under the batteries of Vicks- 
burg. She was later burned by the Confederates to prevent 
her falling into the hands of the Union Navy, 

In the autumn of 1862 Porter relieved Davis, who like 
Foote had been worn out by the arduous river work. In 
January, 1863, Grant arrived in person to command the 
large military force investing Vicksburg, the Gibraltar of 
the river. For nearly a year Porter and Farragut 
rendered to Grant and Sherman invaluable services in 
silencing batteries and in scattering the swarms of guerillas 
that made rapid movements with their field-pieces from a 
vast interior, appearing at spots along the tortuous stream to 
cut off transports with troops and steamers with supplies. 
Thus the navy maintained the army's communications, 
which were entirely by water. Under Porter's protection 
Grant was able to surprise the garrison by landing his army 
south of the town for a brilliant flank movement that cul- 
minated in the surrender of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863. 
"Never in the history of combined movements," declares 
Mahan in his "Life of Farragut," "has there been more 
hearty cooperation between the army and the navy than in 



268 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

the Vicksburg campaign in 1863 under the leadership of 
Grant and Porter." Meanwhile Farragut, by blockading 
the mouth of the Red River, had cut off the beleaguered city 
from a great source of supplies. He also forced the sur- 
render on July 9th of Port Hudson, a powerful post situ- 
ated at a sharp bend farther down the river and intended 
to protect the communications of Vicksburg. "The Miss- 
issippi was now open from Cairo to the Gulf, and the mer- 
chant steamboat Imperial, leaving St. Louis on the 8th, 
reached New Orleans on the 16th of this month without 
molestation. ' ' ^ 

By the opening of the Mississippi and the occupation of 
New Orleans the sea power of the Union had split the Con- 
federacy in two. The Northern navy, by the ever-tighten- 
ing blockade, had forged around the vital states of the Con- 
federacy on three sides — the Atlantic, the Gulf, and the 
Mississippi — a band of iron, and it had provided the army 
an entering wedge on the northern side via Tennessee, from 
which Sherman could ultimately, by his historic march, 
divide the Confederacy still further and make his great 
flanking movement against the coast cities and Lee's armies. 
In addition to this strategic result of the activity of the 
sea power of the Union, the capture of New Orleans, the 
greatest cotton mart in the world, had in the words of the 
historian James Ford Rhodes "a profound effect on opinion 
in England and France. ' ' At the very time that Farragut 
was attacking the forts of New Orleans, the French Em- 
peror was promising Mr. Lindsay, a member of Parliament 
and a Southern sympathizer, that he ''would at once dis- 
patch a formidable fleet to the mouth of the Mississippi, 
if England would send an equal force, and that they would 
demand free egress and ingress for their merchantmen with 
1 Mahan, The Gulf and Inlcmd Waters, p. 173. 



SEA POWER SPLITS THE CONFEDERACY 269 

their cargoes of goods and supplies of cotton which were 
essential to the world. "^ This project was nipped in the 
bud by Farragut's victory, as Mason and Slidell, the un- 
official ambassadors of the Confederacy at London and 
Paris, reported after the battle. Slidell wrote from Paris, 
"If New Orleans had not fallen, our recognition could not 
have been delayed much longer." Mason, writing from 
London to Benjamin, Davis's Secretary of State and War, 
voiced a similar opinion in these words : 

The occupation of the principal southern ports by the enemy, 
and the increased rigor of the blockade of those remaining to us, 
resulting from it, give little hope now of any interference in re- 
gard to the blockade, and leave only the question of recognition.- 

If, therefore, one may say in conclusion that the blockade 
was, as Mahan asserts, the most decisive single factor of the 
Civil War, the occupation of New Orleans and the resulting 
control of its great river by the sea power of the Union was 
the most important single phase of that blockade. 

1 North American Review, CXXIX. 34G. 

2 Rhodes, History of the United States, III. 630. 



CHAPTER XIX 

SEA POWER AT MOBILE BAY 

AFTER his victory at New Orleans, Farragnt, pro- 
moted to the rank of rear-admiral for his 
work, proceeded to Pensacola, which became the 
base of the West Gulf Squadron when it fell back into 
Union hands in May, 1862. From here he directed the 
work of his district, extending to the Rio Grande, and by 
December, 1862, his forces had taken possession of all ports 
in the Gulf except Mobile. This was in accordance with the 
admiral's plans of drawing in the long blockade lines to 
the actual harbor entrances. Hence, also, after the comple- 
tion of his work at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, Farragut 
kept urging the Navy Department to send him monitors 
and troops for an attack on Mobile Bay before the de- 
fenders of the port could complete their powerful iron-clad 
ram Tennessee. General Banks, the Union commander of 
the Department of the Gulf, also urged an immediate at- 
tack. But the Washington Government, worried by the 
machinations of the French Emperor, Napoleon III, in 
Mexico and Texas, had other plans. 

Taking advantage of the war in America and in order 
to seat Maximilian, the brother of Francis Joseph of Aus- 
tria, as Mexican Emperor, Napoleon had sent an army into 
Mexico which a month before the fall of Vicksburg had 
captured Mexico City. French consuls in Texas and at 
Richmond were intriguing to set up a republic in Texas 
as a buffer state between this new empire and the winner 

270 



SEA POWER AT MOBILE BAY 271 

of the Civil "War. Napoleon's plans were not relished by 
either belligerent in the United States. The Confederate 
authorities expelled the consuls, and the Washington Gov- 
ernment planned the ill-starred Red River campaign for 
the conquest of Texas, that Union control might be firmly- 
secured before foreign intrigue could separate that immense 
territory from the United States. 

In the summer of 1864, Banks's troops, after the failure 
of the Red River expedition, at last became available to help 
Farragut in his attack against Mobile Bay, the defenses 
of which had meanwhile been greatly strengthened, espe- 
cially by the completion of the ram Tennessee. This case- 
mated ironclad, whose timbers were still in the forest and 
whose armor belt still in the mines in the spring of 1863, 
was launched and brought down to Mobile the following 
winter for her plating and equipment. With her twenty- 
five inches of pine and oak covered with six inches of iron 
and with her six Brooke rifles she was the most powerful 
vessel built by the South. Despite Farragut 's oft-repeated 
warnings and requests for monitors and troops during the 
spring of 1864, the Tennessee after two months' hard work 
was floated, by means of special constructed ''camels," 
down to the lower bay, where she at once became the most 
serious menace to Farragut 's wooden squadron in the Gulf 
outside. As this was the critical period of the great cam- 
paigns when Sherman and Grant in Tennessee, Georgia, and 
Virginia were trying to surround and isolate Johnston's 
and Lee's armies, it was imperative for the sea power of 
the Union to seal the port of Mobile, next to New Orleans 
the greatest cotton center and now the most important base 
for blockade-runners on the Gulf. 

The Tennessee, whose commander, Admiral Buchanan of 
Merrimac fame, gave up his first plan of attacking Farragut 
outside and so breaking the blockade, had two defects, very 



272 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

serious for her principal use as a ram. She could make 
only six knots, and her steering-chains by a blunder in con- 
struction were exposed on her deck instead of being placed 
beneath the armor. Her slow speed, therefore, rendered 
her ram easily avoidable and her exposed steering-gear 
made it possible to cripple her entirely. But even with 
these defects, she and the three gunboats Buchanan had 
were serious menaces to the Union fleet. 

Besides this flotilla, the defenses of Mobile Bay included 
three forts, Morgan, Gaines, and Powell, — of which the 
first two, Morgan and Gaines, guarded the entrance from 
the Gulf on Mobile Point and Dauphin Island respectively. 
Of the three forts, Morgan by reason of its many heavy- 
caliber smooth-bores and rifles and its situation directly on 
the channel was the only one that was a real menace to* a 
passing fleet. The entrance was further defended by a row 
of piles extending over the shoals east of Dauphin Island, 
and by a triple line of torpedoes across the channel to a 
red buoy, 223 feet from the water battery at Fort Morgan. 
If we omit the shoal water near Morgan, these obstructions 
left an opening of approximately 100 feet for blockade- 
runners. Of the defenses of Mobile Bay, however, the 
Tennessee and the torpedoes played the most important 
roles. 

The torpedoes, or more properly the submarine mines, 
moored across the channel, were either barrel-shaped or 
sheet-iron truncated cones, called tin torpedoes. The 
former were made of beer kegs, filled with powder, floated 
upright by means of wooden cones above and below, and 
detonated by five sensitive primers projecting from the 
sides. The tin torpedoes were kept upright by an air- 
chamber, on the top of which was an iron cap, easily 
dislodged by a slight jar, which on dropping exploded the 
charge of powder in the lower part of the mine. These tin 



I 



SEA POWER AT MOBILE BAY 273 

torpedoes were poorly lacquered axid corroded readily in the 
salt water. The mine field in July included 46 of the barrel 
type, 134 of the tin torpedoes, and possibly a few others 
to be exploded by electricity. 

Toward the end of July, 1864, the troops arrived and dis- 
embarked on Dauphin Island for the attack on Fort Gaines 
simultaneously with the passage of Fort Morgan by Far- 
ragut's squadron. On August 4th the last of the four 
monitors — Tecuniseh, Manhattan, Chickasaw, and Winne- 
haQiO, the ironclads for which Farragut had waited for six 
months — arrived. The first two of these had 15-inch guns 
and the latter two 11-inch, but all were slow, — less than 
seven knots. The morning after the arrival of the last of 
the four, August 5th, Farragut planned to make what 
proved to be his memorable passage into Mobile Bay. 

The admiral's plans were simple. The whole squadron 
of four monitors and fourteen wooden steam sloops and 
gunboats were to form in two columns, the monitors, 
slightly to the right, to protect the van of the wooden ves- 
sels, led by the Brooklyn and the Octorora, against Fort 
Morgan. The four ironclads were to pass very slowly, and 
as their turreted guns could fire in all directions, they could 
pour in their great solid shot at close range until the wooden 
ships had safely passed. The latter were to be lashed 
together, two and two, so that in case of injury to the engine 
of one, her consort could drag her along till past the 
fort and thus prevent her blocking the narrow channel. 
Besides these plans, Farragut calculated his start at flood 
tide to help carry his fleet by, and he hoped for a westerly 
wind to blow the smoke over Fort Morgan. As the tide is 
a known quantity and as the wind at this season at Mobile 
is generally from the west in the morning, Farragut 's fleet 
began the attack at 7 a.m. on August 5th, with the condi- 
tions of wind and tide he had wished. 



274 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

The battle of Mobile Bay had, like the battle of New 
Orleans, two phases, — the passing of the forts and the sub- 
sequent fight with the Tennessee. The wooden ships played 
no decisive part in the battle; indeed, they in each phase 
nearly caused disastrous losses to the Union flotilla. Not- 
withstanding the kernel of truth in Farragut's pithy say- 
ing that iron in the men is more important than iron in the 
ships, this battle only verified the lesson of the Monitor- 
Merrimac action that the ship of wood as a man-of-war was 
doomed. At New Orleans Farragut's squadron had suc- 
ceeded largely because the land guns were old-fashioned 
and the ironclad Louisiana had not been completed. These 
conditions were reversed at Mobile Bay. Farragut's quick 
and resolute action won at New Orleans, as his accurate 
judgment, demonstrated in his insistence on ironclads, was 
decisive at Mobile. The sea power of the industrial North 
manifested itself in nothing so strikingly as 'in its rapid and 
revolutionary metamorphosis from wood to iron and from 
sail to steam. 

According to Farragut's plan, the monitors, with the 
Tecumseh ahead, led the way very slowly by Fort Morgan. 
As they did so, Admiral Buchanan, with his gunboats and 
the Tennessee, emerged from behind Fort Morgan and 
steamjed slowly from east to west, crossing the path of the 
on-coming Union ships at right angles. He moved his ram 
slightly to the west of the red buoy that evidently marked 
the eastern end of the line of torpedoes. As he did so, 
Captain Craven of the Tecumseh — not heeding Farragut's 
warning to pass east of the red buoy, but rather carrying 
out the spirit of Farragut's order to destroy the ram 
after entering the bay — headed straight for the Tennessee. 
A moment later there was a muffled explosion. The 
Tecumseh careened violently for an instant and plunged 
head first to the bottom, carrying with her all but twenty- 



SEA POWER AT MOBILE BAY 



275 



one of her complement of more than a hundred. The only 
exit from the pilot-house of the monitor was down through 
the turret and out by way of a gun-port. Of the few sur- 




_ UNian 

^GUNBOATS 



X ■* roRPEDoes 

D - GAINES (disabled) 

J - CONSORTS CAST OFF 

P - PHILIPPI (burned) 

L "CONFEDERATE LOOKOUT 

G -CONFEDERATE CUAJBOATS 

C -CHICKASAW 

W -WINNEBAGO 

M -MANHATTAN 

T - TECUMSEH 



■^lih 



MiTACOMET thHAfirFOmo 

PORtfiOYAL t^Ri^nAoNQ 

SEMlhoLS ihuiCKAWANH/A 

KENNEBEC bh-MONONGAHELA 

ITASCA thoSSIPEE 

GALENA lih ONEIPA 



THE BATTLE OF MOBILE BAY 
Adapted from the Century Battles and Leaders of the GivU War, IV. 384. 

vivors, the pilot afterward told of the stoical courtesy of 
Captain Craven that cost the latter his life, expressed in 
his last words, ''After you, pilot." The other three moni- 
tors kept on in their slow progress by the fort. 



276 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

Shortly after this accident Captain Alden of the Brook- 
lyn, fearing torpedoes, stopped his engines and by so doing 
nearly caused the ships astern of him to collide with one 
other. Farragut, who was standing in the port main rig- 
ging, where he had been lashed by the thoughtfulness of 
his fleet captain, Drayton, instantly saw the danger, ordere'd 
Captain Jouett of his consort, the Metacomet, to back his 
engines while the Hartford's kept going ahead. Thus Far- 
ragut turned sharp around the Brojoklyn lying athwart the 
stream and in answer to his hail to her as he passed, inquir- 
ing what the trouble was, received the reply, "torpedoes 
ahead. ' ' It was then that he uttered the words since indis- 
solubly associated with this battle: ''Damn the torpedoes! 
Four bells, Drayton! Full speed, Jouett." At the same 
time, he gave the signal for close order. At once the 
column straightened out. By Farragut 's cool decision in a 
great emergency the wooden ships, instead of piling up on 
one another, in a flood tide and right under the guns of 
Fort Morgan, passed on to the great bay beyond. The 
officers of the fleet, who in urgent solicitude for the old 
admiral's safety, had insisted that some other ship than his 
should lead the wooden column, were overruled by fate. 
The Hartford led the way over the mined field without acci- 
dent but suffered from the terrific .-aking fire of the gun- 
boats. She lost more killed and wounded during this period 
than at any time before or later. As Lieutenant Kinney, 
a signal-officer on the Hartford, writes, ' ' The old expression 
of the 'scuppers running blood,' 'the slippery deck,' etc., 
give but the faintest idea of the spectacle on the Hartford." 
As the Hartford steamed on, the Tennessee followed her as 
if to ram, but soon gave up and returned to run the gantlet 
of the rest of the Union ships. Owing to her awkwardness, 
however, and some defect in her primers, she inflicted little 
damage on them. On the other hand, even the heaviest- 



SEA POWER AT MOBILE BAY 277 

caliber Union guns had no effect on her. The Hartford's 
consort, the Metacomet, cut loose and captured one of the 
bothersome gunboats. The other two and the ram now 
took refuge under the guns of Fort Morgan. Farragut's 
fleet had successfully passed the forts and were at 8 :30 a. m. 
coming to anchor. 

Farragut at once made plans with Captain Draj'lon to 
destroy the Tennessee that night, under the guns of Morgan 
if need be, so that if the fort assisted in defending her, it 
would have to fire at friend and foe alike. But even before 
the last of the Union fleet had anchored, Farragut was 
amazed to notice that Buchanan was leaving his refuge and 
coming straight on for a fight with the whole fleet in broad 
daylight, — a brave but unnecessary risk, even if his iron- 
clad was the most powerful vessel afloat. A similar attack 
under cover of darkness would have increased his chances 
of success greatly. 

Farragut immediately ordered the handier and speedier 
wooden ships to ram the Tennessee and the slow monitors 
to bombard her. Thus began the second stage of the battle. 
The steam sloops made a number of brave attacks on the 
Tennessee, but only to break their beaks against the power- 
ful sides of the ram. At this time, the two flag-ships made 
a dramatic dash at each other, bows on, but luckily for the 
Hartford, hit each other glancing blows. At the instant of 
impact the Hartford gave the ram at a distance of ten feet 
her whole broadside of seven 11-inch solid shot, which 
bounded off without any effect; while the ram, owing to 
defects in her primers, fired only one shell, which passed 
through the Hartford's berth-deck and killed five men. As 
the Hartford sheered off to circle around for another at- 
tempt, she was herself struck amidships by the Lackawanna, 
a blow that penetrated half-way through the Hartford, 
knocked two portholes into one, and opened a huge gap 



2?8 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

extending nearly to the water-line. By this time the moni- 
tors had surrounded the ram. Of these the Chickasaw, 
ably handled by Commander George H. Perkins, took and 
kept a position never more than fifty yards from the Ten- 
nessee's stem. There the Chickasaw stuck and poured 
into the ram fifty-two 11-inch shot. She succeeded in jam- 
ming the ram's port shutters, starting her plates, and worst 
of all, cutting her steering-gear and thus rendering her help- 
less. Also as a result of one of Perkins's shots, a flying 
splinter of iron seriously injured Admiral Buchanan. 
Twenty minutes after this, Buchanan's successor in com- 
mand, Johnston, surrendered the Tennessee. 

On the same afternoon, August 5th, the Chickasaw 
shelled Fort Powell from its unprotected rear and forced 
its surrender that night. On August 7th, Fort Gaines 
capitulated after a similar shelling by the same monitor. 
On August 23d, after a bombardment by Granger's troops 
from the rear and by Farragut's fleet from the bay and the 
Gulf, Fort Morgan also surrendered. Henceforth Mobile 
as a port for blockade-runners was sealed. Farragut's 
service of fifty years in the navy received its fitting climax 
in this his last and most difficult battle. In December he 
reluctantly had to refuse a new command in the Atlantic 
and go north for a much needed rest. 

Owing to the approach of the great military campaigns 
taking shape in Georgia and Virginia, the Union Govern- 
ment could not immediately spare the troops necessary for 
the investment of the city of Mobile. It was captured, 
however, the following spring by a combined military and 
naval force. In the attack the gunboats worked under 
great difficulties because the shallow approaches to the 
city were thickly sown with mines, or torpedoes, as they 
were called. An officer at one sweeping fished up one 
hundred of these mines. In the attacks six Union vessels 



SEA POWER AT MOBILE BAY 279 

were sunk by torpedoes before the city surrendered in 
April, 1865. 

Mobile marked the most successful use of the torpedo by 
the South, a weapon in which, with the ram, the Con- 
federacy as the weaker belligerent in soa power placed as 
much reliance as Germany in the "World War placed in her 
U-boats. The Confederate Government had established a 
special torpedo bureau in its Navy Department, which was 
veiy successful in perfecting various devices, aid classed as 
torpedoes in that day. Among .these devices were included 
not only the submarine mines explained above but also 
various types of infernal machines, such as irregular cast- 
iron shells painted black to resemble lumps of coal and in- 
tended for the coal-bunkers of Northern ships. Another 
form was the spar- or outrigger-torpedo, made fast, as its 
name implies, to a long spar projecting from the bow 
of a launch, the early type of torpedo-boat. This spar- 
torpedo was generally a metal cylinder containing the 
charge and an air-chamber to float it upright. Down the 
center of this cylinder ran a tube having a grape-shot at 
the top, held in place by a pin. When, under cover of 
darkness, the launch arrived alongside its intended vic- 
tim, the torpedo was detached from the spar by a lanyard, 
and when all was ready the pin was withdrawn by a pull 
on another lanyard. Thereupon the , grape-shot fell upon 
a fulminate cap at the bottom of the tube, exploded the 
charge, and generally blew up both the victim and the 
launch. It was with a spar-torpedo that William B. Gush- 
ing, a young lieutenant of the Union Navy, on the dark 
and rainy night of October 27, 1864, blew up the last Con- 
federate ram, the Albemarle, lying at Plymouth on the 
Roanoke River in North Carolina, — one of the boldest ven- 
tures of the war. With a similar type of spar-torpedo the 
Confederates off Charleston Harbor in an early form of 



280 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

submarine, appropriately called a David, blew np the 
Northern steam sloop of war Eousatomc. But the Con- 
federacy, despite its skill in perfecting the torpedo and the 
ram, was hampered by lack of materials and machinery 
and was doomed to failure before the overwhelming sea 
power of the industrial and commercial North. 

After the capitulation of the city of Mobile Admiral H. K. 
Thatcher, Farragut's successor in the Gulf, received the 
surrender, on May 4, 1865, of the remaining Confederate 
river vessels in Alabama. On May 25th and June 2d, 
Sabine Pass and Galveston fell back under the control of 
the West Gulf Squadron. This squadron was merged in 
July with the East Gulf Squadron, and the combined force 
was maintained in the Gulf until May, 1867 ; that is, until 
the French emperor gave up his attempt to establish, in 
contravention of the Monroe Doctrine, an empire in Mexico. 

In Farragut's Gulf service at New Orleans and Mobile 
Bay, therefore, the sea power of the United States frus- 
trated the plans of Napoleon III to break the block- 
ade and to place Maximilian on the throne of Mexico. 
Besides, the West Gulf Squadron had broken up an ex- 
tensive illicit trade in cotton in exchange for munitions of 
war for the Confederacy, through Mexican ports on the Rio 
Grande. But the more immediate effects of Farragut's 
Mobile Bay victory for sea power M'ere also important and 
far-reaching. Mobile was connected with the interior by 
rivers and railroads, which helped greatly to maintain the 
communications of the Confederate armies in the gigantic 
military campaigns of the last year of the war. Generals 
Grant and Sherman were bringing to a climax the great 
enveloping 'movement, a "bold offensive on concentric 
lines," by which they were to crush between them — and 
so end the war — the armies of Lee and Hood, the latter of 
whom had succeeded Johnston on July 18, 1864. To cut 



SEA POWER AT MOBILE BAY 281 

(\ff supplies from Mobile, S-herman had on several occa- 
sions tried in vain to destroy the Mobile and Ohio and the 
Jackson and Selm,a railroads. Of Napoleon I it was once 
said that he made his troops win hisr battles with their legs, 
— ^that is, by forced marches enveloping or flanking his 
enemies. Such work requires shoe leather. During the 
Georgia and Tennessee campaign whole regiments of Hood's 
army could not move because of the lack of shoes, which 
came from Europe if at all, — merely one item that illus- 
trates the continually increasing pressure of the. Union 
blockade. The sealing" of Mobile Bay by Farragut's fleet 
shut off the Southern blockade-runners from this their most 
important base on the Gulf. By cutting off the supplies of 
the Confederate armies, Farragut's victory helped Sher- 
man in the capture of Atlanta less than a month later, — 
an achievement which greatly heartened the people of the 
North, wearied by the long deadlock in Virginia. Mobile 
Bay enabled the Federal Administration to bridge the 
dangerous period in national morale before, by the fall of 
Atlanta, the tide set strongly in favor of the Union, Presi- 
dent Lincoln publicly thanked Farragut and Sherman and 
set apart Sunday, September 3d, as a day for "devout ac- 
knowledgment to the Supreme Being" for the double vic- 
tory. And lastly, in the November presidential election 
the opposition party put up as their candidate General 
McClellan, who had been nominated at Chicago on a plat- 
form declaring that the war was a failure. On that 
memorable election day of 1864, by the overwhelming elec- 
toral vote of 212 to 21, the people decided, "In spite of 
burdensome taxation, weariness of war, and mourning in 
everj^ household, . . . to finish the work they had begun. " ^ 
To adapt the words of Seward in a campaign speech, Sher- 
man and Farragut had knocked the bottom out of the 
1 Rhodes, History of the United States, IV. 539. 



282 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

Chicago platform. Without the sea power of the Union 
exerted against Napoleon and the Gulf ports, the South 
might have continued the struggle indefinitely, worn out 
the North, and made a Union one and inseparable an im- 
possibility forever. 



CHAPTER XX 

DAVID GLASGOW FARRAGUT 

FOR his six hours of remarkable work at New Orleans 
and Mobile Bay, Farragut had been preparing him- 
self for fifty years. If genius is, as Carlyle as- 
serts, ''the transcendent capacity of taking trouble," Far- 
ragut was, in this sense at least, a genius. But nature 
and personal effort combined to fit him for his life's 
work; to an eminent degree his success was due to a great 
natural aptitude for war, greatly improved by profound 
study and observation in his profession. The happy union 
in him at the climax of his career of the dash and vigor of 
youth with the wisdom and judgment of age marks him as 
unusual. While Rodney was sixty-four at the time of his 
battle of the Saints, Jervis sixty-three at his battle of Saint 
Vincent, and Howe seventy at his ' ' Glorious First of June, ' ' 
such cases for great captains were, as Mahan points out, 
the exception. For example. Nelson, Napoleon, Welling- 
ton, Grant, and Sherman were all approximately forty- 
five at the peaks of their military careers. Rodney, Jervis, 
and Howe, however, distinguished themselves in old age 
in a form of naval warfare which was essentially the same 
as that of their younger days. Not the least remarkable 
thing about Farragut is the fact that he, trained for half 
a century in the old navy, could at the age of sixty adapt 
himself to the new; for his professional service, extending 
from 1812 to the Civil War, spans the whole transition 
period in sea power from sail to steam and from wood to 
iron. 

283 



284 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

David Glasgow Farragut was born at Campbell's Sta- 
tion, Tennessee, July 5, 1801, the year of Nelson's battle 
of Copenhagen. In 1809 his father, Sailing-Master Far- 
ragut, a native of Minorca, had command of the naval 
station at New Orelans and during this duty took care of 
Sailing-Master David Porter, who spent his last days at 
Farragut's house. In gratitude for this kindness to his 
father, the younger David Porter, of Essex fame, offered 
to train Farragut's son, David Glasgow, for a naval of- 
ficer's career. On the long cruise of the Essex under Por- 
ter in the Pacific during the War of 1812, young Farragut 
showed a marked liking for the sea, and at the early age of 
twelve, "probably with an old seaman as nurse," had 
unusual responsibility thrust upon him in taking charge of 
the prize Barclay and bringing her safely to port. He later 
accompanied Porter — whom he always spoke of as his 
"kind friend and patron," and for whom he retained 
through life a warm affection — on the latter 's cruise against 
the "West Indian pirates. During the long years of peace 
before the Civil War Farragut made many cruises to the 
West Indies, Mexico, and South America and to the Medi- 
terranean. . During these cruises and in the course of his 
duties he was often thrown into intimate contact with great 
historic characters of his time, such as Santa Anna and 
Rosas, dictators of Mexico and Argentina, Garibaldi, the 
Italian patriot, Lafayette, — whom after his memorable visit 
to the United States Lieutenant Farragut carried back 
in the Brandy-wine to France, — Dom Pedro I and II, Em- 
perors of Brazil, Ferdinand IV, King of Naples and friend 
of Nelson, Metternich, the crafty diplomat of the Congress 
of Vienna, and a host of others, of whom Farragut has left 
us intimate glimpses in his Journal. 

In 1855 Farragut attained the rank of captain, the high- 
est grade of that period, and shortly after received com- 



DAVID GLASGOW FARRAGUT 285 

maild of the steam sloop of war Brooklyn, sister ship of 
the Hartford, the type in which he was later to win his 
great victories. In his intermittent shore duties he made 
his home at Norfolk, which was his legal residence for forty 
years until the outbreak of the Civil "War, and where he was 
married. Born, bred, and married in Dixie, Farragut once 
remarked, *'God forbid that I should ever have to raise my 
hand against the South." Torn between two loves, — his 
home and the flag he had served for half a century, — he, 
with that instant decision characteristic of him, left Nor- 
folk for New York on the afternoon of the day that Vir- 
ginia passed the Ordinance of Secession, April 18, 1861. 

Until his great responsibilities in the Civil War had be- 
gun to wear him out, Farragut 's health, physical vigor, 
and muscular strength were remarkable. Not above me- 
dium height, and not what one might call handsome, he was 
powerfully built and of graceful and alert military carriage. 
He was an adept in all physical exercises and he often joined 
his crew in their games of skill. He once won a prize in a 
foot-race with a brother officer. The story of his annual 
handspring on his birthday to prove the vigor of youth is 
well known. He frequently sent for one of th§. crew for a 
bout with the single-sticks. This gave him good practice for 
skill with the sword, which he always wore ashore, not as 
an ornament but for self-defense in returning to the ship 
at night in the back streets of Mediterranean or South 
American ports. ''Any one wearing a sword," he used 
to remark, "ought to be ashamed not to be proficient in its 
use." His physical ability and alertness stood him in good 
stead in his work on the Gulf and on the Mississippi. "A 
general is not too old," Wellington once remarked, ''when 
he can visit outposts in person and on horseback." Far- 
ragut at New Orleans and Mobile made minute first-hand 
inspections, clambering up the rigging and over the sides 



286 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

with the nimbleness of a man one third his age. Since 
Mobile Bay the dispute has continued as to whether he was 
lashed to the port main rigging or the port mizzen. As a 
matter of fact he had been in both places, and an instant 
after the Hartford's collision with the Lackawanna, he was 
hanging far out over the side to take careful note of the 
injury, while his officers and crew were shouting, "Save 
the admiral," "Get the admiral out of the ship." In al- 
lusion to this incident — which caught the popular fancy — 
Joseph H. Choate, the orator at the unveiling of St. 
Gaudens's statue of Farragut in Madison Square, New 
York, May 25, 1881, said that Van Tromp had hoisted a 
broom to the masthead. Nelson hoisted his famous signal, 
"England expects every man to do his duty," and Farra- 
gut hoisted himself "as the living signal of duty done." 

Nature had endowed Farragut no more in his bodily 
vigor than in his alert and vigorous intellect. As he had 
been sent to sea at the age of nine, his early education had 
been neglected. On a later cruise in the Mediterranean, a 
naval chaplain and United States Consul at Tunis, Mr. 
Charles Folsom, seeing Midshipman Farragut 's keen desire 
to make up the defects in his training and also to improve 
his health, gained special permission from Commodore 
Chauncey to tutor the young man and take him on ex- 
tended sight-seeing trips to Marseilles, the ruins of ancient 
Carthage, and the wild interior of northern Africa. After 
the Civil War, Farragut, now a hero in two hemispheres, 
sent his old tutor in grateful remembrance a token of their 
long friendship, to which Mr. Folsom, replying in a letter 
addressed to "My dear Boy," said: "I was ever on my 
guard, my dear Farragut, against flattering you when 
young, so easy was it for admiration and affection to slide 
into extravagant praise. Now indeed I may join my en- 
thusiastic countrjTnen in their applause of all you have 



DAVID GLASGOW FARRAGUT ^87 

accomplished in j^our profession." In his schooling under 
Mr. Folsom, Farragut also picked up a wide knowledge of 
languages. Years later, on another Mediterranean cruise, 
an old Arab woman arrived alongside the ship in a bum- 
boat. After vainly trjdng to understand her an officer 
said: "Send for Farragut. He speaks the language of 
the devil. ' ' To the amazement of the bystanders Farragut 
carried on an easy conversation with the old woman. 

Farragut also showed his mental alertness in his love 
of an argument — in which he always exhibited an open 
mind toward the other man's point of view — and in his 
love of books. He was throughout life a great reader, 
especially of the lives and achievements of the masters of 
his profession. In the period of naval stagnation in the 
long years of peace after 1815, when his brother officers — 
as is often the case — concentrated their interest on the 
individual ship and on the materiel of the service, Farra- 
gut in his reading showed his greatest interest in fleets and 
in personnel. In a letter written from Mobile Bay in 
October, 1864, to his son Loyall, — who later gave the world 
a very interesting biography of his father, — he gives this 
advice about studies and men: 

I confess I don't know much about analytical geotaetry, and 
I might not have seen the use of steam, telegraphy, and railroads, 
when I was as young as you are ; but I do now fully comprehend 
the difficulties of keeping tliem all in order for working. So go 
along with your age, my boy, and remember also that one of the 
requisite studies for an officer is man. Where your analytical 
geometry will serve you once, a knowledge of men will serve you 
daily. As a commander, to get the right men in the right place 
is one of the questions of success or defeat. 

Farragut 's alertness in his professional studies and his 
keen observation in regard to materiel and person- 
nel are brought out even by a cursory reading of his 



288 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

voluminous reports to the Navy Department. During the 
bombardment by the French fleet of San Juan de Ulloa, 
he not only made careful notes of the effects of the hori- 
zontal fire of shells, the new types and arrangement of guns 
and decks of the French ships, the French Navy's equip- 
ment of a frigate as a hospital ship and the French method 
of transferring the wounded with least discomfort, but he 
also scrutinized the defenses of Vera Cruz, as he always did 
those of all ports he visited. ''Who knows but that my 
services may be needed here some day," was his explanation 
of his scrutiny on such occasions. In this connection Mahan 
gives an illuminating remark of Jervis, who after his great 
victory became Earl St. Vincent, and who in seeking infor- 
mation about the defenses of Brest said to his secretary, 
"Had Captain Jervis surveyed Brest in 1774, in 1800 Lord 
St. Vincent would not have been in want of this informa- 
tion." 

Farragut's keen interest in his profession, his deep in- 
sight into naval warfare, especially its human factors, is 
perhaps best understood in his numerous pithy and homely 
expressions that have come down as the heritage of the 
naval service. It is sometimes said of him that he failed 
to appreciate new inventions like the ironclad, the rifle, and 
the torpedo, reluctantly adopting the last named with 
the exclamation, "I have always deemed it unworthy of a 
chivalrous nation." In substantiation of this view his 
remark, ' ' Give me the iron in the men and I care not so 
much about the iron in the enemy's ships," is cited. But 
this was simply his way of saying that morale, the human 
side, the man, is more important than armor. His request 
to be sent in 1854 to the Crimea to observe at first hand 
the application of steam and armor to naval warfare 
shows that he fully appreciated the new inventions of his 
time. Another Farragut epigram, "The best defense 



DAVID GLASGOW FARRAGUT 289 

against the enemy's fire is a well-directed fire from your 
own guns, ' ' demonstrates a fundamental point of his creed 
that men, not their arms or armor, are the essential factors 
of success. The same principle Farragut on another occa- 
sion stated thus: "The more you hurt the enemy the less 
he will hurt you." These quotations are simply his homely 
way of expressing what in more technical language would 
be "the best defense is a vigorous offense." So other Far- 
ragut epigrams throw light on his knowledge of naval war- 
fare. "Once get behind a soldier's back and he is gone," 
sums up his whole system of strategy and tactics at New 
Orleans, Port Hudson, and Mobile Bay. For the attack on 
the last-mentioned place he requested an army, "to shut 
the back door." But above and beyond all his insight 
into naval war was his insight into human nature. Once 
on a return trip from the Mediterranean in a merchant- 
man, Farragut, accompanied by a few invalided sailors, 
had an experience that called forth one of his numerous 
sayings treasured by the naval service. The merchant- 
man's skipper and her crew, at sight of what they took for 
a pirate, were panic-stricken and prepared to abandon the 
vessel in the cutter. Farragut, with a few orders to the 
invalided tars, manned the only gun and prepared for 
resistance to the supposed pirate, which turned out to be 
a harmless fellow merchant ship passing a friendly hail. 
In connection with this incident he gave expression to the 
keynote of his later great success, "Men trained to arms 
will always do their duty, if ably led." 

A phase of his mental grasp of the strategy and tactics 
of his profession was his careful preparation for every 
contingency in a battle. Before passing the forts of New 
Orleans, for example, he had equipped his fleet to meet 
fire-rafts by means of drills with water-buckets, grapples, 
and one hundred and fifty life-boats. This one precaution 



290 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

probably saved the day in the crisis when the Confederate 
fire-raft set the Hartford in flames. And in preparation 
for entering Mobile Bay, with his fleet captain, Drayton, he 
studied for hours the possibilities of the action by means of 
little wooden models of ships, and later he ordered his squad- 
ron under way several times to practise fleet manceuvers and 
to drill his captains in keeping close formation and in chang- 
ing course. In his planning for the contingencies of battle 
and in his intellectual grasp of a situation Farragut was 
much like Nelson. 

But still more than Farragut 's physical and intellectual 
superiority, the sanity and greatness of his character make 
him an officer without peer in American sea power. His 
peculiar aptitude for war was due more to his moral and 
spiritual qualities than to his intellectual. Among the ele- 
ments of his character are a great heart, swayed by emotion 
and humor; an unusual loyalty to ideals of honor, service, 
country, and religion; a strong sense of responsibility; 
and, last and most important, an instantaneous judgment 
in a crisis and a fixity of purpose that prevailed against 
all odds. 

Taking up these elements in Farragut 's character, let us 
consider first his great heart full of warm human feeling, 
and jovial humor. He himself seemed to bear a charmed 
life despite his exposed positions and came through his 
three terrible ordeals of fire at New Orleans, Port Hud- 
son, and Mobile without a scratch, though the Hartford in 
the battles was struck two hundred and forty times and 
her decks were strewn with dying and wounded men. On 
Farragut 's descent from the rigging at Mobile Bay, as he 
saw the brave men who had fallen being laid out on deck, 
an old quartermaster said, "It was the only time I ever 
saw the old gentleman cry, but the tears came in his eyes 
like a little child." Farragut 's devotion to his men was 



DAVID GLASGOW FARRAGUT 291 

like Nelson's, warm and reciprocated. Officers and men 
looked upon both with a feeling little short of reverence. 
Early in his career Farragut determined never to have what 
was called in the old navies a "crack ship," because such a 
ship was the result of endless tyranny over the crew and 
officers. Another example of his kind heart and considera- 
tion for others is brought out by the following remark of his 
fleet captain, Drayton: *'I did not believe any man could 
be great if he did not know how to say ' no, ' but I see he can ; 
for certainly here is a great man, and he is too kind-hearted 
to say 'no' in some cases where it should be said." Young 
officers were impressed by Farragut 's kindness, and a mid- 
shipman wrote of him, ' * He had a winning smile and a most 
charming manner and was jovial and talkative." "With 
this joviality he had a keen sense of humor. Once he re- 
marked to a navigator, whom he had caught in a mistake 
in his reckoning, "Never mind, sir, all men are liable to 
make mistakes, and — perhaps a few women." "Don't 
flinch from that fire," Farragut shouted to his crew fight- 
ing the flames on the Hartford; "there 's a hotter fire than 
that for those who don't do their duty." 

Besides this kindly and humorous good nature of Far- 
ragut, — a trait that made men follow wherever he led, — 
another phase of his character was his stainless honor and 
his loyalty to duty and country. A request that he allow 
his name to be used as a director of a company, with an 
intimation that $100,000.00 of its stock would be placed 
to his credit, he refused on the ground that he did not un- 
derstand the business and could not therefore give adequate 
service in return. He believed that loj^alty to the navy and 
to the country was so important that the officer should over- 
look even injustice, and political intrigue; "for," he said, 
"an unwise decision will recoil on the officials that be, 
sooner or later, ' ' and an open and aboveboard attitude ' ' in 



292 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

the long run will always give one the advantage over an 
intriguing adversary." His devotion to country, and in- 
cidentally his piety, pervade his letters to his family; for 
example, this paragraph from a letter to his son of April 
24,1864: 

This night two years ago was the anxious night of my life, when 
I felt as if the fate of my country and my own life and reputation, 
were all on the wheel of fortune to be turned by the finger of 
the All-Wise; when Dixi, "I said it." It was only left to do or 
die. God was my leader, and we passed through a fiery furnace 
where none but He could have carried us. It is the second anni- 
versary of the passage of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and 
being Sunday, it seemed a fit occasion for going to church and 
offering up our praj'ers and thanks to the Dispenser of all things 
for His blessings and mercies during the last two years. 

In addition to his warm heart and his high principles of 
honor and of duty to country, — phases of character that 
made him an inspiring leader of men, — Farragut had to an 
unusual degree a keen sense of responsibility, a willingness 
on occasion to take a great risk and bear the result of it, 
whatever the result might be. Over-cautiousness has 
blighted the career of many a promising officer. Jervis 
once remarked that the true test of a man's courage is his 
willingness to shoulder responsibility. Farragut declared, 
probably with reference to the unusual burdens thrust 
upon his own young shoulders in 1812 to 1814, "Persons 
who come into authority late in life shrink from responsi- 
bility." In his passing of the forts at New Orleans against 
the advice of his able lieutenant. Porter, and with depart- 
mental orders so worded that in case of failure the entire 
blame would fall on him, he took the whole burden of suc- 
cess or failure on himself. In his overpowering sense of 
responsibility Farragut showed boldness without rashness 
and vigorous rapidity of action without recklessness. Of 



DAVID GLASGOW FARRAGUT 293 

his fleet captain he once remarked: ''Drayton does not 
know fear, and would fight the devil himself, but he believes 
in acting as if the enemy can never be caught unprepared ; 
whereas I believe in judging him by ourselves, and my 
motto in action is [quoting Danton's words] 'L'audace, et 
encore de I'audace, et ton jours de Vaudace.' " How heav- 
ily the burden of Farragut 's great responsibility weighed on 
him is manifest in the following letter to his wife, written 
the day before his last great fight : 

Flag-ship Hartford, 

Off Mobile, August 4, 1864. 
My dearest Wife : 

I write and leave this letter for you. I am going into Mobile 
Bay in the morning, if God is my leader, as I hope He is, and 
in Him I place my trust. If He thinks it is the proper place 
for me to die, I am ready to submit to His will, in that as in all 
other things. My great mortification is, that my vessels, the iron- 
clads, were no't ready to have gone in yesterday. The army 
landed last night, and are in full view of us this morning, and 
the Tecumseh has not yet arrived from Pensacola. 

God bless and preserve you, my darling, and my dear boy, 
if anything should happen to me, and may His blessings also rest 
upon your dear mother, and all your sisters and their dear chil- 
dren. 

Your devoted and affectionate husband, who never for one 
moment forgot his love, duty, and fi^delity to you, his devoted 
and best of wives. 

D. G. Farragut. 
To Mrs. D. G. Farragut, 
Hastings on the Hudson. 

This brings us to the last point in Farragut 's military 
character, — his instant and accurate judgment in a crisis 
calling for instant and vigorous action, and his powerful 
will that forced victory in the face of defeat. At the 
battle of Copenhagen, which Nelson himself regarded as 
his masterpiece, Nelson with a dozen ships of the line and 



294 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

frigates silenced the guns of eighteen anchored hulks sup- 
ported by powerful shore batteries. At the crisis of the 
battle, when several of his ships had gone aground, he was 
signaled to retire by his commanding officer, who probably 
pitied what he regarded as the foolhardiness of his subordi- 
nate. Then it was that Nelson, putting the glass to his blind 
eye, said he did not see the signal, continued the battle, and 
won the most critical fight of his career. Farragnit 's battle 
of Mobile Bay was strikingly like Nelson's at Copenhagen, 
except for Nelson's cynical insubordination in the presence 
of younger officers, an act of which Farragut could not 
have been guilty whatever the gain.^ At the critical mo- 
ment at Mobile Bay, when the Brooklyn's hesitation threat- 
ened confusion and disaster to the fleet, it was Farragut 's 
instant judgment, quick action, and tenacity of purpose 
that won. Hence Mahan justly observes: "In the lofty 
courage and stern determination which plucked victory out 
of the very jaws of defeat, the battle of Mobile Bay was to 
the career of Farragut what the battle of Copenhagen was 
to that of Nelson." Only in a less degree but of the same 
quality was Farragut 's prompt action and resolute determi- 
nation displayed at those other two crises when the Hart- 
ford was in imminent danger of destruction by fire at New 
Orleans or by grounding under the batteries of Port Hud- 
son. Many an officer of unusual intellectual power has 
analj^zed a situation and yet has failed in the execution. 
Such a man has in an emergency hesitated for a moment 
between two courses and lost. Mahan, in his "Life of Far- 
ragut, ' ' says : 

It is the strength of purpose, in the power of rapid decision, 
of instant action, and if need be, of strenuous endurance thi-ough 

1 That Farragut's rule of obedience was very different from Nelson's 
is evident from his letters and Journal, e. g., Loyall Farragut, Life 
of Admiral Farragut, p. 107. 



DAVID GLASGOW FARRAGUT 295 

a period of danger or of responsibility, when the terrifying 
alternatives of war are vibrating in the balance, that the power 
of a great captain mainly lies.'^ 

The main incidents in Farragut's life after the Civil 
War may be briefly summarized. As a reward for his dis- 
tinguished service to his country, he was, in December, 
1864, made a vice-admiral, and on July 25, 1866, Congress 
created the grade of admiral, which was also immediately 
given to him, the first officer to hold this highest honor in 
the American Navy, On a visit to New York the city hon- 
ored him and was in turn honored by the graceful tender 
and acceptance of a gift of fifty thousand dollars wherewith 
the admiral might carry out the citizens' invitation to make 
his home among them. In 1867 Admiral Farragut, accom- 
panied by Mrs. Farragut, sailed for Europe in the steam 
frigate Franklin, flying his broad pennant as commander 
of the European Squadron. This cruise was like a trium- 
phal progress. He was entertained by the most distin- 
quished members of his own profession everywhere, by 
Napoleon III and Queen Victoria, and by the citizens of 
Cuidadela in Minorca, his father's birthplace. After his 
return in 1868 some prominent Democrats urged Farragut 
to allow his name to be placed before the convention as a 
nominee for the Presidency, an honor which he declined. 
He later visited the Mare Island Navy Yard, whose first 
commandant he had been thirty years before. His health 
now began to fail. During a visit to the commandant of 
the navy-yard at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on August 
14, 1870, Admiral Farragut died. After a public funeral 
in New York, attended by President Grant and his cabinet, 
he was buried at Woodlawn, where he rests to-day, 

Mahan compares and contrasts Farragut with Nelson, 

1 Mahan, Admiral Farragut, p. 317, 



296 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

the two whom he regards as the geniuses of American and 
British sea power. In the esteem of his officers and men; 
in dash, boldness, and rapidity of execution; in clear per- 
ception of the decisive features of a campaign, Farragut 
was like Nelson. But the American admiral had not the 
opportunities of the Briton for great fleet duels. Farra- 
gut 's achievements lay rather in combats of fleets against 
forts. Farragut was like Nelson a genius, but without the 
eccentricities of genius. In his humanness; in his high 
ideals of honor; in his deep sense of responsibility to duty 
and to country; in his instant decision and vigor in execu- 
tion, he is without peer in his profession. If we qualify 
the much-abused word "genius" to mean an infinite 
capacity for hard work and a great sane moral balance 
Farragut was and remains the genius of American sea 
power. 



CHAPTER XXI 

MAHAN REVOLUTIONIZES THE WORLD'S CONCEPTION OF 
SEA POWER 

MA-HAN'S professional career at the age of twenty 
began where Farragut's at sixty ended, — in the 
great transition period of the Civil War. Re- 
cently graduated from the Naval Academy, he served 
through the war that saw the momentous change to steam 
and armor. Of this transition he makes the remark in his 
autobiographic "From Sail to Steam": "It has been 
aptly said that a naval captain who fought in the Invin- 
cible Armada would have been more at home in the typical 
warship of 1840, than the average captain of 1840 would 
have been in the advanced types of the American Civil 
War." But despite the great lessons of the war the Ameri- 
can spirit of progress in naval atfairs, which had so re- 
cently sent to the junk pile the wooden fleets of the world, 
went to sleep immediately after 1865. During the long 
period of stagnation that followed, Mahan, like Farragut 
after 1812, served in most discouraging circumstances. 
American traditions of sea power clung to the idea that 
navies could be improvised, that the naval organization 
hardly needed to be maintained in times of peace, and that 
all the necessary elements, ships and men, could be quickly 
provided from the merchant marine. Especially was there 
an idea that if attacked the United States could send out 
privateers to harass the enemy's commerce and even en- 
rich the country with the easy spoils thus secured. No 

297 



298 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

idea of a fleet of ships of various sizes and functions crossed 
the American mind. But Mahan's teachings changed all 
this. If Farragut was the doer, Mahan was the thinker 
of the American Navy. Mahan's ideas created a new 
American Navy and inaugurated a new world epoch for 
sea power. 

Yet Mahan was no impractical theorist. His thinking 
was of far more value to his own country and the world 
than the deeds of many of his brother officers who were 
inclined to regard him as a failure in his profession. He 
realized that the great achievements in history had been 
based on sound workable hypotheses. He was not like the 
professor who at a meeting of scientists gave this toast, 
''Here 's to pure theory and damned be he who applies it 
to anj^thing." He believed alwaj's in harnessing together 
sound theory and practice to get the best results out of 
the team. Of Mahan's practical ability in his profession, 
a brother officer who knew him well says: 

That he [Mahan] distinguished himself preeminently on ship- 
board cannot be claimed. Luck or circumstances denied him the 
opportunity of doing things heroic and his modesty those purely 
spectacular. As a subordinate or as captain of a single ship, 
what he did was done well. No further proof of his qualities 
in this respect is needed than the fact that, at the outbreak of the 
Civil War, when finishing his midshipman's cruise, he was asked 
by a shipmate, an officer who expected a command, to go with 
him "as first lieutenant." To his colleagues of the old navy this 
invitation was the highest form of professional approval. The 
fates decreed that the wider field should not be his wherein, as 
commander-in-chief of a fleet in war time, he could have exhibited 
the mastery he surely possessed of that art with which his name 
will forever be iadissolubly linked.^ 

It will help the reader better to understand the work of 
Mahan as the historian of sea power if he will first take 
1 Fiske, TJ. S. Naval Institute, January-February, 1915, p. 2. 



MAHAN 299 

a glance at the officer's career. Alfred Thayer Mahan was 
of distinctly intellectual parentage. His father was a 
professor of civil engineering at West Point, where the son 
was born on September 27, 1840. Entering the Naval Acad- 
emy as a midshipman only eleven years after its founding 
in 1845 by George Bancroft, the distinguished historian, 
then Secretary of the Navy, Mahan received the intellectual 
broadening of the new system of naval education, a fact 
that partly explains his ability to break away from the 
centuries-old traditions of the period of sail and wood. 
It is interesting to note that he got his appointment to the 
academy through Jefferson Davis, then President Pierce's 
Secretarj^ of War, and that he was a contemporary of 
Schley, Sampson, and Dewey, the real pioneers in the new 
American sea power that was to spring up in the last two 
decades of the century. As a lieutenant, Mahan, mostly 
on blockade duty, saw much service in the Civil War, in 
the latter part of which he was on Rear-Admiral Dahl- 
gren's staff. Of the next twenty years, while the Ameri- 
can Navy, after its great effort in 1861-65, lay in deep 
slumber, Mahan regarded the years 1870 and 1885 as turn- 
ing-points in his own career. In 1870 he was on a Euro- 
pean cruise just before the upheaval which through mili- 
tary, not sea, power, called into being the German Empire 
and the Kingdom of Italy, — a period in which he took a 
most lively interest. From this time dated what he calls 
his "predisposition to recognize the momentous bearing 
of maritime force upon the course of history, which insured 
me a hearing when the fulness of my time was come. ' ' 

To the year 1885, Mahan ascribes the beginning of the 
period when the United States Navy slowly awoke from 
its lethargy, for it was at this time that Congress began 
a new building-program, still on traditional lines, — cruis- 
ers, not 'battle-ships, — but with cruisers like the Chicago 



300 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

whose fourteen-knot contract speed marked at least the 
early dawn of a new day. The same period saw the be- 
ginning of the Naval "War College at Newport, whose 
founder, Stephen B, Luce, Mahan was to succeed as presi- 
dent and with whose destiny he was henceforth closely 
associated. It was in connection with the beginnings of 
the War College, in 1885, that Mahan, then on a cruise in 
the Wachusett on the west coast of South America, received 
recognition of his profound knowledge of naval history 
and strategy in an invitation from Luce to lecture to the 
first classes at the college, — an event that led him to his 
life-work and to an international fame that made him 
a foremost figure in his profession. In 1892 Mahan 
was a member of a commission that chose the site for the 
Bremerton Navy Yard in Puget Sound. In 1894, while 
on a cruise in Europe, Mahan was honored by degrees from 
Oxford and Cambridge, — a recognition that was hastily 
imitated by like distinctions from American universities. 
After forty years' service he retired from active duty to 
devote himself entirely to his favorite theme, — the history 
of sea power. He was recalled in 1898 to serve as a mem- 
ber of the Naval W^ar Board at Washington to outline the 
naval strategy in the conflict between the United States 
and Spain. The next year as a member of the first Hague 
Peace Conference, Mahan rendered important service in 
numerous questions relating to arbitration and to private 
property at sea, and in his cham'pionship of the Monroe 
Doctrine. After the interruption of the Spanish War and 
the Hague Conference, Mahan completed his sea-power 
studies. In 1906 he was made a rear-admiral in tardy 
recognition of his great service to his profession and his 
country. From this time to his death on December 1, 1914, 
Admiral Mahan continued to make contributions to the 
world's literature on questions of naval administration. 



MAHAN 301 

strategy, and armaments, and on national and international 
policies related to sea power. 

In his lectures at the War College, Mahan by the touch 
of genius was to reconstruct from the fossilized remains of 
naval history a new and vital philosophy of sea power. 
For his purposes he found plenty of the earlier French and 
British narratives, especially Bonfils's ''History of the 
French Navy" and Campbell's "Lives of the Admirals," 
on which he could base his reconstruction. But the prac- 
tical application of naval history to future war operations 
met with grave doubt and much ridicule both from brother 
officers and from outsiders. Mahan relates an amusing 
experience with a fat, florid-faced, and condescending rep- 
resentative of one of the great New York dailies, who came 
to have a look at the college. As his eye caught a battle 
plan of Trafalgar on the wall, he laid the future historian 
of sea power flat with his own deep intuitive knowledge of 
naval history. Mahan thus summarizes this incident with 
the reporter. " 'Ah,' he said, with superb up-to-date pity, 
'you are still talking about Trafalgar'; and I could see that 
Trafalgar and I were henceforth on the top shelf of fossils 
in the collections of his memory." 

Among Mahan 's early audiences at the War College, those 
who came to scoff remained to pray; it was this favorable 
reception of his lectures that led to their publication in 
book form. For his first series of lectures he acknowledges 
his indebtedness to Martin's "History of France," a work 
that opened his eyes to the commercial and maritime policy 
of Colbert, the able minister of Louis XIV. The Grand 
Monarch finally rejected Colbert's advice to strengthen his 
sea power and centered his efforts on armies, only to end 
in being broken — as other tyrants before and after him — 
by sea power. This new insight into the connection be- 
tween commercial and naval power — between "civil and 



302 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

military sea power" — gave Mahan the theme and set the 
limits for his first and greatest work ''The Influence of 
Sea Power Upon History," which covers the momentous 
contests for control of the seas between England, Holland, 
and France to the year 1783. From his wide and varied 
reading Mahan had indeed previously caught glimpses of 
the decisive importance of sea power. For instance, while 
perusing a copy of Mommsen's "History of Rome" in the 
library of the English Club at Lima, Peru, in 1885, he tells 
us, "It suddenly struck me . . . how different things might 
have been could Hannibal have invaded Italy by sea, as the 
Romans often had Africa, instead of by the long land 
route." The publication in 1890 of "The Influence of Sea 
Power Upon History" brought Mahan instant recognition 
throughout the world. 

In his next volumes, "The Influence of Sea Power Upon 
the French Revolution and Empire," Mahan covered the 
period from where his first book ended, 1783, to the fall of 
Napoleon in 1815. The new work, which like the former 
was based on lectures previously delivered at the War 
College, took for its theme the exhaustive force of sea power 
in bringing the military dictator of the Continent to his 
knees. In it Mahan proves that the revenues of England's 
vast commerce sustained her allies in one coalition after 
another until Bonaparte finally fell. He shows that after 
the battle of Trafalgar — fought ten years before Waterloo 
— Napoleon, finding that his navies could not wrest sea con- 
trol from England, tried by his Continental Blockade to 
exclude British goods from Europe ; by so doing Napoleon 
destroyed not Great Britain but himself. In his treatment 
Mahan works up to his great conclusion that Napoleon dug 
his grave not in Spain but in his disastrous Russian cam- 
paign, — a direct result of the emperor 's attempts by means 



MAHAN 303 

of his Continental System to exclude British goods from 
the Baltic. This second sea-power book after various in- 
terruptions — for example, one bureau chief refused to 
grant Mahan permission to complete the manuscript on the 
ground that it was not a naval officer's business to write 
books — was finally given to the world in 1892. 

Despite the hard work he put on his first books on 
sea power, Mahan tells us they were a labor of love; this 
was not so with his next in the series, — "Sea Power in Its 
Relations to the War of 1812," which, covering the last 
three years of the Napoleonic struggle, was an outgrowth 
of his previous work. This was a laborious effort, lacking 
in vital interest to one whose studies centered around the 
great fleet actions of a Nelson. But Mahan regarded his 
"War of 1812" as his most thorough piece of historical 
research, based as it is largely on original documents in the 
archives of Washington, Ottawa, and London. Pie applies 
to his "War of 1812" the remark of a Chinese artist to a 
dissatisfied customer, "How can pretty face make, when 
pretty face no have got?" 

But Mahan 's professional biographies of Farragut and 
Nelson, whom he regarded as respectively the greatest 
American, and the greatest British seaman, were, like his 
earlier work, labors of love. For these he had "a warm 
admiration little short of affection." In fact, he says that 
he would no more write the biography of a man for whom 
he did not feel a warm admiration than he would maintain 
a friendship with one for whom he had no affection. In 
an effort to make real to himself the subject of his biography 
he tried to live with him "in as close familiarity as was 
consistent with the fact of his being dead." An ardent 
admirer of Boswell's "Life of Johnson," Mahan tried 
through the letters written by his subjects, and to them. 



304 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

to establish as intimate relation with them as was possible 
in the circumstances. Thus by critically selecting and skil- 
fully introducing an apt remark or act Mahan hoped to give 
to the reader "those minute touches by which an artist 
secures likeness and heightens effect. ' ' Nor did Mahan in 
his treatment pass over the shortcomings especially of 
Nelson. "I grieved while I condemned." In his two 
biographies Mahan tried to find the real officer and man. 
In them he gave the world a careful estimate of the mili- 
tary characters of Farragut and Nelson. 

Mahan 's series of books, especially his first, "The Influ- 
ence of Sea Power Upon History," which was epochal in 
its effects, were tremendous in their stimulus to naval 
thought the world over. In Great Britain, a 'country whose 
every citizen had felt vaguely for centuries the importance 
of sea power on its insular position, the reception of his 
books was particularly enthusiastic. Mahan had given ex- 
pression to Britain's vague consciousness that in past cen- 
turies she had in great crises been saved against conquest 
by her Drakes, Hawkes, and Nelsons. Of the favorable 
reception received by Mahan 's sea-power series in England 
there are numerous evidences in articles contributed to 
British service journals, for example, the following from 
the pen of Colonel Maurice, which appeared in May, 1893, 
as a review of Mahan 's "Influence of Sea Power Upon the 
French Revolution and Empire ' ' : 

Here, for the first time, is told in its true proportions the 
story of that great struggle which was waged by our forefathers 
against the forces of the French Revolution. One is tempted to 
feel ashamed that such a task should have been left to be under- 
taken by an American sailor. Yet it is well that it should have 
been so. The impartiality, the justice, the dignity, with which a 
bystander has been able to record that wonderful story would 
scarcely have been possible for an English subject. Even if an 
Englishman had had all the merits of the writer, he could hardly 



MAHAN 305 

have freed himself from national and party proclivities. Had 
he done so he would have been suspected of them.^ 

But while Mahan's work was more enthusiastically ap- 
plauded in Great Britain, — even as an orator addressing a 
sympathetic and already half-convinced audience needs 
only to reiterate old slogans to set his hearers on fire, — his 
influence in other parts of the world where the power of 
armies was still regarded as the last argument of nations 
was revolutionary. His first two epochal books were 
quickly translated into French, German, Russian, and 
Japanese. The last-named, the "Britons of the East," 
whose island kingdom like Britain's depended on the sea, 
were most apt pupils of Mahan's teachings. They had, 
soon after Perry had called them out of their Oriental se- 
clusion, sent their sons to British naval schools, where their 
future admirals like Togo learned to pay a reverence to 
Nelson little short of Britain's own worship of her hero. 
How thoroughly the Japanese absorbed Mahan's ideas be- 
came manifest in their battle of Tsu Shima in 1905, the 
Trafalgar of steam, where Admiral Togo's strategy and 
tactics, from his choice of bases to his fleet manoeuvers, 
showed a unique application of the principles of the great 
teacher. "As far as known to myself," says Mahan, "more 
of my works have been done into Japanese than into any 
other tongue." 

William II, who became Emperor of Germany two years 
before Mahan's epochal pronouncement on sea power was 
published, and whose empire had been won by great mili- 
tary power only a score of years before, became an im- 
mediate and enthusiastic convert to Mahan's ideas. To 
some Americans the emperor once flatteringly remarked 
that he always kept a copy of Poe under his pillow; and 
to another he made a similar remark about Mahan's first 

1 Maurice, United Service Magazine, New Series, VII. 792. 



306 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

book, — an incident which sheds a new light on the old say- 
ing, "Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown." Hurd 
in the ''Fortnightly Review" for August, 1906, tells us 
that the kaiser possessed a copy of Mahan's "Influence of 
Sea Power Upon History," and had annotated it himself. 
Moreover, he immediately ordered the book to be in every 
ship's library of his fleet. As he was always looking 
askance at British sea power, perhaps he already had some 
vague presentiment of the need of fleets for fulfilling his 
dreams of world conquest. For he had already created 
a navy department and was building the Kiel Canal, which 
would make his sea communications from the Baltic to the 
North Sea safe. He had, moreover, inveigled the British 
into swapping Heligoland for a province in Africa, — an 
exchange which a British statesman tried to- justify by the 
remark that his countrymen had given a button for a whole 
suit of clothes. To this a German strategist, who must have 
read his Mahan pretty carefully, replied that the button 
would hold the whole German suit together. That it came 
pretty nearly doing so in the "World War is a matter of re- 
cent history. It is fortunate for mankind that Great 
Britain in practice if not in conscious knowledge had antici- 
pated Mahan's teaching by three hundred years, for the 
German emperor, finding himself behind in 1914 in the 
race for competitive naval armament, decided that Moltke's 
ideas were after all better than Mahan's. Land power in 
the Balkans would neutralize sea power in the Mediter- 
ranean. And in the event he proved once again the teach- 
ings of history, as illuminated by Mahan, that sea power 
has, in the words of George Washington, the casting vote. 

In a word, then, JMahan's writings have greatly influenced 
the building of navies since the last decade of the nine- 
teenth century both in his own and other countries. 
Though no imperialist himself, Mahan fostered uninten- 



MAHAN 307 

tionally the imperialistic tendencies that have been going 
on in the world during the last quarter of a century. He 
taught his own countrymen and the statesmen of the world 
to think in terms not of cruisers but of dreadnoughts, not 
of single ships but of fleets, not of commerce-destruction but 
of commerce conservation, not of fleets versus forts but of 
fleets versus fleets, not of coast defense but of control of the 
seas, and not of the defensive but of the offensive. Mahan 
in these ways revolutionized the world's conception of sea 
power. 



CHAPTER XXII 

SEA POWER IN THE PACIFIC 

THE year 1898, when the Spanish-American "War 
began and ended — a war in which, on May 9th, 
Admiral Mahan was recalled from his retirement 
to guide the strategy of his country on the Naval War Board 
— was the most important year for American sea power 
since the Civil War. This importance was due not only 
to naval operations in the Caribbean, the immediate seat 
of the war, but quite as much to events in the Pacific, where 
this period witnessed a vast readjustment in Asiatic affairs. 
At this critical time Germany, France, England, Russia, 
and Japan were threatening the dismemberment of China. 
As a result of the Chino-Japanese War of 1894, Japan had 
acquired a suzerainty over Korea. By the interference of 
Russia and Germany in the resulting peace negotiations 
on their hypocritical interest in the integrity of China, 
Japan lost Port Arthur, which she had won in the war. 
This pretended interest Russia soon after cynicallj^ threw 
to the four winds by her own acquisition of Port Arthur, 
which in 1898 she was fortifying as a winter terminus of 
the Trans-Siberian Railway and as a great naval base. 
Germany also found in the killing of some missionaries a 
pretense for seizing a port in China, — Kiao-chau in Shan- 
tung. And England in this same year added to her pre- 
vious spheres of influence Wei-hai-wei. 

While China was thus being dismembered, the United 
States by troubles at its very door, in Cuba, was drifting 
into war with Spain. As one important result of this war 

308 



SEA POWER IN THE PACIFIC 



309 



the American Government found itself in unexpected pos- 
session of important islands in the Pacific, which forced it, 
almost against its will, to abandon its policy of isolation 



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THE PACIFIC OCEAN 

and to take a hand in Far-Eastern questions. This new 
American interest crystallized in John Hay's Open-Door 
policy for China, — a policy which like that other great 
American policy, the Monroe Doctrine, depends for its 
sanction in the last analysis on sea power. 

The underlying causes of the Spanish-American War 
were misrule and insurrections in Cuba, covering intermit- 
tently half a century- As a concomitant of these revolu- 
tions, filibustering expeditions, like that of the Virginius in 
1873, sent by American sympathizers in aid of the Cubans, 
often brought on diplomatic complications between Spain 



310 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

and the United States. Like the Mexican revolutions of 
later date, these disturbed conditions continued to cause 
serious losses in property and lives to American residents. 
During the last revolt of the Cubans, 1895 to 1898, the bat- 
tleship Maine, which had been sent to Havana to safeguard 
the lives of Americans, was on February 15, 1898, blown 
up in the harbor of Havana by some outside agency, — a fact 
brought out by the official investigation that followed. In 
the interval between the blowing up of the Maine and April 
21, 1898, when war began, the American Government was 
preparing for the conflict. 

Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
with his firm belief in preparedness for war and with 
his dynamic energy, had been getting the navy ready for 
the war which he saw approaching, and which he realized 
would be dependent for its decision on sea power. Of 
Eoosevelt's energy, John D, Long, the Secretary of the 
Navy, wrote: 

He was heart and soul in his Work. His typewriters had no 
rest. . , . He was especially stimulating to the younger officers 
who gathered about him and made his office as busy as a hive. 
He was especially helpful in the purchasing of ships and in every 
line where he could push on the work of preparation for war. 

As Fox had discovered in Farragut the man for the 
New Orleans attack, Roosevelt saw in Commodore George 
Dewey the man for the important station in the Far East, 
where a serious situation, calling for a man of action and 
tact, might arise at any moment. Against departmental 
red-tape, bureaucracy, and political favoritism, Roosevelt 
put through the selection of Dewey as commander of the 
Asiatic Squadron. 

George Dewey was bom at Montpelier, Vermont, De- 
cember 26, 1837. He entered the Naval Academy in 1854, 
the year that Perry opened Japan to the trade and civiliza- 



SEA POWER IN THE PACIFIC 311 

•tion of the world. It was Perry's flag-ship, the side-wheeler 
Mississippi, in which Dewey at the age of twenty-four re- 
ceived his baptism of fire as he piloted her by Forts Jackson 
and St. Philip on that memorable night in April, 1862. In 
her he saw service in the Mississippi campaign until under 
the batteries of Port Hudson she was set on fire and drifted 
to her watery grave in the great river whose name she bore. 
He served, also, as second officer, in the attack on Fort 
Fisher in the steam frigate Colorado, which had previously 
been under a martinet who had made her a most unhappy 
ship. Young Dewey by his just and firm attitude toward 
the men stamped out the spirit of insubordination, yet not 
without experiences such as Farragut, in his early youth, 
had had. After the Civil War Dewey's professional career 
was the uneventful succession of duties ashore and afloat of 
peace times, — duties so carefully and conscientiously per- 
formed that his record brought him to Roosevelt's notice. 
At the age of sixty, like Farragut, Commodore Dewey was to 
fight the great battle of his career, — a battle in some respects 
strikingly like that of New Orleans, where Dewey had 
learned under his great leader the art of attacking fleets 
protected by forts. Of his debt to Farragut Dewey says : 

Farragut has always been my ideal of the naval oflfleer, urbane, 
decisive, indomitable. Whenever I have been in a difficult situa- 
tion, or in the midst of such a confusion of details that the simple 
and right thing to do seemed hazy, I have often asked myself, 
"What would Farragut do?" In the course of the preparations 
for Manila Bay I often asked myself this question, and I confess 
that I was thinking of him the night that we entered the bay, and 
with tlie conviction that I was doing precisely what he would 
have done. Valuable as the training at Annapolis was, it was 
poor schooling beside that of serving under Farragut in time of 
war.^ 

This conscious imitation of Farragut is borne out in 

1 Autobiography of George Dewey, p. 50. 






312 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

Commodore Dewey's careful study and preparation for his 
new duties. The interval before his departure for Japan, 
December 7, 1897, he employed in the study of international 
law and in the scrutiny of charts and descriptions of the 
Philippine Islands, — which were at that time so little visited 
by American merchantmen and naval vessels that the most 
recent report in the Bureau of Naval Intelligence was out 
of date by more than a score of years. Although few of- 
ficials in Washington at the time of Dewey's departure be- 
lieved war with Spain was a probability, Commodore Dewey 
thought the situation grave and foresaw that the objective 
in case of war was, not an attack on Spain, but rather the 
seizure of her colonies, especially Cuba and the Philippines. 
Before leaving he arranged for a supply of ammunition to 
be sent out in the Concord and the Baltimore from the navy 
yard at San Francisco, the nearest base, though seven thou- 
sand miles away. On January 3, 1898, in the harbor of 
Nagasaki, he hoisted his broad pennant on the Olympia, pro- 
ceeded to Yokohama to pay his respects to the Emperor of 
Japan — a tactful and diplomatic move — and then started 
for Hongkong, where he received news of the destruction of 
the Maine and got his first instructions from the Navy De- 
partment, through the assistant secretary, "to keep full of 
coal" in the event of an offensive against the Spanish squad- 
ron in the Philippines. 

Feeling greatly the need of a base, Dewey on his own 
initiative had to arrange for the purchase of coal and 
colliers and select an out-of-the-way port wherein to keep 
his supply-vessels in caae of war and the resulting declara- 
tions of neutrality by the great powers, which would neces- 
sitate his withdrawal within twenty-four hours from Hong- 
kong, a British possession. Meanwhile he kept in constant 
touch with the American consul at Manila, from whom he 
got much valuable information regarding the state of the 



SEA POWER IN THE PACIFIC 313 

Spanish fleet under Admiral Montojo and of the defenses 
of Manila Bay. During this time he also overhauled his 
engines, removed the woodwork from his ships, gave them 
a coat of war-paint, and kept his crews up to the mark by 
constant drills. Despite the stream of rumors that reached 
Hongkong of mines and large rifles protecting the entrance 
to Manila, the morale of Dewey's officers and men was 
splendid. The British officers at Hongkong summed up 
their opinion of Dewey 's men and their task in these words : 
"A fine set of fellows, but unhappily we shall never see 
them again." 

These rumors, a subtle form of Spanish propaganda, 
Dewey did not give much credence to, but he continued his 
careful preparation on the assumption that he had a well- 
prepared enemy and a task not very different from Far- 
ragut's at New Orleans. On April 23d, Dewey received 
notice from the Governor of Hongkong to leave the port 
within forty-eight hours. The same day, in the nick of 
time, the Baltimore arrived with its badly needed second 
instalment of ammunition, which filled Dewey's squadron 
a little over half of its full capacity, and there was no more 
within seven thousand miles. Had he and Roosevelt not 
insisted on the despatch of the Conaord and the Baltimore 
and had Dewey not by a personal visit to Mare Island hur- 
ried up the repairs and loading of the vessels, he would 
probably in the present emergency have been without these 
two important cruisers and their more important cargoes. 
On April 25th Dewey was informed by the Secretary of 
the Navy of the outbreak of hostilities and was ordered to 
capture or destroy the Spanish squadron in the Philippines. 
After leaving Hongkong on April 25th, Commodore Dewey 
spent two days at Mirs Bay, a Chinese port near Hongkong, 
to take on board his last supplies of coal and to await final 
intelligence from Washington, and especially to meet the 



314 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

American consul on the latter 's arrival from Manila, from 
■whom he got reliable information that the Spaniards had 
some very powerful rifles in their shore batteries and some 
more rumors that the entrance had recently been mined. 

On April 27th Dewey's squadron, consisting of the 
Olympia, flag-ship, the Baltimore, the Boston, the Raleigh, 
the Concord, the Petrel, and the McCidloch, left Mirs Bay 
for Manila, six hundred miles away. This city is located 
twenty-six miles from the high headlands which guard the 
entrance of Manila Bay. The entrance is divided into two 
channels by the islands of El Fraile, Corregidor, and Ca- 
ballo. Beyond these the bay opens out to a width of twenty- 
five miles, with Cavite, the Spanish naval arsenal, on its 
right and Manila five miles beyond. During the trip across 
from China, Dewey gave his cruisers, which were all un- 
armored, some protection by layers of heavy chain cables 
along the most vulnerable parts. He also held frequent 
conferences with his captains, with whom he planned to 
slip into Manila Bay in column formation under cover of 
darkness, and once inside, on signal from the flag-ship, to 
engage the enemy's fleet. 

Commodore Dewey sighted the Philippines on April 
30th, and after a vain search at Subig Bay — where he had 
been informed by the American consul that Admiral Mon- 
tojo intended to make his stand — Dewey that night with 
all lights out silently made his way into the enemy's lair. 
He had rightly diagnosed the Spanish morale (or, rather, 
lack of morale) ; he believed that the Spaniards' attitude 
would be passive and defensive, and that a quick, aggres- 
sive attack would demoralize them. He had discounted the 
yarns about submarine mines, for he reasoned that none 
but the most expert engineers could plant mines in the 
deep waters of Boca Grande, the channel he intended to 
take, and in that second place the mines, even if planted, 



SEA POWER IN THE PACIFIC 315 

would rapidly deteriorate in the tropical salt water. At 
all events, mines or no mines, he had determined to enter 
the bay. As Dewey's squadron in the pitch-black dark- 
ness silently felt its way in, the alert lookouts could dis- 
cover no scout or torpedo-boat on guard. The Americans 
gpt well beyond the first island before the Spaniards, who 
must have been informed of Dewey's departure from Mirs 
Bay, finally opened fire. Three shots from El Fraile went 
wide of their mark, were answered by a few shots from the 
squadron, and then all was still again. It was now mid- 
night; Dewey's cruisers on approaching the bay itself 
slowed down to four knots in order not to reach Manila and 
the enemy's squadron before daybreak of this memorable 
first of May. 

Thinking the enemy's squadron was under the Manila 
batteries, Dewey swung in a semicircle by the city and as 
he did so got his first glimpse in the early dawn of Mon- 
tojo's fleet of seven units anchored abreast of the Sangley 
Point battery at the end of the peninsula of Cavite. The 
batteries at the city had been firing at the American squad- 
ron but without hitting anything, and now at 5 :15 a, m., the 
Spanish fleet and Sangley Point battery opened on Dewey's 
approaching cruisers. The American commodore at 5 :40 
A. M., turning to the captain of the Olympia, quietly said, 
"You may fire when you are ready, Gridley." 

The Olympia' s salvo was the signal for the rest of the 
American squadron to open fire on Montojo's fleet. Dewey 
passed and repassed the enemy, all told, five times, chang- 
ing his range from 4500 to 2000 yards, thus spoiling the 
enemy's aim, and also bringing into play alternately his 
port and starboard batteries. Two of Montojo's cruisers, 
the Do7i Juan and the Beina Cristina,'his flag-ship, made 
brave attempts at charging Dewey's flag-ship, but were 
stopped in mid-career by the devastating fire of the Ameri- 



316 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

cans. At 7 :35 a. m., after the fifth run, Dewey, informed 
erroneously that his ammunition was nearly gone, deter- 
mined to retire for a time to take stock of his supply. 
Under cover of the smoke — both sides used brown powder — 
Dewey was of the opinion up to this time that the enemy 
fleet was still intact, as his own was, but just as he turned 
away, he saw through the smoke the plight of the Spaniards. 
All but one of their cruisers were in flames or drifting aim- 
lessly shoreward. Finding he had ample ammunition, after 
his men had had breakfast and a rest, Dewey, at 11 :16 a. m., 
returned to the scene of battle. In a few minutes the 
Sangley Point battery was silenced, and the Don Antonio 
de TJlloa, the last Spanish ship in line, her flag nailed to the 
mast and her guns still roaring defiance, sank at her moor- 
ings. 

The results of this action, both immediate and remote, 
were remarkable. Dewey found to his amazement that no 
one had been killed in his squadron and that only 8 were 
wounded. On the other hand, the enemy's casualties 
amounted to 381. The Spanish squadron, consisting, like 
Dewey's, of unarmored units, had been annihilated by the 
volume of fire from the smaller-caliber quick-firers of the 
Americans. Dewey had again proved Farragut's axiom: 
"The best defense against the enemy's guns is a well 
directed fire from your own guns. ' ' The wounded Admiral 
Montojo surrendered himself and the remnants of his crews 
to the American commander. The forts at the entrance, 
their communications cut, also surrendered later. Dewey 
was master of a great bay and had its city cut off from the 
world. He now had a base. Last and most important, the 
victory destroyed Spanish sea power in the Philippines and 
gave the world the first definite intimation that a new naval 
power of great possibilities had appeared in the Far East 
to be reckoned with in international affairs in that quarter. 



SEA POWER IN THE PACIFIC 



317 




J 



CAN/KCAG 







^^1 



li' 






THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 



C = Costilla 

A = Don Juan de Austria 
U = Don Antonio de Ulloa 
M = Manila 



RC = Reina Cristinn 
MD = Marques del Duero 
10 = /«ia rfc Cuba 
IL = i«ia rfe Luzon 



Only movements before 11 a. m. are shown. 

From a diagram of the battle by H. O. Washburn in the Department of 
English, U. S. Naval Academy. 

During the three months between Dewey's victory and 
the fall of the city on August 13th under a combined at- 
tack by General Merritt and Commodore Dewey, events 
occurred in Manila Bay that showed how critically impor- 



318 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

tant the sea power of America, consisting of a small navy 
and a smaller ocean merchant marine, was. Of this period 
Captain Sir Edward Chichester, in eommand of three Brit- 
ish cruisers that arrived in the bay shortly after Dewey 
promulgated his blockade, declared to John Barrett : * ' Your 
Admiral [Dewey] accomplished by tact, firmness and good 
judgment in Manila Bay what many naval men would have 
thought only possible by war. Dewey is a natural fighter, 
but true fighter that he is, he prefers to win a peaceful 
victory. He is a great man. ' ' ^ 

After Dewey's victory and the ensuing blockade, war- 
ships of England, Japan, Germany, and other nations ar- 
rived on the scene. Of these the Germans, who had one 
commercial house in Manila and a handful of nationals 
to protect, quickly gathered in the bay a squadron of five 
war-ships, besides colliers and a transport full of sailors, all 
under Admiral von Diedrichs, — a force more powerful than 
that of the American commander in control of the port. 
While the British with overwhelmingly greater interests in 
the Philippines were scrupulously careful in complying 
with the law of nations as applying to blockade and neutral- 
ity, the German admiral continually disregarded Dewey's 
blockade regulations, made reconnaissances in and about the 
harbor, landed sailors under pretense of drills, held friendly 
and secret conferences with the Spanish authorities, and in- 
terfered with the operations of the insurgents, who after the 
victory became the informal allies of the Americans. All 
this time American naval power was hanging in the balance, 
for Sampson had not yet destroyed Cervera's cruisers at 
Santiago and another Spanish squadron under Admiral 
Camara, more powerful than Dewey 's, was on its way, via 
the Mediterranean, to the Philippines. It was therefore 
vitally important for Dewey to prevent intervention on 

1 Barrett, Life of Dewey, p. 115. 



SEA POWER IN THE PACIFIC 319 

behalf of Spain by any third belligerent. His attitude to- 
ward Von Diedrichs was a remarkable combination of tact 
and firmness, in which he was powerfully backed by the 
British, who, in the person of their commander on the spot, 
Captain Chichester, stood for a strict regard for interna- 
tional law. The climax came when Admiral von Diedrichs 
tried to get all the naval commanders present to protest 
against the bombardment of the Manila defenses on August 
13th. Of this incident Captain Chichester says : 

When the German admiral sent me word that he was coming 
aboard my ship to get me to join in a protest against Dewey's 
action, I looked up international law and spread the books out 
on my cabin table with the pages open and marked — all in a 
row — and when he came I said : "What can I do ? This American 
admiral is so deadly right in all that he has done and all he 
proposes to do that if we protest we will surely show that we 
do not understand the law." Of course, there was nothing to be 
done and I did it. 

During the bombardment Chichester placed his cruisers be- 
tween the German squadron and Dewey's. 

The real crux of the matter is that America with her weak 
sea power had by a masterly stroke during legitimate naval 
operations anticipated the German Emperor in the acquisi- 
tion of the rich Philippine group. Until Dewey had put 
these islands on the map, the Germans hardly had given 
them a thought. The defenseless condition of the Philip- 
pines with the constant insurrections against the tyranny 
and mismanagement of a decadent nation would have made 
the way easy for their conquest by a covetous power. It 
was, in fact, an intimation from the British Government 
that Germany would take over the islands if America with- 
drew from them, which brought President McKinley to his 
final decision to insist upon their purchase from Spain as a 
part of the treaty of peace. 



320 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

As Germany's attitude was hostile to the United States 
during the war, Great Britain's was friendly. The friend- 
ship of the British was fostered by the tactful and able 
diplomacy of John Hay, at that time American Ambassador 
at London. Owing to England's strict observance of the 
duties of neutrality, she refused to grant more coal to 
Admiral Camara at Suez than enough to carry him back to 
Spain and she rigidly enforced the twenty-four hour rule 
against him. Spain was therefore compelled, especially 
after the destruction of Cervera's ships, to abandon her 
attempt to send a new naval force to the Philippines. John 
Hay, who had thus helped to remove some of Dewey's 
worries, was an old friend of the commodore and had sent 
him after his victory a congratulatory letter in which he 
spoke of the ''mingled wisdom and daring" of the victor of 
Manila Bay. 

The far-reaching effects of Dewey's victory were seen in 
the subsequent negotiations regarding the integrity of China 
conducted with the great powers after the war by John 
Hay, now Secretary of State. On September 6, 1899, Hay 
announced his famous Open-Door policy, intended to stop 
exploitation of China, to keep her trade free for all nations, 
and to promote respect for her rights as a sovereign nation. 
This great American doctrine, which takes rank second only 
to that other great American state paper, the Monroe Doe- 
trine, was supported by England and Japan. Hay's 
ideas, which, of course, required the assent of the American 
Senate, encountered much opposition not only from Russia 
and Germany but from his own people. Russia and Ger- 
many, while pretending to agree with the Open-Door 
privileges for all without special discrimination for any, 
continued their cynical policy of exploitation, which led 
to the Boxer movement in China against "foreign devils," 
and to the Russo-Japanese War, which with all its conse- 



SEA POWER IN THE PACIFIC 321 

quences of later Japanese antagonism to the United States 
might have been prevented by following Hay's suggestions 
for an understanding between the United States, England, 
and Japan. 

From John Hay's letters, since published, we now realize 
the opposition his ideas encountered in his own country. 
He says, for instance, in a confidential letter of date of 
September 20, 1900 : 

About China, it is the devil's own mess. We cannot possibly 
publish all the facts without breaking off relations with several 
Powers. We shall have to do the best we can. and take the con- 
sequences, which will be pretty serious, I do not doubt. "Give 
and take" — the axiom of diplomacy to the rest of the world — is 
positively forbidden to us, by both the Senate and public opinion. 
We must take what we can and give nothing — which greatly 
narrows our possibilities.^ 

And in a similar confidential tone in a letter to Henry 
Adams of November 21, 1900, John Hay says : 

What a business this has been in China ! So far we have got on 
by being honest and naif. I do nofe clearly see where we are to 
come the delayed cropper. But it will come. At least we are 
spared the infamy of an alliance with Germany. I would rather, 
I think, be the dupe of China, than the chum of the Kaiser. 
Have you noticed how the world will take anything nowadays 
from a German? Biilow said yesterday in substance — "We have 
demanded of China everything we can think of. If we think 

of anything else we will demand that, and be d d to you" — 

and not a man in the world kicks.^ 

It is quite within the range of possibility that there would 
never have been a World War in 1914 — the delayed cropper 
which Hay seemed to predict would come — if the American 
people had listened more attentively in 1900 to their great 
statesman and diplomat. As England with her vast sea 

1 Thayer, Life amd Letters of John Bay, II. 247. 

2 Thayer, Life and Letters of John Hay, II. 248. 



322 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

power in 1823 backed the new doctrine of Monroe, so slie was 
ready in 1900 to back tbe new American Open-door policy in 
China. 

If, therefore, the sea power of the United States received 
a new impetus from Dewey's victory at Manila Bay and 
made possible a new interest in the Orient, culminating in 
Hay's Open-Door policy, it also acquired bases in the Pa- 
cific, strategically located, for the defense and protection 
of the future commercial and military sea power of the 
United States. England, the nation that has defined and 
developed sea power more than any other, has in past ages 
wisely made secure her sea routes by the acquisition of 
great naval bases. These should have, as Mahan points out, 
three requisites : position, strength, and resources ; but it ia 
rarely possible to secure all three of these advantages in 
one and the same base. Generally a strategic position, the 
most important of the three, is provided by nature; the 
other two qualities — strength and resources — must ordi- 
narily be provided artificially by fortifications, mines, and 
submarines, and by supplies of food, coal, fuel-oil, dock- 
yards, etc. Such bases England has in Gibraltar at the 
gateway of the Mediterranean, Malta at the very door of 
past and possible future enemies, and Hongkong, her ad- 
vance post for a war against an Oriental nation. 

The victory of Dewey — who was given the rank of ad- 
miral by a special law of Congress for his unique achieve- 
ments — acquired for the United States similarly stra- 
tegic positions in the Philippines and Guam, situated as 
they are at the doorway of the Orient. A few months 
after Dewey's victory, by a resolution of Congress of July 
7, 1898, the way was cleared for the acquisition by the 
United States of the Hawaiian Islands, situated at the 
strategical center of the Pacific and at the cross-roads from 
Alaska, California, and the Isthmus of Panama, and from 



SEA POWER IN THE PACIFIC 323 

Australia, Guam, the Philippines, China, and Japan.^ The 
naval base at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands has 
been, since its occuption, greatly developed and played an 
important part in the World War. Furthermore, by the 
American acquisition in 1899 of Tutuila in the Samoan 
group the United States got another potential base, making, 
like Guam relatively to Pearl Harbor, an advance base for 
operations in the Far East. Such bases are a vital ele- 
ment of sea power. They make a place of refuge from 
storms for merchantman and war-ship, a place for their 
repairs, docking, and refueling, and a resting-place for a 
retreating or crippled fleet. Had Dewey's ships been de- 
feated at Manila Bay or suffered severe damages requiring 
spare parts, more ammunition, and hospitals for wounded 
ships and men, or had they been forced to retreat before 
the approach of Camara or at the threats of Von Diedrichs, 
Dewey's lack of a base would have been disastrous. 

In conclusion we maj^ say that American sea power, as 
represented by Dewey's insignificant force and his great 
victory, paved the way for vast commercial and naval 
expansion in the Pacific and for the western gateway to 
the Pacific from the future Panama Canal, whose eastern 
gateway and its approaches by way of the Caribbean were 
to be secured by another victory of American sea power in 
the same Spanish- American war. 

1 See map, p. 309. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

SEA POWER MAKES THE PANAMA CANAL POSSIBLE 

AS in 1898 — in Roosevelt's words "the most impor- 
tant year in this Republic since Lincoln died" — 
American sea power backing American diplom- 
acy won the stepping-stones from America across the 
Pacific to the Orient, so in this same year American sea 
power entrenched itself on the Caribbean and paved the 
way for the linking of the two great oceans by the future 
Pamana Canal. Before 1898, with not a single base in the 
Caribbean, the United States had no control over that great 
pathway of commerce to the isthmus. After 1898, owing 
in very large measure to the naval victory of July 3, 1898, 
at Santiago, the United States had such control. 

The American strategy of the Spanish War was con- 
ducted by the Naval War Board of three members, on which 
Admiral Mahan was the leading authority. The main fea- 
ture of this strategy in the Atlantic was the isolation of 
Cuba, the cause of the war, and located at the very door of 
the United States, one hundred miles from its base at Key 
West. This isolation of the island was the object of Presi- 
dent McKinley's proclamation of a blockade of a definite 
and limited portion of the coast of western Cuba, an order 
promulgated immediately on the breaking of diplomatic 
negotiations on April 21st. 

To make the blockade effective required a- force that 
finally aggregated 124 units.^ Admiral Sampson, an of&eer 

1 Sampson, Century Magazine, Vol. .57, 887. 

324 



THE PANAMA CANAL POSSIBLE 325 

with a good record in the Civil War and later, who had been 
selected over the heads of his seniors to command the North 
Atlantic Squadron based on Key West, was in favor of im- 
mediate offensive naval operations against Havana with a 
view to its capture, but owing to the lack of troops and the 
vital need of keeping the limited American naval forces 
intact — a need all the more serious because of possible 
European intervention in behalf of Spain — the administra- 
tion in Washington was in favor simply of the blockade. 
This would attain the same results without risking the 
ships. As Mahan so frequently points out, a blockade, by 
draining a nation of its dollars rather than of its blood, 
achieves results just as effectively and often more effec- 
tively than attacks on coast defenses. This is also in keep- 
ing with Mahan 's humane plea in his writings and at the 
later Hague Conference against the exemption of private 
property from capture at sea. To deprive a belligerent of 
his resources for war-making wears out his power of re- 
sistance; a blockade with its consequent seizure of food 
and supplies destined for the civil and military population 
takes a belligerent by the throat and forces submission with 
far less loss of human life than actual fighting- 

Accordingly, the objects of the Cuban blockade were 
threefold. The first object was to starve out the Spanish 
troops concentrated largely around Havana and Cien- 
fuegos, where the only Cuban railways were. This object 
was so effectively attained that in less than two months the 
Spanish Governor-General of Cuba wrote that his soldiers 
and sailors in Havana had to exist on rice and hardtack. 
The population had previously been near starvation, for 
the Spanish policy of concentrating the rural population in 
the cities had destroyed virtually all agriculture. A second 
object was the destruction of Spanish commerce, which 
consisted of a few merchantmen connecting the island with 



326 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

the mother country. And a third object was to force 
Spain to send naval and military relief the long journey 
of four thousand miles, a distance which would endanger 
the communications of any such expedition and be a great 
drain on Spain's limited resources. 

This last purpose of the American Government was 
realized in the Spanish naval force under Admiral Cervera, 
mobilized before the war at the Cape Verde Islands, from 
which it was to sail, a week after the war began, to its 
fate. Cervera, who had for several years foreseen the pos- 
sibility of a clash with the United States, had vainly urged 
a corrupt and dilatory government to prepare for war. 
In January, 1898, he wrote to a relative : 

About two years ago I wrote you a letter concerning our con- 
dition to go to war with the United States. I requested you to 
keep that letter in case some day it should be necessary to bring 
it to light in defense of my memory or myself when we had 
experienced the sad disappointment prepared for us by the 
stupidity of some, the cupidity of others, and the incapability 
of all, even of those with the best of intentions. 

After mentioning specific instances of Spanish adminis- 
trative inefficiency, such as the war-ship Catalurm, begun 
eight years before and with her hull in 1898 still unfinished, 
and the three cruisers Vizcaya, Oquendo, and Maria Teresa 
finally completed at Bilboa only by the efforts of an Eng- 
lish naval constructor, he continues: 

But my purpose is not to accuse, but to explain why we may 
and must expect disaster. ... As it would be a crime to say all 
this publicly to-day, I hold my tongue, and go forth resignedly 
to face the trials which God may be pleased to send me. I am 
sure that we will do our duty, for the spirit of the navy is 
excellent. 

Such was the unpreparedness of Spain for war with the 
United States that Cervera had urged his government to 



THE PANAMA CANAL POSSIBLE 327 

grant independence to Cuba to end the constant friction 
with America that he saw must culminate in armed conflict 
and in disaster to Spain. 

But though the strategists in Washington suspected that 
Spain was unprepared, they made their plans to meet an 
equal on the seas. On paper, and from all available of- 
ficial sources, the two navies were equal. So nearly was 
this supposed to be the case that Mahan says one American 
officer of excellent judgment asserted that the loss of the 
Maine had tipped the scales in favor of Spain in the At- 
lantic, and as if to favor this view the American naval 
authorities ordered the Oregon, one of the best ships in the 
navy, to make the long journey from the West Coast to re- 
enforce the Atlantic fleet, — a hazardous undertaking in the 
face of Cervera's supposedly swift and powerful cruisers 
at Cape Verde. The British authority Admiral Colomb 
in his ''Naval Warfare," in contrasting American naval 
preparedness and mobilization before April 21st with 
Spain's inactivity, says, "The one navy was very much 
alive, and the other was to all intents and purposes a dead 
one before the war opened." Colomb calculated the 
strength of the two navies in the ratio of three to two in 
favor of the United States. He shows that at the outbreak 
of war America had 69 war-ships of all types, among them 
the four 10,000-ton first-class battleships of the Oregon class, 
to Spain's 49, the largest of which was 9,900 tons. Its 
initial force the United States increased during the next 
three months by 67 more, making 136 in all. The incre- 
ments were for the most part extemporized types, such as 
yachts, coasters, and some fine scouts like the Harvard, the 
Yale, and the 8i. Louis, acquired from the only transatlantic 
line under American registry in the period before the war, 
when the American merchant marine on the high seas was 
conspicuous by its absence. 



328 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

The lack of an ocean merchant marine on the part of both 
belligerents made the war anomalous in this respect as 
it was in other respects. Though neither belligerent had 
been a signatory to the Declaration of Paris of 1856, which 
prohibited privateering, neither party sent out privateers 
and neither made any prizes worth speaking of. United 
States war-ships captured all told half a dozen merchant- 
men, while the Spaniards took only three prizes of any size. 
The war was also unusual in that neither belligerent made 
any serious attempt to gain or dispute control of the seas. 

This control of the seas Cervera's forces of four cruisers 
and three torpedo-boat destroyers — a type of which the 
United States had none — might, if properly equipped and 
handled, have gained. Such a supposedly fast and homo- 
geneous squadron naval strategists speak of as a "fleet 
in being." This is a force not in itself in command of the 
sea, but one whose very existence is a continual menace 
to the enemy, preventing the latter from concentrating on 
any definite line of operations. Until the "fleet in being" 
is destroyed, the enemy cannot tell when or where a blow 
may fall. He must, therefore, divide or deconcentrate his 
forces until he has destroyed the "fleet in being," which 
is continually threatening his flank and his lines of com- 
munication. Like the wary fox, such a fleet may cause 
its pursuers to scatter to all the four points of the compass 
before it is run to cover. But like the fox, too, it is gen- 
erally caught sooner or later. It is one of the few resources 
of the weaker sea power, Cervera's fleet, before it was 
cornered, not only postponed the sailing of American troops 
under Shafter, but threw the whole Atlantic coast into a 
state verging on panic. 

This panic and the popular clamor of the coast towns 
for protection caused the failure for a time of America's 
sea power to concentrate on the important phase of the 



THE PANAMA CANAL POSSIBLE 329 

war, the blockade of Cuba and the patrol of the Gulf and 
the Caribbean. While Sampson retained the backbone of 
the Atlantic fleet at Key West, Commodore Schley was 
detailed with his "Flying Squadron" to take his station 
at Hampton Roads, a position on the coast, where with 
his speedy cruisers he could ward off an attack on 
Baltimore or New York, or could quickly join Sampson at 
Key West. Another smaller force, the Northern Patrol 
Squadron under Commodore Howell, was stationed off the 
New England coast, in case Cervera should decide to waste 
his valuable powder in shooting at summer resorts on the 
coast of Maine. Admiral Colomb is rather sarcastic re- 
garding this panic in American coast towns in 1898. He 
remarks that Englishmen do not think their fleet is doing 
its duty in time of war unless it is continually out of sight 
of British shores, while Americans want their fleet hugging 
close to their shores in war time. Colomb and Mahan both 
regard this point of view of Americans as due to a miscon- 
ception of the functions of navies. Coast towns, in the 
opinion of naval strategists, should be defended by forts, 
batteries, mines at harbor entrances, and submarines. The 
function of such harbor protection is defensive ; the proper 
function of fleets is offensive. Their work is on the high 
seas to seek and destroy the enemy's fleet. They are 
wasted and demoralized by being required to do service 
which a proper system of coast defense can do so much more 
economical!}^ and effectively. 

On April 29th, as before noted, Cervera left the Cape 
Verde Islands with his four cruisers, the Cristobal Colon, 
the Vizcaya, the Maria Teresa, and the Oquendo, and his 
three torpedo-boat destroyers Pluton, Terror, and Furor. 
He had to sail finally with poor ammunition and defective 
breech-blocks for his guns, and lacking turret guns in one 
of his cruisers. Owing to trouble with his engines and un- 



330 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

scraped bottoms, he averaged only eight knots in crossing 
the Atlantic. He did not arrive in the Caribbean until 
long after he had been expected. To get into touch with 
Spain, he dropped the Terror at Martinique on May 11th, 
and later, on May 14th, he coaled at Curacao, — a fact which 
was quickly cabled to Washington. 

Sampson, off Havana, had received word on May 1st 
from the Navy Deparment of Cervera's departure from 
Cape Verde. He at once proceeded to Porto Rico. As this 
was the colony nearest to Spain's shores, and as it had 
ample coal supplies, Sampson believed San Juan would be 
Cervera's first objective. As soon as the news of the sight- 
ing of Cervera's squadron at Martinique was received, 
Sampson from Porto Rico and Schley from Hampton Roads 
concentrated at Key West, whence, after coaling, Sampson 
returned on IVIay 21st to block Havana against Cervera and 
Schley proceeded to the second port of Cuba, Cienfuegos, 
on May 22d. Meanwhile, on the 19th, Cervera had slipped 
into Santiago. Though the United States Signal Corps 
immediately telegraphed information of Cervera's arrival 
at Santiago, Schley, deceived by a false report from a mer- 
chantman and by smoke rising behind the forts at the 
entrance to Cienfuegos, was sure he had Cervera bottled 
up there. And Sampson did not dare leave the blockade 
of Havana before the various rumors of Cervera's where- 
abouts were confirmed. Not until the latter had been ten 
days at Santiago did the two American commanders con- 
centrate their forces before this port. All this shows how 
difficult it was to run the fox to cover. Admiral Cervera 
regretted ever afterAvard that he had, of all ports in Cuba, 
chosen Santiago, for the fox's hole turned out to be a trap. 

Schley on his arrival off Santiago instituted a blockade 
of the port at a distance of twenty-five miles, which Samp- 
son on June 2d decreased by maintaining a cordon of ships 



THE PANAMA CANAL POSSIBLE 



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332 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

in a semicircle with a radius of from six to four miles in 
the daytime and three at night. He kept some smaller 
vessels and steam-launches on patrol within this semicircle. 
At night Sampson, after experimenting with many search- 
lights, finally kept one battle-ship stationary at a distance 
of two miles, focusing its powerful search-light all night on 
the entrance, with a supporting battle-ship broadside to the 
land batteries to protect it against any fire from the shore. 
The question has often been asked why Cervera did not 
make his sortie at night. He answered this question later 
by stating that such a sortie in the very narrow channel in 
the face of this glaring light, as dazzling as the sun, would 
have resulted in piling up his cruisers on top of one an- 
other. Still, it remains true that between June 1st and 
July 3d, the day of Cervera 's sortie, there were several 
very dark, rainy, and squally nights, which would have 
favored a bold dash; but Admiral Cervera, brave officer 
that he was, was lacking in this quality of dash. 

Besides this close blockade of the harbor exit the Ameri- 
can commander made other dispositions to make Santiago 
Harbor a trap to Cervera 's squadron. He had ordered 
Lieutenant Hobson on June 3d to sink the collier Merrimao 
across the narrow channel, a bold exploit, which, however, 
failed to block the passage. The deed called forth the 
admiration of Admiral Cervera, who sent a special mes- 
sage to Sampson that Hobson and his crew were safe. This 
message illustrated the lack of animus, a characteristic of 
the war on both sides. On June 6th Sampson enfiladed the 
batteries at the entrance to test their strength. On June 
7th he detailed the Marhlehead, the Yankee, and the St. 
Louis to seize Guantanamo Bay, forty miles east of San- 
tiago, as a coaling-station and base of operations. This 
force cut two telegraphic cables to Guantanamo and Santi- 
ago, operations like the earlier and later cable-cuttings that 



THE PANAMA CANAL POSSIBLE 333 

helped to isolate Cuban cities from one another and from 
foreign communications. On June 10th this same force 
landed some marines, the first American troops on Cuban 
soil, who henceforth stood guard over Guantanamo Bay. 
Later in the month Sampson held conferences with the 
Cuban General Garcia and his insurgents, who held the coast 
east and west of Santiago. Furthermore, on General Shaf- 
ter's arrival with his transports Sampson's fleet protected 
the landing on June 22d to 24th at Daiquiri and Siboney, 
half-way between Santiago and Guantanamo, of the Ameri- 
can troops, which later cooperated with the fleet, attacked 
Santiago from the rear, and helped to make Cervera's posi- 
tion in the harbor untenable. Lastly, on July 1st Sampson 
hurled 106 8-inch shells at a range of 8500 yards at invisible 
targets in the bay and the city of Santiago, a novel achieve- 
ment in its day. On this same day, July 1st, and the fol- 
lowing day, the army made its drive, which ended in the 
desperate fighting at El Caney and San Juan Hill. At the 
latter place Colonel Roosevelt's "Rough Riders" made their 
dramatic dash, — a dash that helped powerfully to land the 
Colonel in the governor's chair of the Empire State the 
same autumn. Cut off from communications, in great need 
of coal and the most necessary supplies, and under con- 
tinual bombardment from land and sea, Cervera was forced 
to make his desperate attempt to gain the open sea. 

A little before nine o'clock on the bright Sunday morn- 
ing of July 3d, Cervera with his four cruisers and two de- 
stroyers made his long-expected dash. As he came out, 
he turned sharp to the westward and hugged the shore. 
Sampson, in his flag-ship, the Neiv York, was at the moment 
four miles to the eastward, having left the line to confer 
with General Shafter. He at once flew the signal "Close 
in toward harbor entrance and attack vessels," an order 
which the rest of his squadron had anticipated. Despite 




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336 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN' HISTORY 

the advantage of a running start, two of the Spanish 
cruisers, the Maria Teresa and the Oquendo, were quickly 
overtaken, and under the withering fire of the Americans 
forced ashore in flames. Schley's flag-ship, the Brooklyn, 
leading the chase, had circled to starboard to avoid a des- 
perate threat of ramming from the Teresa just before the 
latter was beached. By making this loop the Brooklyn 
nearly rammed the Texas. At eleven o'clock the Vizcaya, 
also in flames, was forced to beach herself. The Colon, the 
fastest of the four cruisers, was now six miles ahead of the 
leading Americans, the Brooklyti and the Oregon. At one 
o'clock the Oregon succeeded in placing a shell across the 
Colon's bows. A quarter of an hour later the Colon, vir- 
tually uninjured, lowered her colors and ran toward shore, 
where she was scuttled by her crew. The little American 
Gloucester, a converted yacht in command of Wainwright, 
and the nearest ship to the entrance, had, despite her small 
guns and vulnerability, headed straight for the escaping 
squadron and, though greatly outclassed, forced the de- 
stroyer Pluton ashore and then pursued the Furor, which 
was finally sunk by a shot from the New York, at this mo- 
ment hastening at seventeen knots speed in pursuit of the 
bigger game. It was extremely hard luck for Admiral 
Sampson — who had been so vigilant in his efforts to bottle 
up Cervera's squadron — that he had to be absent when the 
battle began and arrived just too late to receive the sur- 
render of the Colon. 

The battle of Santiago may be said to have ended the 
war. Though the American markmanship was good, it 
was not remarkable when we consider the close range at 
which the battle was fought. At Santiago — where smoke- 
less powder was given its first practical test — the large- 
caliber guns of the Americans, which used the old powder, 
made only two hits and the two shots struck the same spot. 



THE PANAMA CANAL POSSIBLE 337 

On the other han I, the Spaniards made virtually no hits 
at all, as was pro>'»\i by the American casualties. Samp- 
son's fleet had oi«e man killed and one man seriously 
wounded, while the Spaniards lost 600 in killed alone. In 
addition, the Ajnericans took 1300 prisoners, including 
Admiral Cervera. 

The preliminary terms of peace were agreed upon by 
the protocol of August 12th, the day that Porto Rico fell 
and the day before the city of Manila surrendered. By the 
articles of the resulting peace, concluded at Paris on De- 
cember 10, 1898, Spain gave up her sovereignty over Cuba 
and ceded to the United States Porto Rico, Guam, and the 
Philippine Islands. In the two battles of Manila and 
Santiago American sea power had won a quick, sharp de- 
cision. 

Here was surely glory enough for all hands in the Ameri- 
can Navy. But as in the War of 1812, the glory was 
clouded by a later controversy over the question as to 
who was in command, and therefore who won, at the battle 
of Santiago, — Sampson or Schley. After the victory news- 
paper men and cartoonists conducted a campaign that 
gradually assumed much bitterness and brought on naval 
and congressional inquiries. In allusion to early news- 
paper statements, Schley in a despatch to the Navy De- 
partment, dated July 10, 1898, said: 

Feel some mortification that the newspaper accounts of July 
6th have attributed the victory on July 3d almost entirely to me. 
Victory was secured by the force under the command [of the] 
Commander-in-Chief, North Atlantic Squadron, and to him the 
honor is due. 

The action had been fought on the general plans given 
by Sampson to his captains a month before; in the crisis 
every captain, using his own initiative, carried out the 



338 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

spirit of Sampson's battle order to clear ship and close in 
on the enemy. While Schley "did his duty on board the 
Brooklyn . . . his ship thereafter rendering magnificent 
and most creditable service," ^ he acted as a captain of his 
own ship, not as a commander of the fleet. On the day 
of the battle, as Secretary Long later wrote, "the result 
would have been the same if both Sampson and Schley 
had been ten thousand miles away." And as Presi- 
dent Roosevelt, who later reviewed the unanimous decision 
in Sampson's favor of the naval court of inquiry, wrote, 
"After the battle was joined not a helm was shifted, not 
a pound of steam was put on in the engine-room aboard 
any ship actively engaged, in obedience to the order of 
either Sampson or Schley, save on their own two vessels. 
It was a captains' fight." It is only just to add, however, 
that Admiral Dewey, the presiding officer of the court of 
inquiry, while joining in the censure of the court for 
Schley's dilatoriness in making the blockade of Cervera 
effective and for the loop incident of the Brooklyn, ex- 
pressed the opinion that Schley was in command at the 
time of the victory of Santiago. As a result of this con- 
troversy, Sampson, broken in health by the strain of his 
responsibility before the battle and deeply disappointed 
by the later events, went to his death without promotion 
and without the thanks of Congress or of his country for 
his great achievement in having his fleet so thoroughly pre- 
pared when the test came that the resulting annihilation 
of the enemy with the loss of only one life in his own force 
closely parallels Dewey's victory. 

But above and beyond' the immediate results of the 
battle of Santiago, the more remote results were far-reach- 
ing. Before the victory the United States had no control 
over the Caribbean Sea, the approach to the Isthmus of 

1 Long, The American Navy, II. 48. 



THE PANAMA CANAL POSSIBLE 339 

Panama. To-day, due to the victory of American sea 
power in Cuba, it has. After the war the United States 
Army continued to occupy Cuba until the inhabitants 
could set up a constitution, elect a president, and take over 
the reins of government. On March 2, 1901, the United 
States Congress added to the Army Appropriation Bill 
for that year the so-called Piatt Amendment. By this the 
new government of Cuba was to agree not to enter into 
any treaty with a foreign power to impair its independence, 
not to contract any public debts that could not be paid by 
the ordinary revenues of the island, to permit the United 
States to intervene in the interest of maintaining Cuban 
independence, and to sell or lease lands to the United States 
for coaling-stations and naval bases. These provisions, 
which were intended to uphold the Monroe Doctrine by 
insuring the independence of Cuba and by intrenching the 
sea power of the United States in the Gulf and the Carib- 
bean, were agreed to by the constituent assembly of Cuba. 
Accordingly, on May 20, 1902, the United States turned 
over the government of the island to a Cuban president, 
duly elected in accordance with its new constitution. 

The United States had now acquired Guantanamo Bay 
and Porto Rico as potential bases for its future sea power 
in the Caribbean. It remained only to give protection and 
resources to these by fortifications, dry-docks, coal-, ammu- 
nition-, and supply-depots to make them powerful bases. 
It is often said by English writers that Jamaica is their 
key to the Caribbean. But Porto Rico and Guantanamo, 
situated on the communications of Jamaica with the mother 
country, and near the vast resources of the United States, 
give the sea power of America the grip on that key. The 
Virgin Islands, more recently acquired by the United 
States, and lying on the eastern extremity of the Carib- 
bean farthest toward Europe, make a possible advance base 



340 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

relatively to Guantanamo. These two, Guantanamo and 
the Virgin Islands, are to the Caribbean what Pearl Harbor 
and Guam are to the Pacific. As the great British bases, 
Gibraltar and Malta, are to the sea control by England of 
the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, so are Guantanamo 
and the Virgin Islands to the sea control of the Caribbean 
and the Panama Canal. By means of the latter, American 
naval fleets will make secure the great route of American 
merchant fleets to the Orient. 

During the Spanish-American War, the long trip of the 
Oregon (fifteen thousand miles via Cape Horn), at a 
critical time when her presence in the Atlantic might mean 
the difference between victory and defeat, called the atten- 
tion of statesmen in America to the need of a canal across 
the Isthmus. The old Clayton-Bulwer Treaty between Eng- 
land and the United States contained a self-denying clause, 
by which each agreed not to gain exclusive control over 
any future canal. As soon as John Hay became Secretary 
of State in the autumn of 1898, he gave the matter of the 
abrogation of the old treaty serious attention. Accord- 
ingly, Henry White, the American Ambassador to Great 
Britain, got a promise from Lord Salisbury to substitute a 
new agreement, with the proviso that tolls for the ships of 
all nations passing through should be the same. In due 
course the Secretary of State engineered the first Hay- 
Pauncefote Treaty, which provided for the complete neu- 
tralization of the canal, and which would prevent the 
United States from fortifying it, or closing it to its ene- 
mies. On this first treaty, the Governor of New York, 
Theodore Eoosevelt, the man destined by fate to push 
through the building of the future canal, wrote Hay the 
following friendly but illuminating criticism: 

If the proposed canal had been in existence in '98 the Oregon 
could have come more quickly through to the Atlantic; but this 



THE PANAMA CANAL POSSIBLE 341 

fact would have been far outweighed by the fact that Cervera's 
fleet would have had open to it the chance of itself going through 
the canal, and thence sailing to attack Dewey or to menace our 
stripped Pacific Coast. If that canal is open to the warships 
of an enemy, it is a menace to us in time of war; it is an added 
burden, an additional strategic point to be guarded by our fleet. 
If fortified by us, it becomes one of the most potent sources of 
our sea strength. Unless so fortified it strengthens against us 
every nation whose fleet is larger than ours. One prime reason 
for fortifying our great seaports is to unfetter our fleet, to release 
it for offensive purposes; and the proposed canal would fetter it 
again, for our fleet would have to watch it, and therefore do 
the work which a fort should do; and what it could do much 
better.^ 

Owing to these objections, the first draft of the treaty 
failed of ratification in the United States Senate. But 
the later draft, the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of November 
18, 1901, giving the United States the sole right to con- 
struct, maintain, police, and fortify the canal, cleared the 
way for the great undertaking. As Colombia haggled over 
the price — .$10,000,000 — for the strip through the Isthmus, 
President Roosevelt, with his characteristic '* big-stick" 
policy, immediately recognized the revolutionists in the 
new republic of Panama, and made a treaty with them, 
which was ratified by the Senate on February 23, 1904. 
This treaty provided for the payment to Panama of $10,- 
000,000 for a strip five miles on each side of the axis of the 
canal, with an annual rental of $250,000 to begin nine years 
thereafter. 

On May 4, 1904, the work began. Under the forceful 
methods of Roosevelt, who put Colonel Goethals of the 
Engineer Corps of the United States Army in charge, rapid 
progress was made. The canal was completed in ten years 
and was opened to traffic on August 15, 1914, in time to 
render important service to the Allied and American navies 

1 Thayer, Life and Letters of John Hay, II. 340. 



342 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

in the World War. It is forty-three miles long and cost 
$375,000,000 to build. In addition to this, the United 
States Government has spent $30,000,000 for fortifications, 
and has constructed, besides repair-shops, terminal facili- 
\ ties, etc., five huge steel piers, and a thousand-foot dry- 
dock. During the first year of operation, 4,500,000 tons of 
shipping passed through the canal, an amount that has 
rapidly increased, reaching a total of 9,371,339 tons in 1918. 
The tolls, which after a controversy in Congress were finally 
made the same for all nations, have averaged five to six mil- 
lions dollars a year. 

On August 5, 1914, the American Government in order 
to forestall any foreign attempt to construct a rival water- 
way in Nicaragua and also further to intrench American 
sea power on the Pacific side of the new canal, concluded 
a treaty with Nicaragua, in which ratifications were ex- 
changed, June 22, 1916. This treaty, in consideration of 
the payment of $3,000,000, granted to the United States 
the sole right to construct a canal by the Nicaraguan route 
and also leased to the United States a naval base on the 
Pacific coast in the Gulf of Fonseca and coaling-stations 
on Great Corn and Little Corn islands. The three million 
dollars were to be applied to the public debt of Nicaragua 
to European countries. This was in keeping with a policy 
inaugurated by President Roosevelt — ^the most far-reaching 
extension of the Monroe Doctrine that has ever been made 
— by which the United States Government constituted it- 
self the receiver or trustee for Latin-American countries, 
like the Dominican Republic, to prevent the seizure of 
their custom-houses or territory for debts incurred to Euro- 
pean countries. Germany, especially, had shown a marked 
tendency to regard the Monroe Doctrine as a scrap of 
paper, while England more and more tacitly recognized 
this great American policy. Roosevelt's rather sharp ac- 



THE PANAMA CANAL POSSIBLE 343 

tion in virtually depriving Colombia of the Canal Zone 
and in supervising the finances of the Dominican Republic 
marked a great change in regard to the Monroe Doctrine. 
Once feared by Europe and tacitly accepted by Latin 
America as a benevolent protectorship by the great north- 
em nation, it came to be an object of fear and suspicion 
by Spanish America. This fear of America's intentions 
President Wilson tried to still by his Pan-American policy, 
as expressed in his Mobile speech : ' ' The United States will 
never again seek one additional foot of territory by con- 
quest. ' ' 

But the United States will never again need to make 
new conquests, for its sea power in the Spanish "War in 
1898 not only gave it great bases on the Pacific and on the 
Caribbean but, still more important, it made possible the 
Panama Canal, the realization of a dream of the human 
race since the days of Balboa, the most strategic fifty miles 
in the world, an achievement that has cut nature's long and 
dangerous sea route via the Horn by ten thousand miles. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

AMERICAN SEA POWER IN THE WORLD WAR 

FOR America the World War was as essentially a 
maritime struggle as the American Revolution or 
the conflict with Napoleon and the War of 1812. 
Though an army of two million men fought in France un- 
der the Stars and Stripes, the causes of the war, and the 
arrival of those millions on the battle-field, were closely re- 
lated to the sea and maritime supremacy. In both 1812 
and 1917 the American people were finally drawn into the 
maelstrom of war after a long diplomatic struggle over the 
freedom of the seas. In each case they fought against the 
belligerent which endangered not American property — 
though this also suffered — Ifut the lives of American citi- 
zens. The results of both wars had predominantly mari- 
time aspects. As in the days of Jefferson, so in Wilson's 
time, the hostilities in Europe created almost automatically 
a merchant marine that took its place next to Great Brit- 
ain's and threatened her commercial supremacy at sea. 
With these facts in mind it ought to be easier to under- 
stand the part American sea power played in the recent 
conflict. 

Although the trend of international agreement had been 
for some years in the direction of greater freedom of the 
seas in war time, as expressed by the Declaration of London 
of 1909, the provisions of the latter document had not been 
fully accepted by all the powers at the outbreak of the war. 
Although it did not make absolute contraband of cotton, 

344 



AMERICAN SEA POWER IN WORLD WAR 345 

copper, rubber, and wool, it could hardly be expected that 
these indispensable materials for modern warfare would be 
allowed to pass freely to the fighting nations, and, accord- 
ingly, neutral trade was thrown back upon the general prin- 
ciples enunciated by the Declaration of Paris of 1856, or to 
the almost chaotic conditions of the last great war, the Na- 
poleonic struggle. In fact, the same mooted questions 
arose : What is a blockade ? What is contraband ? Do free 
ships make free goods ? Shall ultimate destination of com- 
modities be the governing principle? And is it right to 
change the letter of international law because the advance of 
invention has changed methods of warfare ? All these ques- 
tions, and the age-old discussion as to whether or not a viola- 
tion of international law by one belligerent justifies viola- 
tion in retaliation by the other belligerent, appeared in the 
diplomatic contest between the United States, as the chief 
neutral, and both Great Britain and Germany ; they are the 
same questions which Europe and America discussed in 1805 
and in 1861 to 1865. 

As a neutral, the first difficulties encountered by the 
United States were with Great Britain, the power in com- 
mand of the sea. Early in the war Great Britain vir- 
tually abolished the distinction between absolute and con- 
ditional contraband, the latter including articles, such 
as food-stult's and copper, which could not be seized if they 
were to be used by the civilian activities of the belligerent 
but would be contraband if proved to be intended for the 
military forces. As all articles were contraband, no trade 
with German ports was open to neutrals, but it was possible 
for the United States to ship into Holland, Denmark, Nor- 
way, Sweden, and Italy every sort of article which might 
be used in those countries. A few hours would suffice to 
carry these materials into Germany, and it became evident 
that unless the Allies prohibited such commerce they could 



346 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

impose no real economic boycott on Germany, They ac- 
cordingly fell back upon the American doctrine of con- 
tinuous voyage, or ultimate destination, as it is sometimes 
called, the crux of the decisions in the Polly and the Essex 
cases in the Napoleonic Wars, and the subject of such 
diplomatic manoeuvering as preceded the settlement of the 
cases of the Springbok and the Bermuda during the Civil 
War. But the situation of the Allies was worse than that 
of Great Britain in the earlier period. Modern trans- 
portation had so developed that the neutral countries ad- 
jacent to Germany were economically a part of the empire, 
and even if the materials imported were actually consumed 
in neutral territory, such articles as food-stuffs, and such 
metals as were produced by the neutrals themselves, would 
be released for export to Germany. If allowed to import 
food from America, Denmark and Holland could without 
stint pour their milk, their cheese, their beef, and even their 
wheat and forage into the Rhineland, and as the German 
Navy, strategically placed at Kiel, where it could strike 
either into the Baltic or the North Sea, controlled the Baltic 
absolutely, the meat and the minerals of Scandinavia could 
quickly pass across its narrow waters to the German ports 
of Liibeck, Stettin, Danzig, and Konigsberg. 

Under the strict letter of international law it is clear 
that the United States was right in its contention that such 
articles as food-stuffs and cotton were not necessarily con- 
traband and could not be proved by Great Britain to be 
actually destined to the military forces of Germany. As, 
however, the Allies regarded their vital interests as involved 
in the decision, it was natural for sea power to rule. It 
was clear that, as in its protests against English and Na- 
poleonic restrictions on free trade, the United States did 
not regard its vital interests as jeopardized, — for to go to 
war would destroy this very trade, — and that it was 



AMERICAN SEA POWER IN WORLD WAR 347 

unlikely to go to extremes. The naval supremacy of the 
Allies continued therefore to exert pressure on neutral trade, 
and when the United States entered the war it did not 
scruple to join its associates in compelling such neutrals as 
Holland and Norway not only to forbid the exportation of 
articles imported from the United States but also to prevent 
the export to Germany of articles produced in the country 
which might be substituted for them. 

On the question of blockade the British were curiously 
enough forced back to their position in the Napoleonic 
Wars. The development of submarine mines, of submarines, 
and of aircraft made any close watch of the German coast 
impracticable. The British patrols were therefore shifted 
to the stretch of water between Scotland and Iceland. As 
the Straits of Dover were dominated by British destroyers, 
there was no chance for vessels to enter the North Sea from 
the Atlantic without being discovered and searched. Fur- 
thermore, by the Order in Council of IMarch 15, 1915, — 
in which, however, the word blockade was not used, — all 
merchant vessels which might be carrying goods to Ger- 
many directly or indirectly were to be brought into a Brit- 
ish port and their status decided by the British authorities. 
Only such cargoes as received a pass from the Admiralty 
could proceed to their destinations. Such a revival of the 
principle "No trade except through England," was pro- 
tested against by the United States on the ground that 
it amounted to a blockade of neutral ports, even though 
the United States was willing to concede the legality of 
the distant blockade of Germany. Notwithstanding these 
protests British sea power exercised the decisive influence, 
and the restrictions continued, as they had in the days 
of Napoleon. Even under these difficulties American ton- 
nage in the foreign trade, as in 1793. and 1803, increased 
with rapid strides, and signs of the revival of a respectable 



348 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

merchant marine in the foreign trade appeared on the 
horizon. 

As Great Britain's superiority at sea thus caused in- 
vasion of neutral rights during the first two years of the 
war, so Germany's naval inferiority to the Allies, as that 
of France in 1798, brought the Teutonic empire to the 
use of methods of warfare at sea which had not been con- 
templated in international law. First, she protected her 
North Sea coast with submarine mines; next, she scattered 
mines in various places in the North Sea to sink British 
naval vessels patrolling in that area; thirdly, she sent out 
her submarines to sink Allied ships of war and to capture 
and destroy Allied merchantmen bearing supplies or 
troops to the British Isles or the channel ports of France. 

Moreover, on February 4, 1915, Germany announced 
that her submarines would sink Allied vessels without warn- 
ing and without visit and search. The United States at 
once vigorously protested against such a practice, which 
would involve great danger to Americans traveling on 
British and French vessels, but not till March 28th, when 
the British steamship Falaha was sunk in St. George's 
Channel and one American lost his life, did a real case 
arise. Then, on May 7th, off the southern coast of Ireland, 
the Lusitania, of the British Cunard Line, was hit by two 
torpedoes and went down in eighteen minutes. As the 
cliief transatlantic passenger steamer at the time, she 
carried many passengers, 1267 in all, and a crew of 702. 
There were a large number of Americans on board, 114 
of whom were lost. This outrage roused great indignation 
in the United States, and many persons demanded an im- 
mediate declaration of war. The Lusitania was unarmed, 
and carried no munitions. Its only contraband was a 
quantity of empty shell cases, some army saddles, and a 



AMERICAN SEA POWER IN WORLD WAR 349 

large amount of food-stuffs. The sinking could not be 
justified by any of the rules of international law recognized 
by the United States, for by these the safety of all persons 
on board a vessel must be assured before it could be de- 
stroyed. The sinking was, however, in such entire accord 
with the announced policy of the Germans that the kaiser 
could not disavow the act. 

The flame of indignation which this outrage produced 
in the United States, however, and the protests of the 
American Government, so influenced the German authori- 
ties that on June 5th a secret order came from the emperor 
that passenger vessels, even of the enemy, should not be 
sunk.^ But when in March of the following year this 
order was violated and the Sussex, a British steamer plying 
between Dover and Calais, was torpedoed and several 
Americans lost, President Wilson on May 4, 1916, secured 
from the Germans a promise that the practice of sinking 
ships without warning or without attempt to save life 
should be abandoned, unless the ship attempted to escape 
or offered resistance. 

This situation remained until January 31, 1917, when 
Von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to the United 
States, notified the American Government that on the fol- 
lowing day Germany would rescind her promise of May 
4, 1916, and that hereafter within a specified war zone that 
surrounded the Allied coasts of Western Europe and in- 
cluded virtually all the Mediteranean, she would sink with- 
out warning, and without attempt to save life, all ships, 
neutral and belligerent alike, which were found in those 
waters. The exceptions, by which one ship a week was 
allowed to pass from the United States to England by a 
prescribed route, if painted in a peculiar manner, and if it 

1 Von Tirpitz, My Memoirs, II. 157. 



350 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

carried a certificate from the American Government that 
no contraband was on board, only increased the insult to 
our maritime rights. 

Upon receipt of this notice President Wilson broke off 
diplomatic relations with Germany, and began arming 
merchant ships with navy ^ns operated by naval gun 
crews, although Congress, because of a filibuster, failed to 
give him specific authority to do so. As Germany did not 
recede from her position, and as several American steam- 
ships were sunk on March 16th, 17th, 21st, and April 1st, 
the President went before Congress on April 2d, and in a 
speech which has become the classic expression of the issues 
of the World War, recommended a declaration that war 
existed between the two nations. Already 226 American 
citizens had lost their lives from German ruthlessness. It 
was this issue of humanity rather than trade, as in the days 
preceding the War of 1812, that formed the immediate 
justification for war. The President said: 

I am not now thinking of the loss of property involved, immense 
and serious as that is, but only of the wanton and wholesale 
destruction of the lives of non-combatants, men, women, and 
children, engaged in pursuits which have always, even in the 
darkest periods of modern history, been deemed innocent and 
legitimate. Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and 
innocent people cannot be. The present German submarine war- 
fare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. 

Accordingly, on April 6, 1917, Congress passed a declara- 
tion.of war, which was approved by the President and went 
into immediate effect. 

The reasons for the entrance of the United States into 
the World War were thus, as has been indicated, almost 
wholly maritime. Likewise, the participation of the United 
States, while not wholly maritime, was to be dependent 
largely upon maritime factors. A brief consideration of 



AMERICAN SEA POWER IN WORLD WAR 351 

the situation of the Entente Allies in April, 1917, will, 
it is believed, make clear the importance of these factors, 
and justify the lines of activitj^ which the sea power of the 
United States took to bring about a decisive victory for 
democracy and civilization. 

By the beginning of 1917, it had become apparent that a 
decisive victory for either side was not probable on the 
western front, the strategical center of military opera- 
tions. The Allies were, furthermore, sustained very 
largely in their war of attrition by their superior resources, 
due to the fact that being in command of the sea, they 
could draw on America and most of the world for the 
munitions and food w^hich their fighting armies demanded. 
But the menace of the submarine had not been conquered, 
and unless overcome might at any moment threaten the 
whole success of the military movements. Up to April, 
1917, nearly 7,000,000 tons of shipping had been lost 
through submarine attack and the usual accidents of navi- 
gation. To replace this loss only about 4,500,000 tons 
had been constructed, and the Germans believed that six 
weeks of unrestricted submarine warfare would so decrease 
the available tonnage that Great Britain would see starva- 
tion facing her and sue for peace. Although the rate at 
which sinkings had been going on during 1916 had been 
much greater than ever before, about 200,000 tons per 
month, it is probably true that even at such a rate the ac- 
tual objective of the Germans could not have been attained. 
But with the later inauguration of unrestricted warfare, 
not only did neutral vessels hesitate to take the sea, but 
the actual sinkings increased to such a figure that they 
threatened the security of the Allied cause and the possi- 
bility of bringing American troops to Europe and supply- 
ing them there with food and munitions. In the latter 
part of 1916 submarines were sinking from 300,000 to 400,- 



352 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

000 tons each month; in the second quarter of 1917, they 
sank over 2,000,000 tons, and in October of that year sent 
over 500,000 tons to the bottom. Almost as much shipping 
was lost during the nine months of 1917 which followed 
the entrance of the United States into the war as had been 
sunk in all the period from the outbreak of the war to that 
date. 

The objectives before America which concerned her naval 
and maritime activity were therefore clearly twofold : first, 
to assist in the anti-submarine campaign, reduce the losses 
to shipping, and prevent attacks on transports laden with 
American troops; second, to furnish such an increase of 
ships to the Allies as would be adequate to maintain their 
supplies and to throw upon the western front enough men 
and munitions to bring decisive victory. 

In the operations of the navy under the first head the 
most important elements were destroyers, submarine- 
chasers, the convoy system, and the Northern Mine Bar- 
rage. In 1916, when the unprepared condition of the 
United States began to be appreciated, and a three-year 
building-program for the navy was authorized, the most 
important feature was the construction of fifty destroyers 
during the first year. Experience had demonstrated that 
these powerful vessels were the most successful, weapon 
against the submarine, because of their speed, their cruis- 
ing-radius, and their armament of torpedoes and guns. 
When war came the number of destroyers to be built was 
increased, and by the end of 1917 orders for from 
two hundred to three hundred were placed, all to be com- 
pleted by 1919. One was even turned out in fifty days. 

The destroyers were the first American naval units to 
arrive in the war zone, six of them reaching Queenstown 
on May 4th to increase the forces operating in the English 
Channel. The destroyers were also the first to capture a 




jj 0; 
Oh .n 



i^i ic 




Q Z 

< « 

fa .5J 

O ft 



AMERICAN SEA POWER IN WORLD WAR 353 

U-boat for the Americans. It was the TJ-58, which was 
discovered off the entrance to Queenstown on November 
17, 1917, by the Fanning and the Nichol&on. Though the 
periscope of the submarine was raised only about a foot 
above the water, and only for an instant, an American 
lookout noticed it. The destroyers at once dropped depth 
charges set to explode beneath the surface, and these 
wrecked the motors of the submarine, blew off the rudder, 
and forced the enemy to shoot down to a depth of fully 
two hundred feet. When the stricken boat came shooting 
back it leaped out of the water and then went hurtling 
down again. As it disappeared the Yankee gunners sent 
several shells whizzing by the conning-tower, and more 
depth charges were released. But in a moment the U-boat 
came to the surface again, the hatch on the conning-tower 
flew up, and the crew streamed out upon the slippery deck 
and surrendered. The sea-cocks had, however, been opened, 
and in a few moments the submarine sank beneath the 
waters. 

The second important force for anti-submarine work 
proved to be the 447 submarine-chasers which were author- 
ized and built from the latter part of March, 1917, to March, 
1918. These were wooden boats, 110 feet long, with a 
maximum speed of eighteen knots, and were intended to 
scout for submarines, drop depth bombs, and gain informa- 
tion through their delicate listening-devices, which had 
been perfected by American physicists during the early 
da^^s of the war. These ubiquitous craft were so seaworthy 
that they crossed the Atlantic without difficulty, and kept 
the sea with any ship in the naval service. In the bom- 
bardment of Durazzo on the Albanian coast, the sub- 
chasers, as they were usually called, made a record unsur- 
passed by any other type of war-ship in the American 
Navy. While protecting the Allied squadron which was 



354 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

bombarding the town on October 2, 1918, the twelve Ameri- 
can sub-chasers sank two Austrian submarines that came 
out to attack the larger vessels. Also, in the English Chan- 



/"AKoe 'S."^" 



3H£rLANO 'S^Sy^ 




MINED AREAS AROUND THE BRITISH ISLES 

Showing how submarine operations were difficult during the latter part of 
the World War. The southern part of the North Sea was not systematically 
mined but was dangerous to navigation. 

From a British Admiralty Chart. 

nel about Plymouth the presence of these tiny vessels 
stopped entirely German mine-laying and submarine at- 
tack in that vicinity; the very day they were withdrawn 



AMERICAN SEA POWER IN WORLD WAR 355 

the mine-laying began again. Though they had few spec- 
tacular encounters, the submarine-chasers contributed in 
no small measure to the safety of the seas. Not only did 
they possess an uncanny ability to discover the location of 
the submarine marauder, but their excessive generosity 
with depth bombs, their chief weapon, prevented enemy 
operations and shook the nerves of the stoutest German 
submarine sailors and commanders. 

Though a few German submarines appeared on the 
American coast in May, 1918, and destroyed a number of 
small vessels during the next three months, the adoption of 
the convoy system in June, 1917, prevented any interfer- 
ence with the movement of troops and supplies overseas. 
This convoy system must also be credited to American par- 
ticipation in the war. It was in accord with the chief 
policy of the United States for the conduct of the war, viz., 
unity of action. Until the United States entered the war, 
the organization and despatch of from fifty to a hundred 
merchant ships of various nationalities and speeds from a 
prearranged rendezvous off the coast would have been im- 
possible. But after America ceased to be neutral and be- 
came a belligerent the work could be directed from Ameri- 
can ports, and the naval forces of the United States 
— yachts, converted coastwise steamers, and regular naval 
vessels — were immediately available for the convoy service. 
The protection afforded by this system both in the western 
Atlantic and in the submarine-infested waters of the war 
zone was so perfect that not a life was lost of the 1,720,360 
men thus escorted by the American Navy. 

The final and decisive effort of America to throttle the 
submarine was the laying of the Northern Mine Barrage. 
The project of a mine barrier across the North Sea from 
Scotland to Norway was advanced by American naval of- 
ficials in April, 1917, but the barrage was not completed 



356 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

and the first submarine trapped till September, 1918. The 
mines were an American invention, of an improved type 
for deep water, and were exploded by electrical action even 
when the submarine was not in actual contact. One hun- 
dred thousand of these mines were manufactured, 85,000 
were shipped abroad, and 56,000 were planted in an area 
extending for 230 miles in length and 20 in breadth, with 
only narrow channels along the Scottish and Norwegian 
coasts. The mines were manufactured in America, and 
assembled on the eastern coast of Scotland at Inverness and 
Invergordon by American sailors, and 80 per cent of them 
were laid by the American Navy. As the Straits of Dover 
were protected by a similar barrier, submarines found it 
almost impessible to reach the steamer lanes between Eng- 
land or France and the United States. Although only ten 
submarines are known to have been sunk by this stupendous 
enterprise it spelled the end of German ruthlessness at sea. 
As has been said, "The Germans pinned their faith to 
U-boats as the decisive factor. As the last and greatest 
instrumentality of ending the U-boat campaign, the mine 
barrage across the North Sea may be regarded as among 
the outstanding effective contributions to Allied success. ' ' ^ 

That this concentration of American naval effort on the 
submarine menace was justified is shown by the fkct that 
though a squadron of American battle-ships joined the 
British Grand Fleet in December, 1917, and took full part 
in its sweeps through the North Sea and in escorting mer- 
chant ships between Scotland and Norway, — a duty in- 
tended as a bait to tempt the Germans to come out and seek 
to cut off a few unsupported ships, — these battle-ships par- 
ticipated in no action with ships of their class. Another 
division of American battle-ships, stationed in Bantry Bay, 
Ireland, also did some escort duty, but its intended service 

1 Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1919, p. 47. 



AMERICAN SEA POWER IN WORLD WAR 357 

as an attacking force upon German battle-cruiser raiders 
through the English Channel was never called for. 

The second principal need of the Allies and of the United 
States were merchant ships in which to transport American 
troops and to carry^ across the Atlantic the food and muni- 
tions which only countries not used as battle-fields and 
with man-power undepleted by the strain of three years 
of war could furnish. One untapped source of shipping 
lay ready at hand, — a fact that the wily German Secretary 
of State for the Navy, Von Tirpitz, realized,— the 600,000 
tons of German steamships which sought refuge in Ameri- 
can harbors in the days after August 1, 1914. If Von 
Tirpitz had had his way, the captains of these vessels, in 
the weeks preceding the declaration of war by America, 
would have sailed to sea and sunk their ships to prevent 
their appropriation by the enemy. Instead, the command- 
ers caused their engines to be more or less damaged but 
not to such an extent that the navy, with its electric weld- 
ing-gangs, could not repair them and quickly put them 
into service as transports. In addition, 500,000 tons of 
Dutch shipping, which had been laid up in various harbors 
to avoid destruction at sea, also were seized later by "right 
of angary, ' ' ^ and were thus by one sweep of the pen law- 
fully secured for the imperative military needs of the United 
States. 

It was, however, in the actual construction of ships in 
numbers unparalleled in maritime history that the indus- 
trial and engineering genius of the American people most 
strikingly increased the nation's sea power. 

The shipyards of the country had been since the begin- 
ning of the submarine sinkings fully occupied in turning 
out new cargo vessels for the Allies and for the expanding 

1 In maritime law, a forced service imposed on a vessel for public 
purpose, an impressment of a vessel. 



358 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

American trade. Even before the declaration of war the 
need of America for ships was recognized by Congress, and 
the United States Shipping Board was created to regulate 
shipping and promote the development of an American 
merchant marine. When war came its powers were greatly 
extended, the Shipping Board itself was given authority 
to acquire and operate any vessels in the country, while to 
the Emergency Fleet Corporation, its subordinate agency, 
was delegated the work of constructing new vessels. Suf- 
ficient funds for both these purposes were provided. 

Shipping authorities estimated that a tonnage of from 
6,000,000 to 10,000,000 a year must be built to allow a safe 
margin over sinkings and to meet the increased demand 
produced by sending so many fighting-men to Europe. Yet 
in 1916, the country's best recent ship-building year, less 
than 300,000 tons of ships had been constructed. The story 
of how, in the year ending June 30, 1918, American yards 
turned out over a million gross tons of ships and how by 
August the United States had become the chief shipbuilding 
nation in the world, recalls to memory the achievement of 
an earlier period of American history. 

It was only because the American people poured their 
wealth into the Treasury in exchange for Liberty Bonds 
that the Government was enabled to supply the funds for 
this intensified national effort that took second place only 
to the military operations themselves. The total amount 
authorized to be spent by the Shipping Board was more 
than three and a half billion dollars, the actual amount ex- 
pended up to June 30, 1919, only a billion dollars less. 
Before such sums the three hundred and fifty millions spent 
on the Panama Canal pale into insignificance. And the re- 
sults were also striking. In place of the 300,000 gross tons 
of shipping constructed in the year ending June 30, 1916, 



AMERICAN SEA POWER IN WORLD WAR 359 

the next year saw 664,479 tons built, 1918 recorded 1,300,868 
tons, and the following year made still more startling prog- 
ress with 3,326,621 tons. In May, 1919, the production of 
ships amounted to enough, if continued for a year, to in- 
crease the American commercial fleets over 5,000,000 tons. 

The secret of much of this magnitude and rapidity ol 
construction was the "fabricated" ship, one whose parts 
are prepared according to standardized patterns in steel- 
mills distant from the shipyards, and then sent to the coast 
to be assembled. These vessels were necessarily designed 
along simple lines, with flat decks, and with few curves 
which require special heating and bending in the yards. 
Such an assembling plant was the Hog Island Ship Yard, 
on the Delaware, south of Philadelphia, where one after an- 
other along the river extended for a mile and a quarter 
fifty ways for the construction of steel ships. While fifty 
were being built in these ways, twenty-eight others could 
be fitted out at the piers. When one realizes that in 
September, 1917, Hog Island was an uninhabitable and 
malarial marsh, and that five months later the first keel 
was laid, in eleven months the first hull launched, and the 
first complete ship delivered on December 3, 1918, we can 
appreciate something of the rapidity of American enter- 
prise in reestablishing an American merchant marine. 

The armistice which was agreed to by Germany on No- 
vember 11, 1918, effected changes in the sea power of the 
United States almost as epochal as those achieved by its own 
efforts at construction. On November 21, 1918, virtually 
the whole German navy sailed into the Firth of Forth in 
the presence of the British-American Grand Fleet in ig- 
nominious surrender, and the United States became the 
second naval power in the world. German submarines were 
turned over to the Allies and no more were to be built. 



360 SEA POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 

German mercliant tonnage was to be handed over to the 
Allies to compensate as far as possible for the inroads of 
the U-boats. 

The victorious ending of the World War was thus in 
most manifest fashion a performance in which American 
sea power had a full share. Although the armies of the 
Central Powers were not starved into surrender by sea 
power, — for the resources of Russia and Rumania prevented 
this, — the naval and maritime superiority of the United 
States and the other Allies did keep the Allied lines of 
communication from being severed by the German sub- 
marines, and, as Mahan says, communications dominate 
war. If the submarine menace had not been gradually 
eliminated, and if the ship tonnage which the United States 
had at hand and could construct had not been thrown into 
the balance, it is hard to see how the purely military move- 
ments on land could have proved effective. In this sense 
American sea power was decisive in the World War. 

Lastly, it is well worth recalling that in the struggles 
in which sea power has been a factor since American his- 
tory began its decisive influence has. always been on the 
side of liberty. It wrested from Spain her brutal domina- 
tion of the Atlantic seas; it safeguarded the free develop- 
ment of the English colonies along the Atlantic seaboard of 
North America; it won for the colonists their struggle for 
independence, and achieved for the young republic those 
traditions of independence, democracy, and enterprise 
which have come to be thought the qualities of the typical 
American. In the later years of the nineteenth century it 
showed the flag of America on every sea; it throttled the 
monster of slavery and disunion, and substituted for the 
deadening touch of Spanish colonial degeneracy upon the 
islands of the Caribbean and the Pacific the open hand of 
education and progress. Finally, in the struggle of de- 



AMERICAN SEA POWER IN WORLD WAR 361 

mocracy against imperialism sea power proved a decisive 
element which gave to the aspiring free peoples of Europe 
and America their chance to crush forever, let us hope, 
the arrogance of militarism and autocracy. 



INDEX 



Adams, C. F., 247. 
Adams, J. Q., 168-9. 
Alabama, 243, 244, 248-9, 250-2. 
Albemarle, 279. 
Algiers, see Barbary States. 
Alliance, 42, 44. 
Ann McKim, 188. 
Annapolis Convention, 52. 
Argus, 110, 118. 
Arkansas, 267. 
Armor-clads, 226, 227, 228. 
Arnold, Benedict, 16, 23-6. 
Atlanta, 237. 

Austrian Succession, War of, 10- 
13. 

Bainbridge, Joseph, 151. 

Bainbridge, William, 75, 77, 103, 
114-115, 136, 158, 163. 

Baltimore, 121, 122. 

Baltimore, 312, 313, 314. 

Baltimore clippers, 187. 

Banks, N. P., 249, 270-271. 

Barbary States : attack American 
ships, 69; treaties made, 69- 
70; fresh demands, 75; au- 
dience with Dey of Algiers, 
76-7; George Washington af- 
fair, 77-78; Tripoli declares 
war, 78; Preble sent in 1803, 
79; capture of Meshuda, 79; 
Tangier demonstration, 80; loss 
of Philadelphia, 80-81; burn- 
ing of Philadelphia, 83-87 ; 
bombardment of Tripoli, 87- 
88; Intrepid disaster, 89; cap- 
ture of Derne, 89-90; treaty of 
peace, 89-90; Decatur's expe- 



dition in 1815, 90; final sup- 
pression, 90, 155. 
Barclay, R. H., 125, 127-136, 

141. 
Barron, James, 67-8, 116-118, 

155-159, 169. 
Barron, Samuel, 89. 
Bases, naval, 322-3. 
Beaumarchais, Caron de, 25, 28. 
Bermuda, 219, 346. 
Biddle, James, 177. 
Black Ball Line, 185. 
Blockade, 96, 100-1, 104, 119-22, 

212, 214, 215, 216, 218, 221, 

222-4, 324-5, 345-48. 
Blockade runners, first capture 

of, 216; success of, 217, 219, 

220; principal ports of, 217-8; 

type of, 218. 
Bonhomme Richard, 43-44. 
Boston (1801), 75. 
Boston (1898), 314. 
Boxer Rebellion, 320. 
Bremerton Navy Yard, 300. 
Brock, Isaac, 124. 
Broke, P. B. V., 104, 116-118. 
Broken voyage, 56-58. 
Brooklyn, cruiser, 336, 338. 
Brooklyn, steam frigate, 247, 265, 

273, 276, 285. 
Buchanan, F., 228, 271 flF. 
Buffalo, 127-128. 
Bullock, J. D., 241-7. 
Burke, Edmund, 15, 162. 
Bushnell, David, 198. 

Caledonia, 127, 129-135. 
Calhoun, J. C, 123. 



363 



364 



INDEX 



California, 172, 175. 

Camara, Admiral, 318, 320, 323. 

Canada, 188-9. 

Caribbean, 324, 338-9, 343. 

Carondelet, 258, 259. 

Cartagena, 12. 

Carthage, 3. 

Cassin, Stephen, 146. 

Cayuga, 265. 

Cervera, Admiral, 320, 326, 328, 
329-537. 

Champion of the Seas, 191. 

Champlain, Lake, Battle of, 22-6, 
137-149. 

Chariot of Fame, 191. 

Chasseur, 119. 

Chauncey, Isaac, 90, 124, 125- 
126, 137, 286. 

Cherub, 166-7. 

Chesapeake, 67-68, 73, 116-118, 
157. 

Chichester, E., 318, 319. 

Chickasaw, 273, 278. 

China, 53, 176-7, 185, 187, 189, 
308, 309, 320-1. 

Civil War, strategy of, 211-212; 
blockade, 212 ff.; strength of 
Union navy, 215-6, 237; Mer- 
rimac-Monitor, 234 ff. ; priva- 
teering in, 240; commerce de- 
struction, 241 ff.; Mississippi 
campaign, 255 ff. ; Mobile Bay, 
270 ff. ; sea power in, 222-224, 
274, 280; referred to, 58. 

Clay, Henry, 97, 123, 158. 

Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 340. 

Clermont, 200. 

Clipper-ships, American, origin 
of, 187; Baltimore clippers, 
187; era, 188; first large 
types, 188; some famous ones, 
191; advantages over steam- 
ers, 203. 

Cobden, Richard, 182. 

Cochrane, Alexander (Vice Ad- 
miral), 101, 119-21. 



Cockbum, George^ 119-121, 167. 

Colomb, Admiral, 327, 329. 

Colombia (Nevp Granada), 176, 
341, 342-3. 

Comet, 201. 

Commerce, in colonies, 17; after 
Revolution, 51, 53; during Na- 
poleonic War, 54-65, 69, 71; 
during War of 1812, 100-101, 
118-19, 121-2, 104-6; with Far 
East, 176-8; routes of Ameri- 
can, 184, 185, 187; restrictions 
on, 182; statistics, 185-6, 192- 
3, 240; influence of clipper- 
ship, 189; California trade, 
190; with Australia, 191; de- 
cline in Civil War, 193, 251, 
253-4; during Spanish Amer- 
ican War, 327 ; in World War, 
345-8. 

Commerce raiders. Confederate, 
242 ff. 

Concord, 312, 313, 314. 

Confederacy, need of manufac- 
tured articles, 213; importance 
of cotton to, 214; adopte iron- 
clads, 227. 

Confiance, 140. 

Congress, 73, 110, 176, 229. 

Constellation, 71, 73-5, 120, 162. 

Constitution, maritime origin, 
52-3. 

Constitution, 70-72, 104-9, 110, 
114-15, 148, 169. 

Continental System, 60-61, 93- 
94, 302. 

Cooper, J. F., 137. 

Cotton, 214, 217, 226, 255. 

Crimean War, 208, 210, 228, 237, 
288. 

Cristobal Colon, 329, 336. 

Cuba, 309-310, 312, 324, 337, 
339. 

Cumberland, 229. 

Cunard, Samuel, 186-7, 203. 

Gushing, W. B., 279. 



INDEX 



365 



Davis, C. N., 259, 267. 

Decatur, Stephen, 83-88, 103, 

110-114, 136, 137, 150-159, 

169, 182. 
De Grasse, Count, 16-17, 32-34. 
Democracy, indebted to sea 

iwwer, 3. 
Dcmologos, 202. 

D'Estaing, Count, 30, 31, 38, 39. 
Destroyers, 328, 352-3. 
De Tocqueville, 186. 
Detroit, 124. 

Detroit (British), 127, 129-135. 
Dewey, G., 299, 310-11, 312 ff., 

338. 
Don Antonio de XJlloa, 316. 
Don't Give Up the Ship, 118, 134. 
Downie, George, 140-146. 
Drake, 41. 

Drake, Francis, 6, 7. 
Dramatic Line, 185. 
Drayton, P., 276, 277, 291, 293. 
Dreacbwught, 189. 
Dulles, J. H., 138. 
Du Pont, S., 217. 
Durazzo, 353-4. 



Eads, J. B., 258. 

Eag}«, 139, 142-6. 

Eaton, William, 76, 89-90. 

Ellet, Charles, 258. 

Elliott, Jesse D., 127-136, 158, 

169. 
Emergency Fleet Corporation, 

358^; 
Ericsson, J., 204-210, 230-232, 

234, 236. 
Erie, 129-130. 
Erie Canal, 185. 
Erie, Lake, Battle of, 131-134. 
Essex, 284. 

Essex, case of the, 57-9, 346. 
Essex, frigate, 110, 162-167. 
Everard, Captain, 139. 
Exmouth, Lord, 182. 



FaJaba, 348. 

t'anni/ng, 353. 

Farragut, D. G., 137, 166, 170- 
71, 256, 260-278, 280-81, 283- 
290, 297, 303-4, 311. 

Farragut, Loyall, 287. 

Fillmore, Millard, 177. 

Finnis, Lt., 132. 

Fisheries, 18, 183. 

Fitch, John, 198. 

Fleet in being, 328. 

Florence, 189, 190. 

Florida, 242, 252-3. 

Flying Cloud, 191. 

Flying Fish, 188. 

Fonseca, Gulf of, 342. 

Foote, A. H., 256, 258-9. 

Fort Donelson, 259, 260. 

Fort Fisher, 237, 311. 

Fort Henry, 258. 

Fort Jackson, 262, 264. 

Fort Morgan, 272, 273, 278. 

Fort St. Philip, 262, 265. 

Fox, G. v., 213, 256, 260. 

Foxardo, 167-8. 

France, contests with England 
for America, 9-14; naval con- 
ditions in 1775, 20; importance 
of aid to colonists, 27-8; al- 
liance with colonies, 28-9; 
sends squadron under D'Es- 
taing, 30; battle of Ushant, 
30; superior at sea, 30-1; Des 
Touches defeats British, 31; 
De Grasse arrives in Chesa- 
peake, 32; battle of Cape 
Henry, 32-3; defeated at 
Saints' Passage, 3.3-4; action 
in West Indies, 56, 73-75; ac- 
tion of Directory, 72-3 ; in Far 
East, 179; rejects Ericsson's 
monitor, 208-10; sympathy 
with South, 225; intervention 
prevented by the monitors, 
238; World War parallel, 348. 

Franklin, 295. 



366 



INDEX 



Free-trade, 182. 

French War (1798-1801), 71-75. 

Fulton, R., 122, 140, 174, 197- 

204. 
Fulton (1st), 202; (2d), 203. 
Furor, 329, 336. 

Galena, 231. 

General Pike, 126, 127. 

George Wasfimgton, 77-78. 

Germany, 50, 66, 94, 118, 318- 
320, 321, 342, 348-361. 

<5hent, Treaty of, 138, 148, 155. 

Gloucester, 336. 

Goethals, G., 341. 

Grant, U. S., 258-9, 267, 271, 
280, 283. 

Gray, Robert, 53. 

Great Britain: defeats Armada, 
6-7; defeats Holland, 8-9; 
defeats France, 9-15; War of 
Austrian Succession, 10-11; 
War of Jenkin's Ear, 12; Seven 
Years' War, 13-14; situation 
in 1775, 19; attempt to in- 
vade by Champlain, 23; sends 
out privateers, 27; navy de- 
teriorated, 29; strategy against 
France, 29, 30; Keppel at 
Ushant, 30; defeated by Des 
Touches, 31; Cornvsrallis in 
South, 31; battle of Cape 
Henry, 31-34; battle of Saints' 
Passage, 33^; excludes Am. 
ships, 51; Rule of 1756, 54-6; 
Polly case, 56-7; Essex case, 
57-8; Orders in Council, 58- 
69; impressment, 65-8; Chesa- 
peake-Leopard affair, 67-8; 
contact of British and Am. 
navies in Mediterranean, 87; 
suppresses Barbary pirates, 
90; naval policy in 1812-14, 
100; how affected by Am. op- 
erations, 119; blockade of 
Chesapeake, 119-121; opera- 



tions in Maine, 120-122; effec- 
tiveness of blockade, 121-122; 
shipbuilding race on Lake On- 
tario, 125-6; York (Toronto) 
captured, 126; Barclay's mis- 
takes on Lake Erie, 129-130; 
battle of Lake Erie, 131-4; 
Northwest lost, 135-6; at- 
tempts mission by Lake Cham- 
plain, 138-9; forces, 139-140; 
shipbuilding race, 139-141; 
battle of Lake Champlain, 
137-149; capture of Essex, 
165-6; interests in S. A., 
173-4; Opium War, 176; re- 
peals trade restrictions, 182; 
Trent Affair, 221; accepts 
Union blockade, 222; allows 
building of Confederate raid- 
ers, 241-5; stops departure of 
rams, 245-7; supports Dewey 
at Manila, 318-19; blockades 
Germany, 345-6; interprets in- 
ternational law, 345-8; part 
in World War, 356, 359. 

Great Britain, 226. 

Great Republic, 188. 

Greece, 3. 

Griffiths, John W., 188. 

Growler, 139. 

Guam, 322, 337, 340. 

Guantanamo, 332-3, 339-340. 

Guerriere, 104, 107-9. 

Hague Peace Conference, First, 

300, 325. 
Hannibal, 3. 
Hartford, 262, 265, 276, 277, 286, 

290, 291. 
Harvard, 327. 
Hatteras, 249. 

Hatteras Inlet, Capture of, 217. 
Hawaiian Islands, 322-3, 340. 
Hawkins, John, 7. 
Hay, John, 320, 321, 340. 
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 340-1. 



INDEX 



367 



Heligoland, 306. 
Hilyar, James, 166-8. 
Hog Island Ship Yard, 359. 
Holland, 7-9, 29, 44, 177, 357. 
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, quoted, 

260. 
Hopkins, Esek, 21. 
Hornet, 110, 115, 116. 
Howard, of Effingham, 7. 
Howe, Richard (Adm.), 283. 
Howe, William (Gen.), 21, 25, 30, 

39. 
Howpll, J. A., 329. 
Hull, Isaac, 75, 104-109, 136. 
Hull, William, 124. 
Hydrographic Office, 190. 

Impressment, 61, 65-68, 149, 162. 
Intrepid, 83-7, 89. 
Island Number 10, 259. 
Izard, George, 141, 147. 

Jackson, Andrew, 160, 162-171. 

James II., 9. 

James, Reuben, 151. 

James, W^illiam, 140. 

Japan, 177-180, 305, 320. 

Jay's Treaty, 56. 

Jefferson, Thomas, 61-65, 102. 

Jenkins's Ear, War of, 12. 

Jervis, J. (St. Vincent) , 283, 288, 

292. 
John Adams, 170. 
Jones, Catesby, 175, 234. 
Jones, Jacob, 90. 
Jones, John Paul, 22, 35-48, 118. 
Jones, Willie, 36. 

Kearney, Philip, 176-7. 
Kearsarge, 250. 
Korea, 180. 

Lackawanna, 277, 280. 
Lafayette, Marquis de, 169, 284. 
La Rogue, 10. 
Lavyremce, 129-135. 



Lawrence, James, 110, 114, 1 IS- 
IS, 137. 
Lee, 21. 
Lexington, 21. 
Lightning, 191. 
Lincoln, A., 230, 232. 
Linnet, 140, 143-6. 
Livingston, R. R., 199, 201. 
Long, J. D., 310. 
London, Declaration of, 344-5. 
Louis XIV, 3, 9-14. 
Louisburg, 12, 13. 
Luce, S. B., 300. 
Lusitania, 66, 348-49. 

McCulloch, 314. 

McKay, Donald, 188, 

McKinley, W., 319, 324. 

McMaster, J. B., quoted, 57. 

Macdonough, James, 124, 137- 
149, 150. 

Mackenzie, A. S., quoted, 150. 

Macomb, Alexander, 141, 142. 

Macedondan, 83-88, 110-14, 153- 
4. 

Madison, James, 155. 

Mahan, A. T., 3, 10, 16, 26, 212, 
222-3, 259, 267, 269, 283, 294, 
295, 297 ff., 324, 325, 327, 329. 

Maine, 310, 327. 

Mallory, S. R., 227, 228-9. 

Manassas, 265. 

Manila Bay, battle of, 315-316; 
results of, 316-320. 

Manila, fall of, 317, 337. 

Manly, John, 21. 

Mare Island Navy Yard, 295. 

Maria Teresa, 326, 329, 336. 

Marquesas Islands, 165, 183. 

Mason, J. M., 221, 269. 

Maury, M. F., 190, 191. 

Mellish, 22. 

Merchant Marine, a part of sea 
power, 3-4; whaling in col- 
onies, 15; important, in col- 
onies, 17; extent, 18; crews 



368 



INDEX 



forced to enlist in army, 22; 
sudden growth after Revolu- 
tion, 49-50; disadvantages, 
50-51; origin of Constitution, 
52; position in 1803, 53; dis- 
covery of Columbia River, 53; 
beginning of China trade, 53- 
4; Rule of 1756, 54-56; 
Jay's Treaty, 56 ; troubles ■with 
France and Barbary, 56; in- 
crease in tonnage, 56-7 ; U. S. 
chief carrier of world's trade, 
57; "broken" voyage, 56-8; 
Polly case, 56-7; Essex case, 
57-8; Orders in Council, 58; 
real purpose and effect, 58- 
60; Napoleonic Decrees, 59-61; 
Am. ships start Napoleon's 
overthrow, 61 ; Jefferson's Em- 
bargo Act, 61-65; tonnage sta- 
tistics, 64; growth 1805-1812, 
65 ; impressment, 65-68 ; ef- 
fect of British blockade, 1812- 
14, 100, 119-20, 121-22; trade 
in China, 176-7; Japan opened, 
177-180; Korea opened, 180; 
in Civil War, 214, 216; in 
Spanish American War, 327- 
28; rise during World War, 
344, 347; difficulties, 345-8; 
armed, 350; part in the World 
War, 357-360; rapid growth, 
358-360. 

Merrimac, reconstruction of, 227- 
8; attack on Union fleet, 
229 ff. ; battle with Monitor, 
234 ff. ; use of, ram, 238. 

Mexico, invasion of, 225, 238. 

Mines, submarine, 272, 278-280, 
314-15, 354-6. 

Minnesota, 229. 

Mississippi, 203, 265, 311. 

Mobile Bay, 270 ff., 286, 289, 290, 
294. 

Monitor, invented by Ericsson, 
204, 208-9; decisive role in 



Civil War, 226, 236, 238; de- 
cision to construct, 231 ; ideas 
of Ericsson on, 234; trip to 
Hampton Roads, 234; battle 
with Merrimac, 234 ff. 

Monitors, 236, 237, 273-4. 

Monroe Doctrine, 173-4, 238, 
300, 320, 321, 339, 342-3. 

Montauk, 236. 

Montojo, Admiral, 313, 315, 316. 

Morocco, see Barbary States. 

Morris, Robert, 37, 48. 

Napoleon I, 36-7, 59-61, 93-5, 

148, 174, 196. 
Napoleon III, 225, 238, 268, 270- 

1, 280. 
Nassau, 21. 

Naval War Board, 300. 
Naval War College, 300, 301. 
Navigation Acts, 8-9, 17-18, 51, 

182. 
Navy, U. S.; strength in 1785, 

69; in 1805, 90; in 1812, 94; 

in 1823-60, 172-3; in 1861-5, 

215-6, 237; in 1898, 327; in 

1918, 359. 
Nelson, Horatio, 37, 47, 82, 87, 

116, 124, 130, 135, 136, 143, 

150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 

283, 284, 293-4, 295-6, 303-4. 
'New Ironsides, 231. 
New Orleans, 122, 148, 255, 264- 

266, 268, 289, 292. 
Neto York, 333, 336. 
Niagara, 129-135. 
Niagara, Fort, 126. 
Nicaragua, treaty with, 342. 
Nicholson, 353. 
Northern Mine Barrage, 352. 

Ogden, F. B., 205, 206. 
Olympia, 312, 314, 315. 
Ontario, Lake, 125-7. 
Open-Door Policy, 309, 320, 321. 
Opium War, 176, 187. 



INDEX 



369 



Oquendo, 326, 329, 336. 
Orders in Council, 58-9, 347. 
Oregon, 53. 175, 187. 
Oregon, 327 330, 340. 

Pamlico Sound, 217. 

Panama, 176, 190. 

Panama Canal, 323, 324, 338, 

343, 358. 
Paris, Declaration of, 241, 328, 

345. 
Patrick Henry, 229. 
Peacock (I), 115, 116, 118. 
Peacock (II), 118. 
Pensacola, base of Gulf Squad- 
ron, 217. 
Pensacola, 263, 265. 
Perkins, G. H., 266, 278. 
Perry, M. C, 177, 180. 
Perry, O. H., 124, 125-136, 137, 

148, 158. 
Peterhoff, 219. 
Petrel, 314. 

Philadelphia, 79, 80, 87. 
Philippines, 312, 314, 319, 322, 

337. 
Phoehe, 106-7. 
Piatt Amendment, 339. 
Pluton, 329, 336. 
Poictiers, 109. 

Polly, Case of the, 56-7, 346. 
Porter, David, 74, 90, 155, 160- 

171, 182, 284. 
Porter, D. D., 163, 169, 261, 263, 

264, 260, 267. 
Port Hudson, 268, 289. 
Port Koyal, 217. 
Porto Rico, 330, 337, 339. 
Portsmouth Navy Yard, 295. 
Preble, William, 79, 89, 137, 153. 
Preble, 139, 143. 
President, 73, 110, 148, 154-5. 
Prevost, George, 131, 140, 141, 

142, 146, 147. 
Princeton, 206, 207, 210, 228, 

231. 



Pring, Daniel, 139. 
Privateering, 7, 14, 26-7, 118, 

119, 101, 239, 240, 253, 328. 
Propeller, experiments of Fulton, 

198; experiments of Ericsson, 

204 ; other experiments in, 

205. 
Putin-Bay, 131, 135. 

Quebec, 13. 

Queen Charlotte, 129, 135. 

Quiberon Bay, 13. 



Raleigh, 314. 

Ram, 229, 238, 265, 271-2. 

Ranger, 39, 41, 42. 

Red Jacket, 191. 

Red Star Line, 185. 

Reina Cristina, 315. 

Reprisal, 21. 

Revolution, American, sea power 
decisive in, 10; causes mari- 
time, 17-18; naval forces com- 
pared, 19; situation of bellig- 
erent nations, 19; British 
strategy, 20; policy of colo- 
nists, 20-21 ; British supply 
ships captured, 21-3; evacua- 
tion of Boston, 22 ; Long 
Island, 22; Lake Champlain, 
22-0; privateering, 26-7; im- 
portance of French aid, 27-29; 
French alliance, 28-9; French 
squadron arrives, 30; battle 
of Ushant, 30; Spain enters, 
31; capture of Cornwallis, 31- 
33; battle of Cape Henry, 32- 
33. 

Revolution, Industrial, 204. 

River Defense Fleet, 258, 260. 

Roanoke, 234. 

Roanoke Island, 8. 

Robertson, John, 144-5. 

Rodgers, John, 79, 80, 89, 103, 
104, 110, 155. 



370 



INDEX 



Rodney, George, 33, 37, 135, 235. 

Rome, 3. 

Roosevelt, Theodore, 108-9, 140, 

146, 148, 310, 333, 338, 340-1, 

342. 
Rule of 1756, 54-6. 
Russia, 81, 148, 173, 179, 360, 

201. 

Sackett's Harbor, 125-6. 

Sailing vessels replaced by steam, 
195 ff.; see clipper ships. 

Salem, 185. 

Samoan Islands, 323. 

Sampson, W. T., 299, 324, 329, 
337. 

/S'aw Jacinto, 221, 249. 

Santiago, battle of, 324, 333, 338. 

Santiago de Cuba, 12. 

Saratoga, 139, 142, 146. 

Savannah, 202. 

Schley, W. S., 299, 329, 337. 

Sea Powder, Malian its interpre- 
ter, 3 ; aids democracy, 3, 5 ; 
definition, 3-5; includes mer- 
chant marine, 4; influences 
America, 5; in Revolution, 16- 
17; dominates land power, 
147; decisive in 1812, 150; 
maintains Monroe Doctrine, 
173^; services in opening 
trade, 180; in Civil War, 212, 
222-4; Mahan on decisiveness 
during Civil War, 301 ff.; in 
Spanish-Am. War, 323, 337-8, 
343; rules in World War, 346, 
348; decisive in World War, 
360. 

Semmes, R., 247-252. 

Serapis, 43-44. 

Seven Years' War, 13-14. 

Shell, explosive, early use of, 229, 
230, 235, 288. 

Shenandoah, 246, 253. 

Sherman, W. T., 267, 271, 280, 
281, 283 



Ship-building, 17. 

Shufeldt, R. W., 180. 

Side-wheel steamers, 187, 202-3, 
203-4, 207. 

Silborne, 6. 

Slave Trade, 7, 18, 36. 

Slidell, J., 221, 269. 

Sloat, J. D., 175. 

Somers, Richard, 89, 158. 

Sovereign of the Seas, 188, 191. 

Spain, 5, 6, 29, 167, 168, 309- 
339. 

Spanish-American War, causes, 
310-10; battle of Manila Bay, 
312 ff.; German and British 
attitude in, 318-32; strategy 
of, 324; blockade of Cuba, 324- 
325; comparison of forces, 
327; battle of Santiago, 333- 
337 ; peace, 337 ; sea power in, 
323, 337-9, 343. 

Spanish Armada, 7. 

Springbok, 230, 346. 

Steam boats, competition with 
sail, 188. 

Steam navigation, 174, 196, 197, 
198, 200, 201, 205, 206. 

Stevens, J. C, 198, 201, 205. 

Stewart, Charles, 84, 103. 

Stockton, R. F., 206. 

Stoddert, Benj., 72. 

Strategy, definition, 94-5. 

Stringham, S. H., 216. 

Submarine, 198, 200, 280, 347, 
348, 356. 

Sumter, 247, 248. 

Surprise, 191. 

Sussex, 349. 

:recumseh, 135, 273, 273-5, 293. 

Tennessee, 270-278. 

Texas, 330. 

Thames, battle of, 135. 

Ticonderoga, 139, 142, 146. 

Torpedoes, 278-280, 348. 

Trent affair, 221, 226. 



INDEX 



371 



Tripoli, see Barbary States. 
Truxtun, Thomas, 70, 37-5. 
Tunis, see Barbary States. 
Turner, F. J., quoted, 160. 
Turret, principle of, 204, 208-9, 
237-8, 246. 

Ultimate destination, doctrine of, 

219, 220. 
U. S. Shipping Board, 359, 361. 
17-58, 353. 

Vane, Sir Harry, 8. 

Varuna, 265. 

Vernon, Admiral, 12. 

Vicksburg, capture of, 267. 

Vincennes, 176. 

Virgin Islands, 339, 340. 

Vizcaya, 326, 329. 

Von Bernstorff, Count, 349. 

Von Diedrichs, Admiral, 318-19, 

323. 
Von Tirpitz, Admiral, 349, 357. 

Wachusett, 252, 300. 

War of 1812, causes, 58, 59, 
65-8, 92-3; strategic facts, 
93flf.; British blockade, 96-7; 
American offensive, 97-9; work 
of American frigates, 101 fif.; 
extent of American Navy, 102; 
reasons for commerce raiding, 
103; cruise of Rodgers, 104, 
110; chase of Constitution, 
104-5 ; Constitution-Guerriere, 
107-9; Wasp-Frolic, 109-10; 
United States-M acedonian, 1 10- 
113; Constitution-Java, 114- 
116; Hornet- Peacock, 116; 
Chesapeake-Shawnon, 116-118; 
sloop raiders, 118-119; priva- 
teers, 118-120; destructive ef- 
fects of British blockade, 119- 
122; British operations in 
Chesapeake, 119-125; in 
Maine, 121; effects of British 



blockade, 121-122; Americans 
expect easy conquest of Can- 
ada, 123; advantages in inva- 
sion, 123-4; loss of Detroit, 
124; importance of Lakes Erie 
and Ontario, 125; shipbuilding 
race on Lake Ontario, 125-6; 
capture of York (Toronto), 
126; value of large ships, 126- 
7; Elliott's work on Lake 
Erie, 127-8; Perry succeeds 
Elliott, 128; Perry's ship- 
building, 128-9; Barclay's mis- 
takes, 129-130; Perry's ships 
leave Erie, 130-131; Barclay 
forced to fight, 131; battle of 
Lake Erie, 131-134; contro- 
versy between Perry and Elli- 
ott, 134-5; results of battle, 
135-6; battle of Lake Cham- 
plain, 137-149; importance of 
Lake Champlain, 138-9; forces 
compared, 139-140; shipbuild- 
ing race, 139-141 ; land opera- 
tions, 141-142; plan of battle, 
142-143; Macdonough winds 
Saratoga, 144-5; losses, 146; 
results, 146-9; cruise of Essex, 
163-7; World War parallels 
with 1812, 344-48; interpreta- 
tions of international law, 
345-8; referred to, 303. 

Warren, Adm., 101, 113, 119-20. 

Washington, burnt in 1814, 120- 
21. 

Washington, George, navy in 
Revolution, 16, note; sends out 
Lee, 21; forces British out of 
Boston, 22; at battle of Long 
Island, 22; captures Corn- 
wallis, 32-3; realizes import- 
ance of navy, 32, 33; referred 
to, 137, 160. 

Washington, Lawrence, 12. 

Wasp (I), 109-110, 118. 

Wasp (II), 118. 



372 



INDEX 



Watt, James, 196, 198, 204. 

Webb, 188. 

Webster, Daniel, 177. 

Weehawken, 237. 

Welles, G., 213, 356. 

Wellington, Duke of, 141, 146-7, 
158. 

West, influence of, 160-61; de- 
velopment of, 174-5. 

West Indies, 17-18. 

Whaling, 15, 183. 

Wilkes, C, 221. 

William II, 3, 305-6, 321. 

Wilmington, importance to Lee, 
222. 

Wilson, Woodrow, 344, 349. 

Worden, J. L., 234. 

World War, a maritime strug- 
gle, 344; similarity to 1812, 
344; changes in international 
law in 1914, 344-5; difficulties 
of U. S. as a neutral, 345- 
350; with Great Britain, 345- 
348; with Germany, 348-350; 
sinking of Falaia, 348 ; of 
Lusitama, 348-9; Sussex, 349; 



imrestricted submarine war- 
fare, 349-50; U. S. breaks off 
diplomatic relations with Ger- 
many, 350; arms merchant- 
men, 350; declares war, 350; 
maritime causes, 350-1 ; mari- 
time situation in 1917, 351-2; 
submarine sinkings, 351-2; 
American objectives, 352; work 
of destroyers, 352-3; of sub- 
marine chasers, 353^; subma- 
rines on American coast, 355; 
convoy system, 355 ; Northern 
Mine Barrage, 355-6; ship- 
building in U. S., 357-9; 
armistice, 359-60; surrender of 
German Navy, 359; American 
sea power decisive, 360; re- 
ferred to, 3, 58, 66, 92, 321, 
342. 
Wyoming, 250'. 

Xerxes, 3. 

Yeo, James, 125, 137, 146. 
York (Toronto), 125-6. 



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